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**“The Race Between Cooperation and Catastrophe”**  
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I want to express my appreciation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Japan Russia Committee for organizing and hosting this conference. I am honored to have the opportunity to be in Japan to talk about what we all must do together to make a safer world.

I am here today, because I believe that:

1. The gravest danger in the world today is the threat of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
2. We will prevent this danger only if every country accepts that it is the number one threat, and every country makes it a priority to cooperate for our common security.

We are in a dangerous period of history, where the threats have changed quickly, and our responses are changing very slowly – far too slowly.

Throughout much of history, great nations trusted other nations as little as possible. They believed they could guarantee their own security.

But today, with the rise of global terrorism, with poorly secured nuclear weapons and materials around the globe, with our economies so tightly intertwined in trade, it is possible that a small group of terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons in one nation, launch a nuclear attack in another nation, and stagger the security and the economy of every nation.

This gives every nation a common interest and a common duty to do their part to defend the world against a terrorist nuclear attack. No single nation, or group of nations, can prevent weapons of mass destruction terrorism on their own. We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe, and the threats are outrunning our response.

Here in Japan, you have known since March 20, 1995 – just ten years ago this spring – that a terrorist group would be willing to use chemical weapons to try to kill thousands of civilians. Some in the United States dismissed this attack by Aum Shinrikyo as an isolated event that would never recur and affected no one outside Tokyo.

I did not agree. The same year it happened, I launched a United States Senate investigation to understand what this meant for national and global security. The Government of Japan provided superb assistance to my committee. We learned that:

- Aum Shinrikyo had more than \$1 billion in assets;
- They wrote publicly about their desire to kill thousands of people;
- They produced chemical agents such as sarin and VX gas;
- They tried to build a plant to develop biological weapons; and
- They attempted to recruit scientists and technical experts in Japan, Russia and elsewhere to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction.

The 9/11 attacks on the United States made it clear that other groups are also grave threats. The 9/11 Commission in the United States has reported that Osama bin Laden has been working for ten years to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

With so much at stake, our citizens have every reason to ask: “Are we doing all we can to prevent a nuclear attack?” My emphatic answer is “No, we are not.”

Increasingly, we are being warned that an act of nuclear terrorism is inevitable. I am not willing to concede that point. But I do believe that unless we greatly elevate our effort and the speed of our response, we could face this disaster.

Let me explain my sense of urgency by describing four nuclear-related threats we face today:

### **Threat 1. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon**

Imagine the following scenario: Under cover of darkness, terrorists slip into a lightly-guarded nuclear research reactor. Assisted by insiders, they take fifty kilograms of highly enriched uranium and head for a safe house that is equipped with machine tools, chemicals, bomb designs -- everything necessary to turn a terrorist group into a nuclear power.

A few days later, intelligence agents discover the safe house, where they find machine tools with traces of highly enriched uranium – but no bomb. The combined security forces of many governments deploy to guard hundreds of ports and airports and thousands of miles of coastline. Yet the bomb moves through a border crossing – undetected by radiation sensors because it is shielded by a thin layer of lead. At midday in a city of several million people, the world suffers its first nuclear strike in sixty years.

The day after – what would we wish we had done to prevent it?

- We would wish that the world’s top security priority had been a global effort based on best practices to upgrade the security of all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials and to promote a culture of security at all our facilities.

- We would wish that we had contributed more to the IAEA nuclear security fund to lock down nuclear weapons and materials in every country and every facility that has them.
- We would wish that the G8's Global Partnership had turned its pledges into programs and directed its resources aggressively against the most urgent dangers – as it committed to do almost three years ago at its meeting in Canada.
- We would wish we had moved faster to implement the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to remove and secure nuclear weapons materials from research facilities around the world. We would wish that we had established a global norm minimizing and, where possible, converting existing research reactors to operate on low-enriched uranium fuel – thereby reducing the wide distribution of bomb-making material around the world.
- We would wish that the United States and Russia had insisted on bilateral transparent accountability of tactical nuclear weapons in both the US and Russian arsenals.

