

2013

CO-CHAIRS' SUMMARY

# Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region

REPORT PREPARED FOR

*Presidents, Prime Ministers, Parliamentarians, and Publics*

Des Browne, European Leadership Network

Wolfgang Ischinger, Munich Security Conference

Igor Ivanov, Russian International Affairs Council

Sam Nunn, Nuclear Threat Initiative

© 2013 Nuclear Threat Initiative

The views in this publication are the co-chairs' own and do not reflect those of NTI, its Board of Directors, or other institutions with which the co-chairs and participants are associated.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the copyright holder.

For permissions, e-mail [contact@nti.org](mailto:contact@nti.org)

# I. EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

In 1959, Charles de Gaulle's vision of a Europe that stretched from the Atlantic to the Urals—a geographic and political space that includes the European community of nations, Russia, and the United States—was provocative and inspiring. More than 50 years later, a new approach to security in the Euro-Atlantic region is needed to fulfil de Gaulle's vision.

No nation or alliance benefits from persistent inaction in defining a fresh approach to Euro-Atlantic security. At a time of unprecedented austerity and tight national budgets, our publics are literally paying the price for this policy failure—let us call it what it is—which needlessly raises costs for defence and misdirects resources away from fiscal demands, domestic priorities, and emerging security challenges and threats.

In the area of nuclear weapons alone, the potential price tag is breathtaking. The United States is poised to embark on programmes to build new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines and strategic bombers at a cost of more than US\$400 billion and to extend the life of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe at a cost of US\$10 billion. Russia reportedly plans to spend Rub 1.9 trillion over the next decade to modernise its strategic nuclear forces, while the United Kingdom

estimates the cost of Trident replacement at £25 billion.<sup>1</sup>

Why, two decades after the Cold War ended, must the United States, along with Russia, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and other European countries, spend hundreds of billions of dollars, roubles, euros, and pounds in response to these tensions, while both local and national leaders face a growing list of fiscal

<sup>1</sup> Estimates relating to the costs for maintaining and modernising nuclear forces in the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom vary. See "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Budget: An Overview," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, March 7, 2013, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/us-nuclear-weapons-budget-overview/>; I. Kearns, "Beyond the United Kingdom: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States," Discussion Paper 1 of the BASIC Trident Commission, British American Security Information Council, November 2011, <http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/commission-briefing1.pdf>; and D. Priest, "The B61 bomb: A case study in costs and needs," *The Washington Post*, 17 September, 2012.

*Although much of the global security discussion today revolves around Asia, there remains an urgent need for a new strategy for building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region.*

demands and unmet needs? Recognising that there is an inherent limit to nuclear reductions if some nuclear-weapon states are building up their inventories or if new nuclear powers emerge, might a new approach to Euro-Atlantic security not only reduce these staggering costs, but also improve security for all peoples in the Euro-Atlantic region?

The most significant obstacle in the way of achieving this goal remains a lack of trust, fuelled by historical animosities and present uncertainties in the European and global security landscape. This corrosive lack of trust undermines political and military cooperation, increases bilateral and multilateral tensions, and threatens to derail hopes for improving the lives of people across the region.

Although much of the global security discussion today revolves around Asia, there remains an urgent need for a new strategy for building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region—an area that includes six of the world's 10 largest economies, four of the five declared nuclear-weapon states, and more than 95 percent of global nuclear inventories. Today, the common interests of nations in the Euro-Atlantic region are more aligned than at any point since the end of World War II. It would be a tragic mistake, however, to assume that the window for developing a new strategy for building mutual security will remain open forever. We must seize the opportunity and move now.

