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**“Reducing the Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction and  
Building a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism”**

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It's a pleasure to be here in Russia and at this conference with Russians and Americans committed to advancing our common security. I believe the best chance for peace in the world will come when the world's gravest threats are confronted by the world's greatest talent – and we cannot assemble a team of the world's greatest talent unless both Russians and Americans are partners and participants.

I want to thank my long-time colleague, Senator Richard Lugar, for his friendship, for his partnership in our common efforts in threat reduction, and for his steadfast commitment to making the world safer. I also want to thank Senator Domenici, Senator Graham, Senator Bingaman, Senator Mikulski, Congressman Spratt and Congressman Shays for their leadership in reducing the threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Our friend Pete Domenici has led the way in supporting lab-to-lab work, funding joint efforts to secure weapons materials and know-how, as well as accelerating plutonium disposition. He and our friend Andrei Kokoshin -- who has led on these issues in Russia -- received our first NTI Nunn-Lugar awards last night. I also want to thank the Americans and Russians who have so effectively been on the front lines of implementing the Nunn-Lugar program and making it successful.

I left the Senate in 1997, but I did not leave behind these security concerns. Through the Nuclear Threat Initiative, created with Ted Turner's vision and generosity, I have continued working on issues that affect global security. We have six other members of NTI's Board here today – Andrei Kokoshin, Vladimir Lukin, Susan Eisenhower, Rolf Ekeus, as well as Senator Lugar and Senator Domenici.

I believe that the gravest danger in the world today is the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The likeliest use of these weapons is in terrorist hands. I believe that preventing the spread and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons should be the central organizing security principle for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Last October, top U.S. government officials received a highly classified intelligence report, warning that terrorists had acquired a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb and planned to smuggle it into New York City, where it could – if detonated – destroy much of lower Manhattan and kill tens of thousands of people.

This intelligence report – thank God – was later judged to be false. But it was never judged to be impossible or implausible. This should focus our attention on two fundamental questions:

1. If the report had been accurate, and the bomb had gone off, what would we wish we had done to prevent it?
2. Why aren't we doing that now?

Last November, standing with President Putin at the White House, President Bush said: "Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction." This week at the summit, President Bush said: "President Putin and I agree that the greatest danger in this war is the prospect of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Our nations must spare no effort at preventing all forms of proliferation."

These are encouraging words, but if this is our priority, what is our strategy? Where are we putting our resources? Have we rallied our friends and the world behind this "highest priority" to meet this "greatest danger."

This is not just an American question. This is a global question. If a catastrophic terrorist strike could hit New York, it could hit Paris, St. Petersburg, London, Tokyo, or Moscow. The world must answer this challenge, beginning with Russia and the United States. I am pleased that Presidents Bush and Putin have formed a working group to address international terrorism and the connection to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The clock is ticking.

Unfortunately, we have not done enough -- not individually or collectively. The second Bush-Putin summit has just concluded, and the key achievement of the summit was to sign a treaty to reduce by two-thirds the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons on each side over the next ten years.

This is an important accomplishment, and I congratulate President Bush and President Putin. But there is more urgent work to be done. We're in a new arms race. This time – we must be on the same side. Terrorists and certain states are racing to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and we ought to be racing together to stop them. We have to think anew.

Reducing strategic nuclear weapons is our joint response to the reduced nuclear threats between Washington and Moscow. But do we have a joint response to the rising terrorist nuclear threat that threatens Washington and Moscow? I would have to say: "not yet" ... which is somewhat better than "nyet."

The United States and Russia have ceased to be enemies. We are talking, but not yet acting, as security partners. In a sense we have ended one era in our relations, but we haven't fully begun another. Every day we delay, we place ourselves in greater danger.

Our situation, I believe, is captured in the pages of War and Peace. You remember where Count Tolstoy describes young Nikolai Rostov in his first cavalry charge against Napoleon's troops. He was knocked off his horse during the charge and scrambled to his feet in time to see French soldiers running at him with bayonets. His first instinct was that they must be coming to help.

