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An increasingly comprehensive network of international treaties, UN resolutions, and agreements is strengthening global efforts to secure nuclear weapons and fissile materials to prevent their acquisition by terrorists. The most salient are discussed below.
One of the most important tools to combat nuclear terrorism is UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Adopted in April 2004, this
legally binding measure on all UN members prohibits states from providing any form of support to non-state actors (i.e., any individual or group not a sovereign state) attempting to
develop, acquire, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. It also requires states to adopt and enforce laws to prevent non-state actors from possessing or using such weapons for terrorist purposes—in particular, laws requiring effective security measures for WMD-relevant materials and equipment and for controlling their export. Though many states have yet to implement these requirements, the resolution
has set the stage for a universal system of strict physical protection and accounting over nuclear weapons and fissile materials.
Effective implementation of Resolution 1540 is a crucial step in preventing nuclear terrorism.
Another widely subscribed to instrument for enhancing the security of nuclear material is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,
which entered into force in February 1987. It requires its 112 member states to provide effective protection for nuclear materials, including fissile materials, used for peaceful purposes, while in international transport. On July 8, 2005, delegates from 89 countries agreed to fundamental changes
to the convention, which have substantially strengthened it. The amended convention, which still must be ratified by member states, establishes a legally binding obligation to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use and storage, as well as in transport within a country. The amendments also provide for expanded cooperation between and among states regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offenses.
Successful adoption and implementation of the amendments to the Physical Protection Convention will reinforce the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and will be useful steps toward curbing the danger of nuclear terrorism.
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Instruments like these help IAEA inspectors to measure the level of uranium
enrichment.
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The NPT is the most widely subscribed to treaty in the world and requires its 184 non-nuclear-weapon state members to renounce nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA inspections and accounting procedures—collectively known as IAEA safeguards—on all of their nuclear materials to ensure they are not diverted for nuclear explosives.
Measures used to control and account for nuclear material include declarations of activities and inventory, containment and monitoring of nuclear facilities, audits of accounting records, and on-site inspections.
Strengthened safeguards measures, adopted after the disclosure of Iraq's secret nuclear program in 1991, include the use of environmental sampling and short-notice inspections to detect undeclared nuclear facilities or activities. However, each non-nuclear-weapon state NPT party must sign and ratify an Additional Protocol with the IAEA
before these strengthened safeguards can be implemented. As of June 2007, 112 states and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) have signed Additional Protocols, but the protocols had not entered into force in 30 of these countries, including Iran.
Strong international support has been expressed for a global Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would prohibit the production of material useable in nuclear weapons. Were such a treaty to enter into force, it could prevent the further growth of fissile material stockpiles. Progress in negotiating an FMCT has been stalled, however, by disagreements among states about the possibility of verifying such a ban.
On April 13, 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which
criminalizes unauthorized possession or destructive use of nuclear or radioactive materials (including sabotage of nuclear facilities) by non-state actors.
The convention, which entered into force on July 7, 2007, is intended to
strengthen the commitment of UN member states to work together to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, the convention does not apply to acts committed within a single state or when the offender or victims are citizens of the same state.
In July 2006, the United States and Russia launched the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These two countries invited
partner countries to join the initiative by endorsing a statement of
principles. The principles include developing and improving physical
protection systems safeguarding nuclear and radioactive materials,
strengthening security of civilian nuclear facilities, enhancing the
capability to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials to stop
illicit trafficking of these materials, preventing the establishment of
terrorist safe havens, enacting appropriate national legislation to
implement criminal and civil penalties for those who commit or
facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism, enhancing response, mitigation,
and investigation tools for terrorist attacks, and encouraging
information sharing between and among partner countries. In November
2006, thirteen nations convened in Rabat, Morocco, for the first
official meeting of the Global Initiative. As of July 2007, there are 55
partner nations to the Global Initiative, while the EU and the IAEA
carry observer status. Partners have developed a plan for activities for
2007-2008 and frequently meet to promote the statement of principles and
build implementation capacity of participant nations.
Export controls are legal regimes used to prevent the transfer of
nuclear materials and technology to unauthorized users outside their
country of origin. At the international level, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and the
Zangger Committee work to coordinate policies and procedures for
nuclear export controls. At the national level, each country sets and
enforces its own laws governing the use and export of nuclear material.
Key provisions for export control laws include lists of controlled items, a system for issuing export licenses, requirements for end-user certificates establishing the legitimacy of the purchaser, and "catch-all" controls designed to prevent exports of any items or information related to nuclear weapons (even if not listed on control lists) to organizations believed to be developing WMD.
To build an IND, in addition to fissile material, terrorists might require special explosives, crucibles, electronic triggers, and other specialized equipment and components that are subject to export controls. Effective export controls can block shipments to suspicious end-users and thus play an important role in blocking nuclear terrorism.
The United States and other countries, as well as the IAEA, offer guidance, training, and assistance to nations developing and enforcing export controls, including assistance to customs services and border security
officials.
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