

# Libya Chemical Chronology

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[2008-2005](#) | [2004](#) | [2003-2000](#) | [1999-1990](#) | [1989-1920](#)

Last update: May 2010

**As of May 2010, this chronology is no longer being updated.  
For current developments, please see the Libya Chemical Overview.**

*This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.*

*Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.*

## 2008-2005

### 9 April 2008

Libya makes a statement to the plenary session of the 2nd OPCW Review Conference. In the statement the Libyan representative asserts "that they are doing their utmost to implement the CWC. They have declared their stockpiles and had OPCW inspections. According to the Libyan representative they have destroyed 100% of their schedule 3 chemicals, 39% of schedule 2 chemicals, and are prepared to fully cooperate with the OPCW and are committed to meeting the 2012 deadline for full destruction." In addition Libya reportedly criticizes "Israel and call[s] on them to adhere to the CWC as their continued non-involvement has serious negative consequences for the implementation of the convention."

— Chemical Weapons Convention Archive, 9 April 2008, [www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org).

### 7-18 April 2008

A Libyan delegation attends the 2nd CWC Review Conference in the Hague.

— Report Of The Second Special Session Of The Conference Of The States Parties To Review The Operation Of The Chemical Weapons Convention (Second Review Conference) 7 - 18 April 2008, RC-2/4, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 18 April 2008, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

### 24 December 2007

A report by the Bloomberg news agency notes that the United States and Libya are still unable to reach agreement on the details of assistance for Libyan CW destruction activities. The United States has offered forty-five million dollars in aid while Libya continues to demand sixty-five million dollars.

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— Viola Gienger, U.S. Balks at Libya's Demand for Money to Scrap Chemical Arms, *Bloomberg*, 24 December 2007, [www.bloomberg.com](http://www.bloomberg.com).

#### **27-30 November 2007**

At the 51st session of the OPCW Executive Council presents a "Report on the Progress of Destruction of Category 1 and 2 Chemical Weapons Stockpiles." Although the report is not made public it is known that destruction activities have not yet commenced [See May and June 2007].

— *Chemical Disarmament Quarterly*, Vol. 6 No. 1 (March 2008), p. 4.

#### **5-9 November 2007**

At the Twelfth session of the OPCW Conference of States Parties meeting in the Hague Libya is elected as a member of the OPCW Executive council for the period 2008 to 2010.

— *Chemical Disarmament Quarterly*, Vol. 5 No. 4 (December 2007), p. 4.

#### **25-28 September 2007**

At the 50th session of the OPCW Executive Council Libya presents a national paper entitled "Information on the Measures Being Under taken to Complete Conversion of the Former Chemical Weapons Production Facilities Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 1 and Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 2, Rabta, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." No details of the papers contents are publicly released.

— *Chemical Disarmament Quarterly*, Vol. 5 No. 4 (December 2007), p. 5-6.

#### **16-21 September 2007**

Libyan representatives participate in the third Toxic Chemicals Training course for North African States Parties from 16 to 21 September 2007 at the Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) Training and Testing Centre, in Zemianske Kostol'any, Slovak Republic. The course involved open-air training with live CW agents.

— *Chemical Disarmament Quarterly*, Vol. 5 No. 4 (December 2007), p. 27.

#### **18 June 2007**

Libya formally withdraws from an agreement with the United States to share the costs of destroying the remaining Libyan stocks of chemical warfare agents and precursors. In announcing their decision to withdraw from the agreement Libyan representatives express "concerns about indemnification, cost-sharing, and the disposition of the equipment used to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles." In discussing the end of the contract United States officials "expressed confidence that Libya is dedicated to destroying its stockpile."

— Alex Bollfrass, *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 37 No. 6 (July / August 2007), [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org).

#### **11-22 June 2007**

Libyan representatives attend basic and advanced practical training courses on chemical weapons response. The courses, provided by the Republic of Serbia and the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW are offered as part of a new chemical weapons response capacity-building initiative specifically targeted at North African member states. States benefiting from the program are Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. In addition to the contributions of the OPCW and Republic of Serbia the initiative is supported by the European Union (EU), through its third Joint Action in support of OPCW activities.

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— Chemical Weapons Response Capacity-Building Training Course for North African Member States Conducted in Kruševac, Serbia, Press Release #72, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 6 July 2007, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **May 2007**

The Libyan government gives notice that it is withdrawing from a cooperative contract for the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile signed with the United States in late 2006.

— Carol Giacomo, "U.S.-Libya chemical arms-related deal in doubt", *Washington Post*, 8 June 2007; Alex Bollfrass, *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 37 No. 6 (July / August 2007), [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org).

#### **8 December 2006**

The Eleventh Session of the OPCW CSP grants a Libyan request to extend its final deadline for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapon stockpiles to 31 December 2010. The formal decision also establishes new intermediate deadlines for the destruction process. Phase 1 (1%), is to be completed by 1 May 2010; phase 2 (20%), is to be completed by 1 July 2010; and phase 3 (45%), is to be completed by 1 November 2010. Libya is also required to complete the destruction of its Category 2 chemical weapons as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 31 December 2011.

— Decision: Proposal by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the Establishment of Specific Dates for Intermediate Destruction Deadlines, and Its Request for an Extension of the Final Deadline for the Destruction of Its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, C-11/DEC.15, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 8 December 2006, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **December 2006**

The United States and Libya signed a contract to cooperate in carrying out the destruction of Libya's remaining stockpile of chemical weapons: believed to include 23 metric tons of old mustard gas and 1,300 metric tons of precursor chemicals. Under the terms of the contract the United States will pay \$45 million or about 75 percent of the estimated destruction costs. Most of the money will be spent on the construction of a specialized incineration facility at the chemical weapons storage site in the Libyan Desert south of Tripoli. The remaining 25 percent of the project cost is to be paid by the Libyan government.

— Carol Giacomo, "U.S.-Libya chemical arms-related deal in doubt", *Washington Post*, 8 June 2007, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

#### **16-26 October 2006**

A Libyan representative attends the fourth Basic Course for OPCW National Authorities implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Paris, France. The course which is jointly organized by the OPCW and the French government is conducted at the French Training Centre for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Centre français de formation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques CEFFIAC).

— *Chemical Disarmament Quarterly*, Vol. 4 No. 4 (December 2006), p. 37.

#### **30 March 2006**

In Washington D.C. James Tegnella, Director of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), states that the

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U.S. government is considering a Libyan request to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile. Tegnalia notes that that destroying the Libyan stockpile of CW agent and precursors would be a difficult proposition given the harsh climate and isolated location of the current storage site. He also notes that the cost could be as high as 100 million U.S. dollars. Tegnalia observed that the Libyan government has both the responsibility and the financial resources to undertake CW demilitarization without U.S. financial assistance.