Then, he began to think to himself: "Who are they? Are they coming at *me*? Can they be running at *me*? And why? To kill *me*? *Me* whom everyone is so fond of?" He thought of his mother's love for him, of his family's and his friends', and the enemy's intention of killing him seemed impossible...for over ten seconds he stood rooted to the spot, not realizing the situation."

There is a warning for us in this passage from War and Peace. If we stay rooted to the spot, not realizing the situation, we're likely to see more war than peace.

We must overcome our disbelief that there are terrorists dedicating their time, energy and money to acquiring weapons of mass destruction so they can kill millions of people. As unthinkable as that is, we have to respond. We may not be able to make these terrorists less evil, but we must make them less powerful. We must keep them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

How difficult is it for terrorists to acquire a nuclear weapon? That depends on how difficult we make it. It becomes obvious from analyzing the terrorist path to a nuclear attack that the most effective, least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure nuclear weapons and materials at the source. Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take, and harder for us to stop. Once they gain access to nuclear materials, they've completed the most difficult step. That is why the defense against catastrophic terrorism must begin with securing weapons and fissile materials in every country and every facility that has them.

This threat includes but extends well beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union. Some 20 tons of civilian HEU exists at 345 civilian research facilities in 58 countries, yet there are no international standards for securing these nuclear materials within a country. We are talking about the raw material of nuclear terrorism, stored in hundreds of facilities in dozens of nations -- some of it is secured by nothing more than an underpaid guard sitting inside a chain-link fence. This is a global security imperative. A wide alliance of nations must work together to identify it all, account for it all and secure it all -- as soon as physically possible. This will not happen without active leadership from Russia and the United States.

As President Bush has said: "In the breadth of its land, the talent and courage of its people, the wealth of its resources, and the reach of its weapons, Russia is a great power, and must always be treated as such."

Russia today is a great power in another sense as well. Russia is in a unique position to make the world more secure by helping to safeguard weapons and materials here and around the world. Russia has enormous technical and scientific expertise for the task. Russia has influence in some important capitals where most other nations do not.

Russians are known as gifted strategic thinkers – from the battlefield to the chessboard. It should be obvious that when the world faces a global security threat – and there is a particular nation whose people have excelled in every area of creative human endeavor – from art and music, to literature and science -- then the people of that nation should be fully deployed against the threat. If the world's gravest threat is not opposed by the world's greatest talent, we will have failed to do all we can to protect the future for our children.

Today, at this conference, we are working to conceive and to build the architecture to meet this challenge. I'd like to leave you with six essential steps to consider as we begin to map out a new strategy for global security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

(1) The first step is to put our own houses in order – identifying, accounting for, and securing weapons and materials in Russia and the United States. Both the U.S. and Russia should pledge to ensure that nuclear, chemical and biological materials and weapons in both countries are safe, secure and accounted for with reciprocal monitoring sufficient to assure each other and the rest of the world that this is the case. This would require rapid security upgrades, accelerated blend-down of weapons materials and consolidating weapons materials in fewer sites. Each President should appoint one high-level person, reporting directly to the President, to take full responsibility for this issue, and this issue alone. And both Presidents should pledge to complete this task at the fastest possible pace.

(2) The United States and Russia should insist on accurate accounting and adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons, including a baseline inventory of these weapons and reciprocal monitoring. Tactical nuclear weapons have never been covered in arms control treaties. We can only guess at the numbers in each other's inventories. Yet these are the nuclear weapons most attractive to terrorists – even more valuable to them than fissile material, and much more portable than strategic warheads. The relations between our two heads of state are warm. Our perception of our common interest is closer than it has ever been. If this new relationship is going to improve our security, then it must be able to melt the suspicion that has kept us for so many years from an accurate accounting and assured protection of these weapons. As President Putin said on his visit last fall to the United States: “People expect U.S. and Russian politicians to leave behind double standards, empty suspicions and hidden goals and engage in an open, direct, and fruitful dialogue ... The Cold War must no longer hold us by the sleeve.” I agree but the Cold War will continue to hold us by the sleeve until we deal with tactical nuclear weapons.

