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**IISS/CBACI Regional Meeting**  
**“The Future of the Life Sciences: Reaping the Rewards and Managing the Risks”**  
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Thank you all for being here this morning for this conference. I am honored to welcome you on behalf of NTI's Global Health and Security Initiative, the biological arm of NTI -- as well as your primary hosts and sponsors, the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute.

Since Ted Turner and I formed NTI, its goal simply stated has been to reduce the threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials. We have put our time and our resources behind projects that leverage the knowledge and funding of governments and non-governmental organizations in this country and around the world. Our top priorities have been -- and continue to be -- projects that encourage partnerships between governments, and between governments and the private sector.

We are here today to discuss the potential of a new partnership in the private sector that can help reduce the considerable risks of bioterrorism. I fully support Michael Moodie and Terry Taylor's concepts and their efforts in urging the creation of a private sector organization to formulate and promote best practices and procedures in the Life Sciences to prevent our exploding bio-knowledge from being diverted from life-enhancing miracles to instruments of death and destruction.

Each of you has much to contribute to the important discussions that will occur over the next two days, and I thank you for your participation.

Let me make seven points in summary form and then turn the podium over to Michael and Terry who will present the opportunities and challenges of this meeting.

Point #1: Today's world combines the growing access to biological materials and computer power with the anger and hatred it could take to use them as a weapon. This potentially lethal combination creates an accelerating risk of catastrophic terrorism. Biological, chemical and nuclear dangers -- from my perspective -- represent the preeminent threat to global security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Point #2: As Secretary Rumsfeld said: “It does not take a genius to create agents that are enormously powerful, and this can be done in mobile facilities and in small facilities.” Terror groups know this: an Al Qaeda memo, written in June 1999, and found on a computer left behind in Afghanistan, recommended that Al Qaeda's biological weapons program seek talent and cover in educational institutions, which the memo said [and I quote]: “allow easy access to specialists, which will greatly benefit us in the first stage, God willing.”

Point #3: Our governments alone – even if we assume we achieve a much higher degree of coordination and cooperation than exists today – cannot handle biological threats. There must be a collaborative effort between the public and the private sector. The active leadership of the scientific community is essential if we are to develop national and international norms of scientific behavior and best practices that will secure dangerous biological materials without suffocating scientific research.

Point #4: In the event of a biological attack, millions of lives may depend on how quickly we diagnosis the cause, report the findings, disseminate information to the health care community, and bring forth a fast and effective response at the local, state, federal and international levels. This means that we are in a new security and health environment. Public health and medical professionals, hospitals and druggists, as well as pharmaceutical companies and biotech companies, must become a part of our front line of defense.

Point #5: The fight against infectious disease on a global basis, whether caused by nature or by the deliberative act of man, includes but goes beyond humanitarian and moral concerns. It is also now a fundamental national security issue.

Point #6: We have to get serious about how we can keep dangerous pathogens out of the hands of people who would use them as an instrument of terror. I hope that this meeting, and hopefully the new organization that you may help launch, will address the critical questions that we face, which in my view include:

- a) Is a biological Chernobyl waiting to happen? A Biological 9/11? How do we prevent either from occurring?
- b) Should our biotech firms, private labs and university labs develop best practices and personnel assurance programs and cross-check them with their peers?
- c) What is the role and responsibility of pharmaceutical and biotech companies? What is the role of the scientific and academic communities?
- d) How do we cooperate globally on research on vaccines? On antibiotics? Stockpiles? Early detection? Sharing communication? On developing common standards and best practices? On achieving an effective balance between the imperative to share critical new scientific knowledge and the vital need to avoid drawing road-maps for terrorists?
- e) How can we best develop the necessary partnerships among governments, industry and the academic life sciences community?
- f) Do we need new risk management tools?
- g) Do we need new laws or regulations?
- h) How do we greatly improve our security in this arena without stifling scientific inquiry and innovation?
- i) Will the private sector begin to take the lead in addressing these questions, or will we sit back and wait for the disaster and then be overrun with a reactive governmental regulatory regime?

My final point: There are many new bio-miracles on the horizon; there are also dark clouds and dangers. The miracles will likely be produced by individuals or small teams of scientists. The dark clouds and dangers will not be dispelled by a few scientists or by our ships or planes or tanks. Our health security will depend on unprecedented public-private partnerships and cooperation across the globe.

We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe, and the clock is ticking. Thank you for accepting this challenge.

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