Chapter 4

Guidelines for Establishing NWFZs (cont.)

NWS and the Establishing of NWFZs

While the nuclear weapons states often support the creation of NWFZs, the security interests and obligations of these states can conflict with specific provisions of a NWFZ. In particular, the United States and other NWS insist on the right under international law of transit by vessels carrying nuclear weapons consistent with the principle of freedom of the seas. With these concerns in mind, the U.S. government set forth in 1995 its own criteria for the establishment of a NWFZ:

  • The initiative for the creation of the zone should come from the states in the region concerned.
  • All states whose participation is deemed important should participate in the zone.
  • The zone arrangement should provide for adequate verification of compliance with its provisions.
  • The establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security or otherwise abridge the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense guaranteed in the UN charter.
  • NWFZ treaties should effectively prohibit its parties from developing or otherwise possessing any nuclear device for whatever purpose.
  • The establishment of the zone should not affect the existing right of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges within their respective land territory, internal waters and airspace to nuclear powered and nuclear capable ships and aircraft of non-party nations, including port calls and over flights.
  • The zone arrangement should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, particularly that high seas freedoms of navigation and over flight, the right of innocent passage of territorial and archipelagic seas, the right of transit passage of international straits, and the right of archipelagic sea lane passage of archipelagic waters.

China, the only NWS that has explicitly rejected the first use of nuclear weapons, has supported the idea of negative security assurances and has promised unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and member states of NWFZ treaties. France, Russia, and the United Kingdom generally accept the UN principles for establishment of NWFZs and make their decisions to support individual NWFZs on a case-by-case basis.

 

Chapter 4, page 3 of 3

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents.
Copyright © 2005 by MIIS.