

GLOBAL ENTERPRISE TO STRENGTHEN NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

## DISCUSSION PAPER: PERSPECTIVES ON A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE WORLD

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### Introduction

Drawing on a comprehensive review, this paper sketches five perspectives on a world without nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup> It sets out each perspective's overall judgment; underlying assessment; and near-term action priorities.<sup>2</sup> There sometimes are variations within these perspectives; there also are similarities on specific issues across them. Some readers almost certainly will agree with elements of more than one perspective. Together, they define the spectrum of debate about a nuclear-weapon-free world. This paper's purpose is to help understand these different perspectives as a foundation to finding cooperative pathways forward that incorporate elements from across them.

#### The Five Perspectives

- Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists
- Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists
- Post-Cold War Visionaries
- Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders
- Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists

### ***The Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists***<sup>3</sup>

Frustrated by limited progress on nuclear disarmament and motivated by deep concerns about the humanitarian impact of use of nuclear weapons, the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists led the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). In their *overall judgment*, a nuclear-weapon-free world is long overdue and would be far safer for all countries. However, particularly with the NPT nuclear-weapon states (NWS) seen as unwilling to act or to meet their repeated past commitments to nuclear disarmament, this perspective emphasizes that the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) had to take go-it-alone action to advance the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. That step, moreover, is seen as fully consistent with the obligations of all countries under NPT Article VI to pursue "effective measures" for nuclear disarmament.

The *underlying assessment* of this perspective judges that the *risks of nuclear weapons far outweigh any benefits claimed* by NWS and other nuclear-armed states. Those risks are seen to include a catastrophic human and environmental impact of any use of nuclear weapons. That

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risk of use, moreover, is assessed to be very high, given what is seen as the near-inevitability of a failure of nuclear deterrence due to human error, accident, or miscalculation. As for the alleged benefits of nuclear weapons, the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists reject arguments that nuclear deterrence contributed significantly to the lack of major power conflict after World War II as well as arguments that extended nuclear deterrence today plays an important role in preventing non-proliferation. In both cases, they cite other reasons than nuclear deterrence for those outcomes.

This perspective judges that there is a *strong linkage between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation*. A world of nuclear haves and have-nots is seen as inherently unsustainable, with the very existence of nuclear weapons said to encourage still other countries to seek those weapons. This judgment is reinforced by a deep frustration on the part of the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists with the inequality inherent in that division and their belief that the NNWS already have done more than their fair share in support of the NPT's non-proliferation goal. By contrast, this perspective continues, nuclear disarmament progress would strengthen a global norm against proliferation and impede decisions to seek nuclear weapons.

For the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists an emphasis on the *conditions, enablers, and building blocks* of a nuclear-weapon-free world is feared to be an excuse and obstacle to disarmament action. Instead, what is required is to change perceptions of the legitimacy and risks of nuclear weapons first globally, then among NWS and other nuclear-armed states. Thus, little emphasis is placed on addressing today's political and military conflicts to create security conditions for nuclear disarmament. Rather, it is posited that given the consequences and risks of nuclear weapons, those security conditions already exist: The NWS and their allies, as well as other nuclear-armed states, have failed to recognize that they actually would be more secure if nuclear weapons were eliminated. Means to verify and enforce compliance with the obligations of a nuclear-weapon-free world are acknowledged to be necessary – not as conditions, but as implementation challenges that would be resolved on the road to outlawing and eliminating nuclear weapons.

The top *near-term action priority* of the Go-It-Alone Prohibitionists is entry into force of the new TPNW to create a legal norm against possession or use of nuclear weapons, delegitimize those weapons, foster a new public-elite debate about retention of nuclear weapons (or living under a nuclear umbrella), and turn countries possessing nuclear weapons into the new pariahs or rogue states. Over time, it is believed that pressures will steadily grow for nuclear disarmament by the countries with nuclear weapons. Pursuit of other specific disarmament measures is endorsed, reflecting the fact that for many supporters, one purpose of the TPNW is to revitalize nuclear disarmament by sending a very strong signal of NNWS frustrations and concerns.

