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CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM

Report of the Meeting organised by the
Centre of International Studies
University of Cambridge
November 18–19, 2002

The participants

Inset left: Sandra D. Melone, European Centre for Common Ground. Inset right: Professor the Rt Hon Shirley Williams, Baroness of Crosby, Liberal Democrat Leader, House of Lords.

Standing (left to right): Merli Baroudi, Economist Intelligence Unit; Peter Cavanagh, Centre of International Studies; Louis McCagg, Centre of International Studies; Dr Brendan Simms, Centre of International Studies; Stephen Fidler, *Financial Times*; Dr Yezid Sayigh, Centre of International Studies; Timothy J. Winter, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge; Steven Simon, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Sitting (left to right): Ged R. Davis, Shell International; Charles B. Curtis, Nuclear Threat Initiative; Lord Wilson of Dinton, GCB, Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge; Professor James Mayall, Centre of International Studies; Ambassador Richard W. Murphy, Council on Foreign Relations.

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INTRODUCTION

Professor Sir Alec Broers
Vice Chancellor, University of Cambridge

MAJOR EVENTS often strengthen our determination to take action; in short, to do things that we otherwise might not have done.

This was clearly illustrated by the Centre of International Studies' response to September 11, which provided the stimulus to establish a new programme to address broader issues of world instability.

It gives me pleasure to introduce this Report summarising the Centre's meeting in November on Catastrophic Terrorism, sponsored by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Especially important are the cross-disciplinary method of analysis which the Centre will use within the University, and its joint efforts with government, the corporate world, and the NGO communities. I commend this important new initiative.

This publication is a result of two days of discussions on the subject of catastrophic terrorism among a group brought together by Cambridge University's Centre of International Studies. The group, which met in November 2002, was chosen for the diversity of its expertise in an effort to draw out new perspectives and policy recommendations to deal with this disturbing phenomenon. The publication aims at summarising a wide-ranging debate, but the views expressed do not necessarily represent those of all the participants.

TOWARD A MORE HOLISTIC RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Charles B. Curtis
President, Nuclear Threat Initiative

FROM THE earliest establishment of societies, human beings have come together to advance common interests and face common threats, but they have done so successfully and sustainably only when convinced that their vital interests depended on activities that could be achieved better through cooperation than individual action, and that the burdens and benefits of cooperation were justly shared.

The quest for economic advancement has always been a driving force for cooperation, but security cooperation – driven by the threat of war and the need for survival – has served as society's most urgent force for collective action. The unprecedented international cooperation necessary to defeat Nazi Germany was prompted by a clear and collective sense that the Allied Nations faced a shared fate and that their very existence was threatened. As Prime Minister Churchill told the British Parliament in May of 1940, "without victory, there is no survival." The Allies' collaboration to win World War II, and the ensuing collaborative projects of the Marshall Fund, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and, of course, the United Nations, stand as examples of the most widespread and successful collaborations in history.

Today, the most likely, most immediate threat to our survival is nothing as obvious as the Nazi menace. Today's danger comes from the specter of terrorists operating on a global stage; our greatest peril is that this malevolent force becomes armed with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. This modern, virulent form of terrorism has demonstrated an intent to advance its political purposes by killing as many innocents as possible. Neutralizing these terrorists and preventing them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction should be the central organizing security principle of the twenty-first century.

The blueprint for the kind of global cooperation required to counter these threats has not been designed. It is a far more complicated effort than the alliance of 60 years ago – involving more allies, more levels of cooperation and a far different enemy. Today's enemy does not have to defend borders, protect people, control territory, take capitals or conquer nations. To win, it only has to destroy, and for that it does not need armies, warplanes, battleships, or tanks. To disrupt the geopolitical order and the conduct of nations, all it needs are nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons – weapons of ultimate terror and disruption.

Victory over this threat will require all countries to work together to track terrorists, block their travel, intercept their communications, cut off their financing, and – most importantly – to deny them access to the world's most dangerous weapons. This will come only if all nations declare this issue their highest national and global security priority, identify and initiate work on the most urgent projects, dramatically increase funding to reflect the relative risk that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons pose to the health, welfare, economy, and security of every nation – and, finally, commit to a campaign of international cooperation that is entirely without precedent in world history.

Unfortunately, building this kind of global cooperation will require surmounting a host of obstacles. For it to succeed, an overwhelming majority of national governments must all perceive a serious and urgent danger that can be defeated only by cooperation, and government leaders must have sustained public support for cooperation. Yet, not all nations and peoples feel equally threatened by the danger of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism. The calculation of who has most to gain from the coalition is merely a question of who has most to lose from terrorism. Without doubt, America, the UK and other G8 nations have the most to lose in this battle against terrorism. So how do nations with much to lose gain the cooperation of those who have less to lose, especially in countries where there is sympathy for terrorists and hostility toward the West?

The fact that people are completely wrong about the cause of their desperation does not protect us from the consequences of their desperation.

Since September 11, many nations, with Great Britain in the lead, have urged far greater investment of development assistance to poor nations – many framing it as a chance to address root causes and prevent the emergence of a new generation of terrorists. Others oppose this approach, contending that such a response would in essence amount to an acknowledgement and acceptance of blame by the US for the attacks of September 11. Many argue that anti-Western resentment comes from pure hate-filled propaganda, pointing out that Osama bin Laden and many of his colleagues come from well-to-do families, not from the depths of poverty. These contrasting, polar views miss the more obvious central truth.

Millions of people whose lives are miserable are taught falsely to blame the West for the failure of their societies. But the fact that people may be completely wrong about the *cause* of their desperation does not protect us from the *consequences* of their desperation.

To acknowledge and act upon this "fact" would not be a concession to terrorists; it would be an effort to reduce grievances the terrorists are trying to exploit. A successful program to improve the quality of life can help cut public support for terrorism, strengthen civil society and give people a taste of the better world the terrorists would take from them.

Debate will continue on the role of root causes – but action need not and should not await a resolution of this debate. It is not necessary to prove that desperation breeds terrorism before you can justify addressing desperation as part of the effort to fight terrorism – you only need to establish the even more obvious truth that countries are not going to partner with us in fighting terrorism unless we partner with them in fighting misery. It is very difficult to get people to address your priorities, if you're not seen to be addressing theirs.

