Title: Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

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Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

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Abstract:

In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

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Outline

• Introduction
• Obstacle One: Defining TNWs
• Obstacle Two: Negotiations
• Obstacle Three: Technical Issues
• The role of the IAEA
• Conclusion
Introduction

• History
  – INF
  – PNIs

• US Domestic Politics
  – New START Senate Ratification

• NATO Politics
  – Strategic Concept
  – DDPR
Obstacle One: Defining TNWs

• How do we discriminate between TNWs and Strategic Nuclear Weapons?
  – Range
  – Yield
  – Delivery Vehicle
Obstacle Two: Negotiations

- Complexity of negotiating arms control treaties would not be lost on a TNW treaty
  - Asymmetry
  - Limits to US bargaining leverage
  - RF limited conventional forces
  - Compromises?
Obstacle Three: Technical Issues

- Issues of employing an effective inspection and verification regime
  - Counting warheads
  - Centralized storage units
  - Overall limit
  - Transparency
IAEA Role

• Is there a role of IAEA involvement in bilateral arms control?
  – Statue
  – Historical precedent
  – Benefits
  – Drawbacks
Conclusion

• Arriving at an acceptable definition of TNWs will require serious discussion between the Russian Federation and the United States.

• Furthermore, creating a verification regime represents a series of substantive challenges, in particular the potential exposure of sensitive information that could be damaging to each states national security.
As also suggested earlier, an alternative approach and one that may allow for the United States and Russia to side step some of the aforementioned issues would be to set a total ceiling on all nuclear weapons, deployed, non-deployed, strategic, and non-strategic.