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Preventing terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons is absolutely critical in combating nuclear terrorism. As discussed earlier, countries that possess nuclear weapons attempt to protect them as best they can. Nonetheless, many experts believe that more must be done to enhance the security of nuclear weapons globally by protecting, consolidating, reducing, and, where possible, eliminating excess stocks of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear weapons elimination, in fact, is an integral component of the NPT. Under Article VI of the NPT, all of the nuclear-weapons states parties—China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States—are obliged to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."
The process of returning Soviet nuclear weapons previously deployed outside of Russia to Russian territory began near the end of the Soviet regime, and by May 1992, all tactical nuclear weapons
(TNW) had been returned. Although this process of nuclear weapons consolidation was positive from a nonproliferation perspective, some U.S. experts and policymakers were concerned that economic and political turmoil in the new Russian state might compromise the security of its nuclear weapons arsenal.
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Submarine dismantlement under the CTR Program.
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In response to those concerns, in 1991 the United States launched a major initiative—the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.
Named after its legislative sponsors (Senators Sam Nunn and Richard
Lugar), this innovative program provided U.S. funding and expertise to
help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle its enormous
stockpile of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, related
materials, and delivery systems. As of December 2007, the program had
succeeded in deactivating or destroying over 7,260 strategic nuclear
warheads. Work also is under way to improve security at Russian storage
sites, nuclear weapon assembly and disassembly facilities, and on
nuclear warheads in transit.
Nevertheless questions remain about tactical nuclear weapons, which
are outside the purview of any legally binding verifiable arms control
regime (the 1991-1992
Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives are just a set of politically binding unilateral
unverifiable declarations). Neither the numbers nor the location of
these weapons, much less the status of security and accounting
procedures are known. Although Russia has apparently continued to reduce
its TNW stockpile, information about the remaining weapons has not been
shared with other countries; the United States has not released official
data about its TNW stockpile either.
Concern about tactical nuclear weapons is primarily caused by the
fact that they are generally smaller than warheads for strategic weapons
and are thus somewhat more susceptible to theft. Truly portable tactical
nuclear weapons known as atomic demolition munitions, or ADMs, have
apparently been eliminated in both the United States and Russia,
although as recently as the mid-1990s, retired Russian officials alleged
that some number of these ADMs (figures quoted at that time reached as
high as 100) had been lost. Subsequent investigations did not produce
any evidence to support that claim, however. (See Nikolai Sokov's
"Suitcase Nukes:"
Permanently Lost Luggage" and "Suitcase
Nukes: A Reassessment.")
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U.S.-funded warhead security fencing. Photo credit: DTRA
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A useful step in addressing these security concerns would be for Russia to implement fully its pledges under the 1991-92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives regarding tactical nuclear weapons. Ideally, all TNW that are not dismantled should be stored at exceptionally secure facilities far from populated regions. In parallel, the United States should declare its intention to return to U.S. territory the small number of air-launched TNW currently deployed in Europe. Although probably less at risk to terrorist seizure than tactical nuclear weapons forward deployed in Russia, there no longer is a military justification for their presence in Europe. The U.S. action, while valuable in its own right, might be linked to Russia's agreement to move its tactical nuclear arms to more secure locations.
While the efforts of the United States and Russia to reduce and/or
eliminate nuclear weapons have been met with some, albeit very limited,
success, Moscow and Washington, and indeed, the world should address the
threat posed by the arsenals’ hair-trigger status. Years after the end
of the Cold War, Russia and the United States have been unable to
overcome mutual suspicion and continue to maintain their nuclear-tipped
missiles fueled, targeted, and ready for launch, raising the possibility
that terrorists might seize and gain control of launch mechanisms.
Terrorists could also hack into early warning systems and/or spoof a
launch, prompting a counterattack from the other side. Moscow’s aging
early warning network could be especially vulnerable to such attacks,
and the U.S. system, too, is not foolproof, as evidenced by an
investigation several years ago that revealed an electronic backdoor
that could theoretically allow hackers to order the launch of Trident
missiles.
Although little definitive information is available about the operational security of Pakistan's relatively small nuclear arsenal, many analysts worry that political instability, the presence within the country of Islamic militant groups, and the uncertain loyalties of senior officials in the nuclear chain of command increase the risk that Pakistan's nuclear arms could fall into the hands of terrorists. Political reforms that strengthen civilian institutions and reduce the opportunities for extremist elements to prosper in Pakistan would significantly reduce the potential for terrorists to gain access to nuclear weapons. It is widely believed that Pakistan's nuclear weapons do not possess advanced security features such as
PALs, and some experts have recommended that the United States provide assistance to Pakistan for the purpose of improving security over its nuclear arms.
Such assistance, however, is constrained by U.S. law and the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Under the NPT, no state can provide information that would facilitate the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons; thus Washington cannot provide details concerning internal PALs,
which would necessarily require revelation of the inner workings of
nuclear weapons. Moreover, U.S. rules concerning restricted data would
also bar the transfer of such information. However, the United States is
permitted to provide information regarding general "best practices" in
securing nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan has declared publicly that
its nuclear arsenal is secure, it is apparently ready to accept U.S.
support for enhancing security over its nuclear armory. To the extent
that Pakistan keeps the nuclear and non-nuclear components of its
nuclear weapons separate, this would greatly complicate terrorist
efforts to seize an intact nuclear weapon.
The special challenges to the security of nuclear weapons seen in Russia and Pakistan have not been observed to the same degree in China, France, Great Britain, or the United States. For those nuclear weapon states—as well as others possessing nuclear arms—the most effective strategy for keeping the weapons out of the hands of terrorists is to enhance their security, consolidate their locations, reduce their numbers, and move toward their elimination.
There is little public information about the security of Indian or Israeli nuclear weapons. India periodically confronts civil violence among the country’s opposing religious groups, and Israel faces constant terrorist challenges. Assembled Indian nuclear weapons, like their counterparts in Pakistan, are not known to be equipped with advanced security features, and their nuclear and non-nuclear components are believed to be stored separately. Although there have been no reports of the United States directly sharing information with India on nuclear weapons security, it is likely that Washington has offered to do so or will make such an overture given the July 2005 U.S.-India Cooperation Agreement. However, the same constraints on U.S. nuclear weapons assistance to Islamabad should apply to New Delhi. In the case of Israel, most observers believe that its nuclear arms are well-protected given the general state of Israeli security precautions.
There is no reliable information about the number of North Korean nuclear weapons or the manner in which they are secured. Although there are many things to be worried about regarding North Korean nuclear brinkmanship, the nature of the police state probably guarantees the security of the weapons as long as the state does not collapse. The main fear is that the government might attempt to sell some component of its nuclear stockpile to another state or terrorist organization. As discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
is a new tool that could be used to counter such an effort, although its
effectiveness in interdicting and seizing nuclear exports is open to
question. In addition, through discussions known as the Six-Party Talks,
China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States hope to
negotiate an agreement with North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons
programs in return for economic assistance and security guarantees.
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