As Kofi Annan has pointed out poignantly in his *Millennium Report* to the United Nations, people around the world are alike in their desire for freedom from want and freedom from fear. It will simply be impossible to engage the world in a fight against the terrorism that might destroy our society if we are not fighting the hunger and disease and conflict that are destroying theirs. Rich and powerful countries will always be resented by poor and powerless countries unless they are using their wealth and power to help the poor and are seen to be doing so.

There is a lot of work to be done here. The *International Herald Tribune* conducted a poll late last year that reported nine in ten Americans believe America is disliked because of its power, but more than half of *non*-Americans said America is disliked because it does too little to help poorer countries. A separate Gallup Poll of nine Muslim nations published in a US newspaper several months later found that only 12 per cent say the West respects Arab or Islamic values. Just seven per cent saw Western nations as fair in their perceptions of Muslim countries. But the key finding, according to a Middle East expert who analyzed the poll, was, and I quote: "the strong feeling of resentment that emanates from a belief that the United States doesn't care about them." Here, I believe, the United States is but a surrogate for the advanced nations of the Western world.

Countries are not going to partner with us in fighting terrorism unless we partner with them in fighting misery.

Our work should be clear – above and beyond all the logistical, technical, strategic and diplomatic efforts that must be part of a global coalition against catastrophic terrorism built on security terms – we must first make a case to the world that we share a common stake in the struggle. This is primary and imperative. Human beings throughout history have often adopted new and ingenious forms of cooperation when all understood that survival depended upon it. But our claim to other nations that we share a common fate will ring hollow and hypocritical if we declare to the developing world that we are all at risk of terrorism, but continue to act as if only they – and not we – are at risk from global poverty, internal conflict, and disease.

In the post-World War II period, we used to talk a great deal about the "community of nations." At the close of the twentieth century, however, nations had lost much of their sense of community, their sense of common purpose, and their sense of mutual responsi-

We must first make a case to the world that we share a common stake in the struggle.

bility to each other. Security in the twenty-first century fundamentally requires a renewed recognition of our common bond and our mutual interdependence. And that interdependence is nowhere more evident than in the global coalition required to mount an effective defense against catastrophic terrorism.

We are gathered today at a great university – a citadel of Western values and learning. So I ask you, how do we bridge the divides between Western and Eastern civilizations? How do we sustain a global effort among nations for ten, 20, or even 50 years when only some nations are seen to be the direct targets of terrorism and many nations must participate in a cooperative effort to stop it? How can we explain in convincing terms that, in our increasingly globalized economy, all will share in the economic consequences of an attack against one; that an attack against even the strongest of the many will have the greatest effects on the poorest of the whole? In short, how do we convincingly define our shared values and develop and invest in a shared course of effective action?

CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM

Stephen Fidler
Chief Reporter, Financial Times

The "War" on Terrorism

ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2001, a day after the most devastating terrorist attacks the world had seen, President George W. Bush described America and "freedom loving people everywhere in the world" as being under threat. The attacks, which killed 3,000 people, "were more than acts of terror," he said. "They were acts of war."

The attacks were carried out by members of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, led by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian exile based in Afghanistan. Over the previous decade, Al Qaeda had trained thousands of Muslim zealots inculcating them with the view that suicide attacks were a legitimate weapon against their enemies.

The President said the greatest threat was posed by the possibility that such a group could gain access to weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology – when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends – and we will oppose them with all our power."

The idea that war can be waged against terrorism has attracted much comment and criticism. The President and his senior officials have repeatedly said that they recognise the conflict cannot be limited to military means. They have spoken of a "new kind of war" that would employ all the tools available to the modern state: law enforcement, diplomacy, "homeland defence", finance and economics. They promised a reorganisation of foreign policy relationships based on whether Washington judged governments to be, in Bush's words, "with us or against us in the fight against terror."

The President has also described the enemy as terrorism "of global reach", suggesting that Washington intended to discriminate between terrorism with local causes and the catastrophic terrorism with ill-defined or apocalyptic objectives of bin Laden and his cohorts. But it is not clear that the distinction has been made in practice.

Certainly, a failure to discriminate has allowed governments confronting terrorism with definite local causes – for example, India over Kashmir, Russia over Chechnya and Israel over the Palestinian territories – to depict their own terrorism problem as analogous

to that posed by Al Qaeda and to align themselves rhetorically with the war on terrorism. This may have strengthened the determination of governments to follow coercive policy approaches, where negotiation in some circumstances may have been warranted, and at the very least has shielded them from Western criticism.

'There is no security-based solution to this security problem.'

Many observers have pointed to the difficulty of waging war against a concept, and argue that it has been something of a policy trap. In spite of Bush's suggestion that it would be a new kind of war, the emphasis has been on pouring resources into the Military and homeland defence. It is a state-centred approach that many think inadequate. "There is no security-based solution to this security problem," said Tim Winter, a lecturer in Islamic Studies at Cambridge University's Faculty of Divinity.

Yet even the military aspect of policy has not always gone well. While the Taliban government, the sponsors of bin Laden's Al Qaeda group, was quickly removed from power in Afghanistan by military action, much of the leadership of Al Qaeda remains at large, due in part to mistakes in the conduct of the military campaign in the mountains near Tora Bora, south-eastern Afghanistan.

Where the military has not been involved, the approach may have achieved even less. A significant international effort to cut off terrorist financing has been, depending on the perspective of the speaker, either a complete failure or hardly a success. Some $112 million had been seized by November 2002 in 500 bank accounts by authorities around the world, but it was clear that this amount was a drop in the bucket of the funds available to terrorists, and that money destined for legitimate charitable purposes may have also been confiscated. Given the evident difficulties of tackling terrorist financing through established Western channels, it is hardly surprising that efforts to understand the role of informal mechanisms, such as *hawala* financing, in providing money for terrorism have yielded little.

Neither have efforts to reshape the views that Muslims may have of the West, and the United States, been successful. Debatably an effort that does not address real or perceived grievances will do little to overcome an image of a country which some of them, however incredible it may seem to many Americans, see as a rogue state. Yet the attempts that have been made, such as the Madison Avenue-style advertising campaign designed to convince Muslims around the world of the freedom enjoyed by their co-religionists in the United States, strike many as jejune.

