Syria Overview

This page is part of Syria’s Country Profile.

The Syrian Arab Republic has been the site of the most deadly and persistent use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the 21st Century. The Syrian Civil War, an ongoing conflict that began with anti-government protests in March 2011, has been exacerbated by large-scale chemical weapons use, largely undertaken by regime forces under President Bashar al-Assad. According to a 2019 report, over 300 chemical attacks have occurred since the start of the Civil War, many of which targeted civilians. ¹ Efforts to broker an end to the fighting have so far been unsuccessful. ²

Syria joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1969, but pursued nuclear capabilities determined to be in noncompliance with its obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2011. Syria had one of the most advanced chemical weapons (CW) capabilities in the Middle East prior to acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2013, but retained some capabilities in violation of its treaty commitments. Although Syria is a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), current biological weapons (BW) capabilities are unknown.

Beginning in the 1980s, Syria sought to expand its nuclear capabilities, and in 1991 China agreed to construct Syria’s first research reactor at diffusionDer Al-Hadjar, the SRR-1. In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed a building in northwestern Syria that U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials claimed was a plutonium production reactor under construction (the Al-Kibar or Dair Alzour site). The Syrian government denied these allegations. ³ However, in May 2011, following a three-year investigation, the IAEA concluded “that it is very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency” and build with the assistance of North Korea. ⁴ On 9 June 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution that found Syria in noncompliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and reported the case to the UN Security Council. ⁵ The onset of the Syrian Civil War sidelined further action on the nuclear issue, although the issue remains on the IAEA agenda. ⁶

In 2013, elements of the Free Syrian Army occupied the site of the destroyed Dair Alzour reactor, and from 2014 to 2017 the site came under control of the Islamic State (IS). ⁷ Although it is unlikely that any nuclear fuel was on-site, the current location of the uranium meant to fuel the reactor is unknown. ⁸

For more details, visit the Syria Nuclear page.

There is very limited open source information regarding Syria’s biological warfare (BW) capabilities. Syria ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968, and has signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In 2014, the Syrian government declared the existence of a ricin production facility and stockpiles of purified ricin to the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (OPCW). The production facility, known as “al-Maliha,” is alleged to be located within the Greater Damascus area. ⁹

Visit the Syria Biological page for more details.

Before the civil war, Syria possessed one of the largest arsenals of ballistic missiles in the region. Syria’s arsenal was limited to short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which were all variants of the Scud missile and included the Scud-B, Scud-C, and Scud-D. With significant assistance from the Soviet Union/Russia and North Korea, Syria established its own domestic production capacity for each of these missile types. ¹⁰ Syria also produced a domestic version of the Iranian Fateh-110A SRBM, the M-600. ¹¹ In addition to its ballistic missile arsenal, Syria maintained a limited arsenal of anti-ship cruise missiles. ¹²

The Syrian regime began firing Scud missiles at rebel-held targets in 2012, intensifying the conflict. ¹³ By late 2015, Israeli military sources reported that over 90% of the regime’s ballistic missile stockpile had been used in the fighting. ¹⁴ The regime’s Russian allies have deployed advanced missile systems in the conflict, including S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to its airbase in Latakia, Syria. ¹⁵ On 17 December 2018 Russian Deputy Minister Yury Borisov confirmed the use of the 9K720 Iskander SRBM system, Tornado-G and Smerch multiple launch rocket systems, and the Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missile system in combat operations in Syria. ¹⁶

Visit the Syria Missile page for more details.

The country’s initial CW capability was provided by Egypt prior to the October 1973 war against Israel. ¹⁷ Beginning in the 1980’s, Syria developed an indigenous capability to produce chemical weapons agents, including mustard gas, sarin, and VX nerve agent, at several production facilities located throughout the country. ¹⁸ Syria possessed a number of delivery systems for chemical weapons, including the Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles, aerial bombs, artillery shells, and rockets. ¹⁹ The Assad regime has employed “barrel bombs,” crude explosive devices usually dropped by helicopter, in chemical attacks during the Civil War. ²⁰

The ongoing Civil War in Syria has seen numerous chemical weapons attacks, most carried out by the Assad regime. ²¹ On 21 August 2013, a large-scale chemical weapons attack using sarin nerve gas occurred in the Ghouta area of Damascus. A preliminary U.S. intelligence assessment of the attack determined that 1,429 people were killed in this attack, although casualty reports vary widely. ²² Following the attack, U.S., U.K., French, and German intelligence services concluded that the Assad regime was responsible, and a subsequent UN inspection team report supported those findings. ²³ Pressure from the international community subsequently forced Syria to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 10 September 2013. ²⁴ Syria also agreed to the disarmament of its chemical weapons stockpiles with a deadline of 30 June 2014, and the OPCW dispatched teams to Syria to destroy chemical weapons and related production equipment. ²⁵

By 23 June 2014, all of Syria’s declared chemical weapons production facilities had been rendered inoperable and all reported chemical weapons and their precursors had been removed from the country. ²⁶ From 7 July through mid-August 2014, the United States neutralized 600 tons of precursor chemicals for sarin and sulfur mustard aboard a U.S. cargo ship. ²⁷ An additional 200 tons of chemical precursors were sent to the UK for destruction. ²⁸ Syria began the long-delayed destruction of twelve facilities in January 2015. ²⁹ On 4 January 2016, the OPCW announced that all declared Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles had been destroyed. ³⁰ However, in 2016, the OPCW reportedly issued a confidential report claiming that Syrian CW disclosures had been inaccurate and incomplete, and that Assad retained some CW capacity. ³¹

Chemical attacks using chlorine and nerve agents continued, including the use of what OPCW investigators determined to be sarin in Khan Sheikhoun on 4 April 2017, and the suspected use of chlorine and an unidentified nerve agent in Douma on 7 April 2018. ³² The Syrian government has denied responsibility for these attacks. The United States launched 59 Tomahawk missiles at Al-Shayrat airbase after determining it was the location from which the chemical attack on Khan Sheikhoun was launched. In response to the Douma attack, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France carried out airstrikes against three sites associated with the regime’s chemical weapons program. ³³ Of additional concern are reports by the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea that they are assisting the Syrian government in its efforts to reconstitute its chemical weapons program. ³⁴

Visit the Syria Chemical page for more details.