— *The CBW Conventions Bulletin*, No. 72+73 (September 2006), p. 19.

#### **13-23 March 2006**

A Libyan representative attends the third Basic Course for OPCW National Authorities implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Paris, France. The course which is jointly organized by the OPCW and the French government is conducted at the French Training Centre for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Centre français de formation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques CEFFIAC).

— *Chemical Disarmament Quarterly*, Vol. 4 No. 2 (June 2006), p. 21.

#### **10 November 2005**

The Tenth Session of the OPCW CSP grants, in principle, a Libyan request for extensions of the intermediate deadlines for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapon stockpiles. The Executive Council of the OPCW will establish specific dates for the 1%, 20%, and 45% deadlines at its next regular meeting in March 2006. Libya is still required to meet the final destruction deadline of 29 April 2007 and must make regular reports to the Executive Council of the OPCW detailing progress made in meeting its CW destruction obligations.

— Decision: Request by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for Extensions of the Intermediate Deadlines for the Destruction of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons Stockpiles C-10/DEC.10, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 10 November 2005, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **4 July 2005**

H.E. Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), attends the opening of the Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Sirte, Libya. During his time in Sirte the Director-General met the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Alpha Oumar Konare, to discuss developments in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Director-General's attendance at this meeting was part of the OPCW's continuing push to promote universality and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Africa.

— OPCW Director-General attends opening of the African Union Summit in Libya, meets Chairperson Konare, Press release #29, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 5 July 2005, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **31 March 2005**

The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction presents its final report to the President. Although primarily tasked with reviewing intelligence capabilities in regard to current threats the Commission also compares "the Intelligence Community's judgments concerning Libya's weapons programs before Tripoli's decision to open them to international scrutiny with current assessments, thereby providing a rare "before" and "after" study of U.S. intelligence assessments." In regard to Libya's CW program the Commission concludes that the "Intelligence Community's central judgment that Libya

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possessed chemical weapons agents and chemical weapons aerial bombs was correct, but Libya's actual chemical agent stockpile proved to be smaller in quantity than the Intelligence Community estimated."

— Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Report to the President of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 254, [www.wmd.gov](http://www.wmd.gov).

#### **15-18 March 2005**

The Executive Council of the OPCW holds its 40th session in the Hague. In the course of its discussions the Executive Council adopts a decision establishing specific extended deadlines for the destruction of 1%, 20%, and 45% of Libya's Category 1 chemical weapons stockpiles. [See 30 November 2004]

— *Chemical Disarmament Quarterly*, Vol. 3 No. 2 (June 2005), p. 4.

#### **5-6 January 2005**

Polish Prime Minister Marek Belka visits Libya to discuss bilateral cooperation. Belka met with Colonel Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi and Libyan Prime Minister Shakri Ghanem. A bilateral cooperation accord concerning the nonproliferation of WMD was signed. Poland also agreed to help Tripoli in the conversion of its chemical weapons plant production from military to civil use and to assist in liquidating Libya's chemical weapons stockpile.

— "Opening a New Chapter - The First Day of Prime Minister Marek Belka's Visit to Libya" The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, *Event Archive*, 5 January 2005. [www.kprm.gov.pl](http://www.kprm.gov.pl); "Poland-Libya: Thawed Relations," *The Warsaw Voice*, 16 January 2005, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **January 2005**

David Richmond, director-general for Defence and Intelligence of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and current chair of the G8 Senior Nonproliferation Officials Group, describes UK priorities on bioterrorism under its chairmanship of the G8 during 2005: "The UK is already engaged in a biological non-proliferation project in Georgia intended to redirect plant health scientists previously employed in the Soviet anti-crop programme. We are working in close collaboration with the US and Canada and other donors on identifying similar areas of potential work in Libya and Iraq."

— *The CBW Conventions Bulletin*, No. 67 (March 2005), p. 27.

[Back to Top](#)

## **2004**

#### **14 December 2004**

The Executive Council of the OPCW holds its 39th session in the Hague. A number of decisions are adopted relating to Libya's chemical weapons destruction obligations. Libya's combined plan for conversion and verification of the chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) Rabta Pharmaceutical Factories 1 and 2 (phase II) are approved; several facility agreements for on-site inspections at the Category 2 Al-Jufra chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF), Ruwagha chemical weapons storage facility (CWSF), CWPF Tripoli STO-001, and for the Rabta

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Pharmaceutical Factories.

— *The CBW Conventions Bulletin*, No. 67 (March 2005), p. 6.

### **30 November 2004**

The Ninth Session of the OPCW CSP grants, in principle, a Libyan request for extensions of the intermediate deadlines for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapon stockpiles. Libya is still required to meet the final destruction deadline of 29 April 2007 and must make regular reports to the Executive Council of the OPCW detailing progress made in meeting its CW destruction obligations. [Note: This decision addresses the situation whereby Libya acceded to the Convention and declared an existing CW stockpile subsequent to the deadlines for destruction of 1% (1999) and 20% (2002) of all stockpiles, and had not been able to meet the 45% deadline of April 2004. The destruction timetable is set out under Part IV (A) C. 17 (a) of the Verification Annex to the CWC.]

— *Request by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for Extensions of the Intermediate Deadlines for the Destruction of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons Stockpiles C9/DEC.7*, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 30 November 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

### **30 November 2004**

At its Ninth Session, the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) grants Libya's request to convert the chemical weapons production facilities (CWPF), Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 1 and Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 2 (Phase II), into a pharmaceutical plant to produce low-cost vaccines and medicines to treat AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis for distribution to the African market. The CSP decision also requires that the Rabta conversions be completed no later than three years after the decision enters into force. [Note: This decision changes Part V of the Verification Annex, removing a technical / administrative obstacle that may have acted to deter accession to the CWC. The original rule required that all conversions of CWPFs to purposes not prohibited under the Convention needed to be completed no later than six years after the Convention's entry into force (i.e., 29 April 2003). Under the new regulation, such a conversion will have to be completed as soon as possible, but in a maximum of six years, after the Convention enters into force for the State Party].

— *Decision: Request by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to Use the Chemical Weapons Production Facilities Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 1 and Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 2 (Phase II) in Rabta, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for Purposes Not Prohibited Under the Chemical Weapons Convention C9/DEC.9*, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 30 November 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

### **23 November 2004**

In an interview with the French newspaper, *Le Figaro*, Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi says that Libya did not receive fair compensation for deciding to give up the development of nuclear and chemical weapons. Qadhafi says: "to tell you the truth, we have remained a little disappointed by the reaction of Europe, the U.S. and Japan. They have not really rewarded Libya for its contribution to international peace. We are still waiting."