Even some inside the Bush administration have recognised that the war on terror does not by itself provide an overarching rule for foreign policy in the way that the Cold War did – there are simply too many important issues for which it provides little or no direction. "Counter-terrorism… is a priority, not an organising principle for American foreign

policy," Richard Haass, head of policy planning at the State Department, told a London audience in September. "It will influence the focus of attention and resources and will require that we address other foreign policy challenges, such as state failure and nation building. But counter-terrorism cannot be a doctrine."

Moreover, though the effort to deal with terrorism is being addressed through the state, the relative wherewithal of the state is weakening, accelerated by the advance of science and technology and their rapid spread around the world. This is true even of affluent industrial countries, which evidently cannot guarantee physical protection against terrorists, even within their own borders. But it is even more relevant for weaker states. It is now absolutely clear that failing and failed states can be a breeding ground for terrorism, spreading the external costs of their failure far and wide.

The implication of this weakening of state power is not entirely negative, deriving as it does in part from the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites. But the 1990s saw a number of developments that helped the spread of terrorism, and the capacity of terrorists to wreak devastation: economic migration, a growth of organised crime, drugs and arms trafficking, overt corruption in Russia and the collapse of the "guns, guards and gates" methods of controlling fissile and other dangerous materials. Worrying links are developing among some non-state actors, for example between organised crime and terrorists.

Policy shortcomings

YET SOME of the efforts to reassert the primacy of the state may be fuelling support for terrorism. To some extent, dealing with a new type of security threat is likely to entail some sacrifices of personal freedom. Individuals appear ready to accept searches before they board aircraft, for example. Yet some observers have been surprised with the speed with which US citizens and their legislators have been ready to compromise privacy and personal freedom by tolerating greater government scrutiny of their affairs. Moreover, there are dangers in the decision by the Bush administration to deny some suspected supporters of Al Qaeda prisoner of war status, or access to the criminal justice system. The risk is that such decisions erode the qualities of freedom and the relative impartiality of justice that distinguish the US and its allies from many other states of the past and present. "The more you defend yourself the more you find that the things you stand for are put in danger," said Yezid Sayigh of the Centre for International Studies at Cambridge University.

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A series of related questions are also raised by the conduct of the US outside its own borders. Some critics argue that US exceptionalism – some would say unilateralism – has weakened support for Washington around the world, bringing accusations, however

unjustly, that, in countering the threat to its interests its behaviour has been no better than its enemies. American behaviour in the aftermath of regime change in Iraq will send an important signal to the rest of the world. US conduct in Iraq and in the war on terror could play a large role in determining whether the US will truly be the carrier of values that shape the twenty-first century, and indeed whether many of those values endure.

There is no doubt that the Bush administration's supposed unilateralism has angered some Europeans, stirring latent anti-Americanism and bringing calls for Europe to increase its foreign policy independence from the United States. It would be surprising, given differences of history and geography, Europe's relative proximity to likely trouble spots, and sensitivity to immigration, if differences had not emerged. A separate European vision also has the virtue of weakening the claim that the "Christian" West is conspiring against the Muslim world. But Europe's ability to carve out a separate path is constrained by Europe's lack of military capability, continuing sharp differences among European member states on important foreign policy questions, and the slowness, even where there is relative unity, of the European Union's decision-making processes.

The idea that catastrophic terrorism is solely an American problem is surely belied by events.

Yet many other Europeans do not think a separate path is desirable. Their concern is a widening gulf between Europe and the United States. Some argue that a more avowed and less equivocal commitment to multi-lateralism on Washington's part would be in America's own interest, and help cement the trans-Atlantic partnership. This was an alliance that had, after all, united to overcome the more serious threat posed by the Soviet Union and should be united in confronting the new challenges.

Indeed, the idea that catastrophic terrorism is solely an American problem is surely belied by events. Europe provided the springboard for the September 11 attacks. Alienation among many younger Muslims in Europe is severe, and getting worse in the face of what Baroness Williams of Crosby, Liberal Democrat leader in the House of Lords, has called Europe's "secular apathy". Reflecting this, the number of Muslims in British prisons has doubled over ten years and UK intelligence estimates about 3,000 British males circulated through Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan in the mid- to late-1990s.

One obstacle to developing non-military approaches to deal with the threat posed by catastrophic terrorism is the view, prevalent in Washington, that to speak of addressing the "root causes" of the September 11 tragedy is to reward those who committed the crime. Such reluctance is understandable, perhaps inevitable. In what sense could the 3,000 innocents who lost their lives that day, or their families and loved ones, be to blame for whatever perceived wrongs the United States may have committed in its foreign policy? Indeed, the causes of the Palestinians and Iraqis, the victims of US policy in the

minds of many Muslims, have only relatively recently been adopted rhetorically by the Al Qaeda leadership.

A practical way to address the dilemma posed by this issue has been suggested by Charles Curtis, President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a charity founded to deal with the threats posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. "Millions of people whose lives are miserable are taught falsely to blame the West for the failure of their societies. But the fact that people are completely wrong about the *cause* of their desperation does not protect us from the *consequences* of their desperation. To acknowledge and act upon this 'fact' would not be a concession to terrorists; it would be an effort to reduce the grievances the terrorists are trying to exploit."

Thus, while many agree with President Bush that the combination of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction comprises a threat of a totally new character, few would identify the policy responses as reflecting this quality. "The mere assertion of our leadership has not been very effective," said Richard Murphy, a former senior US diplomat now with the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

The quality of responses may have been limited by the complexity of modern government and the speed in which it has to consider and implement policy. "One of the dangers for governments is that they are guided by their fears and those of the public rather than by rational analysis," said Lord Wilson, the former head of Britain's Civil Service.

Others outside government, less constrained by time, are able to provide a different perspective informed by a variety of disciplines. They can provide a framework for setting policy beyond the short-term, providing a medium- and even long-term view. Yet, according to Curtis, such analyses must be timely because governments are in a race against the clock: "The years of living dangerously are the next one, three, five years. Governments will have to act in that time frame." Nonetheless, it is worth reflecting on the question: What in hindsight will we wish we had done after September 11?

