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“Securing the Bomb” and
“Assessing the G8 Global Partnership”
July 13, 2006

There are nuclear weapons materials in more than 40 countries.

The most effective, least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure nuclear weapons and materials at the source. Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process – building the bomb, transporting it, and detonating it – is easier for the terrorists to take, and harder for us to stop.

At the G8 meeting in Canada in 2002, the G8 leaders said: “Together with the spread of international terrorism, [WMD proliferation] is the pre-eminent threat to international security.”

This weekend, the G8 leaders will meet in Russia -- four years after they pledged \$20 billion to their initiative, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

Today we are releasing two reports that we hope will put in context the urgent need for the G8 and other world leaders to put these issues on their front burners -- to accelerate and strengthen global efforts to prevent the spread or use of nuclear or biological weapons.

The reports are:

- *Securing the Bomb 2006* by Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier of Harvard’s Managing the Atom Project – the fifth annual assessment of progress in locking down nuclear warheads and materials.
- *Assessing the G8 Global Partnership: From Kananaskis to St. Petersburg* by the Strengthening the Global Partnership Project led by Michele Flournoy and Robert Einhorn of CSIS.

NTI is proud to have sponsored both of these assessments.

The good news in these reports?

- Presidents Bush and Putin reached an accord on nuclear security at their 2005 summit in Bratislava, Slovakia demonstrating personal engagement in these essential issues.
- Security and accounting upgrades have been accelerated in Russia, and nuclear materials are being removed from vulnerable sites around the world.
- Under the Global Partnership, there has been progress in addressing Russia's priorities for action – chemical weapons destruction and submarine dismantlement.
- The Global Partnership has resulted in more equitable burden-sharing.
- Our leaders have made progress on the liability and access issues that have impeded this vital work.

But the bottom line in both these reports is that there is still a huge and enduring gap between the threat and our response.

President Bush, President Putin and the other G8 leaders have said preventing nuclear terrorism must be a top priority.

But the facts are that:

- Preventing nuclear terrorism is being treated as important but not urgent.
- Preventing nuclear terrorism is being recognized as a serious threat, but there is no comprehensive threat assessment.
- Preventing nuclear terrorism is being addressed with opportunistic steps to secure material, but not with a comprehensive threat-driven set of plans and priorities.
- Preventing nuclear terrorism is on the front burner for dedicated people in a number of countries who are helping close the gap, but there is no sustained and focused high-level leadership from the top. (see pages 41-43 and 141-143 of the *Securing the Bomb* report)

Our leaders have been using the right words. President Bush has said we need to do “everything in our power” to make sure terrorists never get the bomb. The G8 has pledged a partnership and \$20 billion to address these threats.

But the bottom line, when you look at the progress on both these fronts as these two reports make clear, this threat is not being treated as an urgent, front-burner security threat by the United States, by Russia or by the world.

We know when a President makes a security issue a real priority – it is first subject discussed in meetings with world leaders; it is the focus of his public remarks; his Cabinet and staff put it at the top of their agendas.

The G8 summit this weekend in St. Petersburg gives our leaders another chance to put these issues on the front burner. President Putin has made energy security the top Summit priority. Present and future nuclear energy production must be an important component of any broad, energy security approach. Without cradle-to-grave protection of nuclear material, we cannot have energy security. That is particularly true of weapons usable material.

To put the threat in context -- let's assume a couple of miracles. Presto: Iran and North Korea totally give up their nuclear weapons programs in a totally verifiable way. Even if you assume the elimination of North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs -- issues which will likely dominate the G8 discussion and the news -- we would still be living in a world with an unacceptable risk of nuclear terrorism. There would still be 40 countries with nuclear weapons materials -- some of it secured by nothing more than an underpaid guard and a chain link fence. The world would continue to produce tons of nuclear weapons-usable materials.

These reports are full of important facts, conclusions and recommendations. Reading them together, let me simplify my take-away major points:

- Securing stockpiles of nuclear weapons material in the former Soviet Union has made real progress -- the pace of the program has accelerated -- but significant threats remain.
- Securing stockpiles in the rest of the world is at least being taken seriously -- GTRI has begun, but barely, and the security standards for upgrades are considerably less than for Russian and U.S. sites.
- On a scale of 1 to 10, on the WMD threat the G8 should be given a 10 for rhetoric, a 7 for pledges and a 2 for progress on addressing our most urgent threats. The down-side:
 - a) The Global Partnership is not really global.
 - b) The pledges for actual funding are short of the commitment made by the G8 in 2002.
 - c) Most of the pledges have not turned into programs and actions.

The G8 Global Partnership needs:

1. Strong leadership -- a global approach -- real partnership;
2. Additional funding; and
3. Threat based priorities.

Our security against nuclear terrorism is only as strong as our weakest link. Terrorists may not go where there is the most material; they will likely go where the material is the most vulnerable. The defense against nuclear terrorism begins with securing weapons and materials in every country and facility that has them. No nuclear material, no nuclear weapon. No nuclear weapon, no nuclear terrorism. Like a gazelle running from a cheetah, we're moving in the right direction, but not keeping up with the threat.

That takes leadership -- I hope that we see it at the G8.

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