— T. Ország-Land, "Libya Coming in from the Cold," *Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst*, 1 March 2005, [www4.janes.com](http://www4.janes.com).

### **18 October 2004**

The Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) recommends that

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State Parties adopt a change to Part V of the Verification Annex of the CWC. The proposed change would allow the conversion of the former Libyan chemical weapons production facility at Rabta "to produce low-cost vaccines and medicines for... the African continent."

— *OPCW Executive Council Approves Recommendation to Allow for Conversion of Former Chemical Weapons Facility in Libya*, Press release #50, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 18 October 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **15 October 2004**

During a visit to Tripoli by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi says that Germany and other Western states should thank him for his "services to international peace" in renouncing Libya's WMD programs. This was the first-ever trip to Libya by a post-war German Chancellor and follows the EU lifting of an arms embargo against Libya on 11 October.

— "Kadhafi Demands Thanks from West for 'Services to Peace,'" Agence France Presse, 15 October 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 October 2004**

Following the European Union's decision to lift its arms embargo on Libya, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State Baroness Symons travels to Tripoli for three days of meetings with the Libyan government.

— "In Brief," Financial Times Information/China News, 13 October 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

#### **12 October 2004**

Ambassador Eric M. Javits, head of the U.S. delegation to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), urges the Executive Council to consider "the proposal by Libya, with the support of 17 other States Parties, for a technical change to the [Chemical Weapons] Convention to allow conversion of the facility at Rabta." He notes, "Libya desires to convert the Rabta chemical weapons production facility to produce low cost pharmaceuticals to treat AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis throughout the African continent and the developing world. The United States supports Libya's proposal."

— Eric M. Javits, *Remarks to the Executive Council of the OPCW*, 12 October 2004, U.S. State Department, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov).

#### **11 October 2004**

The Council of the European Union agrees to pursue "a policy of engagement with Libya." The Council decides to "repeal the restrictive measures adopted by the EU in application of UNSCR 748(1992) and 883(1993)" and lift the arms embargo against Libya. Arms transfers "will be subject to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports," however, as well as to a post-embargo arms transfer regime currently being developed.

— *2609th Council Meeting: General Affairs and External Relations*, Press Release C/04/276, Council of the European Union, 11 October 2004, p. 6, <http://ue.eu.int>.

#### **22 September 2004**

Both in New York for a special session of the UN General Assembly, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Libyan Foreign Minister Abdurahman Shalgam meet to discuss the two countries' continued rapprochement. U.S. officials

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note that the meeting "was on the highest level in decades."

— Barry Schweid, "Powell Holds Talks with Libyan Foreign Minister," Associated Press, 23 September 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

#### **20 September 2004**

President Bush signs an executive order that "terminates the national emergency declared in 1986 under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act." This action makes possible the removal of the "remaining economic restrictions on aviation services with Libya [and]... unblocks approximately \$1.3 billion in assets frozen under the Libya sanctions program belonging to both Libyan and non-Libyan entities."

— Adam Ereli, U.S. State Department Deputy Spokesperson, Daily Press Briefing, 20 September 2004, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov); "Statement by the Press Secretary," Financial Times Information, 20 September 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

#### **17 September 2004**

High-level discussions between U.S. and Libyan officials are held in London regarding the final phase of Libya's disarmament pledges.

— "Bush Prepares to Lift Sanctions Against Libya after confirming dismantling of weapons," *National Post*, 20 September 2004, p. A9, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

#### **10 September 2004**

U.S. President George Bush eases minor sanctions on Libya. In a memorandum to Secretary of State Colin Powell, he writes, "I hereby determine and certify that the application of sanctions, as required by (the Arms Export Control Act), would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests." He encourages the Export-Import Bank to "guarantee, insure or extend credit, or participate in the extension of credit in support of United States exports to Libya."

— "Bush lifts minor sanctions on Libya," Associated Press, 10 September 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

#### **1 September 2004**

A State Department official announces that the United States hopes to conclude talks with the Libyan government and declare the country free of WMD by the end of September.

— "US Hopes to Conclude WMD Talks with Libya This Month," Agence France Presse, 1 September 2004, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

#### **20 August 2004**

According to Jane's Intelligence Digest, Libya's past attempts to create chemical weapons included procurement of precursor chemicals, such as pinacolyl alcohol (a precursor for soman nerve gas), from firms in Western Europe and the Far East.

— "More dual-use threats uncovered," *Jane's Intelligence Digest*, 20 August 2004, (Posted 18 August 2004), [www4.janes.com](http://www4.janes.com).

#### **2 July 2004**

Libyan officials officially announce plans to use the former chemical weapons facility located in a pharmaceutical

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factory at Rabta to produce vaccines for distribution in Africa.

— "Libya to Produce Vaccines in Former Chemical Weapons Facility," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 2 July 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 June 2004**

The United States restores formal diplomatic ties with Libya. Assistant Secretary of State William Burns inaugurates a U.S. liaison office in Tripoli and notes that Libya will be taking steps to establish diplomatic representation in the United States.

— "U.S. and Libya Restore Direct Diplomatic Relations After 24 Years," *Financial Times Information*, 29 June 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **13 June 2004**

A Scottish daily newspaper *The Sunday Herald* reports that Britain is now the "leading exporter of components of weapons of mass destruction" and that Libya previously bought chemical weapons technology from the United Kingdom.

— "UK Sells WMD Components to 'Axis of Evil' Countries," *Scottish Media Newspapers Limited*, 13 June 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **7 June 2004**

The government of the United Kingdom releases its annual report on the application of strategic export controls in 2003. The report notes the approval of exports corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, non-military toxic chemical precursors, and toxic chemical precursors to Libya.

— *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls, Annual Report 2003*, (June 2004), pp. 249-250, [www.fco.gov.uk](http://www.fco.gov.uk).

#### **2 June 2004**

Meeting at Sea Island, United States, the leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) countries agree to an Action Plan on Non-proliferation. Under this plan, the G8 will use the Global Partnership against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to coordinate G8 efforts to address proliferation challenges globally, including the retraining of Iraqi and Libyan scientists involved in past weapons of mass destruction programs.

— The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release, "G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation," 2 June 2004, [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov).

#### **Early June 2004**

U.S. Assistant Secretary for Commerce William Lash, during a visit to Tripoli, states that shipments of Libyan oil to the United States have begun.