The nature of the threat

THE SEPTEMBER 11 attacks were so devastating in part because modern societies are so highly tuned and depend so much on the smooth functioning of many separate parts. It is not just that we are dependent on technologies that most of us do not understand, but we are dependent on their working almost optimally. Indeed, it does not take a catastrophic terrorist strike to bring modern economies, or important parts of them, to a halt. Just-in-time stocking patterns, for example, have helped to increase productivity, but when they break down – as they did during the UK fuel strike of 2000 – the impact is huge. "We are creating systems and structures that are vulnerable to fairly simple acts," said Lord Wilson, now Master of Emmanuel College at Cambridge University. It raises the question of whether and how we can make our societies more robust.

In this kind of environment, making predictions is hazardous. Even more than is usual, very different outcomes can depend on chance events: the discovery of smuggled fissile material, the capture of a terrorist before he boards an aircraft or as he crosses a border. It places a premium on good intelligence, but as the volume of raw intelligence data grows rapidly, it increases the chance that important information is overlooked.

'The years of living dangerously are the next one, three, five years. Governments will have to act in that time frame.'

Extrapolating from the past is unlikely therefore to provide much help in projecting the future: there are too many "wild cards" in the pack. "I don't think this is straight line territory. This is going around corners," Wilson said.

Given our highly-strung economies, it may be impossible to focus in advance on all the methods that terrorists could use to cause a catastrophe. The willingness of religious zealots to commit suicide is clearly an effective delivery mechanism. Jet fuel has already been turned into a means of mass destruction, and airliners could generate even greater terror if they were to be guided into nuclear installations.

Yet, there is evidence of Al Qaeda's intention to acquire weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and, for the purposes of this discussion, radiological or "dirty" bombs. Though by no means the only one, this is a cause of real concern.

The most likely source of such weapons, the raw material and the expertise to make them are the states of the former Soviet Union, where security at many important sites is questionable. Cooperative threat reduction programmes have been directed at addressing the risks they pose, by the financing of proper security for dangerous materials and legitimate programmes for scientists to reduce the temptation to sell their services to rogue actors. Originally US-financed, these initiatives now have the financial support of the Group of Eight countries and have been broadened to include other states that present proliferation risks. Unfortunately, the US Congress is showing signs of reluctance to continue funding this programme.

Each type of weapon, in fact, poses a different risk, both in terms of the ease with which technologies could be spread to terrorists and of the potential destruction should they be used. At the bottom of the scale of destruction, the deployment of chemical and radiological devices is unlikely to be able to kill more than a few hundred people, though both represent terrorist weapons *par excellence* in the sense they would provoke widespread fear and panic if used in an urban environment. It is not easy, though, to develop a weapon that would effectively disperse a chemical agent in a city. Less complicated may be a radiological bomb, in which conventional explosive is packed around low-grade radioactive material, of which supplies are relatively plentiful. Experts are divided on how

effectively such a device would disperse radioactivity, but it is conceivable that one could render several city blocks unlivable or deny access to symbolic buildings or monuments for generations.

More worrying still is the potential for biological attack, a risk that unfortunately seems likely to grow over time into the biggest threat. The techniques used in making biological weapons are spreading as the bio-technology industry grows around the world. The manufacture of bio-weapons, unlike nuclear weapons, can be relatively simple and easy to hide. Biological attacks could have a wide range of effects, depending in part on whether the agent is infectious. The distribution of anthrax through the mail in the US in late 2001 showed how easily a relatively unsophisticated delivery mechanism could generate panic, but it resulted in only five deaths and 23 suspected cases.

The spreading of smallpox into a largely unvaccinated population would be a different matter, infecting perhaps 80 per cent of those who came into contact with it and killing a third of them. However, since the eradication of smallpox in its natural state in 1979, the distribution of this agent has been officially limited to certain laboratories in the US and Russia. Only if it has leaked from those laboratories or if other governments kept secret reserves of smallpox could it get into the hands of terrorists. Any smallpox attack would also risk backfiring on the organisation responsible, since it would be impossible to target. Because of its extreme contagion, the disease would probably cause as much devastation in poor and Muslim countries as in rich ones, and probably more. Nonetheless, Western governments are preparing for this remote eventuality by buying smallpox vaccines.

'We are creating systems and structures that are vulnerable to fairly simple acts.'

Perhaps of greatest concern is the possibility that some kind of nuclear weapon could fall into the hands of terrorists. The difficulties of manufacturing fissile material are such that they can only be made undetected by states, or under state auspices. Yet the protection afforded weapons-grade nuclear materials, particularly in the states of the former Soviet Union, leaves much to be desired. Though strategic nuclear weapons are relatively secure, tactical nuclear weapons have never been accounted for. Fissile material outside weapons is a source of even more concern: Russia is said to have produced 1,200 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium and 200 tonnes of plutonium. In 2000, it was estimated that just 40 per cent of this material in Russia had been secured. Fifty-eight countries around the world have research reactors. In many of them, criminal syndicates operate.

Once highly-enriched uranium has been obtained – making a plutonium bomb is more difficult – constructing a crude gun-type nuclear device would be relatively simple, particularly if the services of an out-of-work nuclear scientist could be called upon. But it is not the threat of one nuclear bomb that is the greatest concern, though that prospect

is horrific enough in terms of loss of life, it is the prospect that a successful nuclear attack could be followed by blackmail and the threat that others would be detonated.

The probability of a successful nuclear attack by terrorists is low, and it is not even certain that the presumption the group would use nuclear weapons if they had them is correct. Since 1945, possession of nuclear weapons has been useful to states, but the states that have them have not found it in their interests to use them. Yet, given the risk associated with any event is equivalent to the product of the probability of its occurring and its consequences (Risk = Probability x Consequences), it is an eventuality policy makers have to take seriously.

Understanding Al Qaeda

WHILE IT IS widely assumed that Al Qaeda's terrorism campaign is seeking to maximise Western casualties, it has already sought out targets, such as the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, of symbolic significance. Its next objectives could be the destruction of other perceived symbols of Western power, such as the US Congress or the Houses of Parliament, rather than further large-scale slaughter. There is speculation that the group has turned its attention to economic targets, and its own actions and communiqués suggest it is widening its target set to include Washington's allies and Israel.

