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Nearly 3 kilograms of stolen HEU were seized in Prague in December, 1994. |
Global stockpiles of fissile material are unofficially estimated to include some 1,830 metric tons of plutonium and 1,900 metric tons of HEU--enough for hundreds of thousands of bombs.
(Most of the plutonium is embedded in highly radioactive spent fuel and
thus cannot be used in nuclear explosives without use of expensive and
specialized methods to separate the plutonium from the spent fuel.
Worldwide, military stockpiles contain about 250 metric tons of
separated plutonium, and civilian stockpiles contain more than 230
metric tons of separated plutonium.) While the HEU and plutonium
are overwhelmingly concentrated in the five nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States) as defined by the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, more than 50 nations each possess more than five kg of weapons-usable fissile material. Significant quantities can be found in India, Israel, and Pakistan and possibly in North Korea. Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland possess enough plutonium for many nuclear weapons, and some 20 metric tons of HEU exist at over 130 operational and an unknown number of nonoperational nuclear research facilities in over 40 countries as widespread as Chile, Ghana, Iran, and Jamaica.Once the exclusive property of a handful of states, nuclear materials
have spread across the globe. Starting in the 1950s, many countries
bought nuclear materials and technology, often in the form of HEU-fueled
research reactors, from the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and
France. Under the Atoms for Peace program, for example, beginning in
1954, the United States shared nuclear materials and technologies with
other countries, so long as the recipient states agreed to inspections
of the transferred technology to ensure it was not used for military
purposes.
Since the 1970s, the United States and other nuclear suppliers have
taken incremental steps to reduce the civilian use of HEU, including
efforts to convert HEU-fueled reactors worldwide to use low-enriched
uranium (LEU) fuel that cannot be used in nuclear weapons. In addition,
the United States and Russia have launched take back programs to
retrieve the HEU fuel provided to these countries. However, due to
political and economic constraints, these efforts to reverse the global
spread of nuclear materials may not be fast enough and sufficiently
comprehensive to secure vulnerable materials from theft, diversion, and
sabotage. In the absence of global, legally-binding standards for the
security of nuclear materials, it is up to each country to secure and
account for its own stockpiles based on that country's discretion and
resources. Because most countries regard nuclear material security as a
state secret, no one--including the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the U.S. government, or other governments--has a complete picture of
which facilities are most vulnerable, and, therefore, which should be
targeted for international assistance that might reduce the risks. Those
seeking fissile material will look for vulnerable facilities or
individuals with access to material, making the world's nuclear material
security only as strong as its weakest link. For more details on the
global threat posed by fissile material worldwide, see the NTI website
section on
Controlling Warheads and Nuclear Materials.
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See "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle" multimedia presentation for more information on the possible diversion of nuclear materials.
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Stocks of fissile material fall into four major categories:
- HEU and plutonium used by nuclear-weapon possessing states for
their military programs;
- plutonium extracted from spent civilian nuclear power plant fuel
in a number of countries (principally Belgium, France, Great Britain, India,
Japan, Russia, and Switzerland);
- HEU used in military propulsion systems (e.g., nuclear
submarines); and
- HEU used in in the civilian nuclear sector as fuel for nuclear research purposes and for the production of medical isotopes. In addition, civilian HEU fuel used in propulsion reactors, specifically, on three Russian icebreakers and a Russian transport ship, though the fuel on these vessels represents only a small fraction of the global HEU stock. In addition, Russia has recently begun to develop floating nuclear power plants, which plan to use HEU as fuel.
Each of these categories of fissile material is potentially at risk at several types of locations: where it is produced, where it is processed or fabricated into weapons or fuel, where the weapons are deployed or the fuel used, and along a vast network of transportation links connecting those sites. Even if one focuses only on the category of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector, the scope of the physical protection problem is enormous.
In light of the magnitude of the problem, it is remarkable that there have not been more confirmed cases of fissile material diversion or smuggling. The
Illicit Nuclear Trafficking Database of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example, identifies fewer than two dozen incidents of fissile material trafficking since 1991. All of these involve material likely to have originated from the former Soviet Union. Fortunately, none of these known cases involved sufficient quantities to permit construction of an IND. However, in December 2004, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency published the following
assessment of security over Russian fissile materials: "We assess that undetected [nuclear] smuggling has occurred, and we are concerned about the total amount of material that could have been diverted or stolen in the last 13 years." Furthermore, in
February 2005 testimony to U.S. Congress, CIA Director Porter Goss indicated that
"There is sufficient [Russian nuclear] material unaccounted for so that it would be possible for those with know-how to construct a nuclear weapon." While Goss's statement does not necessarily mean the missing nuclear material has been sold or stolen, it does indicate that Russia and the world lack an accurate baseline inventory of how much fissile material exists and where it is stored.
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DOE security forces.
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Even in the United States, where security over fissile materials is considered strong, increased security measures may be needed to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear-weapons material. Although the U.S. DOE has taken measures aimed at increasing security at nuclear facilities nationwide to counter terrorist threats, some weapons-usable material at nuclear weapons laboratories may still not be adequately protected. According to
some studies, a well-organized group of terrorists could breach security at U.S. nuclear labs long enough to assemble and detonate an IND. To address this vulnerability, DOE has ordered the consolidation of weapons-usable material at a smaller number of more secure sites and has worked to improve the strategy used by security forces to protect special nuclear material. However, an April 27, 2004,
report by the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office) found that some U.S. sites with special nuclear material have been slow to implement new security measures.
The International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States, and other countries have put in place a range of measures to monitor and secure nuclear weapons usable fissile materials in the former Soviet Union and around the world. Nuclear material for thousands of nuclear weapons has been destroyed; security for dozens of sites housing vulnerable material has been vastly improved; and thousands of nuclear weapon scientists and technicians have been given temporary civilian jobs.
Yet much more remains to be done. By the end of fiscal year 2004, U.S.-funded
security upgrades had been made at only 56 percent of the buildings housing
weapons-usable nuclear material in the former Soviet Union. More than half of
the weapons-usable material in the former Soviet Union is housed in other
buildings that have yet to receive even the first round of "rapid upgrades."
Beyond the former Soviet Union, security upgrades are only just beginning
leaving significant stocks of nuclear material vulnerable.
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Security upgrades at a nuclear facility in Central Asia.
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In sum, the most crucial task for limiting the danger of a
terrorist nuclear attack using an IND--securing fissile materials worldwide--remains far from being fully implemented.
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