***Near-Term Action Priorities –  
Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists***

- *Entry-into-force of the TPNW*
- *Campaign to change governments', elites', publics' perceptions – political, economic, other measures*
- *Support disarmament measures and agreements– for example, EIF of CTBT; FMCT; nuclear reductions; nuclear disarmament verification research; other effective measures with NNWS and NWS cooperation*

### ***The Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists<sup>4</sup>***

The *overall judgment* of the Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists also endorses a nuclear-weapon-free world as the only assured guarantee against use of nuclear weapons. Most of its proponents also stress that with sufficient political will a nuclear-weapon-free world is a realizable outcome – and for this perspective’s proponents within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), can be achieved within the near term. (This perspective includes many supporters of a TPNW, but deserves separate consideration both because of some important differences with the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists and because of its historic and continuing importance in NPT deliberations.)

As with the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists, this perspective’s *underlying assessment* argues that the catastrophic and, in its view, growing *risks of nuclear weapons* – including use by accident, miscalculation, or intention – far outweigh any claimed security benefits. Closely related, most proponents reject any legitimacy or necessity for policies of nuclear deterrence, including extended nuclear deterrence. A minority opinion stops short of that blanket rejection but finds much less justification for nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War world.

For the Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists, there is a very strong *linkage between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation*. The legal obligation in Article VI to pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world is assessed as having been critical to gaining adherence to the by many NNWS. Today, sustaining support for the NPT and avoiding an erosion of its credibility is judged closely linked to reversing a perceived retreat by NPT NWS from implementing their nuclear disarmament obligations. The long-term sustainability of a world of nuclear haves and have-nots is rejected: Possession of nuclear weapons by some countries is seen as providing an incentive or at least justification for others to seek them. The Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists, including those proponents not closely associated with the TPNW, also challenge the inequality and unfairness of a world of nuclear haves and have-nots.

This perspective disagrees with the argument made most strongly by the Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists, but also within the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders, that a transformed global security environment is a *condition* for a nuclear-weapon-free world. To the contrary, making progress on nuclear disarmament, it is argued, would improve the global security environment given the perceived impact of nuclear weapons in increasing tensions and confrontation among adversaries. As do the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists, Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists judge that the security conditions for eliminating nuclear weapons exist. What is needed is to change perceptions of nuclear weapons and encourage the NWS to accelerate pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world based on the recognition of the greater risks to NWS of retaining, rather than eliminating, nuclear weapons.

Proponents of this perspective sometimes explicitly acknowledge the importance of promoting peace and conflict resolution as well as other outcomes cited by the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders, e.g., effective non-proliferation. They recognize as well that verification, compliance, and enforcement measures will be necessary in a nuclear-weapon-free world. But the Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists also argue that nuclear disarmament progress should not be contingent on creating a more conducive regional and international security environment or achieving other conditions. Not least, it again is feared that emphasis

on conditions, enablers, and building-blocks of nuclear disarmament is intended to or will unintentionally divert efforts from making progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The most important *near-term action priority* is for the NWS to implement their prior nuclear disarmament commitments, rooted in Article VI and elaborated in the 1995 Principles and Objectives document as well as at the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. In addition, the TPNW's entry-into-force is singled out by some, but not all, of the Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists. Many of them also call for the prompt negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapon Convention to outlaw the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons – but unlike the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists, they call for participation by all countries possessing nuclear weapons.

#### ***The Post-Cold War Visionaries***<sup>5</sup>

Most associated with senior statesmen that were central to the development and implementation of nuclear weapon policy and posture during the Cold War, the Post-Cold War Visionaries now affirm in their *overall judgment*, that a nuclear-weapon-free world would be a safer and more secure world. Unlike either the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists or many Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists, however, this perspective is quite cautious as to whether a nuclear-weapon-free world can be fully realized. For that reason, its proponents propose that the pathway to a nuclear-weapon-free world runs through *an interim stopping – or jumping off – point*, termed variously, the base camp (on the mountain of a nuclear-weapon-free world), the minimization point (of the numbers, reliance, and roles of nuclear weapons), or the strategic elimination of nuclear weapons (as instruments of statecraft, power, and security).<sup>6</sup>

Unlike the preceding perspectives, the *underlying* assessment of virtually all of the Post-Cold War Visionaries either affirms or at least accepts the legitimacy, necessity, and role of nuclear weapons in helping avoid a U.S.-Soviet conflict during the Cold War. They acknowledge the Cold War risks of nuclear deterrence but view them as having been less than the benefits.

