Syria Overview

Syria Overview

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Background

This page is part of Syria’s Country Profile.

The Syrian Arab Republic has been the site of the most deadly and persistent use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the 21st Century. The Syrian Civil War, an ongoing conflict that began with anti-government protests in March 2011, has been exacerbated by large-scale chemical weapons use, largely undertaken by regime forces under President Bashar al-Assad. According to a 2019 report, over 300 chemical attacks have occurred since the start of the Civil War, many of which targeted civilians. 1 Efforts to broker an end to the fighting have so far been unsuccessful. 2

Syria joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1969, but pursued nuclear capabilities determined to be in noncompliance with its obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2011. Syria had one of the most advanced chemical weapons (CW) capabilities in the Middle East prior to acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013, but retained some capabilities in violation of its treaty commitments. Although Syria is a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), current biological weapons (BW) capabilities are unknown.

Nuclear

Beginning in the 1980s, Syria sought to expand its nuclear capabilities, and in 1991 China agreed to construct Syria’s first research reactor at diffusionDer Al-Hadjar, the SRR-1. In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed a building in northwestern Syria that U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials claimed was a plutonium production reactor under construction (the Al-Kibar or Dair Alzour site). The Syrian government denied these allegations. 3 However, in May 2011, following a three-year investigation, the IAEA concluded “that it is very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency” and build with the assistance of North Korea. 4 On 9 June 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution that found Syria in noncompliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and reported the case to the UN Security Council. 5 The onset of the Syrian Civil War sidelined further action on the nuclear issue, although the issue remains on the IAEA agenda. 6

In 2013, elements of the Free Syrian Army occupied the site of the destroyed Dair Alzour reactor, and from 2014 to 2017 the site came under control of the Islamic State (IS). 7 Although it is unlikely that any nuclear fuel was on-site, the current location of the uranium meant to fuel the reactor is unknown. 8

For more details, visit the Syria Nuclear page.

Biological

There is very limited open source information regarding Syria’s biological warfare (BW) capabilities. Syria ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968, and has signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In 2014, the Syrian government declared the existence of a ricin production facility and stockpiles of purified ricin to the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (OPCW). The production facility, known as “al-Maliha,” is alleged to be located within the Greater Damascus area. 9

Visit the Syria Biological page for more details.

Missile

Before the civil war, Syria possessed one of the largest arsenals of ballistic missiles in the region. Syria’s arsenal was limited to short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which were all variants of the Scud missile and included the Scud-B, Scud-C, and Scud-D. With significant assistance from the Soviet Union/Russia and North Korea, Syria established its own domestic production capacity for each of these missile types. 10 Syria also produced a domestic version of the Iranian Fateh-110A SRBM, the M-600. 11 In addition to its ballistic missile arsenal, Syria maintained a limited arsenal of anti-ship cruise missiles. 12

The Syrian regime began firing Scud missiles at rebel-held targets in 2012, intensifying the conflict. 13 By late 2015, Israeli military sources reported that over 90% of the regime’s ballistic missile stockpile had been used in the fighting. 14 The regime’s Russian allies have deployed advanced missile systems in the conflict, including S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to its airbase in Latakia, Syria. 15 On 17 December 2018 Russian Deputy Minister Yury Borisov confirmed the use of the 9K720 Iskander SRBM system, Tornado-G and Smerch multiple launch rocket systems, and the Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missile system in combat operations in Syria. 16

Visit the Syria Missile page for more details.

Chemical

The country’s initial CW capability was provided by Egypt prior to the October 1973 war against Israel. 17 Beginning in the 1980’s, Syria developed an indigenous capability to produce chemical weapons agents, including mustard gas, sarin, and VX nerve agent, at several production facilities located throughout the country. 18 Syria possessed a number of delivery systems for chemical weapons, including the Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles, aerial bombs, artillery shells, and rockets. 19 The Assad regime has employed “barrel bombs,” crude explosive devices usually dropped by helicopter, in chemical attacks during the Civil War. 20

