| |
 |
|
Easily broken padlock securing nuclear material in Russia prior to U.S.
assistance.
|
U.S. Department of Energy
International Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
Program. This effort provides equipment and expertise to help secure
Russian fissile material. As of mid-2006, about half of Russian fissile
material had received at least minimal security upgrades under this
program. Comprehensive security upgrades for all Russian fissile
material, however, are not expected to be completed until the end of
2008. This means at present, about 300 tons of Russian fissile material,
enough for thousands of INDs, is at risk and will remain at risk for
years to come, unless the Material Protection Control and Accounting
Program can be significantly accelerated and strengthened.
U.S. Department of Energy Material Consolidation and
Conversion Program. This effort is designed to reduce the amount of
HEU in potentially vulnerable locations in Russia by converting HEU to
low-enriched uranium (LEU) and consolidating storage of remaining HEU in
fewer, more secure facilities. By mid-2006, the program had converted
eight
tons of HEU to lower-enriched forms. However, it has failed to date to
persuade any Russian facilities to part with all of their fissile
material. U.S. Department of Defense Mayak Fissile Material Storage
Facility. This facility, constructed by the CTR
Program at Ozersk, Russia is designed to hold 50 metric tons of
plutonium from 12,500 dismantled nuclear weapons under very strict
security. It also could accommodate up to 200 tons of HEU. After years
of controversy during which the facility remained empty, it began
accepting weapon-grade material on July 11, 2006.
|
HEU metal shavings from a dismantled Russian nuclear weapon. |
USEC (formerly the United States Enrichment
Corporation) "Megatons to Megawatts" HEU Purchase Agreement.
Under this 20-year program, which began in 1994, Russia is diluting ("downblending")
500 metric tons of weapons-usable HEU to produce LEU fuel for nuclear
power plants—material that cannot be used for nuclear weapons. The
material is purchased by USEC, a private U.S. business, working closely
with the U.S. and Russian governments, which then sells it commercially
to nuclear power plant operators. As of October 2006, 285 metric tons of
HEU (sufficient to manufacture 11,410 nuclear weapons) have been
rendered unusable for this purpose. Efforts to accelerate or enlarge
this program have not been successful, in part because of technical
limitations in Russia’s downblending capacity.
U.S.
Department of Energy Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production
Program (also supported by the Netherlands and Canada under the G-8
Global Partnership). Russia continues to produce more than a ton of
new plutonium annually in its military nuclear program at three
specialized reactors, which also produce heat and electricity for their
surrounding areas. This foreign-assisted program will provide Russia
fossil fuel plants as alternative sources of energy, allowing the
plutonium reactors to be shut down. The new facilities will not be
completed until 2008 and 2011, however. U.S. Department of Energy
Plutonium Disposition Program (also supported by France, Germany, Great
Britain, and Japan, under the G-8 Global Partnership). This
initiative will use 34 tons of plutonium from Russia’s military program
as fuel in Russian nuclear power reactors, rendering the plutonium very
difficult to use for nuclear weapons. The program will dispose of two
tons of plutonium annually, beginning in 2011 at the earliest.
In the near term, the most rapid improvements in securing Russian
fissile materials can be made through accelerating the International Material Protection, Control, and Accounting
Program.
|
|