By contrast, this perspective judges that going forward, the *risks* of nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear deterrence increasingly will outweigh the benefits – due to uncertainties and greater complexities in a world of multiple nuclear adversaries, possible access to nuclear weapons by non-state actors, and the prospect of mistakes and errors of

#### ***Near-Term Action Priorities – Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists***

- *NWS implement prior NPT commitments* – for example, actions from 1995 Principles and Objectives, 2000 “13 Steps”, 2010 NPT Action Plan – NWS should choose how best to demonstrate their good faith implementation of prior commitments
- *Pursuit of supporting disarmament agreements and revitalize Conference on Disarmament* – for example, CTBT EIF; FMCT; NSAs; deep, irreversible, transparent, verifiable nuclear reductions; limits on missile defenses/space activities: (for some) outlaw nuclear weapons via TPNW or a Nuclear Weapons Convention
- *Reduce role and risk of use of nuclear weapons* – for example, no qualitative improvements, modernization, life-extension, upgrading of nuclear weapons and facilities; no foreign deployments-centralized storage; nuclear weapons off high-alert; no nuclear threat-making
- *“Infrastructure” and “supporting activities” for a nuclear-weapon-free world* – for example, verification research and development; greater nuclear transparency; prevent proliferation; ensure no terrorist access to nuclear materials/weapons; address enforcement issues

judgment (taking into account what they emphasize was the role of good fortune in avoiding use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War). In differing ways, the Post-Cold War Visionaries also believe that progress in ameliorating regional and global disputes in pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world will reduce further the need to rely on nuclear deterrence, including extended nuclear deterrence. But this perspective accepts a continued, if lessening, reliance on nuclear deterrence if only as a reluctant fact – even as actions are pursued toward its vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The Post-Cold War Visionaries focus explicitly on the residual *risks of a nuclear-weapon-free world*. They are very concerned about the risk of cheating, the challenges of verification, and the uncertainties of enforcement and compliance. That concern partly explains their questions about whether such a world can be fully realized. However, particularly contrasted with the Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists, this perspective judges that the risks of a nuclear-weapon-free world – or even a world of residual nuclear-weapon capabilities – would be less than the risks of the future nuclear-weapon world that they see on the horizon.

Most Post-Cold War Visionaries share the judgment of the two preceding perspectives that there is a strong and compelling *linkage between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation*. Not only do they believe that the distinction between nuclear haves and have-nots ultimately is not sustainable, they are also concerned that reliance on nuclear deterrence at the least provides rationales for new countries to acquire nuclear weapons. Unlike other perspectives, this perspective also emphasizes the benefits of making progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free world in gaining international support from NNWS for strengthened non-proliferation actions.

While highlighting the importance of changed perceptions of the role and utility, benefits and risks, security and insecurity of nuclear weapons, the Post-Cold War Visionaries focus heavily on the *conditions, enablers, or building blocks* of progress toward and, more importantly, achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. A wide range of security, political, military, and institutional changes are variously referenced, from creating a security environment conducive to nuclear disarmament, to robust international mechanisms to detect and, if necessary, respond to non-compliance. The Post-Cold War Visionaries, however, differ among themselves as to whether changing perceptions of nuclear weapons is a matter of creating such conditions, enablers, and building blocks (and changed perceptions will follow) or primarily of encouraging officials in nuclear-weapon states to recognize the great risks inherent in nuclear weapons and act accordingly (with progress not contingent on conditions) – or both.

