Launched in 2018, the Global Enterprise to Strengthen Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (GE) works to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ensure a successful 10th NPT Review Conference (RevCon)—one that yields specific commitments to practical and achievable actions that will advance the NPT’s goals now and in future review cycles.

To that end, the GE has regularly convened meetings with officials from more than 20 countries—along with a small number of non-government experts—representing a geographically and politically diverse set of NPT States parties, including each of the five nuclear weapon states (NWS). The meetings have provided an informal setting for participants to better understand each other’s perspectives and priorities, identify areas of agreement, collaboratively explore creative solutions to difficult problems, and generate support for specific actions. The discussions have spanned substantive options for cooperative engagement on nuclear risk reduction, transparency, and fissile material management, as well as new ways to advance NPT goals through Joint Voluntary Commitments by groups of States parties.

Drawing from these discussions, this paper offers a focused set of recommendations for achieving success at the RevCon to advance the shared interests of NPT states and promote and strengthen the NPT regime. It reflects the views of the NTI team, informed by the GE process, but these views are not necessarily shared by all GE participants.
Recommendations for the 10th NPT RevCon

Success should not be limited to a consensus final document, even though achieving a consensus outcome should remain the priority goal. States should pursue multiple outcome options, including:

- A high-level political declaration by all States parties reaffirming a shared commitment to the core principles of the NPT and reinvigorated pursuit of all its goals.
- Joint Voluntary Commitments (JVCs) made by individual states or groups of states. JVCs are commitments that advance the treaty’s core objectives that could be made prior to or at the RevCon and/or be reflected in a RevCon Final Declaration.
- Use of multiple documents to reflect the RevCon’s results, some agreed to by consensus, some reflecting differences, and others reflecting agreements among a subset of States parties.

States should engage privately in advance of the RevCon to find mutually acceptable ways to navigate politically difficult issues. Specific examples include how to refer to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in any final declaration, how to deal with past commitments, and how to manage differences between the United States and Russia and the United States and China in explaining disappointing progress on implementation of their Article VI disarmament obligations.

States should take specific actions to reduce the heightened risk of use of nuclear weapons, while acknowledging that risk reduction is not a substitute for renewed progress on nuclear disarmament consistent with Article VI. These may include:

- A reaffirmation of the January 3, 2022 joint statement by all members of the P5 that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” The P5 should build on this statement by committing to use the P5 process to agree on specific actions to lessen the risks of nuclear use and prevent nuclear catastrophe. A comparable affirmation by all NPT States parties at the RevCon would send an important signal of wider concern about the risk of use of nuclear weapons and the need for NWS to take credible actions to reduce that risk.
- The establishment of a P5 working group dedicated to reducing the risk of use of nuclear weapons, however that risk might arise. This should be accompanied by a commitment to report annually during the five-year review process on the specific risk-reduction actions the P5 states have taken individually and collectively. This annual reporting obligation would heighten the working group’s credibility, add a measure of accountability, and provide transparency to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).
A high-level declaration by all P5 countries committing to pursue dialogue and cooperative actions to enhance strategic stability, decrease nuclear competition and threats, and contribute to implementation of their Article VI commitments.

Building on past commitments, states should agree on a short set of objectives to be achieved prior to the 2025 RevCon, with an emphasis on reenergizing action on Article VI.

These could include:

- Resuming at an appropriate time the U.S.-Russian arms control process and strategic stability dialogue. These efforts should aim to preserve strategic arms limitations after New START expires in 2026 and address the many aspects of U.S.-Russia nuclear and strategic competition.
- Establishing an official Track 1 U.S.-China strategic dialogue (supplemented by Track 1.5 and Track 2 exchanges) with the goal of enhancing U.S.-China strategic stability and avoiding an acceleration of strategic competition and nuclear risks.
- Reaching agreement among the P5 to implement a set of focused confidence-building and transparency measures aimed at lowering the risk of unintended military confrontation, crisis, and escalation. Such actions could include restraints on military exercises and on activities in space and cyber space, as well as other means to mitigate potential strategic miscalculation.
- Initiating discussions within the P5 process on what is hindering progress toward full implementation of Article VI and reporting back to the 2024 PrepCom on the results of those discussions, as well as actions being taken to overcome those obstacles.
- Resolving outstanding issues to complete and bring into force the nuclear-weapon free zone treaties and their protocols.
- Reaffirming the moratoria on nuclear-weapons testing and completing additional Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratifications with a view to entry-into-force at the earliest possible date.
- Initiating and ideally completing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, including necessary transparency and verification provisions.
- Developing and demonstrating the technologies, concepts, and procedures needed to verify the elimination of nuclear weapons.

NWS and NNWS should affirm the importance of greater interactive dialogue as part of the review process and agree on approaches to achieve that objective.

Greater interactive dialogue will increase transparency between NWS and NNWS, strengthen trust and accountability, and help reestablish a common foundation and commitment to advancing all objectives of the NPT. Specific approaches could include:

- Providing opportunities for NNWS to interact with NWS during the preparation of the reports NWS will provide to the 2025 RevCon on implementation of their Article VI and other NPT commitments.
» Agreeing to dedicate time at one (or multiple) PrepCom(s) during the 2025 review cycle for comprehensive and detailed presentations by NWS on their nuclear forces, doctrines, and postures.

» Agreeing to dedicate time at one (or multiple) PrepCom(s) for the 2025 RevCon for a dialogue among NWS and NNWS on near- and long-term priorities and practical measures to advance nuclear disarmament.

» Strengthening dialogue between NWS and NNWS on the planning, discussions, and results of the P5 process.

States should commit to take specific national actions to strengthen fissile material management (FMM).

Accounting, securing, safeguarding, and, in the case of weapons-usable materials, minimizing fissile material is critical for disarmament. Specific actions to strengthen security, transparency, and accountability of fissile material could include:

» Acknowledging that robust and effective FMM advances the goals of the NPT.

» Undertaking and/or fully implementing commitments related to minimizing and eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications, minimizing stockpiles of separated plutonium, and ensuring and strengthening the physical protection of nuclear materials.

» Beginning work and supporting incremental steps toward the development of a comprehensive baseline of information, including for stocks of military and civilian fissile materials as well as their production infrastructure, and mechanisms to ensure transparency and accounting of materials moving forward.

States should affirm their commitment to the inclusion of diverse perspectives in the NPT review process.

Diversity will support progress on the treaty’s implementation and could be bolstered by:

» Ensuring diverse representation across States parties’ delegations.

» Taking advantage of the work of regional organizations and other multilateral initiatives to strengthen participation and engagement across geographical regions.

» Supporting and facilitating active participation of civil society organizations in the review process.

A version of these recommendations was published by NTI in October 2021.