The Next Line of Defense: Blocking Terrorist Use of Nuclear Weapons or Fissile Materials

Protecting nuclear weapons and fissile materials "at the source" is the most effective and certain means for preventing nuclear terrorism. But even if a nuclear weapon or fissile material were diverted or seized, opportunities would remain to thwart their actual use.

• If terrorists relied on middlemen to acquire nuclear contraband, for example, it might be possible to disrupt the illicit nuclear trafficking network before the goods were transferred to the terrorist organization.
• Terrorists might require a long time to ready a weapon or IND for use and to transport it to their desired target. They would also require a team of experts and specialized equipment and components subject to international controls, the acquisition of which might be blocked.
• If the loss of a nuclear weapon or fissile material were detected, authorities in the country that owned the weapon or material would launch a massive hunt to find and regain control over it, receiving assistance from other states, as appropriate.
• Border security in the owning country, in potential target countries, and in transit states would be greatly intensified, as would collaboration among the intelligence, law enforcement, and militaries of all countries concerned.

Much of this response activity would build on existing capabilities aimed at halting nuclear trafficking and nuclear proliferation to states of concern—as well as on continuing efforts to counter terrorism, worldwide.

Border Security

Concerns about the risk of WMD trafficking in the former Soviet Union led the United States and other concerned states to provide extensive assistance to border guard forces and customs services, programs that have subsequently been extended to states in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Far East. Among other elements, these efforts have included the placement of radiation detection equipment at key border crossings through the U.S. DOE's Second Line of Defense Program.

Container of HEU seized by U.S.-trained inspectors.

To reduce the possibility of a nuclear device being smuggled into the United States from abroad, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has launched the Container Security Initiative to permit the inspection in major ports of embarkation of cargoes bound for the United States. This effort is being coordinated with the DOE's Megaports Initiative, which provides radiation detection equipment for use in these major foreign ports. U.S. Immigration and Customs enforcement is also using radiation monitors extensively at U.S. points of entry to identify and block illicit imports of fissile materials into the United States.

Interdiction—The Proliferation Security Initiative

A U.S. Coast Guard team searches a cargo dhow in the Arabian Gulf.

In May 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a system of international partnerships for interdicting WMD cargoes by searching ships, aircraft, and vehicles suspected of transporting WMD or missiles under existing national and international legal authority. The immediate focus of the PSI has been the prevention of shipments of these materials to or from North Korea. By 2006, over 60 countries (including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, and Spain) had agreed to participate in the PSI. An informal partnership rather than a formal treaty, the PSI does not actually provide countries with additional legal authority to conduct searches and seizures of WMD materials in international waters or airspace. Instead, by agreeing to the principles of the PSI, partner states pledge not to engage in WMD-related trade with countries of proliferation concern and to permit their own vessels and aircraft to be searched if they are suspected of transporting WMD materials or technology.

Intelligence—Breaking Illicit Trafficking Networks

From 1987 until 2003, Dr. A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, directed an international nuclear smuggling operation that provided uranium enrichment technology and equipment to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. The Khan network also marketed nuclear weapon design information to Libya and possibly to other states. The network was eventually broken up as the result of intelligence and law enforcement efforts, the details of which have yet to be disclosed. One major operation was the seizure of cargo on a vessel named the BBC China, which carried a cargo of fissile material production equipment for Libya.

It is not known if the Khan network sought to sell its nuclear wares to non-state actors. One cannot rule out that possibility or the prospect that remnants of the Khan network or other nuclear trafficking operations might in the future seek to market sensitive nuclear commodities to terrorist organizations. In light of these risks, continuing intelligence and law enforcement efforts will remain a crucial part of a layered approach to combating nuclear terrorism.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2006 by MIIS.