A comprehensive menu of *near-term action* priorities is identified by the Post-Cold War Visionaries, though each specific recommendation is not supported by all proponents. Those priorities range from reducing the role and risk of use of nuclear weapons, to highlighting the infrastructure and supporting activities needed for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

### ***The Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders<sup>7</sup>***

The *overall judgment* of the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders affirms support for a nuclear-weapon-free world as the historic, long-term, and ultimate goal of the NPT. At the same time, this perspective strongly judges that the political-security-strategic conditions of a nuclear-weapon-free world are not present today and not readily visible. Cooperation is needed to advance those conditions and create a security environment conducive to phased nuclear disarmament progress in a manner that ensures undiminished security and maintains stability for all countries.

Regarding their *underlying assessment*, the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders – most often explicitly, sometimes by their actions – judge that in the current strategic context nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are necessary and legitimate means of their security. In their assessment, the *benefits* of nuclear weapons for meeting a variety of security challenges continue to outweigh the *risks*. Many of them explicitly argue that the existence of nuclear weapons played an important role in the lack of conflict between the major powers during the Cold War. Nonetheless, the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders overall acknowledge the risks of reliance on nuclear deterrence as a means of security – during the Cold War and going forward. At the same time, they often are much more concerned than even the Post-Cold War Visionaries about the risks that would remain in a nuclear-weapon-free world. Those risks are seen to include that of renewed great power conflict and the emergence of a nuclear-armed revisionist aggressor.

Unlike all of the preceding perspectives, some of the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders are explicitly skeptical of the posited linkage between *nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation*. The actions and statements of other proponents on related issues strongly suggest that they share this skepticism. Specifically, the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders are unconvinced that a world of nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots is not sustainable. Citing cases of past proliferation, proponents of this perspective also argue that there is little empirical evidence that those countries' decisions were impacted by the state of

### ***Near-Term Action Priorities – Post-Cold War Visionaries***

- *Reduce role and risk of use of nuclear weapons – for example, increase decision time, no launch on warning, additional de-alerting, remove warheads from delivery vehicle; no planning for massive retaliation, reciprocal no-first-use, sole purpose doctrine; affirm nuclear war must not be fought, cannot be won; consolidate/no deployments of forward-based NSNW systems, secure nuclear weapon materials, strengthen non-nuclear deterrence*
- *Pursuit of supporting disarmament agreements – for example, CTBT EIF and nuclear testing moratorium; FMCT; NSAs; transparent, irreversible, and verifiable nuclear reductions; limits on missile defense limits/space activities; Nuclear Free Zones*
- *“Infrastructure” and supporting activities for a nuclear-weapon-free world – for example, verification research and development, greater nuclear transparency; strengthen compliance and enforcement mechanisms; prevent proliferation and ensure no access to nuclear weapons by terrorists; international or multilateral management of the nuclear fuel cycle, including international approaches*

nuclear disarmament. They also see no evidence that greater nuclear disarmament success results in a greater readiness of NNWS to support steps to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

The Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders stress the importance of international cooperation to put in place two broad sets of *conditions or prerequisites* for progress toward the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world – if not its ultimate achievement. The first set of conditions addresses changes of the international security environment or strategic context needed to convince today’s countries with nuclear weapons that they are able to relinquish those weapons completely. A long menu is put forward, from easing tensions, resolving conflicts, and strengthening trust, to resolving proliferation challenges. (Also see the accompanying text box on “near-term priorities.”)

The second set of conditions focuses on what is seen as necessary to ensure security and stability for all countries in a nuclear-weapon-free world. Along with necessary verification measures, particular emphasis is placed on a need for robust and effective collective security institutions, norms, and processes of collective security based on the UN Charter and great power cooperation to respond to violators and non-compliance. Ranging from agnostic to skeptical, the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders are not prepared to rule out creating these conditions over a long period of time – or at the least, achieving sufficient geopolitical changes to make possible incremental and continuing step-by-step progress toward the nuclear-weapon-free world envisaged by the NPT.