Over the past year, more than 30 senior political, military, and security experts from the Euro-Atlantic region have worked together to address this challenge and produce a report that recommends a fresh approach, one that could be developed jointly by all nations in the Euro-Atlantic region. ***The key to this strategy is a new continuing process of dialogue mandated by the highest political levels, where security could be discussed comprehensively and practical steps could be taken on a broad range of issues.***

*Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Report Prepared for Presidents, Prime Ministers, Parliamentarians, and Publics* outlines objectives and steps that could be discussed as part of this new dialogue in six areas (nuclear forces, missile defences, prompt-strike forces, conventional forces in Europe, cybersecurity, and space). The four of us—joined by our distinguished military and civilian colleagues associated with this initiative—believe this new approach for building mutual security can move Europe, Russia, the United States, and, ultimately, other regions towards a safer and more stable form of security with decreasing risks of conflict and greater cooperation, transparency, defence, and stability worldwide.

The report's key findings and illustrative matrix of steps follow. The full report, in Russian and English, is available at [www.BuildingMutualSecurity.org](http://www.BuildingMutualSecurity.org).

## II. KEY FINDINGS

The following six recommendations provide a foundation for building a new strategy through dialogue and practical steps.

**1. A new dialogue on building mutual security must address core security issues through a dynamic process that directly deals with key divides.** A fresh approach to building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region could ensure that all states confront one another's fears and distrusts and that lingering divides are effectively bridged. The goal would be to understand and address different threat perceptions; decrease risks of conflict; and increase security, cooperation, transparency, mutual defence, and stability for all nations.

This approach to building mutual security could facilitate progress on a broad range of issues. If all parties believe that a serious dialogue is underway to understand and deal with different threat perceptions, the parties can make progress, recognizing that these issues are all related to overall security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.

**2. Political leaders must mandate the dialogue.** Establishing a politically mandated dialogue in which senior civilian and military leaders are continuously engaged is the crucial first step. In its absence, no institution or forum is likely to succeed in developing a new approach to Euro-Atlantic security. This initiative is not likely to spring up from existing official institutions

and bureaucracies. A successful process will require that heads of state or heads of government (whichever is appropriate) in Moscow, European capitals, and Washington mandate the dialogue between civilian and military leaders.

Such a mandate could help create the essential positive dynamic for discussions that would further boost what must be a systematic effort to deepen cooperation and mutual understanding. As part of this dialogue, nations could discuss a range of practical, concrete steps relating to core security issues that together could increase transparency, mutual understanding, decision time for political leaders in extreme situations, and mutual defence capabilities.

***A framework to advance dialogue could include increasing leadership decision time.*** The new dialogue on building mutual security could address practical steps to increase decision time and crisis stability for leaders, particularly during heightened tensions and extreme situations. Taking surprise or short-warning fears off the table by mutual understandings and subsequent agreements would significantly improve stability, particularly in a potential crisis.



## PROPOSED GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR SUCCESSFUL DIALOGUE

- Considering offence and defence, nuclear and conventional weapons, and cybersecurity in a new security construct
- Reducing the role of nuclear weapons as an essential part of any nation's overall security posture without jeopardizing the security of any of the parties
- Creating robust and accepted methods to increase leadership decision time during heightened tensions and extreme situations
- Transitioning from the remnants of mutual assured destruction to mutual understanding to mutual early warning to mutual defence to mutual security
- Enhancing stability by increased transparency, cooperation, and trust

To get started, leaders from a core group of Euro-Atlantic nations could appoint an informal Euro-Atlantic Security Contact Group, perhaps joined by a representative from the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The purpose of the Contact Group would be to develop recommendations to leaders on key points, including the principles guiding this new dialogue, the civilian and military leaders who should be charged with this new responsibility, the issues to be addressed, and any early priorities.

Leaders could then meet to initiate the new dialogue on building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region, informed by the recommendations of the Contact Group. This meeting would provide a clean launch to a new process and new approach. Leaders could make clear that they seek to develop a process that will respond more quickly to changing technological and

political developments and will avoid rigid linkages that can result from a situation where every nation insists that their issues be addressed first or resolved before any others.