Yet our understanding of the Al Qaeda organisation, which has been likened to a flock of birds, leaves much to be desired and to depict it as some kind of apocalyptic cult with a membership of madmen motivated by hatred is hardly sufficient.

There is a growing volume of source material to begin a better understanding of the organisation, the link between its threats, motivations, intentions and doctrine. Aspects of its doctrine can be inferred from documents, including a 1,500-page Al Qaeda manual showing exhaustive operational details, videos and communiqués released by Al Qaeda and related groups, and a growing number of interviews with Al Qaeda operatives and fellow travellers. There are also clues from the targets it has chosen. September 11 was not the first attempt at causing mass casualties: in 1993, Al Qaeda made its first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center; in early 1996, the Manila air conspiracy would, if it had been successful, have killed 4,000 people over the Pacific.

The group is dominated by men from Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, from other Gulf states. Pakistanis and Afghans, and a few North Africans and Egyptians, play an important but smaller role. Its adherents appear to be motivated by hatred of the US as a dominant and hegemonic power, but also by the view, in some ways contradictory, that it is irresolute and decadent, unable to take casualties, as demonstrated by its retreats from Lebanon and Somalia. But the linkages among various affiliated groups – for example, in Uzbekistan, Indonesia and Hamburg – are not well understood.

Al Qaeda's initial motivation appears to have been a desire to expel the US from Saudi Arabia and otherwise deter Washington from supporting the House of Saud. Yet if its public statements are meaningful, its objectives have expanded to oppose intervention in Iraq and support for Israel.

Despite what President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair said in the aftermath of September 11, this phenomenon is "about religion". Yet, an explanation of the phenomenon of Al Qaeda must look to socioeconomic and political causes. Its emergence is explained in part by economic difficulties, falling wages and rising unemployment in many Muslim countries. In many countries of the Middle East, there is disappointment that past political and economic promise has yielded little and fundamental problems associated with *rentier* economies are emerging. Signs of hopelessness are growing, fed by a combination of rapid population growth and high youth unemployment. While these economic concerns are real enough, they are being articulated as religious issues. From the Al Qaeda perspective, much of what has happened in the world is testament to Muslim failure and the blame for that failure lies with the corrupt governments of the Islamic world. If this is what has engendered the outraged pride of bin Laden, Islamic scholars believe the Al Qaeda leader has interpreted the scriptures in his own distorted way and disregarded Islamic tradition in issuing his *fatwa*.

'While we think about these things, the problem is metastasising, it's getting worse.'

Yet if our understanding of the phenomenon is growing, it is doing so only slowly. As it does, Al Qaeda is mutating. According to Steven Simon of the International Institute for Strategic Studies: "While we think about these things, the problem is metastasising, it's getting worse."

Factors influencing Al Qaeda's future

BUT HOW IS Al Qaeda changing, and what can be said about its likely development over the next three to five years? To some extent, the answer will be determined by the success of the US-led campaign to kill and capture the current leadership. But there are many other factors that could contribute to changes in the numbers of active operatives, supporters and individuals who acquiesce to its methods. Al Qaeda could conceivably become a political movement or it could splinter, with some members resorting to crime, as have other terrorist groups before it.

The trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is widely considered to have an important influence on the support Al Qaeda will receive in many Muslim countries. That is not to say, however, that a peace settlement would on its own finish Al Qaeda, as is suggested by the fact that the September 11 attacks were planned while the peace process appeared to be making progress. Even if this conflict were resolved, other grievances,

much more localised, would probably emerge. Yet a decision by Israel to reoccupy the Occupied Territories, perhaps in the context of war with Iraq, could help recruitment to its cause. Worse, some extreme Zionists have indicated their wish to destroy the Dome of the Rock, the third holiest site in Islam. Such an action, demonstrating that Islam is not the only religion that generates fundamentalists, would alienate, perhaps irrevocably, the entire Muslim world from Israel and, by extension, the West.

Given the role played in Al Qaeda's development by economic weakness in the oil-dependent Gulf region, the outlook for regional economies is likely to be another important influence on recruitment. On that score, there is little optimism that the economic backdrop will improve much. This is partly because of a sea-change that has taken place in the last 18 months over how the West, in particular the US, thinks about energy. Energy security has moved up the agenda – and that has demanded the emergence of sources of energy outside the volatile Gulf region. During 2001 and 2002, the oil price remained over $20 a barrel, helping to curb demand but also providing a perfect environment for oil producers outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to invest and produce more. Non-OPEC production volumes have increased, with half of that coming out of Russia and significant further volume growth expected. Beyond that, there is the prospect for the rapid development of Iraqi crude. Iraq now produces 2.5 million barrels a day, a figure that, with the end of United Nations sanctions, could double by the end of the decade – assuming the successor regime establishes conditions to attract the massive foreign investment such an expansion would require.

There is no doubt of the central role Saudi policy has played in nurturing the Al Qaeda phenomenon.

Such developments would impose severe disciplines on OPEC, with potentially destabilising consequences both for the oil cartel and its largest producer, Saudi Arabia. The Saudi ruling family has been disturbed by signals from Washington suggesting it wishes to diversify its energy suppliers, fearing it will undermine the tacit accord under which for more than half a century the Saudis have agreed to provide stable energy supplies in return for US security guarantees. These Saudi preoccupations have been reinforced by the knowledge that influential figures in Washington, both inside and outside the Bush administration, see Saudi Arabia as a growing problem for US foreign policy. This view has been reinforced by the fact that 15 out of the 19 September 11 hijackers were Saudis, and the reported difficulties in securing Saudi co-operation in the following months, including efforts to clamp down on Al Qaeda's sources of finance.

Officially, Saudi Arabia is still viewed as a friendly power by Washington, though that stance would be substantially affected by how helpful or obstructive the Saudis prove to be in any US-led war against Iraq. In the medium-term, further uncertainty about Washington's relationship with Saudi Arabia is created by likely changes over the coming

decade in its Saudi leadership. As the children of Ibn Saud, the state's founder, advance in years, there is no understood procedure for how power will be transferred to the next generation, raising the possibility of a bitter struggle within the royal family.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt of the central role Saudi policy has played in nurturing the Al Qaeda phenomenon. The intransigence of Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia has made hardliners look almost middle-of-the-road. It has encouraged, in the words of Tim Winter, an Islamic scholar, the "systematic demonisation of the religious other". The Saudis have humoured fundamentalists for so long that any change will be enormously difficult.