— Mmegi/The Reporter, "Libya Supplies U.S. With Oil Again," *AllAfrica, Inc.*, 6 June 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **13 May 2004**

The Libyan Foreign Ministry announces the government's decision to renounce all arms trade with countries that are not signatories to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and that "Tripoli views as favouring the proliferation of weapons of mass of destruction." Libyan officials decline to name specific countries covered by this new commitment. U.S. Undersecretary of State and Arms Control Envoy John Bolton states that Libya confirmed to

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U.S. and British officials that the decision will apply to trade with North Korea, Syria, and Iran.

— Afaf El-Gueblaoui, "Libya Renounces Arms Trade with WMD States," Agence France Presse, 13 May 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **27-28 April 2004**

Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi travels to Brussels to meet with European Commission President Romano Prodi and Belgian Premier Guy Verhofstadt in pursuit of normalizing relations with European countries.

— "Qaddafi Visits Europe," *Facts of File, Inc.*, 29 April 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **23 April 2004**

The United States lifts sanctions against Libya. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act is no longer applicable to Libya and the Treasury Department modifies sanctions on U.S. firms and individuals to allow the resumption of most commercial and financial activities, though restrictions continue to apply to exports of dual-use items. In Libya, the state-owned National Oil Corporation confirms that its first shipment of oil to the United States will take place in May.

— "Statement by the Press Secretary," *Financial Times Information*, 23 April 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Edmund Blair, "Libya Ships First Crude to U.S. in 20 years," *Calgary Herald*, 24 April 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **20-22 April 2004**

An international meeting on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—sponsored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Ethiopian government, and the African Union Commission—commends Libya for "its decision to eliminate its chemical weapons under the full OPCW verification" and urges other African states make the continent a chemical weapons free zone by signing the CWC and/or enacting national legislation to enforce it.

— *African Union Calls for Chemical Weapons-Free Zone in Africa*, Press Release #16, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 29 April 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org); "African States Urged to Enact Legislation Against Chemical Weapons," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 April 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "OPCW Calls For Chemical Weapons Free Zone in Africa," *Xinhua News Agency*, 23 April 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **20 April 2004**

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) announces that Libya has confirmed its plans "to start dismantling its remaining chemical weapons stockpile" over the following months. According to OPCW rules, Libya must complete destruction of those stockpiles before April 29, 2007.

— "Libya to Dispose of Its Remaining Chemical Weapons Within Months: OPCW," Agence France Presse, 20 April 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **Early April 2004**

Responding to requests from U.S. and British officials, Libya publicly announces its intention to "convert hundreds of its Scud-B missiles into shorter-range, less powerful weapons for purely defensive purposes and end all military trade with North Korea."

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— Judith Miller, "U.S. Says Libya Will Convert Missiles to Defensive Weapons," *New York Times*, 11 April 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **25 March 2004**

British Prime Minister Tony Blair meets with Colonel Mu'ammur al-Qadhafi outside of Tripoli. Blair states publicly that Libya has "provided 'full and transparent cooperation' in the dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction programmes." He also announces that the Shell oil group has won a \$200 million contract to explore for natural gas in Libya and that a British aerospace company is likely to provide civil aviation services to Libya.

— "Roundup: Gaddafi Gains Breakthrough with Former British Enemy, Eds: Britain Hopes for Lucrative Contracts with Libya," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 25 March 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Patrick E. Tyler, "Blair Visits Qaddafi, Ending Libya's Long Estrangement," *New York Times*, 26 March 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **23-26 March 2004**

The Libyan government presents a general plan for the destruction of its stockpile of Category 1 chemical weapons to the thirty-sixth session of the OPCW Executive Council (EC). The EC also approves detailed plans for the verification of destruction of Category 3 chemical weapons at the Al-Jufra STO-002 chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF) in Libya. [Note: Category 1 chemical weapons are chemical warfare agents, whether weaponized or in bulk containers, or final stage precursor chemicals. Category 3 chemical weapons are "unfilled munitions and devices, and equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons."]

— "36th Session of the Executive Council," *Chemical Disarmament Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 2004), p. 17.

#### **23-26 March 2004**

Libyan delegation attends the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council as an observer for the first time.

— *OPCW 36th Executive Council Convenes, Libya Attends*, Press Release #11, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 26 March 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **23 March 2004**

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Burns meets with Colonel Mu'ammur al-Qadhafi and Libyan officials in Tripoli on the future of U.S.-Libyan relations. Secretary Burns reiterates U.S. willingness to continue assisting Libya in fulfilling its commitments to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction.

— "State Dept. Official Releases Statement Regarding U.S.-Libyan Relations," *States News Service*, 23 March 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com). In remarks at the Hague to the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Ambassador Eric M. Javits announces U.S. support for a Libyan proposed plan to convert its former chemical weapons production facility at Rabta to produce low cost pharmaceuticals, "provided that it is done within the legal framework of the Convention and in a manner that is transparent to all State Parties."

— Eric M. Javits, *Remarks to the Executive Council of the OPCW*, 23 March 2004, U.S. State Department, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov).

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#### **19 March 2004**

Inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) complete their initial inspection of Libya's chemical weapons stockpiles. They report having found more than 20 tons of mustard gas and enough material to produce thousands of tons of Sarin nerve gas. They also report having witnessed the destruction of 3,500 empty aerial bombs built for the delivery of chemical payloads.

— *Initial Inspection in Libya Completed*, Press Release #10, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 22 March 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org); "Inspectors Verify Libya's Weapons Stash," Associated Press, 22 March 2004, <http://ajc.com>.

#### **10 March 2004**

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter confirms that officials from the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Nonproliferation were in Libya to conduct a study of Libya's needs for scientific redirection.

— Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary for Verification and Compliance, "Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, Human Rights and the Future of U.S.-Libyan Relations," Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 10 March 2004, [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov).

#### **5 March 2004**

Libya submits its initial complete declaration under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The declaration reports that Libya possesses approximately 23 metric tons of mustard gas, 1,300 metric tons of nerve gas precursor chemicals, an inactivated chemical weapons production facility, and two chemical weapons storage facilities.

— *Libya Submits Initial Chemical Weapons Declaration*, Press Release #8, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 5 March 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **27 February-3 March 2004**

OPCW inspectors verify and monitor the destruction process of Libya's chemical weapons equipment, which includes crushing by bulldozer 3,300 aerial bombs designed to deliver chemical agents.

— *Libya Completes the First Phase of Chemical Weapons Destruction*, Press Release #7 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 4 March 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **20 February 2004**

OPCW receives from the Libyan Government a partial declaration of the country's chemical weapons stockpiles.

— *Libya Completes the First Phase of Chemical Weapons Destruction*, Press Release #7 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 4 March 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **11 February 2004**

In an address at the National Defense University, U.S. President George W. Bush emphasizes the importance of containing weapons of mass destruction expertise from Libya and Iraq. President Bush also declares his administration's intention to redirect Libyan weapons scientists to peaceful employment.

