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**New Agenda for U.S.-Russian Cooperation**  
**December 14, 2004**

Good morning. We're all here because we believe we can make the world safer if we can get the United States and Russia to strengthen cooperation on counter-terrorism and nonproliferation. The question is how? Thanks for giving me the chance to present NTI's views on this important subject.

Before I start a discussion of what we can do to improve our cooperative work, let me acknowledge that what the U.S. and Russia have accomplished over the last decade is nothing short of remarkable. The cooperative work that started with Nunn-Lugar and continues today through the G-8 Global Partnership and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, by any and every measure, is an extraordinary achievement for two nations previously locked in a perilous rivalry. The men and women in our governments deserve our praise and admiration for what they have done to reduce nuclear and other WMD dangers and for the many sacrifices and hardships endured in the effort. Unfortunately, I can't praise their efforts without also expressing serious concern that their dedicated service is not receiving the priority attention it deserves and is not proceeding at a pace commensurate to the dangers.

Keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of terrorists is a common security imperative.

If this threat were acted on with the urgency that it should be – the governments of the United States and Russia would have no higher priority than developing the strongest possible partnership with each other. Indeed, preventing catastrophic terrorism and proliferation should be the centerpiece of the U.S.-Russia post-Cold War relationship. It should dominate every meeting between our two leaders. It should be at the core of our diplomacy. A strong U.S. relationship with Russia is a vital means to so many ends – it ought to be considered an end in itself.

There are crucial challenges requiring a strong partnership that have to do with our bilateral relations alone. Chiefly, these have to do with addressing the dangerous legacy of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union – matters well known to this audience.

1. We need to accelerate the work of the Nunn-Lugar program– securing all the nuclear weapons and materials in Russia to a very high standard. We do not have to agree on how we should characterize the current security status; we

need only agree on the urgent need for continuous improvement. Clearly, we can't do this without Russia's wholehearted and enthusiastic commitment.

2. We need to provide an accounting of tactical nuclear weapons. To allow these weapons to go unaccounted for in the modern age of terrorism is a danger to Russia, the United States, and every other nation as well. Clearly, we cannot gain this accounting unless Russia consents to it. With the right kind of partnership, this consent is far more likely to be forthcoming.
3. We need to agree to a staged process to remove our nuclear missiles from the high alert nuclear posture which allows missiles to be launched within minutes. As NTI Co-Chairman, Sam Nunn, stated in a recent Financial Times Op-Ed, this posture increases the risk it was designed to reduce; it perpetuates the climate of the Cold War; and it should be ended as soon as possible consistent with each country's security interest. If we took this single step, we would not only improve our security, we would greatly improve the capacities of both nations to provide leadership and gain the cooperation of others in meeting the world's nonproliferation challenge.

These are three crucial issues facing our two countries. But they can't be the only aim of our partnership. Our common agenda must include them, and go beyond them. In fact, I believe that we will have stronger cooperation on the Cold War legacy issues if we are also working together – visibly and more effectively -- on a global basis to fight terrorism and nonproliferation.

Let me briefly mention seven global threats that we can address far more effectively with a strong U.S. Russia cooperative partnership:

1. We need to halt Iran's nuclear weapons program; to do it will require Russia's cooperation – as a powerful regional player and neighbor and as a supplier of nuclear technology and nuclear fuel.
2. We need to halt the North Korean nuclear weapons program; to bring this about, again we could use Russia's help – as a powerful regional player and neighbor, as one who built the nuclear reactors and trained the technicians, and as one who can help provide for North Korea's legitimate energy needs.
3. We need to spread the work of the Nunn-Lugar program to every nation that has nuclear weapons or materials – to make sure they also are secured to a very high standard. This is something Russia and the U.S. can best do together. For more than 50 years, the United States and Russia handled thousands of weapons and thousands of tons of material without a catastrophic accident. The dedicated scientists, engineers and military officers who created this record of safety have continued to learn from each other under the Nunn-Lugar program and have a lot to offer the rest of the world. We should do everything possible to make our 'best practices' *universal* practices in countries that handle these weapons and materials.

4. We need to clean out the poorly secured nuclear materials now in research reactors and other facilities around the world. We cannot do this, as effectively or as expeditiously as we must, without Russia. Much of these nuclear materials were supplied from Moscow. In many cases, Russia – more than the United States – has the diplomatic history and influence to negotiate a cleanout.

5. We need to develop new vaccines, antidotes, and means of detecting biological attacks. We cannot do this nearly as well without the help of Russia. Thousands of scientists accumulated great expertise in the Soviet biological weapons program. Today, this expertise gives Russia an unmatched ability to advance global protection against bio-terrorism. If we do not work together, we're not making the most of the defenses we have.

6. We need to work together on solutions to managing the dangers inherent in the ownership and operation of fuel cycle facilities.

7. Lastly – and perhaps most importantly -- we need to do everything possible to reduce tensions in global hotspots – both to prevent the outbreak of wars, and also to quell the violence that fuels terrorist recruitment and support. Again, Russia's active help will be required in the Subcontinent, and in the Middle East, and especially in areas and among parties where Russia's influence may be greater than ours.

These, in total, represent ten areas of vital global security consequence. The best strategic plan for addressing every one of these requires a prominent leadership role for Russia – either because of Russia's unique capabilities, or its unique political position, or both.