The dialogue could then proceed in both concept and practice in other tracks, including new ones, with the continuing involvement of leaders and the Contact Group. Existing tracks—such as the Russia-NATO Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation in the OSCE—could provide avenues for advancing specific issues. Some issues may be bilateral, involving neighbouring states; other issues might be multilateral, involving certain regions of Europe; and still other issues might be applicable throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and have broad implications for Asia and other regions, meaning that China and other key states will need to be engaged and their perspectives taken into account. Other existing agreements and decision-making mechanisms also could be considered. Clearly, the United States and Russia would have to work bilaterally to begin and advance key elements of this agenda.

**3. Core principles should guide the new dialogue on building mutual security.** Implementing the approach to building mutual security described in this report should be guided by a set of core principles consistent with the development of a flexible, phased, consultative approach to building mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region. These guiding principles could include

- Considering offence and defence, nuclear and conventional weapons, and cybersecurity in a new security construct
- Reducing the role of nuclear weapons as an essential part of any nation's overall security posture without jeopardizing the security of any of the parties
- Creating robust and accepted methods to increase leadership decision time during heightened tensions and extreme situations
- Transitioning from the remnants of mutual assured destruction to mutual understanding to mutual early warning to mutual defence to mutual security
- Enhancing stability by increased transparency, cooperation, and trust

**4. The dialogue could support specific steps that would not require new legally binding treaties but could help facilitate treaties where necessary.** The objective of the dialogue would be to develop practical steps that could be taken through politically binding arrangements. This approach could create a positive dynamic for discussions among member states of the Euro-Atlantic region and further boost what will be a continuing effort in the years ahead to deepen cooperation. Such an approach could also

- Inform negotiation of any new legally binding treaties and improve prospects for their approval by legislatures and parliaments
- Include efforts to adjust or update existing treaties and agreements to ensure that they are appropriate to the current security environment

**5. Priorities will be essential for making progress.** The approach recommended in this report is meant to be applied broadly. It could cover nuclear forces, missile defences, prompt-strike capabilities, conventional forces, cybersecurity, and space, as well as their relevant domains (e.g., air, sea, land, and space).

Within this flexible framework for dialogue, priorities could be established and progress implemented in phases over the next 15 years. Over time, increasing transparency, awareness, decision time in extreme situations, and capabilities for cooperative defence—both active and passive—could increase trust, build confidence, and provide a foundation for subsequent steps.

Issues relating to nuclear weapons and missile defence should receive the highest priority in the first five years, with a premium on the early implementation of options that will increase transparency, confidence, and trust. However, it should also be possible to take steps relating to conventional forces, cybersecurity, and space during the initial phase. In all instances, practical progress in one area will help catalyze progress in others. Specific illustrative steps with phasing are laid out in Section III of this summary.

**6. A new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum could be established to implement many of the specific steps proposed in this report and further ongoing discussions.** A principal recommendation of this report is that although existing structures can and should be used and improved where necessary, a new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum that begins with a new process of dialogue could

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A new dialogue on building mutual security must address core security issues through a dynamic process that directly addresses key divides.
2. Political leaders must mandate the dialogue.
3. Core principles should guide the new dialogue on building mutual security.
4. The dialogue could support specific steps that would not require new legally binding treaties but could help facilitate treaties where necessary.
5. Priorities will be essential for making progress.
6. A new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum could be established to implement many of the specific steps proposed in this report and further ongoing discussions.

be established. Such a forum could play a crucial role in (a) implementing key steps once agreements have been reached and (b) sustaining the dialogue on building mutual security. The establishment of this new forum also could elevate the profile of this new initiative and help symbolise and instil this fresh approach to building mutual security. Specifically, the forum could

- Provide a mechanism for implementing many of the specific steps discussed in this report relating to nuclear forces, missile defence, prompt-strike capabilities, conventional forces, cybersecurity, and space. For example, the forum could begin as a venue for establishing Missile Defence Cooperation Centres and later for implementing reciprocal transparency and confidence-building measures relating to nuclear forces, or the pooling and sharing of data relating to cyberthreats
- Provide an integrating platform across all potential military domains—land, sea, air, and space
- Over time, be used as a venue for discussions between civilian and military specialists on core Euro-Atlantic security issues, such as comparison and development of joint threat assessments, both regionally and globally; military doctrines; and so forth