— Remarks by U.S. President George Bush on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation at Fort Lesley J. McNair -

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National Defense University, "President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD," Washington, D.C., 11 February 2004, [www.whitehouse.gov](http://www.whitehouse.gov).

#### **5 February 2004**

The Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force in Libya as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) collaborates with the Libyan Government to facilitate the country's compliance with the Convention. The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, H.E. Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, remarks in a meeting with OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter that "Libya is committed to the full and effective implementation of the Convention on Libyan territory. Libya intends to comply with this Convention in the spirit of complete transparency."

— "OPCW Team Visits Libya," OPCW Technical Secretariat, 5 February 2004, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **6 January 2004**

Libya deposits instruments of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

— "Iran, Libya, and Pakistan's Nuclear Supermarket," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, No. 75, (January/February 2004), [www.acronym.org.uk](http://www.acronym.org.uk).

#### **3 January 2004**

The United States renews sanctions imposed on Libya in 1989, calling for the Libyan government to pursue concrete actions to follow its pledge to renounce weapons of mass destruction.

— "How Khadafi Brought Libya Back Into the International Fold," Agence France Presse, 27 April 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **January 2004**

Teams of British and American weapons experts enter Libya to assist in planning the destruction of tons of mustard agent manufactured in Libya for use in chemical warheads. U.S. officials report that Libya has already begun destroying chemical shells.

— Patrick E. Tyler, "British and U.S. Experts Return to Dismantle Libya Arms Program," *New York Times*, 20 January 2004, [www.iht.com](http://www.iht.com); Carla Anne Robbins, "U.S. Military Flies Large Cargo of Nuclear Gear Out of Libya," *Wall Street Journal*, 28 January 2004, [www.wsj.com](http://www.wsj.com).

[Back to Top](#)

## **2003-2000**

#### **19 December 2003**

Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi pledges to rid Libya of all weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Abd-al-Rahman [Muhammad] Shalgam states the following in a news conference, "... we confirm that Libya will abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Biological Weapons

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convention, as well as accepting the Additional Protocol of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Treaty."

— Patrick E. Tyler, "Qaddafi's New Tune Confounds," *New York Times*, 30 December 2003, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com);  
"Libya to Eliminate Weapons of Mass Destruction," *JANA*, 19 December 2003, in FBIS Document GMP20031219000267.

#### **20-24 October 2003**

During its eighth session, the Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) extends observer status to Iraq and Libya, neither of which is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

— OPCW Conference of the States Parties decision C-8/DEC.5, 23 October 2003.

#### **October 2003**

U.S. and British experts inspect laboratories and military facilities for three weeks with Libya's permission. The CIA experts allowed to explore the chemical and nuclear facilities remark that, "It wasn't the individual things we were shown that we were blown away by," but "the extent to which we were given access."

— Patrick E. Tyler and James Risen, "Libya Arms Talks Lasted Three Months," *New York Times*, 22 December, 2003, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com).

#### **12 September 2003**

The United Nations Security Council lifts sanctions on Libya following the government's agreement to pay compensation to the families of victims of the 1988 Lockerbie terrorist attack.

— "How Khadafi Brought Libya Back Into the International Fold," *Agence France Presse*, 27 April 2004, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 April - 9 May 2003**

Libya attends the first CWC Review Conference (RevCon) as a non-state party.

— Alexander Kelle, "The First CWC Review Conference: Taking Stock and Paving the Way Ahead," *Disarmament Forum*, No. 4 (UNIDIR: 2002), p. 3, [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

#### **January 2003**

Investigators from the Fiscal Police Regional Nucleus and the Customs Antifraud Department in Genoa, Italy impound 50 tons of chemical precursors docked in transit in the Genoa-Voltri harbor bound for Libya. The precursor chemicals necessary for the production of mustard gas are packaged in several hundred drums. It is revealed that a Belgian company has been dispatching the chemicals through a number of "intermediate staging posts" or triangulations before reaching the final destination in Libya. The Belgian and Libyan companies involved claim that the chemicals are "duly declared" and that their purpose is for pesticide manufacturing not WMD development. The Italian Public Prosecutor's Office and the United States administration, however, do not abandon suspicions that once the chemicals arrive in Libya, they could easily be used locally or diverted to other countries for terrorism sponsorship.

— "Italian Police Seize 50 metric tons Chemical on UN Weapons Blacklist," *La Repubblica*, 16 January 2003, in

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"Genoa Finance Police Impound Libya-Bound Cargo of Chemical Weapons Precursors," in FBIS Document EUP20030116000096, 16 January 2003.

#### **Late October 2002**

Allegedly Iran and Libya secretly sign an agreement to develop chemical weapons in Tripoli. Iran pledges to supply Scud missile technology capable of carrying chemical agents and to provide Libya with equipment such as masks and outerwear to protect against chemical exposure. Libya and Iran are reported to have "exchanged a memorandum on cooperation in developing warheads for missiles that will carry nerve gas and technology to produce nerve gas using phosphorus trichloride."

— "'Informed Source': Iran, Libya Signed 'Secret' Chemical Weapon Pact in Oct '02," *Tokyo Foresight*, 18 October - 14 November 2003, pp. 28-29, in FBIS Document JPP20031029000041; "North Korea and Iran also Support Libya's Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction--The United States and the UK Will Analyze Their Technological Level," *Sankei Shimbun*, 6 January, 2004, in "Japanese Daily: DPRK, Iran Helped Libya Develop Weapons of Mass Destruction," in FBIS Document JPP20040106000017.

#### **8 May 2002**

Libya refutes Under Secretary Bolton's allegations that it has been pursuing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons according to BBC reports.

— "Libya Denies Claims of Chemical Weapons," *BBC News*, 8 May 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

#### **6 May 2002**

U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton accuses Tripoli of pursuing offensive chemical capabilities, maintaining that the Rabta facility produced 100 metric tons of various types of "chemical arms" before closing for the first time and continued producing chemical weapons in 1995 when it reopened under the pretense of a pharmaceuticals plant. He also remarked, "following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Libya has reestablished contacts with illicit foreign sources of expertise, parts and precursor chemicals in the Middle East, Asia and Western Europe."

— Francis Temman, "Washington Warns Cuba, Libya and Syria against Spreading Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Agence France Presse*, 7 May 2002.