The ongoing Civil War in Syria has seen numerous chemical weapons attacks, most carried out by the Assad regime. 21 On 21 August 2013, a large-scale chemical weapons attack using sarin nerve gas occurred in the Ghouta area of Damascus. A preliminary U.S. intelligence assessment of the attack determined that 1,429 people were killed in this attack, although casualty reports vary widely. 22 Following the attack, U.S.U.K.French, and German intelligence services concluded that the Assad regime was responsible, and a subsequent UN inspection team report supported those findings. 23 Pressure from the international community subsequently forced Syria to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 10 September 2013. 24 Syria also agreed to the disarmament of its chemical weapons stockpiles with a deadline of 30 June 2014, and the OPCW dispatched teams to Syria to destroy chemical weapons and related production equipment. 25

By 23 June 2014, all of Syria’s declared chemical weapons production facilities had been rendered inoperable and all reported chemical weapons and their precursors had been removed from the country. 26 From 7 July through mid-August 2014, the United States neutralized 600 tons of precursor chemicals for sarin and sulfur mustard aboard a U.S. cargo ship. 27 An additional 200 tons of chemical precursors were sent to the UK for destruction. 28 Syria began the long-delayed destruction of twelve facilities in January 2015. 29 On 4 January 2016, the OPCW announced that all declared Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles had been destroyed. 30 However, in 2016, the OPCW reportedly issued a confidential report claiming that Syrian CW disclosures had been inaccurate and incomplete, and that Assad retained some CW capacity. 31

Chemical attacks using chlorine and nerve agents continued, including the use of what OPCW investigators determined to be sarin in Khan Sheikhoun on 4 April 2017, and the suspected use of chlorine and an unidentified nerve agent in Douma on 7 April 2018. 32 The Syrian government has denied responsibility for these attacks. The United States launched 59 Tomahawk missiles at Al-Shayrat airbase after determining it was the location from which the chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun was launched. In response to the Douma attack, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France carried out airstrikes against three sites associated with the regime’s chemical weapons program. 33 Of additional concern are reports by the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea that they are assisting the Syrian government in its efforts to reconstitute its chemical weapons program. 34

Visit the Syria Chemical page for more details.

