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World Leaders' Summit  
Stanford University  
June 24, 2005**

**“International Cooperation:  
The Indispensable Security Imperative”**

When I survey the range of threats and challenges that form the agenda of this conference, I'm reminded of one of the many wise sayings of that unique American sage, Woody Allen.

I quote: “More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to utter despair. The other, to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”

Actually, as the members of this audience know, there is a third path – the path of international cooperation – that leads past the disasters to a more secure world. That's what I would like to talk about tonight.

This is one of the most realistic conferences I've ever attended. Most conferences bring leaders together to discuss one issue. That's helpful. It can give leaders a chance to immerse themselves in one subject. But it's not the real world. Issues and threats do not come one at a time, in a single file line. They come all together and all at once.

This conference agenda is a valuable reminder of that fact. It highlights not one issue, but combines two – the danger of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the issues of human security, including threats of poverty, regional conflict, infectious disease, and deprivation. If we explore these issues deeply, we find that they're powerfully linked and affected by a long list of other pressing issues including failed state governance, human rights abuses, religious fanaticism, race and gender discrimination, illiteracy, economic dislocation, and environmental degradation.

Until you consider issues not just separately, but in relation to one another, you will never learn which issues affect which others, and which actions can have the most positive impact.

This is the heart of strategy.

Perhaps nothing is more over-used in policy and political discussions than the term “strategic.” It is carelessly used as a synonym for words like smart, or clever, or calculating. In reality, an action is strategic if it meets two tests: if it advances your highest goals, and if it does so by delivering the maximum impact for the effort.

So this is the strategic question I would like to explore with you tonight: given our finite resources and the near-infinite dangers around us, what threats should get our most urgent attention, what are we doing about them – and what should we be doing about them?

Most theorists would agree the magnitude of a threat is determined by the combination of two factors – the threat’s ‘destructive power’ multiplied by its ‘probability of occurrence.’ If a danger is probabilistically small but persists over a long time, the likelihood of occurrence becomes much greater. If you reduce the risk of occurrence substantially, the long-term danger goes down even more substantially. If you don’t like math and prefer English, the analysis comes down to four questions: “What’s the chance a particular threat can happen? How much damage will it do if it does? Can we reduce the probability if not the consequence? How?”

If a 10-kiloton nuclear device goes off in mid-town Manhattan, or any major city on a typical workday, it could kill hundreds of thousands in a single stroke.

The loss of life would not be the only impact. The world’s interdependent economy could suffer a near mortal blow – damaging the weakest economies the most. Healthy levels of spending and global investment could be retarded for a generation, if not longer. The balance between security and liberty worldwide would move harshly against liberty. All that from a single nuclear explosion. The effects would be far greater if there were not just one nuclear weapon, but a second or a third.

This means, of course, that the destructive power of a nuclear strike is exceedingly high. There is more talk today about the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack because we are finally coming to accept that the probability is much higher than we had thought.

On NBC’s “Meet the Press” a few weeks ago, Tim Russert asked 9/11 Commission chair Thomas Kean if he thought there was a real possibility of a nuclear attack on an American city in his lifetime. Governor Kean said: “We talked to nobody who had studied this issue who didn’t think it was a real possibility.”

When you combine that “real possibility” with the destructive effects of a nuclear weapon, you have our greatest threat. From its inception, reducing the probability of this peril has been NTI’s primary focus. Our international Board believes this is not just an American threat, but a threat to the world order. The danger to “us” is literally to each of us and all of us together.

With so much at stake, citizens of the world have every reason to ask: “Are we doing all we can to prevent a nuclear attack?” The emphatic answer is “no, we are not.”

Let me review four major initiatives with you – highlighting both the good news, then the bad news.

Initiative Number One: Here's the good news: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program has been working since 1991 to secure and destroy weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. This program helped Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus get rid of all their nuclear weapons – an historic achievement. It has also made significant progress in securing nuclear weapons, materials, and know-how in Russia.

Here's the bad news: We're not moving nearly fast enough. The NTI-funded study "Securing the Bomb 2005" pointed out in May that we secured less nuclear material in 2004 than we did in 2003. In the two years after 9/11, we secured less or about the same amount as the two years before. Right now, only one-half of all buildings and one-half of the material in the Russian nuclear complex have received security upgrades.

The U.S. Department of Energy says we'll finish securing all nuclear materials in Russia by 2008. But we're never going to meet that deadline at the rate we're going; we need a dramatic acceleration. And we're never going to accelerate unless we break through long-standing disagreements with Russia about who pays in the event of an accident and whether we can visit their nuclear sites to confirm the work has been done. Only President Bush and President Putin can sweep away these obstacles and get us moving – and – nearly four years after 9/11 – they haven't done it yet.