[Back to Top](#)

## **1999-1990**

#### **November 1999**

The trial of Brigadier Wouter Basson, leader of Project Coast, exposes Project Coast as the coordinating organization responsible for the South African apartheid regime's chemical and biological warfare program. During the trial, Basson testifies that a Libyan named Abdul Razuk sold Project Coast five tons of BZ (3-Quinuclidinyl Benzinate) from Hong Kong, all of which, minus 980 kg, were eventually weaponized by the South African Defense Force (SADF) between June and December 1992. He also testifies that Libya was a "potential buyer" for the Roodeplaat Research Laboratory (RRL) in Europe, a laboratory known to have expanded its animal research and

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testing facilities to accommodate research on chemical and biological warfare agents.

— Jean Pascal Zanders, John Hart, and Frida Kuhlau, "Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control," *SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), p. 510; "Roodeplaat Research Laboratories," UNIDIR, p. 69, [www.unidir.ch](http://www.unidir.ch).

#### **May 1999**

In Geneva, Switzerland the United States and Libya begin a series of secret meetings to explore solutions to disputes between the two countries. In the course of the meetings, which are focused on terrorism and compensation for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing Libyan representatives the Libyans offer to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and open their facilities to inspection. The United States chooses not to pursue this opportunity.

—Ronald Bruce St John, "Libya and the United States: a Faustian Pact?" *Middle East Policy* Vol 15 No. 1 (Spring 2008), p. 134.

#### **January 1999**

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that Libya continues to pursue independent CW production capabilities through the foreign supply of chemical precursors and other CW equipment. UN sanctions have, however, hindered the progress of this pursuit since their enactment, especially during the early part of 1998.

— Anthony H. Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 17.

#### **29 April 1997**

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) enters into force. Libya participates in negotiations but does not sign prior to entry into force.

— Jean Pascal Zanders and Maria Wahlberg, "Chemical and Biological Weapons and Arms Control," *SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), p. 510.

#### **March 1997**

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Director John Holum reports U.S. intelligence has found that Libya has halted construction of the Tarhuna underground chemical plant following threats that the United States would resort to "the whole range of American weapons" to stop the construction.

— "Libya Halts Chemical Arms Plant," *United Press International*, 19 March 1997, [www.brook.edu](http://www.brook.edu).

#### **11 February 1997**

South African President Nelson Mandela vows to initiate an investigation regarding allegations implicating South African Defense Force members in the sale of chemical precursors and expertise to Libya soon after the 1994 South African elections.

— Joshua Sinai, "Ghadaffi's Libya: The Patient Proliferator," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 010/012, 1 December 1998, [www.janes.com](http://www.janes.com).

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#### **October 1996**

German courts convict a German national charged with facilitating Libya's acquisition of computer technology used for chemical weapons development and importing into Libya equipment from India designed to clean the residual emissions left behind by poison gas production. The convicted national allegedly used an Irish company as a dummy company to divert attention from the final destination of the equipment.

— Anthony H. Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 17.

#### **9 August 1996**

German authorities arrest two German businessmen under allegations that they assisted Libya with the development of its chemical weapons program by exporting equipment for chemical weapons between 1990 and 1993. Allegedly, the two men purchased an estimated \$2.07 million worth of Siemens chemical process control equipment and modified it to produce nerve agents. They then shipped the equipment to Libya through a Belgian front company in Antwerp owned by Lebanese-born Berge Balanian, a former informant for the German intelligence service. [Note: During the investigation of this case, two other German companies come under suspicion for involvement in the development of Libya's CW capabilities.]

— Jean Pascal Zanders, Susanna Eckstein, and John Hart, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Development and Arms Control," *SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997).

#### **April 1996**

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry announces during a visit to Cairo that Libya is building a chemical weapons production facility at Tarhuna and states that the United States will do whatever it takes to halt the development of this plant. Libya's Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi claims in response that the facility is part of the Great Man-Made River Project that aims to irrigate the country through diverting water from aquifers in the south to the Mediterranean coast. In order to forestall a potential U.S. attack on the Tarhuna facility, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak sends investigators to the facility to assess the level of development. They conclude that although they witness tunnels leading into the facility, they find no equipment indicating current activity at the site.

— Jean Pascal Zanders, Susanna Eckstein, and John Hart, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Development and Arms Control," *SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997).

#### **1996**

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) names the chemical facilities at Rabta and Tarhuna in its publication, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*. Tarhuna is an underground plant designed to subvert satellite reconnaissance.

— Department of Defense, the United States of America, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, November 1997, [www.defenselink.mil](http://www.defenselink.mil).

#### **September 1995**

According to U.S. and European intelligence sources, a \$20 million CW facility near Rabta opens. It is allegedly

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capable of producing mustard gas and has 13 automated production lines. [Note: Libya rebuts these allegations claiming that the facility is a pharmaceuticals plant.]

— Thomas Stock, Maria Haug, and Patricia Radler, "Chemical and Biological Weapon Development and Arms Control," *SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 1996).

### **September 1993**

The United States puts pressure on Thailand to remove 200 Thai workers helping in the construction of the Pharma-300 chemical facility at Tarhuna. The Thai Government closes two job placement firms supplying workers to Libya and arrests the owner of a Thai company involved in the construction of the Tarhuna plant under allegations that he employed Thai workers abroad in Libya without the Thai Government's consent. Libya pledges to deport 25,000 Thai construction workers living and working in Libya in retaliation but later rescinds the threat. [Note: As many as three Thai companies are known to have provided workers and equipment to the development of the Tarhuna and Rabta plants.]

— Thomas Stock and Anna De Geer, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Development and Arms Control," *SIPRI Yearbook 1994* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994).

### **October 1991**

The director of Imhausen, accused of assisting the development of the chemical facility at Rabta (Pharma-150), receives five years in prison on charges of illegally supplying CW materials to Libya and tax evasion. Two other Imhausen company managers also undergo trial and are convicted for supplying Libya with equipment and materials assisting in the development of Rabta. [Note: All investigations looking into West German involvement with Libya's CW development ceases soon thereafter by order of the Bundestag.]

— Thomas Stock, "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Developments and Proliferation," *SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993); S. J. Lundin and Thomas Stock, "Chemical and Biological Weapons Development and Arms Control," *SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament* (New York: Oxford UP, 1991).