The unwillingness of the Saudi rulers to confront the religious extremism that they have fostered has raised once more in Washington, and further afield, the issue of democracy in the Middle East. If in Saudi Arabia fundamentalism has been nurtured, elsewhere in the region any expression of religious agitation has been vigorously suppressed, pushing people towards extremism. There is a widespread sense of a "democratic deficit" in the region, which means popular will often does not have an expression through the political process. Institutions function poorly and, as a result, governments are not widely trusted and are held to be unreliable.

The idea of "democratisation" in the Middle East has supporters across the political spectrum in the US. There are, in fact, some suggestions of modest opening in the Gulf states. Some small steps towards a more democratic process have taken place in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. Even in Saudi Arabia, some reformist Islamic literature is being permitted into the country and some middle-class businessmen allowed into the *diwan* and the *majlis ash-shura*.

If democracy is to advance further in the Middle East – a question as relevant for other Muslim states such as Pakistan – there is no inevitability that the transition will be smooth. Indeed, the opposite is more likely. Greater democracy would be unlikely to bring about, at least in the short-run, government in the Middle East that is friendlier to Western interests, and could well generate more extremism. "Democracy for them doesn't necessarily equal security for us," said Brendan Simms of the Centre of International Studies at Cambridge.

'Democracy for them doesn't necessarily equal security for us.'

Some policy suggestions

THE WEST'S alignment with non-democratic states in the Middle East undoubtedly undermines the credibility of its policy in that region and further afield. But, the longer-term possibility of a region of democracies offers one possible set of conditions for a US withdrawal from the region.

In this context, Turkey is widely viewed as being of huge importance. It can be an example of economic and democratic success to other Muslim countries. But it can also

show how the West can deal with Islamic societies on an equal footing. The successful admission of Turkey into the European Union can also undermine the notion of the EU as some kind of Christian club.

The West's alignment with non-democratic states in the Middle East undoubtedly undermines the credibility of its policy in that region.

The emergence of a moderate Islamist party in Turkey – the Justice and Development Party – also represents an opportunity, not least for the West. "If you adopt a Manichean world view in which all Islam is a threat, then you are adopting bin Laden's vocabulary," said Winter, himself a Muslim. "I'm optimistic that the Party represents a more convivial Islamist tendency. Turkey could provide leadership not only in Europe but in the whole Muslim world, and allow Muslims to engage more constructively with the West's global order."

It is time, Winter argued, for a policy of "cultural pre-emption", an idea deliberately echoing the notion of military pre-emption that has been incorporated into the US national security strategy. It suggests a respectful dialogue with Islamists in Turkey, Indonesia and other countries in an effort to break down the wall of mutual incomprehension that divides the West from many Muslims. Western governments have avoided dialogues that confront these strains, but the information they generate could be critical in informing government policy. The idea of pursuing dialogue, if not with Al Qaeda at least with those who are intellectually close, does not exclude the need to pursue separate security solutions. Talking with Muslims – not just with governments but with established religious leaderships despite the constraints they may feel in engaging in a debate with non-believers – offers the possibility of mapping out the real preferences of relevant communities and improving understanding in the West about how Muslims see their place in the world. It suggests great care should be taken before policy decisions are made to close down Islamic charities and to depict organisations as terrorist. And while raising barriers to immigration may seem a natural response to the events of September 11, it suggests Western governments be sensitive to the problems such barriers may cause.

This approach has a broader foreign policy dimension. Western policy often feeds into incentive structures that lie at the root of the problems, and policy "solutions" should not make matters worse. Foreign policy should support moderation in other countries, but should not be seen in those countries as an exploitative or one-way exercise. Western governments, which write the rules, can do more to give people in other countries a greater stake in the global order. In agencies such as the World Trade Organisation, they can do more to make sure that poor countries are provided fair access to their markets and that their domestic policies, for example in agriculture, are not exacerbating the plight of their own people.

The approach also argues that the West should work harder to build coalitions, and not just those coalitions that reflect the immediate policy priorities of the US. Coalitions of the willing, bilateral agreements and new gatherings such as the Group of Eight have a place, but more effort should be directed towards bolstering multilateral regimes, particularly those aimed at curbing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Despite the limitations of this traditional approach – such agreements are not and do not purport to be the only solution to weapons proliferation – many of these arrangements have in the past helped to curb the spread of such weapons and can do so in the future. For if the US and other important actors are viewed as having given up on the non-proliferation agenda, there is likely to be growing pessimism about the chances of curbing the spread of such weapons. Such pessimism will encourage governments to seek them and further increase the risks that they may be obtained by terrorists.

Western governments, which write the rules, can do more to give people in other countries a greater stake in the global order.

These are strong reasons for redoubling non-proliferation efforts, and even bolstering them with fresh initiatives. One such initiative should be directed to the Middle East. After years of stagnation in the peace process and evidence that both Israelis and Palestinians will need a considerable injection of outside energy to join in a new round of talks, it would be timely to remind them – along with all parties in the region – of the growing menace posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Restricting the scope of non-proliferation talks to selected states in the region, such as Iraq and Iran, would be futile. Yet, in practice, it would be hard for this or indeed any US administration to take the initiative to confront Israel on the issue of its own weapons of mass destruction. The European Union could therefore make a significant contribution by proposing region-wide non-proliferation negotiations.

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THE PARTICIPANTS

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Merli Baroudi is Director, Country Risk Services at the Economist Intelligence Unit, where she is responsible for a team of 80 country analysts producing both political and economic risk assessments across 100 countries. Formerly a Vice President at the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City, she graduated initially from the bank's renowned credit training programme before moving on to work in the capital markets and treasury division of the bank, focusing primarily on Latin America and Asia. Her publications include numerous articles on topics ranging from the sustainability of current account deficits to scenarios of US military action in Afghanistan. She has a Bachelors degree in History from Smith College, a Masters degree in International Relations (concentrating on development economics) from Columbia University, and a Masters degree in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of London.