The *near-term action priorities* put forward among the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders fall into four broad areas: sustaining nuclear deterrence; reducing nuclear dangers; rebuilding great power cooperation; and not least, intensified and practical cooperation among all countries to put in place the conditions and to overcome the structural obstacles for progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free world. Within these broad areas, however, there are differences among this perspective’s proponents, both in support of specific actions and in their more detailed definitions of what some actions would require.

***Near-Term Action Priorities –  
Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders\****

- *Sustain nuclear deterrence*
- *Nuclear risk reduction measures* – for example, sustain non-use of nuclear weapons and reduce role of nuclear weapons; no-first-use commitments; increase nuclear decision-time and effective warning systems; extreme circumstances doctrine; ensure nuclear security; develop code of responsible nuclear conduct
- *Rebuild great power cooperation* – ameliorate conflicts, rivalries, and tensions; address today’s strategic and other military issues and concerns; resolve compliance issues
- *Create conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free world* – for example, ease tensions, build trust, and ameliorate conflicts/confrontations among and between states; restore multilateral dialogue; resolve proliferation challenges – build non-proliferation confidence; resume U.S.-Russia reductions – no increased nuclear deployments by other NWSs or engagement of all NWS; no nuclear sharing; pursue new supporting agreements: FMCT; finalize NFZs; sustain nuclear testing moratorium; CTBT EIF; reaffirm and extend NSAs; create institutions and infrastructure: strengthened transparency; effective and credible verification; build and demonstrate credible and effective collective security infrastructure; revitalize disarmament architecture; constraints on sensitive technology exports; address civilian nuclear fuel cycle risks

\* Some of these action priorities are not supported by every proponent of this perspective.

### ***The Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists<sup>8</sup>***

The Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists acknowledge the repeated international endorsement of a world without nuclear weapons. However, their *overall judgment* is that it is extremely doubtful whether the conditions needed to create a nuclear-weapon-free world ever can be realized and at least for some of them, that it likely would be more, not less, dangerous.

Even more so than the immediately preceding two perspectives, the *underlying assessment* of this perspective judges that nuclear weapons deterred a conventional World War III. The Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists go on to argue that nuclear weapons continue to make a central contribution to moderating great and regional powers, preventing conflict escalation, and avoiding major war. Closely related, this perspective warns of heightened vulnerabilities for countries facing persistent non-nuclear imbalances in a nuclear-weapon-free world, as well as potential losses of sovereignty for middle nuclear powers in that world.

The Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists are concerned about an increased *risk of use* of nuclear weapons in today's world and, like all of other perspectives, stress the importance of ensuring that nuclear weapons are not used again. However, their response emphasizes not nuclear disarmament, but credible strategic and extended deterrence.

This perspective shares the view that preventing additional nuclear proliferation is extremely important. But making arguments very similar to those of the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders, it dismisses any posited *linkage between progress toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation*. If there is any linkage between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the Nuclear Weapon-Free World Rejectionists continue, that linkage runs in the opposite direction: Pursuit of nuclear disarmament at the expense of extended nuclear deterrence may enhance proliferation incentives.

Even more so than the Nuclear Disarmament Condition-Builders, the Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists contend that a fundamental transformation of world politics, with the complete replacement of the state system that emerged in the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century, is the *condition* for eliminating nuclear weapons. Some proponents go even further to argue that only by changing human nature would it be possible to eliminate conflict and the use of force among nations – and nuclear weapons.

This perspective's top *near-term action priority* is sustaining nuclear deterrence to reduce nuclear dangers and avoid major power conflict. At the same time, the Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists are ready to consider other measures to ensure continued non-use of nuclear weapons if compatible with sustaining deterrence. They also express a cautious but skeptical readiness to consider limited arms control measures as an adjunct to nuclear deterrence.