The day after – I believe we would wish we had done all those things. Why aren't we doing them now?

### **Threat 2. A terrorist attack with a dirty bomb**

Now, imagine the following scenario: a terrorist group with insider help acquires a dangerous quantity of cesium-137 from a medical facility. The terrorists use conventional explosives to incorporate the powdered cesium chloride into a “dirty bomb,” and detonate it in the financial district of Tokyo or Beijing or Moscow or New York -- dispersing the cesium isotope across a 60-square block area. The explosion kills a couple dozen people and millions evacuate the city in panic. Billions of dollars of real estate is declared uninhabitable. Cleanup is estimated to take years and cost additional billions.

The day after a dirty bomb attack – what would we wish we had done to prevent it and to mitigate the damage if it occurs?

- We would wish that we had worked harder to develop a risk-based global inventory of vulnerable radioactive sources and better prioritized our efforts to secure them through a partnership effort around the globe.
- We would wish that we had worked harder to secure radioactive sources at each stage of their lifecycle – from their production through their shipment, use, and disposal – a cradle to grave approach to dangerous nuclear materials.
- We would wish that we had ensured that first responders had plans, protective gear and decontamination equipment in place to respond to an attack, and that we had mounted a serious public education and training program to mitigate the consequences of the attack.

The day after – I believe we would wish that we had done each of these things. Why aren't we doing them now?

**Threat 3. A sharp increase in the number of nuclear weapons states.**

Imagine the following scenario: North Korea continues to turn its spent nuclear fuel into bomb-grade plutonium and manufacture nuclear weapons, and then suddenly tests a weapon – as India and Pakistan did in 1998. Iran continues playing cat and mouse, until it has developed enough highly enriched uranium to build several nuclear weapons.

As Iran and North Korea become nuclear weapons states, other nations re-examine their options. Before a decade passes, five other nations have become nuclear powers – provoking greater regional tensions, greater pressure on other nations to go nuclear, greater chance of nuclear accidents and greater danger that weapons or materials could fall into terrorist hands. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty becomes an artifact of history.

After this occurs, what would we wish that we had done to prevent it?

- We would wish that the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia had forged an effective strategy involving real incentives for Pyongyang to give up its program but also agreement on strong penalties if the North Korean regime remains on its present course.
- We would wish that the international community had acted more vigorously to dissuade Iran from acquiring a uranium enrichment capability and that our negotiating strategies had included a more effective blend of cooked carrots and sharp sticks.
- We would wish that we had developed new international arrangements to discourage the spread of enrichment and other fuel-cycle capabilities under national control, including a consortium of nuclear suppliers who would guarantee nuclear fuel at favorable market rates to other states, thereby removing any pretext for new states to develop fuel-cycle capabilities of their own.
- We would wish that the nuclear weapons states, especially the United States and Russia, had set an example of devaluing rather than enhancing the importance of nuclear weapons at a time when we were asking others to renounce nuclear weapons. As Director General ElBaradei has said, it's hard to tell people not to smoke when you have a cigarette dangling from your mouth.
- In this respect, we would wish that the United States and Russia had followed the Treaty of Moscow with other substantive actions – by adding benchmarks for progress, mechanisms for verification, timetables for reductions and a mutual pledge to eliminate warheads, not just delivery mechanisms.
- We would wish that the United States had moved forward with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and worked toward its ratification.

The day after we wake up and discover several new nations with their fingers on the nuclear trigger, and dramatically increased opportunity for terrorists to gain nuclear material – I believe we would wish we had done all these things. Why aren't we doing them now?

#### **Threat 4: Accidental or unauthorized nuclear missile strike**

Imagine this scenario: The relationship between Russia and the United States deteriorates. Old rivalries and suspicions are rekindled, and as tensions mount, President Putin is informed by the head of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces that their warning systems have picked up the signature of the launch of a single United States nuclear missile heading toward Moscow.

President Putin would ask if the system could be sending a false warning. He would be told: "Yes, the warning could be false."

He would ask if it is one missile or could be more. He would be told that the Russian warning system is badly eroded, so it appears to be one, but it could be a much larger attack.