In summary, addressing core security issues within the unifying policy framework of a dialogue for building mutual security could yield an historic and long overdue transformation in Euro-Atlantic security. Most important, the process could assist all parties in overcoming many of the political fears and divides that have bogged down progress in the past. ***It could also provide an important impetus to cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region on an even broader front, including economics, energy, and other vital areas of the globalization process.***



## III. THE ROAD AHEAD: PRIORITIES AND PHASING

A new, continuing process of dialogue mandated by the highest political levels, where security could be discussed comprehensively and practical steps could be agreed upon and taken on a broad range of issues, is the critical first step and the necessary foundation for building mutual security.

The following includes practical steps that are examined by a group of experts as part of this initiative and that could be considered as part of a new dialogue. Of course, once governments launch the official process, the actual steps, priorities, and phasing would be decided by participating nations.

### NUCLEAR FORCES

#### YEARS 1–5

- Commit to remove all nuclear weapons from prompt-launch status globally over the next 10–15 years. As a first step in this gradual process, the United States and Russia could remove a percentage of strategic nuclear warheads operationally deployed today from prompt-launch status as early as possible.
- Implement reciprocal transparency, security, and confidence building on tactical nuclear weapons.

- Implement a 50 percent reduction in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons now stationed in Europe, with a target for completing consolidation of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the United States within five years; reciprocal steps by Russia.
- Implement UK-French shadow declarations as a voluntary confidence-building measure.

#### YEARS 6–15

- The United States and Russia limit the number of warheads on prompt-launch status to several hundred deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
- Implement reciprocal confidence-building measures relating to ballistic missile submarines.

- Seek agreement with the United Kingdom and France removing all warheads from prompt-launch status and gain mutual assurances that no nuclear-armed state, in the absence of an actual or imminent threat, will operationally deploy its nuclear weapons on prompt-launch status.
- Remove all warheads from prompt-launch status.

## MISSILE DEFENCES

### YEARS 1-5

- Implement, through the new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum, the establishment of a Missile Defence Cooperation Centre and the pooling and sharing of data and information from early-warning radars and satellites.
- Implement reciprocal transparency measures regarding missile defence systems and capabilities and annual declarations looking ahead 5–10 years (e.g., numbers of silos and mobile launchers, missiles, radars, ships, and so forth).
- Continue joint missile defence exercises.
- Implement written political commitments not to deploy missile defences in ways that would undermine stability.

### YEARS 6-15

- The content and character of future cooperation against longer-range ballistic missile threats—including issues associated with long-range (or strategic) ballistic missiles—would be considered.
- Implement agreements relating to future cooperation against longer-range ballistic missile threats and address concerns relating to the impact of missile defence systems on strategic arms.

## PROMPT-STRIKE FORCES

### YEARS 1-5

- Conceptual discussions would begin in Years 1–5; however, many of the issues associated with prompt-strike forces and the implementation of specific steps would be addressed in Years 6–15.

### YEARS 6-15

- If and as prompt-strike programmes emerge, provide programmatic transparency.
- Implement operational transparency and confidence building, including a system of advance notification and observation (where relevant) of prompt-strike system test launches, prompt-strike forces exercises, and their imminent use.
- Implement reciprocal basing commitments, announcing at which bases and in what numbers prompt-strike forces will be deployed and segregating bases and systems from any nuclear weapons-related activities or deployments, with visits to these bases.

## CONVENTIONAL FORCES

### YEARS 1-5

- Increase evaluation visit quota under the Vienna Document and ensure each participating state can adequately participate; consider regional military liaison missions to conduct Vienna Document observations.
- Expand the application of the Treaty on Open Skies within the OSCE, and allow additional collection capabilities such as digital photography.
- Intensify consultations regarding key Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty-related provisions that could be included in a politically binding agreement applying to all nations in the Euro-Atlantic region.

### YEARS 6-15

- Agree on key CFE Treaty-related provisions essential to building mutual security, and conclude a politically binding agreement to extend and implement these provisions with Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).
- Implement new agreements on conventional forces in Europe with CSBMs.