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Glossary

WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
WMD: Typically refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, though there is some debate as to whether chemical weapons qualify as weapons of “mass destruction.”
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
A legally-binding agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), concluded as a condition of membership in the Treaty. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements allow and oblige the IAEA to ensure that all nuclear material and nuclear activities in a state are peaceful and not diverted to nuclear weapons. See entries for Full-scope Safeguards and Information Circular 153; for additional information, see IAEA Department of Safeguards.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Research reactor
Research reactor: Small fission reactors designed to produce neutrons for a variety of purposes, including scientific research, training, and medical isotope production. Unlike commercial power reactors, they are not designed to generate power.
Diffusion
Diffusion: A technique for uranium enrichment in which the lighter Uranium 235 isotopes in UF6 gas move through a porous barrier more rapidly than the heavier Uranium 238 isotopes.
Plutonium (Pu)
Plutonium (Pu): A transuranic element with atomic number 94, produced when uranium is irradiated in a reactor. It is used primarily in nuclear weapons and, along with uranium, in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. Plutonium-239, a fissile isotope, is the most suitable isotope for use in nuclear weapons.
Nuclear reactor
Nuclear reactor: A vessel in which nuclear fission may be sustained and controlled in a chain nuclear reaction. The varieties are many, but all incorporate certain features, including: fissionable or fissile fuel; a moderating material (unless the reactor is operated on fast neutrons); a reflector to conserve escaping neutrons; provisions of removal of heat; measuring and controlling instruments; and protective devices.
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Security Council: Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Council consists of fifteen members, five of which—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are permanent members. The other ten members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. The five permanent members possess veto powers. For additional information, see the UNSC.
Uranium
Uranium is a metal with the atomic number 92. See entries for enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Geneva Protocol
Geneva Protocol: Formally known as the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, this protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and bans bacteriological warfare. It was opened for signature on 17 June 1925. For additional information, see the Geneva Protocol.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Mustard (HD)
Mustard is a blister agent, or vesicant. The term mustard gas typically refers to sulfur mustard (HD), despite HD being neither a mustard nor a gas. Sulfur mustard gained notoriety during World War I for causing more casualties than all of the other chemical agents combined. Victims develop painful blisters on their skin, as well as lung and eye irritation leading to potential pulmonary edema and blindness. However, mustard exposure is usually not fatal. A liquid at room temperature, sulfur mustard has been delivered using artillery shells and aerial bombs. HD is closely related to the nitrogen mustards (HN-1, HN-2, HN—3).
Sarin (GB)
Sarin (GB): A nerve agent, sarin causes uncontrollable nerve cell excitation and muscle contraction. Ultimately, sarin victims suffer death by suffocation. As with other nerve agents, sarin can cause death within minutes. Sarin vapor is about ten times less toxic than VX vapor, but 25 times more toxic than hydrogen cyanide. Discovered while attempting to produce more potent pesticides, sarin is the most toxic of the four G-series nerve agents developed by Germany during World War II. Germany never used sarin during the war. However, Iraq may have used sarin during the Iran-Iraq War, and Aum Shinrikyo is known to have used low-quality sarin during its attack on the Tokyo subway system that killed 12 people and injured hundreds.
VX
VX: The most toxic of the V-series nerve agents, VX was developed after the discovery of VE in the United Kingdom. Like other nerve agents, VX causes uncontrollable nerve excitation and muscle excitation. Ultimately, VX victims suffer death by suffocation. VX is an oily, amber-colored, odorless liquid.
Nerve agent
A nerve agent is a chemical weapon that attacks the human nervous system, leading to uncontrolled nerve cell excitation and muscle contraction. Specifically, nerve agents block the enzyme cholinesterease, so acetylcholine builds up in the nerve junction and the neuron cannot return to the rest state. Nerve agents include the G-series nerve agents (soman, sarin, tabun, and GF) synthesized by Germany during and after World War II; the more toxic V-series nerve agents (VX, VE, VM, VG, VR) discovered by the United Kingdom during the 1950s; and the reportedly even more toxic Novichok agents, developed by the Soviet Union between 1960 and 1990. The development of both the G-series and V-series nerve agents occurred alongside pesticide development.
Scud
Scud is the designation for a series of short-range ballistic missiles developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s and transferred to many other countries. Most theater ballistic missiles developed and deployed in countries of proliferation concern, for example Iran and North Korea, are based on the Scud design.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Disarmament
Though there is no agreed-upon legal definition of what disarmament entails within the context of international agreements, a general definition is the process of reducing the quantity and/or capabilities of military weapons and/or military forces.