Peter Cavanagh

Peter Cavanagh is the Executive Director of the new Cambridge Programme for Security in International Society and a member of the Advisory Board for the Centre. From 1994 to 2000, he was responsible to the European Commission and other agencies for the development of academic institutions in Kosovo, the Arab World, the CIS and China. He was the first Director of the EC's new Euro-Arab Management School in Granada, Spain. From 1995 to 1997, he was Director of International Operations for the European Foundation of Management Development in Brussels. Prior to that, he was Managing Director of Petrus Management Services in London, where he worked for over 20 years as a Consultant for such varied organisations as the British, French and Chinese Governments, the European Commission, the Royal Opera House in London, and major multi-nationals. Peter Cavanagh originally studied architecture and planning at Cambridge University, where he is a member of Corpus Christi College.

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Charles Curtis is the President and Chief Operating Officer of NTI (the Nuclear Threat Initiative) and a current member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously served as Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the United Nations Foundation. Before joining UNF, he was a partner in Hogan & Hartson, a Washington-based law firm with 15 domestic and international offices. He served as Under Secretary and later as Deputy Secretary of Energy from 1994 to 1997, and, as Chief Operating Officer of the Department, he had, among other duties, direct programmatic responsibility for all Department energy, science, technology and national security programs. A founding partner in the Washington-based law firm Van Ness Feldman, Charles Curtis has had over 15 years' practice experience and more than 18 years in Government service, holding positions on the staff of the US House of Representatives, the US Treasury and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

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Ged Davis is Vice President, Global Business Environment in Shell International Limited and Head of Shell's Scenarios Team. He has been a scenario practitioner for over 20 years, engaged in the building and use of scenarios at the country, industry and global level. From 1997 to 2000 he was facilitator and lead author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's emissions scenarios 2000–2100, and in 1996/97 was Director of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development's Global Scenarios 2000–2050. Prior positions in Shell International include Head, Scenario Processes and Applications, and Head, Socio-Politics and Technology, with special

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Stephen Fidler is Chief Reporter of the *Financial Times*, responsible for producing well-researched articles on foreign policy, national security and international business issues from the newspaper's London headquarters. He joined the Financial Times in 1987, taking responsibility for its coverage of international capital markets and the developing country debt crisis. From 1991 to 1998 he was Latin America Editor, based in London but spending several months of each year in the region. In addition to writing on important regional developments such as the Mexican Peso crisis, he guided a significant expansion of the paper's network of correspondents and its coverage of Latin American and Caribbean issues. As US diplomatic editor from 1998 to 2001, he covered international economic issues from Washington and travelled extensively to Asia and Europe. Prior to joining the *FT* he was a correspondent with Reuters, where he had assignments in New York, the Middle East and London. He has made frequent appearances on US radio and television, and has a degree in Economics from London University.

Professor James Mayall

James Mayall was appointed the first Sir Patrick Sheehy Professor of International Relations at the University of Cambridge in June 1997, becoming Director of the Centre of International Studies in January 1999. From 1966 to 1998 he lectured in International Relations at the London School of Economics. Over the past decade his research and writing has concentrated on the resurgence of ethnic, national and religious conflicts since the end of the Cold War. He recently published *World Politics: Progress and its Limits* (Polity Press, 2000) and is currently working on a sequel, *Progress and Tragedy in International Relations; Making Sense of September 11th, 2001,* and on a longer-term project dealing with the impact of the end of empire on international order. He is a Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, and was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2001.

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Louis McCagg is a consultant on institution building and programme development at the Centre of International Studies, Cambridge. Before joining the Centre in 2001, he served the University in similar roles with Cambridge Futures, the Margaret Beaufort Institute of Theology, the Ospreys, the Judge Institute of Management Studies, and the University Development Office. In the US he was Secretary of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh; Director of the Education Task Force, New York Urban Coalition; Executive Director of Child Find of America; and President of the Westchester Land Trust. He is a graduate of Harvard and attended Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

Sandra D. Melone

Sandra Melone is Executive Director of the European Centre for Common Ground (ECCG), an international non-governmental organisation, based in Brussels, which she established in 1996. ECCG and their partner organisation, Search for Common Ground (SFGG) in Washington DC, are leaders in the field of international transformation. Common Ground has programmes and offices in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, South East Asia, the Balkans, and the Middle East. She previously worked for the Programme in Burundi, where she founded the Women's Peace Centre. Drawing on her substantial experience in the field of international human rights and conflict

resolution, she has given numerous workshops on mediation, consensus building, negotiation and cross-cultural communication, and written articles on a range of related topics. She is on the Board of Directors of EPCPT (the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation), the EPLO (the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office), and FAIB (the Federation of International Organisations in Belgium).

Ambassador Richard W. Murphy

Since 1989 Richard Murphy has been the Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. After service in the US Army, he was appointed to the Foreign Service of the Department of State. Following an initial assignment in the Central African Federation, he undertook Arabic language and area studies and served in Lebanon, Syria, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia. He was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from 1983 to 1989, when he retired. President Reagan nominated him to the rank of Career Ambassador in 1986, a rank restricted at any given time to five career diplomats. He is a frequent commentator on Middle Eastern issues for National Public Radio, CNN and BBC, and has written for *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The International Herald Tribune* and the *Christian Science Monitor*. He is Chairman of the Middle East Institute in Washington DC, a trustee of the American University in Beirut and a member of the Board of Directors of Harvard Medical International. He was educated at Harvard and Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

Dr Yezid Sayigh

Yezid Sayigh was recently appointed Academic Director of the Cambridge Programme for Security in International Society. He is also Consulting Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. He first joined the Centre as a Senior Teaching Fellow on a grant from British Aerospace. His diverse experience includes being a negotiator during bilateral Palestinian-Israeli peace talks and Middle East arms control talks. As a consultant he provides policy and technical support to the Palestinians in their peace talks with Israel, and advises on public sector institutional development and governance reform. A selection from his list of publications includes the award-winning *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997, Paperback edition 2000), "The Middle East in Comparative Perspective" in *Europe's Emerging Foreign Policy and the Middle Eastern Challenge* (Munich: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2002), and, in preparation, *State Formation Under Arafat: Politics, Society and Political Economy in a Globalised Era.*

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Brendan Simms is the Newton Sheehy Lecturer in International History at the Centre, a lecturer on Geopolitics and Foreign Relations for the Faculty of History, and a Fellow of Peterhouse College. His PhD supervisions focus primarily on Central European History during the Napoleonic period, Anglo-German relations after unification and the recent conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. His latest book, *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia* (Penguin Press, 2001), based on in-depth interviews with the main protagonists, received widespread critical acclaim and was shortlisted for the BBC's Samuel Johnson Prize for non-fiction. He has lectured and broadcast on BBC4, the BBC World Service, and ABC Radio Australia on German History, British foreign policy and the Bosnian war, and written articles and reviews for the broadsheet press. He is currently working on *New Worlds and Old Balances*, focusing on Britain's strategic management of its global commitments in the eighteenth century.