This is why – from the very beginning – NTI has tried to say as emphatically as we can that U.S. security, Russian security, and global security depend on the breadth and depth of U.S.-Russia cooperation. We must have a cooperative partnership – focused not on Russia's security vulnerabilities but on Russia's strengths -- a partnership built on respect and common purpose. Respect should come naturally when you encounter another who can help you do things that you need to have done, but that you cannot do as well or even at all, if you have to do them by yourself. The common purpose required to make this partnership effective and sustaining must rest on our perception of common dangers now well documented in the words of our leaders.

But, as you all know, it is not always easy to focus on common dangers in the midst of real differences. There is growing concern in the United States and Europe about Russia's future direction – a worry that Russia's recent actions may suggest a step backward and spawn increasing conflict with Western values and Western states. We cannot, and should not, ignore these concerns, but we have to find a way to address them that does not drive a wedge between us, and inhibit cooperation in areas that are crucial to our collective security. In this environment, we must try even harder to strengthen our cooperative work.

To this end, NTI has reached out to some of the best minds in both countries and funded a variety of joint efforts with the Russian Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to explore the greater cooperation we need on counter-terrorism.

We have funded projects to help channel the expertise of Russia's bio-weapons scientists into peaceful pursuits.

We have also funded a study on how the MPC&A program within Russia can be sustained – and likewise how the decades of U.S. and Russian experience in securing weapons and materials in Russia, can be expanded to share 'best practices' worldwide.

Most strategic, however, of all NTI funding projects in this domain, was our funding of a joint RAS/NAS workshop on overcoming impediments to U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation.

As you will all recognize, the idea for this workshop – as well as the idea just mentioned for expanding best practices – belongs to John Holdren and Nikolai Laverov, who served as co-chairs of the Joint Committee on U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-proliferation, and made these recommendations in their pivotal letter to the Academy Presidents two years ago this month. We owe them our thanks.

The joint Academies report on overcoming impediments detailed six sets of impediments, from political and legal, and scientific – to bureaucratic issues, funding questions, and the legacy of the Cold War mindset. The report also recommended specific tools for overcoming these impediments, and a follow-on project on a detailed reform agenda was approved for funding by NTI this past October.

The joint Academies report, in our view, is immensely valuable – but true to its purpose: it highlights what we don't have. We agree on goals; we agree on the impediments we face, but when it comes to finding the right tools to overcome those impediments, we need a higher power.

No agency chief in either nation, no matter how committed, can put together a plan for overcoming obstacles without immediately bumping into competing agency priorities that cannot be reconciled by anyone except the President.

Presidents Bush and Putin have already declared this a priority. Standing next to President Putin at the White House following their meeting two months after September 11, President Bush declared: "our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction."

But we all know that the pace of our efforts are undercut by funding issues, bureaucratic spats, and fights over liability, visas, site visits and other issues that prove – amply and painfully -- this project is not yet a true Presidential priority.

Those who claim it is a priority point to the words of our presidents, but these words have not been matched by deeds. What then do we need to do to make that priority real?

First of all, we need on the U.S. side to make this a clear and insistent Presidential priority – one that matches resources to needs and compels interagency cooperation. (Perhaps a new National Security Presidential Directive would serve this purpose.) Second, this issue should be the first matter for discussion in every U.S.-Russia Presidential summit, and every high-level military or ministerial meeting between our countries. We need both Presidents to demand that all impediments to cooperation be overcome – and that any issues not resolved should be brought to the two Presidents for decision.

Third, on the U.S. side, it has been NTI's consistent view that we need a single, high-ranking Presidential advisor (probably at the Deputy National Security Advisor level) who is responsible for managing the U.S.-Russia partnership on counter terrorism and nonproliferation efforts worldwide. A similarly empowered role is also critical within the Russian senior leadership. The senior officials in Russia and the United States would manage this issue in their own governments, and monitor the cooperation and progress between summits.

Fourth, the understanding of the danger must start at the top and penetrate down through the bureaucracy even to the lowest custodians of the dangerous materials. Agency officials should understand that national security must not be compromised over turf issues or Cold War mindsets. Custodians of dangerous materials should understand that they have been entrusted with their nation's security, and must honor that trust and be honored for their work.

This message can pervade the governments only through the high-profile leadership of the two Presidents. Indeed, everything we discuss and everything we propose depends for its success on the attention and commitment of the two Heads of State.

In January 1961, a few months after President Kennedy was elected and a few days before he took office, he was welcomed to the White House by President Eisenhower. President Eisenhower, after eight years of experience in the Oval Office, advised the youngest American ever elected President: "No easy matters will ever come to you as President. If they are easy, they will be settled at a lower level."

"No easy matters will ever come" to the U.S. and Russian Presidents in overcoming impediments to U.S.-Russian cooperation. But the danger is not that "no easy matters will ever come," but that no *difficult* matters will ever come. The greatest danger, indeed, is that the difficult matters will remain where they have been – stagnant, unnoticed and unresolved at a lower level. The only way to prevent that is for the Presidents of both nations to create an enhanced environment for cooperation, to insist on

progress commensurate with our common dangers, to watch for it, and to raise hell when they don't see it.

In short, in order to strengthen U.S.-Russian cooperation, we need both of our Presidents to take charge and take responsibility. Our security depends upon it.

Thank you.