### **1991-1992**

Middle East Defense News (Mednews) publishes a report detailing the various weapons suppliers to Iraq, Syria and Libya, including resources used for CW capacity building. For CW resources to Libya, the report names companies from Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. From Belgium, the Flaekt Company provides Libya with a cooling tower for the Rabta Plant and Philips Petroleum supplies Libya with thiodiglycol, a key sulfur mustard precursor. DISA, a Danish company, sells foundry equipment for CW bomb production at Rabta, while the French company, De Dietrich, supplies glass-lined cauldrons for the same facility. From Hungary's Lampart company, Rabta receives glass-lined reactor equipment, and from Italy's Peterlee company, the facility obtains other unspecified equipment for CW capability development. Japan's Marubeni and Japan Steel Works companies supply steel works for bomb-plant development at Rabta. Switzerland's Schweizerischen Kreditanstalt provides "banking services in Zurich for Rabta contracts," and Yugoslavia's Energoinvest assists with the development of Rabta's power sub-station. Companies from the United Kingdom such as Ironbridge, J.G. Trading, Tosalex Trading, and Ihsan Barbouti International (IBI) facilitate

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contracting and shipping for the Rabta plant. Germany is the most prominent supplier of resources contributing to Libya's chemical weapons development according to Mednews. The report names 21 West German companies and one East German company as contributing financial, engineering, precursor chemical, computer, building material, contractor, transportation, and technological resources to be party to Libya's chemical weapons development. West German companies as such consist of Abacus, Alfred Teves GmbH, Bischoff, Deutsche Bank, Drebs und Kiefer, Merck, Gesellschaft fur Automation, Heberger Bau, Hunnebeck, Imhausen Chemie, J. Sartorius, Kone, Krebs and Kefier, Linde, Pawling and Harnishchfeger, Preussag, Raab Karcher, Rhenus, Rose GmbH, Salzgitter Industriebau GmbH, Thyssen, Webac, and Zink. East Germany's VEB Stahibau provides assistance in steel production for the Rabta plant. Ihsan Barbouti International (IBI) is a British and German front company that plays a central role in brokering contracts for the construction of the Rabta site.

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80; Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 114-127.

#### **July 1990**

The United States accuses the Chinese Government of exporting approximately 10,000 tons of chemicals usable for chemical weapons development to the Libyan Pharma 200 chemical facility at Sebha, which has Lewisite and Sarin production capabilities.

— Bill Gertz, "Chinese Move Seen as Aiding Libya in Making Poison Gas," *Washington Times*, 12 July 1990, p. 6.

#### **14 May 1990**

Press reports from Washington indicate that a major fire allegedly destroys the chemical facility at Rabta ceasing all production. The Libyan Government initially accuses the United States of sabotaging the facility, then detains two employees of the Otto Kay Company of West Germany. According to commercial satellite photographs taken during the blaze, piles of burning tires are shown to be the actual cause of the smoke screen over Rabta, rather than fires within the plant itself. The chemical facility at Rabta is undamaged by the fire. The U.S. Government deems the fire suspicious and concludes that the Libyan Government staged it in order to ward off a U.S. air strike on the facility.

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80.

#### **13 May 1990**

Lutz Stavenhagen, Chancellor Kohl's senior aide in charge of intelligence, informs reporters during a visit to Israel that Libya is planning the construction of another chemical plant to be built underground, hidden from satellite reconnaissance. The site for the new plant is supposedly 650 km south of Tripoli at Sebha, the "former Otrag missile proving grounds." The Libyan News Agency, JANA, denies the construction of such a plant at Sebha; however, British reporters uncover contractual evidence that Hans Joachim Rose, a German intermediary from Stuttgart, has been directly involved in attempting to purchase Siemens computer systems for the Sebha facility for use in controlling chemical weapons production.

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— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80.

#### **Mid--1990s**

According to an international trade expert, an east Japan chemical equipment maker ships to Iraq and Libya reactor vessels made of "Hastelloy," an anti-corrosive alloy composed of nickel, chromium and molybdenum used in the mass-production of sarin. The alloy resists the corrosive qualities of phosphoric acid and hydrogen fluoride (HF) that occur during sarin production.

— "Red Thread Linking North Korea, Iraq and Sarin--Export Network for Japanese-Made Sarin-Cooking Pot," *AERA*, 28 April 2003, cited in "Japanese Firm Reportedly Sold Nerve Gas Equipment to Iraq, Libya, North Korea," in FBIS Document JPP2030424000082, 28 April 2003.

#### **Early 1990s**

Production of the blister agent sulfur mustard and nerve agents such as sarin and tabun become known capabilities of the chemical facility at Rabta. The facility reportedly has a capacity to manufacture up 10,000 pounds of chemical agents per day. [Note: This represents a hypothetical capacity; actual production quantities are frequently significantly lower.]

— Bill Gertz, "Chinese Move Seen as Aiding Libya in Making Poison Gas," *Washington Times*, 12 July 1990.

[Back to Top](#)

## **1989-1990**

### **17 February 1989**

West German Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Chief of the Federal Chancellery Wolfgang Schauble submits a report to the Bundestag (the German lower house of parliament) detailing West German intelligence's knowledge of Libya's chemical weapons development since April 1980. It names Imhausen-Chemie as a "potential supplier" and exposes the West German government's prior knowledge of Libya's development of CW capabilities and the possibility of West German firm involvement in such development. Although Schauble argues that the absence of conclusive evidence precludes the investigation of these firms by the West German government, he exposes the "shortcomings of West Germany's legal framework," opening West Germany to international scrutiny.

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 31.

### **12 January 1989**

West German authorities seize 12 boxes of documents from the offices of Iraqi-born Ihsan Barbouti of IBI Engineering. The documents include contracts proving IBI Engineering's orchestration of the "international procurement effort for the Rabta plant." After the raid of Barbouti's offices, Barbouti himself disappears.

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 29.

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### **1 January 1989**

West German company Imhausen-Chemie's role as the "prime contractor of the 'Pharma-150 Pharmaceuticals' plant in Rabta, Libya" becomes public knowledge. Libya's foreign minister remarks to a French interviewer at the Paris Conference that "[d]espite the fact that the production of chemical weapons is not banned by the Geneva agreement, Libya has decided of her own free will that it will not produce, and furthermore does not intend to produce, chemical weapons."

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 268.

### **Late 1988 - Early 1989**

The American news media publicly confronts Chancellor Kohl's refusal to prevent technology transfers contributing to the development of Libya's chemical weapons program. The Chancellor denies German firms' involvement in such transfers or any knowledge of the construction of the Rabta facility as such. A wave of criticism against West German export controls ensues after U.S. commentator William Safire dubs Rabta an "Auschwitz in the Sand" following the Chancellor's public denials.

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80.

### **1988**

Spain's Prime Minister Felipe González refuses to grant the United States permission to use Spanish bases for a bombing campaign to destroy the Rabta chemical factory in Libya.

— "Spain Plays a Key Role in Relations with Libya," *El Mundo*, 9 December 2003, in FBIS Document EUP20031209000187.

### **December 1988**

The Rabta facility obtains glass-lined vessels capable of withstanding corrosive chemical reactions from the French firm De Dietrich.

— Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Nonproliferation Review*, Spring/Summer 1997, p. 94.