## CYBERSECURITY

### YEARS 1-5

- Begin discussing and implementing, through the new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum, a process of reporting dangerous events in cyberspace, pooling and sharing data to provide an enhanced cyberthreat picture, and using the Euro-Atlantic Security Forum as a conduit to coordinate and provide other nations with assistance.
- Using the new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum as a venue, senior cyber officials discuss shared approaches to the defence of networks, responses to cyberattacks, and means of strengthening international partnerships to address cybersecurity. This collaboration could include discussions relating to the development of an international agreement or agreements that would limit cyberwar.

### YEARS 6-15

- Implement shared approaches to cybersecurity, including any agreements relating to limiting cyberwar.

## SPACE

### YEARS 1-5

- Implement the Information Exchange pilot project for the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities using the new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum and the Missile Defence Cooperation Centres.

### YEARS 6-15

- Using the new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum as a venue, discuss future transparency and confidence-building measures or legally binding agreements relating to space.

## A NEW EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY FORUM

*A new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum begins with a new process of dialogue mandated by political leaders. That dialogue can lead to agreements on practical steps and further discussions. The forum could play a key role in implementing specific steps and building mutual security.*

### YEARS 1-5

- Within the framework of the new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum, implement the establishment of a Missile Defence Cooperation Centre to provide an enhanced threat picture and notification of missile attack.
- Begin consultations regarding possible steps that could be included in a Euro-Atlantic security regime for conventional forces.
- Report dangerous events in cyberspace, pool and share data to provide an enhanced threat picture, and coordinate assistance.
- Provide a venue for cyber officials to meet to discuss shared approaches to the defence of networks, responses to cyberattacks, and means of strengthening international partnerships to address cybersecurity.
- Implement the Information Exchange pilot project for the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.

### YEARS 6-15

- Discuss future transparency and confidence-building measures or legally binding agreements relating to space.

## PRIORITIES AND PHASING

	NUCLEAR FORCES	MISSILE DEFENCES	PROMPT-STRIKE FORCES
<b>YEARS 1-5</b>	<p>Commit to remove all nuclear weapons from prompt-launch status globally over next 10-15 years; U.S. and Russia remove % of strategic forces off prompt launch.</p> <hr/> <p>Reciprocal transparency, security, and confidence-building on tactical nuclear weapons.</p> <hr/> <p>Fifty percent reduction in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, with a target for completing consolidation of all U.S. TNW in 5 years; reciprocal steps by Russia.</p> <hr/> <p>Voluntary UK-French shadow declarations.</p>	<p>Establish Missile Defence Cooperation Centre through new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum; data sharing from early-warning radars and satellites.</p> <hr/> <p>Reciprocal transparency measures regarding missile defence systems and capabilities with annual updates.</p> <hr/> <p>Continue joint missile defence exercises.</p> <hr/> <p>Written political commitments not to deploy missile defences that would undermine stability.</p>	<p>Begin conceptual discussions.</p>
<b>YEARS 6-15</b>	<p>U.S. and Russia limit number of warheads on prompt-launch status to several hundred.</p> <hr/> <p>Implement reciprocal confidence-building measures relating to ballistic missile submarines.</p> <hr/> <p>UK-France agree to remove warheads from prompt-launch status; gain mutual assurances that no nuclear-armed state, without actual or imminent threat, will deploy nuclear weapons on prompt-launch status.</p> <hr/> <p>Remove all warheads on prompt-launch status.</p>	<p>Consider future cooperation against longer-range ballistic missile threats.</p> <hr/> <p>Implement agreements relating to longer-range ballistic missile threats; address concerns over impact of missile defence on strategic arms.</p>	<p>If and as prompt-strike programmes emerge, provide programmatic transparency.</p> <hr/> <p>Implement operational transparency- and confidence-building, including system of advance notification and observation (where relevant) of test launches, exercises, and imminent use.</p> <hr/> <p>Reciprocal basing commitments; segregating bases and systems from any nuclear weapons-related activities or deployments; base visits.</p>

Indicates a possible agenda item for the Euro-Atlantic Security Forum; other steps also could be included.



CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE	CYBERSECURITY	SPACE	
<p>Increase evaluation visit quota under Vienna Document and ensure full state participation; consider regional military liaison missions.</p> <hr/> <p>Expand Open Skies Treaty within the OSCE; allow additional collection capabilities.</p> <hr/> <p>Intensify consultations on CFE provisions that could be included in politically binding agreement.</p>	<p>Begin reporting dangerous events in cyberspace through new Euro-Atlantic Security Forum; pool and share data; coordinate and provide nations with assistance.</p> <hr/> <p>Discuss shared approaches to: defence of networks; responses to cyberattacks; and strengthening international partnerships.</p>	<p>Implement pilot project for International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities through Euro-Atlantic Security Forum.</p>	<p><b>YEARS 1-5</b></p>
<p>Agree on key CFE provisions essential to building mutual security; conclude politically binding agreement, with CSBMs.</p> <hr/> <p>Implement new agreements on conventional forces in Europe, with CSBMs.</p>	<p>Implement shared approaches to cybersecurity, including agreements relating to limiting cyberwar.</p>	<p>Discuss future transparency and confidence building measures or agreements.</p>	<p><b>YEARS 6-15</b></p>

## IV. CO-CHAIRS AND PARTICIPANTS

### CO-CHAIRS

**Des Browne (United Kingdom).** Lord Browne of Ladyton. Convener, Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Convener, European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. Former Secretary of Defence of the United Kingdom.

**Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany).** Chairman, Munich Security Conference. Global Head of Government Relations, Allianz SE, Munich. Former German Ambassador to the United Kingdom and to the United States. Former German Deputy Foreign Minister.

**Igor Ivanov (Russia).** President, Russian International Affairs Council. Professor, Moscow State Institute for International Relations. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences.

**Sam Nunn (United States).** Co-chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Distinguished Professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology. Former Senator from the state of Georgia.

**Name in blue indicates current or former member of the military.**

### PARTICIPANTS

**Steve Andreasen (United States).** National security consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Lecturer, Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. Former Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, White House National Security Council.

**Robert Berls (United States).** Senior Advisor, Nuclear Materials Security Program. Director, Moscow Representative Office, Nuclear Threat Initiative.

**Charles Boyd (United States).** Starr Distinguished National Security Fellow, Center for the National Interest. Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe. General, U.S. Air Force (retired).

**James Cartwright (United States).** Former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General, U.S. Marine Corps (retired).

**James Collins (United States).** Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Former U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation. Former Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States.

**Vladimir Dvorkin (Russia).** Principal Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Former Head of the 4th Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Former Strategic Missile Forces officer. Major General (retired).



**Viktor Esin (Russia).** Former Chief of Staff, Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation. Colonel General (retired).

**Eugene Habiger (United States).** Distinguished Fellow and Policy Advisor, Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia. Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command. General, U.S. Air Force (retired).

**Armin Hasenpusch (Germany).** Former Vice President, Foreign Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst). Major General (retired).

**Andrei Kortunov (Russia).** Director General, Russian International Affairs Council. President, New Eurasia Foundation.

**Catherine Kelleher (United States).** Senior Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. Professor, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland. Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. Former Representative of the Secretary of Defense to NATO.

**Ian Kearns (United Kingdom).** Chief Executive, European Leadership Network. Former Deputy Chair, independent IPPR Commission on UK National Security. Former Adviser to the UK Parliamentary Committee on National Security Strategy.

**Łukasz Kulesa (Poland).** Head of the Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).

**Valentin Kuznetsov (Russia).** Senior research fellow, Institute of the USA and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN). Former Chief Military Representative of the Russian Federation with NATO. Vice Admiral (retired).

**Pierre Lellouche (France).** Member of Parliament (Deputy of Paris). Member of Paris City Council. Former Minister of State for Europe and Minister of State for Foreign Trade.