(3) Both President Bush and President Putin should order their military leaders, in joint consultation and collaboration, to devise operational changes in the alert status of

their nuclear forces that would reduce toward zero the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation and expand the decision time available to each president before they would be forced to make the fateful decision to launch. They should begin with an operational stand down of the weapons now scheduled for reductions.

(4) Our two nations should combine our biodefense knowledge and scientific expertise and apply these joint resources to defensive and peaceful biological pursuits. The two Presidents could promote a bilateral effort to cooperate on our research agendas and build upon what both nations know. This is an endeavor that should begin with Russia and the United States and expand to include the rest of the world.

(5) Both Presidents should pledge that the treaty they have just signed will be supplemented by additional agreements to ensure transparency, verifiability, irreversibility and stability. The goals of stability and irreversibility would be substantially advanced by agreeing to dismantle nuclear weapons from each nation's stockpile.

I want to close with a sixth point, which includes the rest and goes beyond them. It is the heart of the new initiative Dick Lugar and I and our colleagues are launching, another phase in our partnership. Getting your reaction to this concept, and your ideas for how to improve it, is the purpose of this conference.

(6) So, number six: the United States and Russia should launch a Global Coalition against Catastrophic Terrorism. The Global Coalition would be based on the fundamental premise that the greatest dangers of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are threats all nations face together and no nation can solve on its own. The most likely, most immediate, most potentially devastating threat is the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. The best way to address the threat is to keep terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. And we must never forget: the chain of worldwide security is only as strong as the link at the weakest, least-protected site. That is why the Coalition must be global.

It would begin with the United States and Russia, but quickly expand to include nations such as China, India, and Pakistan. It would involve every state with nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials – and assist them in establishing standards and cooperative programs for inventory control, safety, and security. It would improve border and export controls, and train international teams to respond in the event of terrorist nuclear explosion or the loss of control of nuclear weapons or materials.

To deny terrorists access to dangerous biological materials without hindering important medical research, the Coalition would establish standards for safeguarding biological materials in scientific practice. It would devise approaches for limiting the spread of biological weapons know-how and developing effective measures to prevent bioterrorism and minimize the effects of any potential attack. It would direct more resources and attention to global infectious disease surveillance and prevention – improving worldwide efforts in detecting and reporting disease outbreaks, reporting

findings, and bringing forth an effective global response. In addition to the moral imperative of stepping up the fight against infectious disease around the globe, we now have a security imperative.

These ideas represent the outlines of a Global Coalition against Catastrophic Terrorism that could emerge from U.S.-Russia cooperation, and only from U.S.-Russia cooperation.

I am certain that the idea of Russia and the United States leading something so ambitious might prompt some to say: “Nunn is Don Quixote, dreaming the impossible dream. What about the frictions in U.S.-Russia relations? What about Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, chemical and biological weapons compliance, NATO expansion, missile defense, Chechnya, Jackson-Vanik, steel – or even chicken parts?”

My answer is to end where I began. To put these issues in perspective, we must again ask this question: If terrorists succeed in destroying Washington or Moscow with weapons of mass destruction, what would we wish we had done to prevent it? Why aren't we doing that now?

One nation cannot win this fight alone. As the Russian proverb says: **ОДИН В ПОЛЕ НЕ ВОИН.**

“One person on the battlefield is not a soldier.” Two nations cannot win the fight alone either. But the actions of many nations often follow from the actions of a few – particularly when the actions of the few are in the interest of the many. Our two nations have done more than all other nations combined to build up the world's deadly supply of weapons and materials. We must now build them down. As we do, we will gain the authority and credibility we need to ask other nations to do their part to reduce this global threat. Together, we must inspire the world to come together in a way it never has before – to prevent a danger it has never faced before. Let us begin.