#### ***Near-Term Action Priorities – Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Rejectionists***

- *Sustain nuclear deterrence* to reduce nuclear dangers and ensure non-use, for example – enhanced flexibility and resilience to deter any nuclear use
- *Rejection of proposals for doctrine and posture changes* – no first use, sole purpose, shift from launch under attack
- *Limited arms control* measures that sustain deterrence – for example, transparency and predictability measures; verification and enforcement – bilateral agreements; no ratification of CTBT



## **Identifying Areas of Convergence for Cooperative Engagement**

The Global Enterprise seeks to identify possible opportunities for cooperative engagement among all NPT Parties. Despite the disagreements, this paper's sketch of different perspectives on a nuclear-weapon-free world suggests that such possibilities exist. Across this spectrum of perspectives, there also are significant areas of convergence. These potential areas of agreement are even more apparent at this spectrum's core (with many of the Go-it-Alone Prohibitionists also considered as wearing their Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalist hats).

There is agreement, for example, on the risk inherent in nuclear weapons, including a possible failure of nuclear deterrence; the importance of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons; the historic commitment of all NPT Parties to pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world; the greater safety of a world without nuclear weapons if it can be realized and needed verification and compliance mechanism built; and on many broad action priorities. Moreover, sometimes lost in the debate, there also is agreement – often explicit, sometime implicit – that the most fundamental challenge in moving toward a nuclear-weapon-free world is changing perceptions of nuclear weapons. On this latter point, nonetheless, there is disagreement as to whether changing perceptions depends primarily on encouraging a recognition of the great dangers of nuclear weapons or on creating conditions, enablers, and building blocks. But as long as condition-building is not used as an excuse for inaction, there is no inconsistency between calling for nuclear disarmament action based on the dangers of nuclear weapons and supporting efforts to create a regional and global environment more congenial to resumed pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Against this background, the challenge for the NPT community is to rebuild habits of cooperation in light of these areas of convergence. Doing so offers the best opportunity to advance shared interests in a robust and credible NPT.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> This paper's description of these five perspectives is based on a comprehensive selection and review of speeches, statements, working papers, studies, and other materials prepared over the past two decades. Every effort has been made to cover the breadth of the ongoing debate. Although there undoubtedly are other specific references that with more time could have also been included, doing so would not have significantly changed the basic analysis.

<sup>2</sup> Given this paper's more practical purpose and for ease of reading, I have described the different perspectives without the use of direct quotations and extensive footnoting. I here acknowledge my dependence on the many specific sources that are cited at the start of each of the following sections.

<sup>3</sup> For this perspective see *inter alia*: Beatrice Fihn, "The Logic of Banning Nuclear Weapons," *Survival* vol. 59, no. 1, pp.43-50; "Ban Nuclear Weapons Now," ICAN; Statement by Ambassador Alexander Marschik, United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, leading to their total Elimination," March 27, 2017; Dr. Nick Ritchie, "The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: delegitimizing unacceptable weapons" in Shatabhisha Shetty and Denitsa Raynova (eds.), *Breakthrough or Breakpoint? Global Perspectives on the Nuclear Ban Treaty*, European Leadership Network, Global Security Special Report, December 2017, hereafter cited as ELN, *Breakthrough or Breakpoint?*, pp. 47-51; Tom Sauer, "Whether you like it or not, the Nuclear Ban Treaty is here to stay: a reply to Brad Roberts," European Leadership Network, 29 March 2018; Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer, "The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience," *Survival*, vol. 60, no. 2, pp. 61-72.

<sup>4</sup> For this perspective see *inter alia*: Hans Blix, Chair, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms*, Stockholm Sweden, 1 June 2006; Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs, International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, *Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers*, Canberra/Tokyo, 2009 – the so-called Canberra Commission (also included below); "Elements of a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons," Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.15, 23 March 2018; "Nuclear Disarmament," Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.17, 23 March 2018; "Nuclear Disarmament," Working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States, NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP 35, 20 April 2018; "Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: reiterating the urgency of its implementation," Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa), NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP. 13, 15 March 2018; Sameh Aboul-Enein, "The Roadmap to Total Nuclear Disarmament," in George Perkovich and James M. Acton (editors), *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), pp. 271-286; Jonathan. Schell, "The Power of Abolition," in Perkovich and Acton, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-162; Angela Kane, "Response to Lewis A. Dunn's Proposal of 'Strategic Elimination,'" in "Symposium: The Strategic Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," *The Nonproliferation Review*, November-December 2017, Volume 24, Numbers 5-6, pp. 471-477; Pan Zhenqiang, "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why not Outlaw Them First?" in Perkovich and Acton, pp. 249-264.

