Like Russia, Argentina produces a significant number of radioisotopes
for global distribution. To keep radioactive sources safe and secure
throughout their lifecycle, the Argentine government has developed an
interlinked system between the independent regulatory body and
government agencies, such as the Federal Police and the Customs Service.
The Nuclear Regulatory Authority issues licenses for the use of
radioactive sources, ranks sources based on their safety and security
risks, inspects licensed facilities, and tracks imports and exports of
radioactive materials. The authority also works to ensure that used and
orphan sources are safely stored and properly brought to official
disposal sites.
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IAEA headquarters in Vienna. |
The IAEA is the world's nuclear watchdog organization. One focus of the
IAEA is maintaining and improving the radiation safety standards and
guidelines that are used throughout the world, including security for
both nuclear power plants and radioactive sources. The IAEA has been
working for a number of years to increase security standards and
measures. The threat of radiological terrorism was well recognized
before September 11th, but the terrorist attacks prompted renewed
urgency in efforts to address this threat. These most recent efforts are
contained in the IAEA's updated action plan to combat nuclear and
radiological terrorism, which was adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors
in March 2002.
The agency has published a number of guidelines, codes,
and technical documents with recommendations on safety and security
measures for nuclear facilities. These are meant to help ensure the
safety of the people and environment in which nuclear reactors are
located. New and revised guidelines are being developed to target
specific areas where security improvements are needed or where new
threats have been identified. Some of these areas include protection
against insider sabotage of nuclear facilities, methods to identify
sections that are critical to the operation and safety of each nuclear
facility (“vital” areas), and ways to develop and maintain current and
realistic threat assessment plans.
In addition to its radiation safety and security
publications, the IAEA conducts a number of international, national, and
regional training workshops for nuclear authorities. These workshops
cover physical protection measures, threat assessment plans, emergency
response measures, and other relevant areas. An important assessment
system, the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS),
is also organized through the IAEA. IPPAS teams are made up of
international and national physical protection experts. Countries
voluntarily invite IPPAS teams to visit their nuclear facilities and
evaluate their respective nuclear regulatory system. The team then
recommends ways for the country and its facilities to improve
protection measures. Details and results of each IPPAS mission are kept
confidential. But this service allows participating countries to learn
from each other's and from the IAEA's nuclear security expertise and
experiences.
The general safety and security standards for radioactive
sources are listed in the International Basic Safety Standards for
Protection against Ionizing Radiation and the Safety of Radiation
Sources (BSS for short). The BSS requires radioactive source owners to
track and secure the sources to prevent theft or damage. To help
countries stay in line with the BSS, the IAEA assists countries in
establishing regulatory bodies and improving existing regulatory
agencies that can inventory and monitor radioactive sources. It provides
forums in which countries and international experts can exchange ideas
and practices. The IAEA also provides advice on domestic laws, and
education and training for radiation safety and customs officials. In
addition, the IAEA recently updated its list of radioactive sources, now
organized into categories to reflect their potential danger level and to
indicate appropriate security measures. These initiatives are part of
the IAEA's updated plan of action to combat nuclear and radiological
terrorism.
There are several international agreements that countries
can abide by as one way to publicly demonstrate their commitment to
preventing dangerous acts using radioactive material. These include the
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code
of Conduct, for short) and the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM). In July 2003, an intergovernmental working
group completed revisions to the Code of Conduct to further address the
threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The IAEA Board of
Governors approved these revisions in September 2003. As of November
2006, 88 countries have expressed support for this nonbinding code.
Similarly, the CPPNM is undergoing revisions to better address security
concerns. After many years of failed attempts, on July 8, 2005,
delegates from 89 countries agreed to strengthen the CPPNM. A
shortcoming of the original CPPNM was that it only applied to physical
protection during the international transport of nuclear material
intended for peaceful use. By expanding this narrow focus, the amended
CPPNM “makes it legally binding” for parties to the convention “to
protect nuclear facilities and material in domestic peaceful use,
storage as well as transport,” according to the IAEA. However, the
improved CPPNM will not come into effect until two-thirds of the 112
parties ratify the amendments. The ratification process is expected to
take several years.
Also as part of its updated plan of action, the IAEA has
stepped up its efforts in working with other international organizations
and national governments to locate and secure orphaned radioactive
sources. On June 12, 2002, the IAEA, the United States, and Russia
signed an agreement to locate, recover, and secure the radioactive
sources that pose the greatest danger. At the March 2003 International
Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources, U.S. Secretary of
Energy Spencer Abraham announced an expansion of this tripartite
program. As a result of this expansion and the earlier work, several
missions have been carried out in countries of the former Soviet Union,
and more are scheduled in countries outside of this region.
National governments are increasingly working together to
establish greater safety and security for radioactive sources around the
world. One of the most recent forums for this cooperation was the March
2003 International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources,
attended by more than 700 delegates from over 100 countries. The
conference was sponsored by the United States and Russia and organized
by the IAEA. Participants discussed and exchanged ideas and information
on additional security measures, ways to prevent illegal smuggling of
radioactive sources, and appropriate responses to RDD use. The
conference's main findings emphasized the importance of the BSS and the
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The
conference also called for an international effort to locate, recover,
and secure orphaned sources throughout the world.
At a follow-on conference in 2005 in Bordeaux, about 300
delegates from 64 countries assembled to focus on creating a sustainable
system of regulatory controls, dealing with the legacy of past
activities that resulted in numerous orphaned sources, preventing
illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, and preparing emergency
first responders to manage the consequences of an RDD attack.
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March 2003 International Conference on
the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. |
The Group of Eight (G-8) nations—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia as an observer
country—is a smaller, but powerful, forum in which countries have
decided to work together to address the threat of radiological
terrorism. The G-8 includes most of the major producers of commercial
radioactive sources. At its June 2003 summit, the G-8 announced that its members
would focus on high-priority provisions of the Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. It would also consider ways
for national governments to act on those provisions. Some possible areas
of emphasis included improving national regulatory measures for
monitoring radioactive sources, improving export controls, developing
laws to ensure safe and secure disposal options, and building upon
existing programs to recover orphan sources.
Governments and international organizations are not the only ones working to prevent radiological terrorism—the legitimate users of radiation sources are trying to do their part, as well. In the United States, licensed sources owners are taking steps to abide by the additional security guidelines issued by the NRC after September 11th, despite the costs associated with increased security. Some users are also looking at adopting alternatives to radioactive sources, where possible. For example, during an April 2003 international meeting of radioactive source producers and distributors, participants discussed possible ways to phase out radioactive cesium-chloride, which poses a higher security risk because of its easily dispersible powder form.