Initiative Number Two: Here's the good news: In May of 2004, the U.S. launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative – to secure, remove and ultimately render harmless the highly enriched uranium now in research reactors around the world. The U.S. has engaged Russia and sought a number of other state "partners" in the Initiative.

Here's the bad news: Of the more than 130 research reactor facilities in 40 countries with bomb-making materials, no more than a handful of dangerous sites have been cleaned out. The United States is leading this effort although it does not yet appear to have an actual work plan, including a timeframe, to secure all stockpiles of weapons usable nuclear materials around the globe. Nor does it appear to have a threat-based assessment for prioritizing this work.

Initiative Number Three: Here's the good news: The G8 – soon to meet in Gleneagles, Scotland – committed three years ago to create and fund with \$20 billion the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. This laid the foundation for global cooperation.

Here's the bad news: \$20 billion is not enough; it should be a floor, not a ceiling. To address the declared "number one threat to international security," Russia and the largest Western economies have managed to commit far less than one-half of 1 percent of their GDP. Even so, of the \$20 billion goal, only \$17 billion has so far been pledged. Of the \$17 billion pledged, only a small fraction has been spent. Of the money spent, not nearly enough has gone to address the most urgent threats. And big bureaucratic obstacles still stand in the way of urgent action.

Initiative Number Four: Here's the good news: As we all know, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has 189 signatories. It prohibits the increase of nuclear weapons states, and the whole world generally agrees that the spread of nuclear weapons is not a good thing for the future of the planet.

Here's the bad news: In the past 7 years, India has tested nuclear weapons. Pakistan has tested nuclear weapons. North Korea appears to have developed nuclear weapons. Iran appears determined to make nuclear weapons. The international community response has not been cooperative, coordinated or effective. Facilities to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, the essential ingredients of a nuclear weapon, continue to proliferate. The world has been yet unable to develop the right blend of incentives and penalties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or the facilities to make weapons materials – and every new nation that acquires these capabilities increases the chances that terrorists will also get them.

Those are but four international cooperative efforts. I could also mention the failures to get an accounting of U.S.-Russian tactical nuclear weapons or the deficiencies in strategic arms control. Or I could mention the lack of follow-through on Security Council Resolution 1540.

As you can tell, there is a pattern here. The good news is that the world has recognized the threat and is taking action. The bad news is that, in arena after arena, our response does not match the threat. Nations of the world are not doing nearly enough to defend us against our gravest danger.

When nearly all parties agree on the urgency of a common threat and generally agree on the steps needed to address it – what possible explanation can there be for a lack of action?

Lack of action can only be explained by a lack of leadership.

I'm not talking about the kind of leadership that just keeps things running and honors the patterns of the past. We have that.

I'm talking about leadership that acts boldly to change the way the world thinks and acts – a leadership that fosters an urgent and sustained international cooperation capable of meeting the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Throughout history, great nations grew great and remained great without relying heavily on cooperation. They believed they could guarantee their own security.

That era is gone. The great leaders of this globally interconnected and interdependent age will be those who convince not only their own citizens, but all citizens, that if we are going to enjoy peace and prosperity in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, then all nations must cooperate in fighting and defeating the dangers that threaten us all.

The most urgent case for cooperation comes down to terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction. The world's leaders, to protect their own nations, must agree and then convince the world that the specter of terrorist attacks with nuclear and other weapons of mass

destruction is the number one threat for every country, and it will be prevented only if every country makes it a priority to cooperate for our common security.

The most effective, least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure nuclear weapons and materials at the source. And that requires the active cooperation of most of the nations of the world, including all with nuclear capability and those that can contribute to the task. Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process – building the bomb, transporting it, and detonating it – is easier for the terrorists to take, and harder for us to stop.

The defense against catastrophic terrorism must begin with securing weapons and fissile materials in every country and every facility that has them – to keep it out of terrorist hands. No nuclear material, no nuclear weapon. No nuclear weapon, no nuclear terrorism.

That is a simple formula, but a complicated endeavor. There are nuclear materials in a large number of countries in the world. Terrorists trying to steal nuclear materials won't necessarily go where there is the most material; they will go where the material is most vulnerable. That means our security is only as strong as its weakest link. It also means that – to a degree never seen before in history – rich and powerful nations will need the cooperation of smaller, poorer nations to safeguard their security. Our security absolutely depends on it. As NTI Co-chairman and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn has said over and over: “We’re in a race between cooperation and catastrophe.”

While I am focusing my remarks tonight on the nuclear threat, preventing acts of bio-terrorism will require just as much cooperation or even more.

