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Although radiological terrorism is relatively easier to execute than nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism, there remain obstacles that many terrorist groups are unable or unwilling to overcome. This section will look at some of the challenges faced by potential radiological terrorists.
One of the biggest risks associated with this option is that the terrorists themselves might be exposed to a lethal dose of radiation. If the radioactive source emits a high amount of gamma radiation, for example, terrorists without proper shielding could suffer such severe exposure that they die within minutes. Death could occur even before removing the radioactive source from its original location and long before the radiological device could be assembled and used. If the source is successfully obtained, terrorists who wish to use the radioactive material for a dirty bomb or other RDD may need to remove the protective shielding surrounding the material, providing more risk of exposure. Delivery of the radioactive device will also increase this risk. While this obstacle is not always enough to stop terrorists who are willing to die for their cause, it does deter many, if not most, terrorist groups.
Radiological terrorism also requires a bare minimum of technical expertise and a basic understanding of radiation and radioactive materials. If terrorists are trying to construct an effective dirty bomb, for example, they must be able to change the radioactive material into a usable form, such as grinding radioactive pellets to make radioactive dust. Then the terrorists must build a device that will effectively scatter the radioactive material over a relatively large area. Radiological terrorists would need to have an understanding of how different radioactive sources pose different security risks. The level of risk depends on the half-lives of the sources, their accessibility and mobility, the presence of shielding, and other factors. Let's use the example of a terrorist placing a radiation-emitting device in a public area. Radioactive material that emits only alpha particles would not cause much injury to people passing by because alpha particles cannot penetrate the outer skin layer. In contrast, radiation-emitting devices using gamma sources might cause radiation injuries because gamma radiation can penetrate skin. In order to access the actual radioactive materials, terrorists also would need the know-how to recognize the radioactive source, and remove any shielding. It should be recognized that these obstacles are neither easy nor impossible to overcome.
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Construction and dimensions of a typical
radioactive sealed source. |
This option presents more difficulty for terrorists than use of a radiological device. Nuclear power plants, in particular, are designed to withstand certain extreme events, such as earthquakes or hurricanes. Some are even strong enough to endure a crash of a small airplane. The outside casing of the reactor often consists of concrete several feet thick, and can be reinforced and lined with steel. Inside, the more modern reactors have built-in safeguards and automatic shutdown features to prevent a meltdown of the radioactive core in case of an accident or attack.
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Security fencing at a Czech nuclear power
plant. |
In addition to these built-in functions, nuclear power plants are usually heavily guarded by both humans
and technology. Before a nuclear power plant begins operation, the operators are supposed to consider the threats that a particular plant might face. For example, if an attack takes place, how many attackers might be involved? What kinds of vehicles or weapons were to be used? What if the attackers were assisted by an insider? Based on these considerations, the operators are then supposed to design security measures to prevent such attacks. Multiple fences, cameras around the perimeter and throughout the plant site, and armed guards are just a few of the security measures in place at many nuclear power plants in the United States and other countries. All persons and vehicles entering the site are often inspected. To prevent insider sabotage, nuclear plant employees must undergo criminal background checks and psychological tests before being employed. Once inside the facility, some plants require employees to abide by the "two-person" rule, which prohibits employees from working alone inside the most vulnerable areas of the nuclear power plant.
Successfully bypassing all these security precautions requires a fairly sophisticated degree of knowledge and expertise. Terrorists who can construct and deliver one or more highly destructive truck bombs or hijack a large commercial airliner are more likely to use these implements in an attack rather than pursue an insider job to achieve their desired amount of destruction. Especially if the terrorists decide to use only one or two truck bombs, they must have detailed data on the physical layout of the nuclear power plant, including the location of vital components such as the reactor core
and the control room, and knowledge of the plant's security measures. Finally, terrorists considering this option must be willing to die in the attack. Like the radiological dispersal device option, these present difficult, but not impossible, challenges.
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