He would ask: "Is it possible that an all-out attack could destroy all our missiles and take away our ability to retaliate?" He would be told: "Yes."

He would ask: "How much time do I have before I have to decide whether to launch our missiles or lose them?" He would be told: "Thirty minutes at most."

This scenario could result in a mistaken, accidental or unauthorized nuclear missile strike. The day after, what would we wish we had done to prevent it?

- The United States and Russia would wish that we had changed our Cold War force postures and removed our nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert, so both leaders would have more time to gather data, exchange information, gain perspective, discover an error and avoid an accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized nuclear launch.
- The United States and Russia would wish that we had recognized that our very survival depends on the accuracy of each other's early warning systems and that we had followed through on the 1998 initiative to develop a joint early warning center to prevent false warnings and greatly reduce the danger of a catastrophic mistake.

The day after – I believe we would wish we had done all of these things. Why aren't we doing them now?

I do not want to suggest this morning that we are doing nothing to prevent a nuclear catastrophe. Important steps have been taken, including:

- The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which has been working since 1991 to secure and destroy weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. This program helped Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus get rid of all their nuclear weapons – an historic achievement.

- The US–Russian Global Threat Reduction Initiative is now working to remove and secure highly enriched uranium from research facilities around the globe, but we have a long way to go.
- At the US-Russia summit earlier this year, Presidents Bush and Putin each made a personal commitment to enhance and accelerate efforts to secure nuclear weapons and nuclear materials worldwide.
- The G8 committed three years ago to create and provide \$20 billion to fund the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

These are all indispensable steps for global security. But there is a big difference between what we're doing, and what we ought to be doing.

- \$20 billion should be a floor, not a ceiling.
- Pledges need to be turned into real money and projects. Even though it represents a minimum -- of the \$20 billion goal, only \$17 billion has so far been pledged. Of the \$17 billion pledged, only a small fraction has gone to specific projects. And big bureaucratic obstacles still stand in the way of urgent action.
- We must develop the global partnership against catastrophic terrorism into an effective, focused, well-funded and truly global effort.
- Our leaders must personally put this issue on their front burners and cut through the barriers to cooperation.

Japan's leadership and action is essential to the success of the Global Partnership. The ingredients of leadership that make Japan a deserving candidate for permanent membership in the UN Security Council also make Japan a natural leader in the Global Partnership. Japan is the only nation to suffer a nuclear attack and the first nation to suffer a lethal terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction, so you know that preventing the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction has to be our top security priority.

Even before the Global Partnership was formally established at the G8 summit in June 2002, Japan was engaged in important threat reduction activities. Japan has:

- Taken the lead in helping Asian countries strengthen their capacities in the area of export control;
- Contributed to threat reduction activities;
- Started helping Russia dismantle decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines;

- Participated in a multilateral project to dispose of plutonium formerly contained in Soviet nuclear weapons;
- Signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- Supported the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; and
- Championed the strengthening of IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol.

Your efforts have been important. But given the magnitude and urgency of the threat, it is time for Japanese leaders and the Japanese public to consider whether Japan can do more. Japan's pledge of \$200 million is the lowest of any G8 member, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of national wealth. Budget pressures are tight here in Japan – as they are nearly everywhere -- but if preventing nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our number one security priority, all countries must step up their efforts.

More funds are essential but not enough. In addition to submarine dismantlement and plutonium disposition, Japan can work with the United States, Russia and the IAEA to accelerate the global cleanout of weapons-grade uranium from research sites throughout the world and support chemical weapons destruction facilities in Russia. Japan can also join the United States and other donors in funding a fossil fuel plant in Russia so that the last Russian reactor producing plutonium for nuclear weapons can be shut down.

No matter what country we call home, we should all agree that the central organizing security principle of the 21st century should be preventing the spread or use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. For this mission, we need all the tools in all of our collective arsenals. We cannot succeed without Japan's leadership, resources, example and commitment.

We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. If we have a nuclear disaster, the world will demand immediate action to prevent the next one. Why wait until the day after? We must do it now.