**Simon Lunn (United Kingdom).** Consultant on NATO to the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Former Secretary General, NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

**Evgeny Maslin (Russia).** Former Director, 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Colonel General (retired).

**Jeffrey McCausland (United States).** Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Diamond6 Leadership and Strategy, LLC. Distinguished Visiting Professor of Research and Minerva Chairholder, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Colonel, U.S. Army (retired).

**John McColl (United Kingdom).** Former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. General (retired).

**Sergey Oznobishchev (Russia).** Head of Section, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. Director, Institute for Strategic Assessments. Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Sergey Rogov (Russia).** Director, Institute of the USA and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN). Member, Russian Academy of Sciences.

**Joan Rohlfing (United States).** President and Chief Operating Officer, Nuclear Threat Initiative. Former Senior Advisor for National Security and Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, U.S. Department of Energy.

**Volker Rühle (Germany).** Former Minister of Defence of Germany. Former Member of the Bundestag.

**Vyacheslav Trubnikov (Russia).** Former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation. Former Director, Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation. Former Ambassador of the Russian Federation to India. General (retired).

**Erich Vad (Germany).** Brigadier General. Director, Military Policy, Federal Chancellery (serving in his personal capacity).

**Alan West (United Kingdom).** Admiral, the Right Honourable Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC PC ADC. Former Security and Counter-Terrorism Minister in the Home Office. Former First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy.

**Isabelle Williams (United Kingdom).** Co-Director, Nuclear Security Project, Nuclear Threat Initiative.

**Vladimir Yakovlev (Russia).** Former Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Rocket Forces. General (retired).

# Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region: Report Prepared for Presidents, Prime Ministers, Parliamentarians, and Publics

*Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region* is the result of a Track II dialogue among distinguished former senior political leaders, senior military officers, defence officials, and security experts from Europe, Russia, and the United States. Des Browne, Wolfgang Ischinger, Igor Ivanov, and Sam Nunn co-chaired the effort.

The report's key findings and supporting analysis were developed through a series of meetings that began during the Munich Security Conference in February 2012. Members of the group subsequently gathered in Washington, Moscow, and Paris to finalise the report to be presented to political, military, and civil leaders in 2013.

Additional information, including the Russian report and summary materials, is available at [www.BuildingMutualSecurity.org](http://www.BuildingMutualSecurity.org).

## CO-CHAIRS

Des Browne  
(United Kingdom)

Wolfgang Ischinger  
(Germany)

Igor Ivanov  
(Russia)

Sam Nunn  
(United States)

## PARTICIPANTS

Steve Andreasen  
(United States)

Gen. Eugene Habiger,  
USAF, Retired  
(United States)

Pierre Lellouche  
(France)

Joan Rohlfing  
(United States)

Robert Berls  
(United States)

Maj. Gen. Armin  
Hasenpusch, Retired  
(Germany)

Simon Lunn  
(United Kingdom)

Volker Rühle  
(Germany)

Gen. Charles Boyd,  
USAF, Retired  
(United States)

Andrei Kortunov  
(Russia)

Col. Gen. Evgeny Maslin,  
Retired  
(Russia)

Gen. Vyacheslav Trubnikov,  
Retired  
(Russia)

Gen. James Cartwright,  
USMC, Retired  
(United States)

Catherine Kelleher  
(United States)

Col. Jeffrey McCausland,  
USA, Retired  
(United States)

Brig. Gen. Erich Vad  
(Germany)

James Collins  
(United States)

Ian Kearns  
(United Kingdom)

Gen. John McColl, Retired  
(United Kingdom)

Adm. Alan West  
(United Kingdom)

Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin,  
Retired  
(Russia)

Łukasz Kulesa  
(Poland)

Sergey Oznobishchev  
(Russia)

Isabelle Williams  
(United Kingdom)

Col. Gen. Viktor Esin,  
Retired  
(Russia)

Vice Adm. Valentin  
Kuznetsov, Retired  
(Russia)

Sergey Rogov  
(Russia)

Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev,  
Retired  
(Russia)