Biological agents capable of killing millions of people now sit in academic, government, and industrial laboratories throughout the world. To reduce the threat of a bio-terror attack, life scientists everywhere will have to integrate security in the conduct of their research, and we will have to harmonize bio-security laws for controlling access to deadly pathogens. At the same time, governments around the world need to improve infectious disease surveillance and diagnostic capacities, and expand their communications links, so that an epidemic can be halted quickly if prevention fails. In defense against bio-terrorism, cooperation is indispensable in both prevention and response.

As many in this audience know, it will not be an easy matter for wealthy nations to gain the cooperation of developing nations in fighting WMD terrorism. Our urgent claim to developing nations that we share a common fate will ring hollow and hypocritical if we declare to the developing world that we are all at risk of terrorism, but continue to act as if only they – and not we – are at risk from global poverty, intrastate conflict, and disease. The essential reality in the globalized world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is that the security of the wealthy nations is now linked to the security of the weakest. To strengthen civil society in the developing nations is to strengthen security in the developed world. Moreover, to gain the cooperation essential to a mutual defense, as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has so eloquently described, it is essential to cooperate on the most basic elements of societal need, whether that need be the “Freedom from Fear” or the “Freedom from Want.”

There is still more to do, however. There are two approaches to preventing catastrophic terrorism – and until now, I’ve talked only about one. The first approach is to lock down all weapons materials to keep them from falling into terrorist hands. This is the supply side of the problem. Cut off the supply of weapons so that the terrorists who want to use them can’t get them.

The second approach to prevention is on the demand side. If we want to cut off the terrorist demand for weapons of mass destruction, we have to learn how to defuse hatred. This means, as we work to reduce the grievances that terrorists are trying to exploit, we must work with the people and the governments in predominantly Muslim nations to isolate and weaken the brand of Islamic extremism that is a fertile breeding ground for catastrophic terrorism.

In the first instance – the hatred against America comes from those who would demonize America, blame it for the ills that befall Muslim nations, and incite violence against us. This threat is captured in the words of a Muslim cleric who said quite plainly: “We don’t want to change your mind, we want to destroy you.” The world community must not see this as an American problem. America is the symbol of the grievance, but the complaint goes deeper, to disdain broadly Western culture and Western values.

We must address this hatred – not because it is legitimate, but because it is dangerous. That means we need to know more about how these people and their audiences see the Western world. And we – particularly the United States – must give greater consideration to how our policies, actions, and culture are seen in their world. We have to understand what is behind the hatred, and how it gets there, and work to get it out. The United States is just getting around to this agenda and not having much success. This too is an area where we need far greater international help and cooperation.

In the second instance, there is hatred that is based on a belief that we in the West don’t care enough or do enough to help the developing world. Some of these views are distortions. But we have to be honest with ourselves. Some are not. We have for a very long time built relations with leaders of countries and ignored their citizens. To the extent that there might be some rational basis for resentment against rich countries, in the same way in which there would be resentment against a rich and powerful person who ignored the suffering of others – we must work to correct it. This means increasing our commitment to the health and wealth and security of people in the developing world. In short, our advocacy of democratic values must be backed up by concrete investments in strengthening the social fabric and economic capacities of these societies.

You who are at the center of national security debate know that these issues have often been called ‘soft issues.’ Those who discount the importance of these issues have traditionally believed that superior military power is all you need to be secure, because people who fear you won’t challenge you. But times have changed.

The reality – as author Robert Wright has written – is that “the amount of discontent in the world is becoming a highly significant national security variable.”

The effort to address the needs of people in the developing world and their discontent is tied directly and urgently to our effort to protect ourselves. The entire noble effort of non-proliferation is really, in my view, an effort to buy time. As technology advances, these weapons will become easier to make, not harder. Population growth in much of the world will aggravate the human security problems of today. The simple and inescapable truth is we have to learn how to reduce grievances and defuse hatred before it can acquire the tools to express itself explosively and catastrophically.

To do that – as in the case of keeping weapons and nuclear materials out of terrorist hands – will require an unprecedented degree of international cooperation. It will require us to exploit every bilateral, multilateral and institutional relationship we have or can develop. But it will also require us to make more effective the principal means we as a community of nations have formed to provide for our mutual security.

Today, on the eve of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, we should recognize the power and value of the UN to help in all these tasks. We know the troubles that confront the world. And we know the troubles that confront the UN. We invented the UN so we could provide for our collective security. As NTI's co-founder, Ted Turner, recognized with the creation of the United Nations Foundation, we need to strengthen the UN and make the most of the leverage it can give us in addressing every one of the world's problems.

Archimedes – who gave us the mathematical understanding of leverage – once boasted: “Give me where to stand, and I will move the earth.” The leverage of international cooperation will do more than help us move the world; it will help us save the world from its gravest peril. With your leadership and help, with an “aroused understanding and insistence,” we will do just that.

I do not accept that a catastrophic act of nuclear terrorism is inevitable – nor should you.

Thank you.