Sources

  1. Schneider, Tobias, and Theresa Lütkefend, Nowhere to Hide: The Logic of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, Global Public Policy Institute, 2019, www.gppi.net.
  2. United Nations Office at Geneva, “Syrian Peace Process,” www.unog.ch; Aliia Raimbekova and Sorwar Alam, “Turkey, Russia, Iran FMs to assess Astana Syria process,” Andalou Agency, 6 March 2018, www.aa.com.tr.
  3. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Israeli Nuclear Reactor Strike and Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Background Analysis,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 24 October 2007, www.csis.org.
  4. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” 24 May 2011, www.iaea.org.
  5. “Syrian Nuclear Dispute Sent to United Nations,” Global Security Newswire, 9 June 2011.
  6. “IAEA Director General Reviews Global Trends at Start of Board Meeting,” 6 March 2017, www.iaea.org.
  7. Anne Barnard and Margaret Cocker, “ISIS, Squeezed on Two Sides, Loses Syrian City and Border Crossing,” The New York Times, 3 November 2017, www.nytimes.com.
  8. David Albright, Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, and Sarah Burkhard, “Syria’s Unresolved Nuclear Issues Reemerge in Wake of ISIL Advance and Ongoing Civil War,” Institute for Science and International Security, 30 June 2015, www.isis-online.org.
  9. “Decision: Combined plan for the destruction and verification of the ‘al-Maliha’ ricin production facility in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Executive Council, The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 19 November 2014, www.opcw.org.
  10. “R-17 (Scud B/C/D variants),” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 30 April 2012, www.janes.com.
  11. Missile Threat, “M-9 variant,” The Claremont Institute, www.missilethreat.com; Jeffrey Lewis, “Iran Marketing Missiles?” Arms Control Wonk, 8 August 2011, www.armscontrolwonk.com; “Fateh A-110 variant (M-600),” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 27 April 2012, www.janes.com.
  12. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Overview,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 June 2008, www.csis.org.
  13. Andre de Nesnera, “Syrian Scud Missiles Seen as Escalation of War,” Voice of America, 19 December 2012, www.voanews.com.
  14. “Israel Says 90 Pct of Syria’s Ballistic Missiles Used Up on Rebels,” Reuters, 18 November 2015, www.reuters.com.
  15. Karen DeYoung, “Russian Air Defense Raises Stakes of U.S. Confrontation in Syria,” The Washington Post, 17 October 2016, www.washingtonpost.com.
  16. Jeremy Chin, “Russian MoD Confirms Use of Iskander-M SRBM in Syria,” Missile Threat, 18 December 2018, www.missilethreat.csis.org.
  17. Shoham, Dany, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” Nonproliferation Review 5.3 (Spring-Summer 1998), www.nonproliferation.org.
  18. Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, “Syria and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI - Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2004) p. 35.
  19. Council on Foreign Relations, “French Government’s Declassified Intelligence Assessment on Chemical Weapons Attack in Syria,” 2 September 2013, www.cfr.org.
  20. Michelle Nichols, “U.N./OPCW Inquiry Blames Syria Government for Gas Attacks, Likely Sanctions Fight Looms,” Reuters, 24 August 2016, www.reuters.com.
  21. United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Security Council, “United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,” 13 December 2013, A/68/663-S/2013/735, www.un.org; Tobias Schneider and Theresa Lütkefend, Nowhere to Hide: The Logic of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2019), p. 3.
  22. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on 21 August 2003,” 30 August 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov.
  23. “Syria chemical attack: Key UN findings,” BBC News, 17 September 2013, www.bbc.co.uk.
  24. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Member State-Syria,” www.opcw.org.
  25. “Press release by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations on the advance team in Syria,” Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 11 October 2013, www.opcw.org.
  26. “Syria Chemical Weapons Facilities ‘Destroyed,’” Al-Jazeera, 1 November 2013; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Announcement to Media on Last Consignment of Chemicals Leaving Syria,” OPCW News, 23 June 2014, www.opcw.org.
  27. David Alexander, “U.S. ship finishes neutralizing Syria’s worst chemical arms: Pentagon,” Reuters, 18 August 2014, www.reuters.com; Jim Garamone, “Cape Ray Begins Neutralizing Syrian Chemical Materials,” DoD News (Washington), 7 July 2014, www.defense.gov.
  28. “200 Tons of Syrian Chemicals in UK for Destruction,” Associated Press, 16 July 2014, www.english.alarabiya.net.
  29. Anthony Deutsch, “Exclusive: Syria Begins Destruction of Chemical Weapons Facilities,” Reuters, 19 January 2015, www.reuters.com.
  30. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Destruction of Chemical Weapons Completed,” 4 January 2016, www.opcw.org.
  31. Colum Lynch and David Kenner, “U.S. and Europe Say Assad May Have Kept Some Chemical Weapons,” Foreign Policy, 23 August 2016, www.foreignpolicy.com.
  32. Liz Sly, Suzan Haidamous, and Asma Ajroudi, “Nerve gas used in Syria attack, leaving victims ‘foaming at the mouth,’ evidence suggests,” The Washington Post, 11 April 2018, www.washingtonpost.com; “Letter dated 26 October 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” Report from the OPCW-UN Joint Investigated Mechanism transmitted by the Secretary-General, United Nations, 26 October 2017, www.un.org.
  33. Jim Garamone, “U.S. Allies Strike Syrian Targets in Response to Regime’s Chemical Attacks,” DoD News, 13 April 2018, www.defense.gov.
  34. “Final report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to resolution 2345 (2017),” Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), United Nations, 5 March 2018, www.un.org.

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