Abstract:
John Deutch reported that nuclear materials and technology are more accessible now than at any other time in history. This is due to the social and economic changes in the nuclear industry and the poor material accountability at nuclear facilities. Even nuclear weapons are at risk, as a 'knowledgeable Russian' reported that a warhead could be replaced with a training dummy and might not be detected for as long as six months.
Deutch reported that in 1992 Iran unsuccessfully approached the Ulba (Ust-Kamenogorsk) Metallurgical Plant in order to obtain enriched uranium. He also claimed that the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo sought to buy Russian nuclear warheads. Contrary to most other reliable sources, he maintained that the only cases of diversion of weapons-usable material that were not scams were the seizures of about 6 grams of plutonium (Tengen), a gram sample of HEU (Landshut), approximately one half kilogram of MOX fuel (Munich), and slightly under 3 kilograms of HEU (Prague). He further reported that 'none of the (non-MOD fissile material facilities) in Russia or other newly independent states had adequate safeguards or security measures by international standards for weapons-usable materials.
Appended to the author's written testimony was a chronology of nuclear smuggling incidents from 1993-96. The appendix contains no preface as to the CIA's determination of the accuracy of the incidents reported: On 17 March 1996, Tanzanian police arrested one individual and seized a container of radioactive cesium.
On 14 March 1996, Polish police arrested a man for possession of uranium in Bielska-Biala.
On 23 February 1996, the Belarusian KGB seized 5 kg of cesium-133 which was reportedly sealed in glass containers.
According to a U.S. diplomatic report, on 17 January 1996 a Palestinian in Dubai, UAE offered to sell 3 kg of reportedly Russian-origin red mercury to a Lebanese-American businessman.
On 28 December 1995, the Russian FSB arrested nine members of a criminal organization in Novosibirsk and seized radioactive material that was identified in press reports as 'enriched' uranium-235. The material was reportedly transported to Novosibirsk by middlemen, possibly from Kazakhstan. The destination reportedly may have been South Korea. [See also the 21 December 1995 Novaya Sibir entry.] On 10 November 1995 Hungarian police discovered 26 kg of radioactive material in the trunk of a car and three suspects were subsequently arrested.
On 7 November 1995, Iranian press reported that Iranian law enforcement arrested 5 Iranians with 9 packets of uranium in Tehran and two other cities. No details were given on the origin, amount, or the enrichment of the material.
On 4 April 1995, 6 kg of uranium-235, uranium-238, radium, and palladium were found in a Kiev apartment which was occupied by an army lieutenant colonel and a warrant officer. The material reportedly came from Russia. [See also entry from November 1902- August 1995.] On 28 August 1994, a container with radioactive substances was found on a street in Tallinn. [See the entry from 26 July 1995.] On the same day Romanian authorities reportedly arrested several individuals who were attempting to sell 4.55 kg of uranium tetrachloride ('61.9 percent pure uranium') for $25,000 per kilogram.
On 12 June 1994, three staffers of the 'Institute of Nuclear Physics' were convicted of stealing 4.5 kg of uranium.
In 1993, three Iranians believed to have connections to Iran's intelligence service, were arrested in Turkey for attempting to acquire nuclear materials from the FSU.
Abstract Number: 19960590
Headline: The Threat of Nuclear Diversion
Date: 20 March 1996
Bibliography: The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs
Material: nuclear materials
