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 undreds of nuclear
power plants and millions of radioactive sources are in use around the world
today. Safety measures have long been applied to most of these sources to
protect workers, the public, property, and the environment against accidents
involving radioactive materials. Especially after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, however, people and governments began to realize that stronger security measures would be required to prevent attacks on nuclear power plants or the intentional malicious use of radioactive sources. Fortunately, only a small fraction of the millions of sources in use pose a high risk of leading to a potent RDD. Therefore, many governments have been focusing their enhanced security efforts on this high-risk class of sources.
Commercial nuclear power plants are producing electricity in more than 30 countries, and research reactors are operating in over 50 nations. Security requirements and measures differ in each country. Most nuclear power plants have long been subject to safety precautions and security measures based on their original threat assessment analyses. Especially since September 11, however, governments and international organizations have stepped up their efforts to individually and collectively decrease the risk of radiological terrorism by improving security measures for nuclear power plants and radioactive sources. This section will describe some of the actions being taken by a number of countries, agencies, and organizations.
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. |
The United States is one of the largest distributors and users of radioactive sources in the world. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), together with state governments, regulates the more than two million radioactive devices (with many containing more than one source) throughout the United States. (It is estimated that many of these devices are no longer needed or used.) The NRC issues general and specific licenses, according to the type of radioactive source and its danger level. NRC or state government regulators periodically inspect licensed institutions to make sure that the radioactive sources are present and secured, and can punish licensees in cases of severe or repeated violations. All licensed institutions are required to follow the general security guidelines set by the Code of Federal Regulations, but the specific security decisions, such as the type of locks to use, are made by the individual licensees. After September 11, the NRC advised licensees on specific measures to increase the security of radioactive sources, particularly those held in large quantities or considered dangerous for other reasons. These
initial measures were voluntary, but the NRC has been developing and issuing mandatory security regulations
for various types of radioactive sources.
The government is also working to secure orphaned sources on U.S. soil. As a first step, it is increasing awareness of the problem at targeted locations and looking for ways to improve detection methods. In November 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced the creation of the Nuclear Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force. This task force
has worked with the IAEA to identify and improve security for the most vulnerable research reactors worldwide. In addition, it
has identified, secured, and temporarily stored high-risk radiological materials both in the United States and abroad. The task force's mission
has included taking over management of the DOE's Offsite Source Recovery
Project. This project was previously established to retrieve and secure orphaned
sources within the United States, and by October 2006, this project had secured more than 13,000 unwanted and orphaned sources. To further reduce the risk of radiological terrorism, the government is training and equipping the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection to detect radioactive sources being smuggled into the country. Several U.S. Congress members have also introduced bills on radioactive sources that would increase security measures, improve storage and disposal sites and methods, and speed up efforts to locate, secure, and dispose of orphaned sources around the world.
In May 2004, then-Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham
launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). GTRI combines
into one umbrella program the previously separate programs of the
Offsite Source Recovery Project, work to secure high-risk radioactive
sources in about 40 countries, and efforts to secure nuclear fissile
materials at research reactors and related facilities in dozens of
countries. GTRI partners include the United States, Russia, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and countries where radioactive and
nuclear materials require additional security.
In December 2005, the NRC completed issuing new
regulatory rules to strengthen export and import controls on high-risk
radioactive sources. The United States started working with the Group of
Eight (G-8) industrialized nations to encourage widespread enactment of
stronger import and export controls. The NRC has also been creating a
database to track high-risk sources throughout their life cycle. Such a
database did not exist prior to September 11.
To prevent attacks on nuclear power plants, the United States already requires that its 103 nuclear power reactors have armed guard forces and multiple security barriers, such as fences and automatic shutdown procedures. After September 11, security alerts were heightened several times when terrorist threats to nuclear power plants appeared credible. During one such period, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) temporarily banned flights in the immediate airspace over 86 sensitive U.S. nuclear sites, including many nuclear power plants. The NRC has also updated the threat assessment plan that plant operators are to use when considering security measures. In line with the NRC's updated plan, plant operators
were required to protect against these new threats by October 2004. Plant operators have increased the numbers of and training for security guards.
In April 2003, the NRC issued orders to power plant owners to require
that security guards remain physical fit and alert and that they do not
work excessive hours. General access to the plants has also been restricted.
Since 1991, the NRC has conducted a number of mock terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants to test the effectiveness of the plants' security measures. About half of these attacks have resulted in the mock terrorists successfully bypassing the security measures and simulating damage to the plants. The nuclear industry, however, argues that the mock attacks were not intended as pass/fail exercises. Instead, these mock attacks were intended to help the government and the individual plant operators locate and remedy the weaknesses in the plants' security designs
and procedures. Several bills calling for further security upgrades have also been introduced in the U.S. Congress. One proposal recommended improving security precautions to prevent sabotage by plant insiders. Another bill urged more standardization in regional and national security measures. Soon after September 11, the NRC suspended the mock attacks because it was concerned that the testing would distract the guard force during a heightened alert period. In 2004, the NRC
resumed a new testing system, which is designed to include more frequent mock attacks
and other training exercises.
Russia's 30 operational nuclear power reactors produce about 15 percent of the country's electricity supply. More reactors are under construction, and Russia plans to eventually supply more than half of its energy needs through nuclear power. Construction, operation, and protection of nuclear power plants are overseen by
the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), formerly known as the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). The Rosenergoatom Crisis Center in Moscow monitors and records radiation data from all of Russia's nuclear power plants. It is responsible for coordinating the response if an emergency should occur at one of the plants. The center has developed emergency plans to deal with radiation accidents.
Like U.S. reactors, many Russian nuclear power plants have built-in safeguards and automatic response systems to prevent a meltdown of the radioactive core in case of an accident or attack. In addition, the Russian government plans to conduct mock attacks on its nuclear power plants. These mock attacks will be used to identify and remedy any weaknesses in its security measures. The government has also participated in international training and response workshops. Heightened security measures have included increased scrutiny of nuclear power plant employees to prevent insider sabotage or attack. Extra security measures have been added to nuclear power plants near the Chechen border because of past threats by Chechen rebels to attack Russian nuclear facilities.
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Yuriy Vishnevskiy, former head of GAN. |
Russia is also a major producer and distributor of radioisotopes. Two government agencies, the Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor [GAN]—the Russian equivalent of the U.S. NRC) and
Rosatom, oversee the monitoring and control of Russia's radioactive sources. In 2002 and 2003, Russia created new laws requiring stricter control of radioactive sources throughout their lifecycles—that is, from production to disposal. GAN is continuing to inventory the existing sources. Minatom announced that it would establish centers in each of Russia's 89 regions to monitor the radioactive sources during every stage of their lifecycles. The Russian government has also
taken steps to tighten its controls over exports of radioactive sources. It is considering ways to make the export process more user-friendly in hopes of eliciting more consistent reporting. And it has
made efforts to improve customs' prevention and detection of illegal smuggling of radioactive materials.In addition, Minatom announced plans to conduct anti-terrorism training exercises, which would include training on locating and securing orphaned sources. These exercises would complement Russia's joint efforts with the IAEA and other governments, such as the United States and the Republic of Georgia, to locate and recover orphaned sources in countries of the former Soviet Union.
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