The Delivery Systems Threat

How missiles, bombers and drones raise the stakes of weapons of mass destruction and disruption

The spread of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons may pose a grave threat, but these weapons are only one part of the story. To use or threaten to use a weapon of mass destruction, a country, or a terrorist group, needs to deliver it to its target. That’s where ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, drones, and even trucks or ships enter the picture. Delivery systems determine how, when and against whom a country—or a non-state actor—can use these deadly and disruptive weapons.

Learn about the threat posed by various delivery systems, and especially missiles, to global security

 

What types of delivery systems exist?

The most common types of delivery systems for a country seeking the means for WMD delivery are ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft (often, but not exclusively, bombers), and un-crewed aerial vehicles (also known as “drones”). Non-state actors may pursue cruder methods due to ease of access and opportunity.

Proliferation Concerns

Today, missiles are the preferred delivery system among states globally, with more than 50 countries capable of producing missiles indigenously or through collaboration with other countries. A number of non-state actors including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis also have or are pursuing missile capabilities.

Review the state of global missile and missile defense capabilities with CNS’s Missile and Missile Defense Databases.

 

 

Numerous countries benefited from the widespread availability of short-range Soviet “Scud” missiles in the 1970s and 1980s and learned how to re-produce, modify and improve them. Through “reverse-engineering” like this, many countries have produced new missiles of their own. Some countries—like North Korea—have shown they are willing to sell designs, parts and expertise for financial gain. Whichever path a country chooses, it’s not easy. That’s why most countries don’t start from scratch. But even with a head start, a country can’t simply rely on the internet or documentation; it must develop or recruit highly skilled and experienced engineers. Building a missile that can deliver a nuclear warhead is a significant engineering feat.

Ballistic missiles and peaceful space launch vehicles are very similar technologically. Although there are some important differences, several technologies are essential to both, enabling countries to advance their missile capabilities under the cover of peaceful programs, and complicating efforts to control the spread of ballistic missiles.

As recently as 2016, North Korea launched a rocket for the stated purpose of putting a satellite in orbit. There are two key differences between missiles and space launch vehicles: accuracy and the use of re-entry vehicles. Because these hurdles present themselves only after a launch program is already significantly advanced, countries seeking ballistic missile programs can present their rocket programs as peaceful space launch programs to deflect international suspicion while in the procurement, development and testing phases of technologies ultimately intended for offensive military use.

Space launch activities at North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launch Facility provided North Korea with valuable dual-use data and experience toward advancing its ICBM program.

 

Stopping the Spread

Despite the dangers of delivery system proliferation, there are no binding international controls on the spread of missiles or other delivery systems. There are a number of voluntary arrangements that limit the spread of missile technologies, but these are relatively weak. They are supported by diplomatic efforts to discourage the spread of sensitive technologies and block cash from flowing to would-be proliferators.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary association of supplier states established in 1987. Members adhere to export policy guidelines based on a common list of controlled items that can be used to develop missiles. More than 130 states have signed the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) since 2002, which contains politically binding commitments to curb the proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles. The voluntary and non-binding nature of both the MTCR and HCOC renders them weak in curbing proliferation, a phenomenon exacerbated by the fact that countries such as North Korea and Iran have not only circumvented the regimes to build their programs, but are now themselves actively proliferating missile technologies to new countries and non-state actors.

To learn more about the threat posed by various delivery systems to global security, review NTI’s Delivery Systems Tutorial, produced by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

October 26, 2020
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How missiles, bombers and drones raise the stakes of weapons of mass destruction and disruption

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright 2020.