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Steven Simon is Carol Deane Senior Fellow in American Security Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Before joining IISS in November 1999, he served on the National Security Council staff at the White House for five years, where he worked on Persian Gulf security strategy, peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism. Prior to his White House assignment, he held a succession of posts at the Department of State, including Director of Political-Military Plans and Policy, Co-director of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Task Force, and acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Security Affairs. He is co-author of *The Age of Sacred Terror* (Random House, 2002). He has a BA from Columbia University in Classics and Near Eastern Languages, an MA from Harvard University in Religious Studies, an MPA from Princeton University, was a Fellow at Brown University and a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow at Oxford University.

Professor the Rt Hon Shirley Williams, Baroness of Crosby

In addition to her role as trustee of various charitable foundations, Professor Williams is currently Leader of the Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords and a Privy Councillor. She is also a member of the US International Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, and a Board member of the Moscow School of Political Studies. She was a Minister in the Labour Government from 1976 to 1979, and co-founder of the Social Democratic Party in 1981, becoming its President from 1982 to 1988, and serving as Social Democrat MP for Crosby from 1981 to 1983. A frequent broadcaster, she has also written numerous books and articles for UK broadsheets and the *International Herald Tribune*. Her latest publication, "Human Rights in Europe" is in *Human Rights: What Work?* (Ed. Power and Allison, 2000). Awarded numerous honours including doctorates at British, American and European universities, she is Public Service Professor of Elective Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, and Professor Emeritus at Harvard. She is also a Visiting Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, and lectures at various British and American universities including Cambridge.

Lord Wilson of Dinton, GCB

Lord Wilson was appointed Master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in October 2002. Prior to his appointment as Master, Richard Wilson was Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service (1998–2000). A career diplomat, he served in the Board of Trade and the Department of Energy, where he was Under Secretary and Principal Establishment and Finance Officer (1982–86), becoming Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet Office (1987–90), Deputy Secretary (Industry) to HM Treasury (1990–92), Permanent Secretary at the Department of Environment (1992-94), and Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office (1994–97). He was educated at Radley and Clare College, Cambridge, and called to the Bar, Middle Temple, in 1965.

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Timothy Winter is a Lecturer in Islamic Studies in the Faculty of Divinity, Cambridge. His publications include two translations from the classic of Islamic spirituality, *The Revival of the Religious Sciences* by Iman al-Ghazali (d.1111). He has written a number of academic articles, as well as contributing to BBC radio and British national newspapers. He is currently preparing a volume entitled *The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology* for Cambridge University Press. He studied at Westminster School, London, at the University of Cambridge, and at traditional Islamic institutions in Cairo.

NTI - Nuclear Threat Initiative

Working for a safer world

THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (NTI), established in January 2001 by Ted Turner, is a charitable organisation created in response to two central facts: nuclear, biological and chemical weapons represent the world's single greatest threat; and there is an increasingly dangerous gap between the global threat and the global response.

NTI is working to close the growing and increasingly dangerous gap between these threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the global response by taking direct action to reduce the threat through start-up, pilot and model initiatives that the government and private sector could replicate on a larger scale. It encourages others to take action to reduce the threats by being a catalyst for action, promotes dialogue, builds common ground, and increases public awareness of the gaps between the threat and the response. These gaps include a gap in the way governments are organised to address the threats, a gap in resources and a gap in thinking about these issues.

NTI also seeks to contribute to policies and activities that bring nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials under secure control and reduce their quantities. Its aims are to restrict the spread of weapons know-how; to reduce the risk of intentional or accidental use of weapons of mass destruction; to develop better strategies and means to guard against the threat from biological weapons; to bring about changes in nuclear forces to enhance safety, security and stability; and to increase public awareness, encourage dialogue, catalyse action and promote new thinking about reducing the dangers from weapons of mass destruction on a global basis.

The Centre of International Studies

THE CENTRE was founded in 1967 by Sir Harry Hinsley, Professor of History, Master of St John's College and a former Vice-Chancellor, and Professor Clive Parry, of the Faculty of Law. Hinsley had been a member of the Enigma code-breaking team at Bletchley Park during World War II, and both he and Parry firmly believed that International Studies was a practical discipline whose role was to bring academia together with the worlds of government and diplomacy, a conviction which still underpins the Centre's research and teaching programmes. Its valuable contribution to public, political and scholarly debate is recognised worldwide.

The Centre of International Studies at the University of Cambridge seeks to gather the most experienced analysts and practitioners in the field of international relations. Faculty, students and administrators are supported by a management culture that encourages initiative taking, creativity and open-mindedness.

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Renowned for their inter-disciplinary approach, its scholars come from a variety of subject areas, eg law, economics, history and politics, and pursue their research and teaching in association with their worldwide contacts in government, business, international organisations, NGOs and the military.

The University of Cambridge offers an unrivalled base of knowledge and expertise on which the Centre's programmes can draw, and its considerable resources have earned over many centuries their well-deserved reputation for excellence. In recent years, the city has acquired a new image as the fastest growing environment in Europe for the nurturing of knowledge-based companies in information and communication technologies and biotechnology, many of which were spawned from leading edge research within the University itself.

Terrorism *ter'ər-izm*
gen. A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized.

Terrorist *ter'ər-ist*
Dyslogistically: One who entertains, professes, or tries to awaken or spread a feeling of terror or alarm; an alarmist; a scaremonger.

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