### **November 1988**

The United Nations Secretary General receives a letter from Libya denying any pursuit of offensive CW capabilities.

— Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, *International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 267.

### **14 September 1988**

U.S. Department of State Spokesman Charles E. Redman announces during a State Department briefing that Libya has developed chemical weapons production capabilities and is on the verge of manufacturing chemical agents. Redman allegedly expresses a willingness to use force against Libya in hopes that the threat will convince suspected West German and Japanese suppliers to cease transactions with and activities in the country. Later that evening, NBC News reports that Libya plans to produce nerve and mustard agents at a plant 80 km south of Tripoli.

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— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 27-8.

### **May 1988**

U.S. officials learn that Japan Steel Works has been aiding in the construction of a metalworking plant at Rabta capable of producing artillery shells and "corrosion-resistant containers for chemical agents." Japan Steel Works refutes the allegations, stating that it sold Libya "only general purpose metal-working tools, designed to make desalination equipment." Based on the inclusion (in the deliveries) of specialty steels used in bomb casing, U.S. and British intelligence remain convinced that Libya is using materials from the Japanese company to manufacture chemical weapons, however. [Note: Japan later assures the U.S. State Department that Japanese companies ceased all activity at Rabta by July 1998.]

— "Libya Has Trouble Building the Most Deadly Weapon," *The Risk Report* 1 (December 1995), [www.wisconsinproject.org](http://www.wisconsinproject.org).

### **Mid-1988**

The Rabta Plant, consisting of 30 buildings guarded by Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) batteries and special troops, begins test runs.

— Anthony H. Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 16.

### **1988**

Libya completes construction of the chemical facility at Rabta, approximately 120 km southwest of Tripoli. The facility proceeds to manufacture at least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents over the next three years. Libya receives 19 metric tons of the dual use chemical dichlorethane legally shipped by the German pharmaceutical firm Merck. According to U.S. source allegations, Libya has developed a production site with nerve agent capabilities at Matan 100 km north of the Chad border.

— *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, U.S. Department of Defense, November 1997, [www.defenselink.mil](http://www.defenselink.mil); Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Nonproliferation Review*, Spring/Summer 1997, p. 94; S. J. Lundin, "Chemical and Biological Warfare: developments in 1989," *SIPRI Yearbook 1989* (New York: Oxford UP, 1989), pp. 110-111.

### **September 1987**

Libya allegedly drops Iran-supplied chemical agents on Chadian troops at the "Maaten as-Sara air base." The chemical agents used could potentially be mustard dropped by aircraft. Following the attack, Chad hands over gas munitions called "granaten" to the French as proof of Libya's offensive; however, the chemical contents of the munitions never undergo analysis.

— *Proliferation: Threat and Response*, U.S. Department of Defense, November 1997, [www.defenselink.mil](http://www.defenselink.mil); Anthony H. Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and

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International Studies, 1999), p. 16; Gordon M. Burck, *International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 269.

#### **22 December 1986**

Libya allegedly initiates a second chemical attack on Chadian rebels using napalm and toxic gas. [Note: Evidence of the actual chemical substances used on this occasion remains uncorroborated.]

— Gordon M. Burck, *International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 269.

#### **11 December 1986**

Chad accuses Libya of using poison gas against Chadian forces in Northern Chad.

— J. P. Perry Robinson, "Chemical and Biological Warfare: Developments in 1986," *SIPRI Yearbook 1987* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1987), p. 107.

#### **7 February 1986**

German intelligence (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*-- BND) reports the suspected involvement of a German shipping company in the potential shipping of 100 tons of sodium fluoride, a CW precursor, to Libya on a Panamanian freighter called "*Capira*" from Zeebrugge, Germany in early October 1985.

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 35.

#### **1986**

British intelligence sources disclose that the Soviets have supplied nerve agent warheads for Scud-B missiles to Libya.

— J. P. Perry Robinson, "Chemical and Biological Warfare: Developments in 1986," *SIPRI Yearbook 1987* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1987), p. 198.

#### **5 July 1985**

Imhausen-Chemie becomes a potential supplier for the Rabta facility, as indicated in a 1989 report submitted to the Bundestag (the German national Parliament) by Federal Minister for Special Tasks and Chief of the Federal Chancellery Wolfgang Schauble.

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 80; Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Poison Gas Connection: Western Suppliers of Unconventional Weapons and Technologies to Iraq and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1990), p. 31.

#### **1984-1988**

Imhausen-Chemie becomes the central actor in the supply network providing the Rabta project with equipment and materials for CW production.

— "Case Study Libya: Proliferation Techniques: Organization of the Supply Network for Rabta," VUB, SIPRI, and ISN, 1998-2001, <http://cbw.sipri.se>.

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#### **1984**

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl declines to take action in preventing chemical weapons precursor, technology, or production equipment transfers to Libya, despite international suspicion that German firms are the primary suppliers to the Libyan chemical weapons program. The German chemical company Imhausen-Chemie signs a contract with Libya to build the chemical plant at Rabta. According to Imhausen-Chemie President Jürgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, the leader of IBI Engineering, Ihsan Barbouti, approached Imhausen to assist in the construction of a "multi-purpose" chemical plant at Rabta.

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya* (Los Angeles, CA: Simon Wiesenthal Center, August 1992), p. 80; "Case Study Libya: Proliferation Techniques: Organization of the Supply Network for Rabta," VUB, SIPRI, and ISN, 1998-2001, <http://cbw.sipri.se>.

#### **Late 1980s**

Libya begins the construction of an underground chemical plant 650 miles south of Tripoli at Sebha entitled Pharma 200.

— "Sebha [Pharma 200]," GlobalSecurity.org, 2000-2004, [www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org).

#### **Mid-Late 1980s**

Libya begins the construction of a large chemical weapons facility called Pharma 150 at Rabta, disguising it as a pharmaceuticals facility. Libya also begins construction of a second plant, called Rabta-II, 65 km south of Tripoli at Tarhuna, dedicated to producing chemical agents and ballistic missiles. The Libyans design the site at Tarhuna to withstand an air attack by building two 200-450 foot-long tunnels covered by 100 ft. sandstone shields and lined with reinforced concrete. These tunnels can resist the penetration capabilities of U.S. GBU-27B and GBU-28 penetration bombs. Libya also begins to build another chemical/biological plant at Sebha called Pharma-200. It is an underground site located on a military base that is almost identical to Rabta in design.

— Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya* (Los Angeles, CA: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p.80; Anthony H. Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p. 17; "Sebha [Pharm-200]," GlobalSecurity.org, 2000-2004, [www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org).

#### **1920s**

Although suspicions remain uncorroborated, Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini allegedly authorizes bombing in Libya using mustard gas.

— Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, *International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 267.

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