<sup>5</sup> See, *inter alia*, on this perspective: George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons", *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007; George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World", *The Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 2008; George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent", *The Wall Street Journal*, January 19, 2010; George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation", *The Wall Street Journal*, March 7, 2011; George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Pace of Nonproliferation Work Today Doesn't Match the Urgency of the Threat", *The Wall Street Journal*, March 5, 2013; Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs, International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, *Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers*, Canberra/Tokyo, 2009 – the so-called Canberra Commission;

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James E. Goodby, "The Nuclear Dilemma: Constants and Variables in American Strategic Policies" in George P. Shultz and James E. Goodby, *The War that Must Never be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence*, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2015), pp. 57-80; Steven Pifer, "A Realist's Rationale for a World without Nuclear Weapons," in Shultz and Goodby, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-107; and James E. Goodby, "Creating the Conditions for a World without Nuclear Weapons," in Shultz and Goodby, *Op.cit.*, pp. 473-501; Lewis A. Dunn, "The strategic elimination of nuclear weapons: an alternative global agenda for nuclear disarmament," *The Non-Proliferation Review*, Volume 24, Numbers 5-6, November-December 2017, pp. 401-434; George Perkovich and James M. Acton, "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons" Adelphi Paper 396 in George Perkovich and James M. Acton, *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-132; "A progressive approach to a world free of nuclear weapons: revisiting the building blocks paradigm," Working paper submitted by Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain," Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations, "A/.AC/286/WP.9, 24 February 2016.

<sup>6</sup> Given its proposed minimization point and caution on whether a nuclear-weapon-free world can be realized, the Canberra Commission Report also is included here as well as within the Nuclear Disarmament Traditionalists where many of its elements fall.

<sup>7</sup> For this perspective see *inter alia*: "Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND)," Working paper submitted by the United States of America, NPT/CONF.2020/PCII/WP.30, 18 April 2018; Christopher A. Ford, "NPT Wisdom for a New Disarmament Discourse," Remarks at the Ploughshares Fund Conference, "Nuclear Weapons Policy in a Time of Crisis," October 26, 2017; William J. Perry, Chairman, James R. Schlesinger, Vice-Chairman, *America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009); Brad Roberts, "Ban the Bomb? Or Bomb the Ban? Next Steps on the Ban Treaty," European Leadership Network, Global Security Policy Brief, March 2018; Vladimir Yermakov, "Statement at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," April 24, 2018; Vadim Smirov, "Statement at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 1 nuclear disarmament), April 26, 2018; Paul Schulte, "The UK, France and the Nuclear Ban Treaty," in as ELN, *Breakthrough or Breakpoint?*, pp. 19-25;; Alice Guitton, "Statement at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – Cluster I: Nuclear Disarmament", 25 April 2018. "Statement by the United Kingdom", Pillar I, 2018 Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 26 April 2018; "Statement by Chinese Delegation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference – On Nuclear Disarmament", 26<sup>th</sup> April,,2018

<sup>8</sup> For this perspective see *inter alia*: Franklin Miller, "Disarmament and Deterrence: A Practitioner's View" in Perkovich and Acton, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-156; John S. Foster and Keith B. Payne, "What Are Nuclear Weapons For?" *Forum on Physics and Society of the American Physical Society*, October 2007, Vol. 36, No. 4; Keith Payne, Study Director, John S. Foster, Chairman, Senior Review Group, *A New Nuclear Review for a New Age*, National Institute for Public Policy, April 2017; Bruno Tertrais, "The 'humanitarian dimension' of nuclear disarmament: a legitimate debate?" Note no. 12/2015, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, June 1, 2015.