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Evian and Beyond: Priorities for the Global Partnership
May 28, 2003
Paris, France

I am here in Paris to participate in this news conference because I believe three things:

1. The gravest danger in the world today is the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
2. The likeliest use of these weapons is in terrorist hands.
3. Preventing the spread and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons should be the top security priority and the central organizing security principle of the 21st century.

Global cooperation is essential to reduce the threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons – not because cooperation gives us a warm feeling, but because every other method will fail.

Terrorists determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction will go anywhere in the world to get them. A series of national, bilateral or regional plans will not provide a seamless global defense; it will leave holes and gaps that offer dangerous opportunities for our adversaries.

The threats are real:

- The hardest step in making a nuclear weapon is getting plutonium or highly enriched uranium. These materials are hard to make – the most likely way a terrorist will get these materials is to buy or steal them. The essential ingredients of nuclear bombs are spread around the world in abundant and poorly secured supply. In Russia and the other former Soviet states, there are large quantities of weapons materials – enough to make thousands of weapons – that are insufficiently protected.
- In 40 countries around the world there are more than 100 research reactors that use highly enriched uranium – some of this material is secured by nothing more than an underpaid guard sitting inside a chain link fence. More than 20 of these have been identified as needing urgent action.
- Around the world, including the United States, laboratories working with deadly biological materials have insufficient security.
- Millions of deadly chemical weapons are at risk. At the Shchuchye facility in Russia, nearly 2 million rounds of nerve agents – enough to kill everyone on earth -- sit in decaying buildings.

At last year's G8 meeting, the leaders seemed to understand these threats and committed \$20 billion over 10 years to establish the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

They meet again this week in Evian. They have had twelve months to start turning their good ideas into concrete actions and resources.

What should we expect? Here is my list:

1. A plan and a timeline for an urgent effort to secure the most vulnerable nuclear materials through short-term emergency upgrades – either by greater protection or consolidation or both.
2. An agreement on how much money each country is committing and when.
3. A top official in each government responsible for programs against catastrophic terrorism.
4. A plan to convert research reactors that use highly enriched uranium and to secure the weapons-usable material at those sites.
5. A plan with a timeline and cost estimates for blending down all the world's excess highly enriched uranium – storing what cannot be absorbed by commercial markets.
6. A plan for expanding the G8 Partnership to include all nations with something to safeguard and something to contribute to safeguarding it. The country we leave out just may end up being the source for a terrorist bomb.
7. A plan for instituting global norms and standards for the handling of dangerous pathogens to prevent these materials from being controlled and used by terrorists.
8. A plan for international standards for the physical protection of nuclear material. There is currently no international standard or requirement for the physical protection of nuclear material within a state.
9. An agreement to take full advantage of the skill and experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the only international institution of global scope devoted to monitoring access to weapons-usable material. The IAEA's essential work is woefully underfunded.

We know the current situation is not safe. We must act and act together. We are already working hard on the demand side of the problem – by targeting the terrorists who are seeking these weapons. But we need to do far more on the supply-side -- securing the sites that might supply these weapons. As we intensify efforts to destroy terrorist networks, they will intensify efforts to destroy us. We must overcome our disbelief that there are terrorists dedicating their time, energy and money to acquiring weapons of mass destruction so they can kill millions of people. As unthinkable as that is, we have to respond. We may not be able to make these terrorists less evil, but we must make them less powerful. We must keep them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take and harder for us to stop. Once they gain access to nuclear materials, they've completed the most difficult step – and our nightmare begins. That is why the

defense against catastrophic terrorism must begin with securing weapons and materials in every country and every facility that has them. This is a big challenge, but it is finite and doable.

This meeting at the one-year mark is a critical test for the G8 and the Global Partnership. I am hopeful about the announcements that will come in Evian. Much has been done, but we are not doing enough.

The stakes are high. We are well past the time when we can take satisfaction with a step in the right direction. A gazelle running from a cheetah is taking steps in the right direction. It's no longer just a question of direction; it's a matter of speed. We are not moving as fast as we can or as fast as we must.

No issue is more important. No threat is more dangerous.

If a weapon goes off tomorrow in Moscow, Tokyo, New York, or here in Paris - what will we wish we had done to prevent it? We must do it now.

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