

DISCUSSION PAPER: PROMOTING AN AMBITIOUS, FORWARD-LEANING ICONS

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I. INTRODUCTION

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will hold the third International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) in February 2020. As with ICONS in 2013 and 2016, the conference will begin with a day-long ministerial segment during which states will provide national statements and issue a ministerial declaration. In advance of the 2020 ICONS, states should consider how to achieve an ambitious, forward-leaning ministerial declaration and how to inject a culture of deliverables into the ministerial segment.

This paper provides the basis for discussion at the November 5-6, 2019, Global Dialogue meeting of ideas to achieve an ambitious ICONS.

II. ELEMENTS OF A MINISTERIAL DECLARATION

Reviewing past consensus documents, including the 2013 and 2016 ICONS ministerial declarations, the 2018 and 2019 IAEA General Conference (GC) nuclear security resolutions, the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Action Plan in support of the IAEA (IAEA Action Plan), and the 2014 and 2016 NSS communiqués¹ can help identify areas where progress can be made for the 2020 ministerial declaration and where we want to protect ambition and prevent backsliding. The appendix contains further detail on language from these documents.

The following provides a menu of areas for consideration in the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration.

Assurance and Confidence Building: Neither the 2013 nor the 2016 ICONS ministerial declarations referenced the importance of building confidence in the effectiveness of a state's nuclear security. Instead, similar to GC nuclear resolutions, they focus on nuclear security as being the responsibility of states. The NSS process highlighted the importance of confidence building in the nuclear security context in the 2014 NSS communiqué and the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan. It would be a significant advance for the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration to acknowledge that all states have a stake in knowing that other states are fulfilling their nuclear

¹ The 2016 NSS communiqué incorporated by reference prior NSS communiqués and announced a series of Action Plans to strengthen elements of the global nuclear security architecture, including the IAEA, the United Nations, INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

security responsibilities and maintaining effective security, and identifying examples of confidence-building measures.

IAEA INFCIRCs Focused on Nuclear Security: Several NSS “gift baskets” (joint statements focused on specific issues, supported by smaller groups of states) were converted into IAEA Information Circulars ([INFCIRCs](#)) after 2016 and therefore made available for all IAEA member states to support. The 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration could recognize the contribution of nuclear security INFCIRCs as a way to demonstrate commitment and make progress in specific issues and areas of nuclear security. Although the 2018 and 2019 GC nuclear security resolutions did not reference nuclear security INFCIRCs, they did recognize the contribution of the NSS process itself. Going beyond recognizing the NSS process generally to specifically recognizing these joint statements (as translated into INFCIRCs) as a major output of the NSS process would be an innovative step. An even more ambitious approach would be for the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration to encourage states to sign on to relevant INFCIRCs related to nuclear security.

CPPNM/A Article 14: Both the 2013 and 2016 ICONS ministerial declarations and the 2018 and 2019 GC nuclear security resolutions encourage states to become party to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A). The 2019 GC nuclear security resolution added an important new phrase reminding parties to the convention to inform the depositary (the IAEA) of their laws and regulations which give effect to the convention. This obligation is found in Article 14.1 of the CPPNM/A. Article 14.1 was also referenced in the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan in the context of advocating for the IAEA to assist states in implementation of the convention, including Article 14.1. The 2020 ministerial declaration could take inspiration from the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan and the 2019 GC nuclear security resolution and go beyond the 2013 and 2016 ICONS ministerial declarations to remind states party to the CPPNM/A of their Article 14.1 obligations and encourage states to submit the required information to the IAEA before the 2021 CPPNM/A review conference.

Military Nuclear Materials: The 2013 ICONS ministerial declaration explicitly called out the importance of securing all nuclear materials, including those used for military purposes. Similarly, military nuclear materials were referenced the following year in the 2014 NSS communiqué and then again in the 2016 NSS communiqué. However, the 2016 ICONS ministerial declaration completely removed any reference to military nuclear materials, reverting to the more general language used in GC nuclear security resolutions. It would be a significant advance for the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration to acknowledge that nuclear security is equally important for nuclear materials in military use, not just civilian use, particularly salient as the 2020 ICONS will be held three months prior to the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

Minimization of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium Management: The 2013 and 2016 ICONS ministerial declarations are in line with the 2018 and 2019 GC nuclear resolutions in the treatment of HEU minimization, which encourage further minimization “where technically and economically feasible.” None of these documents acknowledges the large stockpiles of separated plutonium, however. An ambitious 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration could contain language similar to that used in the 2014 NSS communiqué, which encouraged states to “minimize their stocks of HEU and to keep their stockpile of separated plutonium to the minimum level, both as consistent with national requirements.” Similar language was included in the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan in the context of working with the IAEA to minimize HEU and advocating for the IAEA to support states’ efforts to keep their stockpiles of separated plutonium to the minimum level. The 2014 NSS communiqué also encouraged specific HEU minimization activities, which the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration could also do.

The IAEA’s Central Role: The 2013 ICONS ministerial declaration referenced the IAEA’s central role in nuclear security, but the 2016 ICONS ministerial declaration did not, instead referencing the IAEA’s “core nuclear security activities.” Both the 2018 and 2019 GC nuclear security resolutions are more in line with stronger language on the IAEA’s central role in the 2013 ICONS ministerial declaration. The most comprehensive statement of commitment to the IAEA’s central role in nuclear security is contained in the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan, which not only calls out in specific terms the IAEA’s contributions in core areas, but contains commitments by NSS participating states to support, use, and encourage others to use IAEA services and documents. The 2014 NSS communiqué also reaffirmed the essential responsibility and central role of the IAEA and welcomed the increased prominence of nuclear security in the IAEA’s work. At a minimum, the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration should once again reaffirm the IAEA’s central role in nuclear security. As a more ambitious step, Member States could draw upon the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan and more clearly articulate what the IAEA’s central role on nuclear security entails, not only within the IAEA, but across other international organizations and initiatives focused on enhancing nuclear security. Given the broader set of nuclear security activities in which the IAEA is engaged and the increased demand for assistance, the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration could request the IAEA develop a strategic plan for the Division of Nuclear Security that is linked to the objectives and strategies of the IAEA as a whole and of other departments.

IAEA Resources: Both the 2013 and 2016 ICONS ministerial declarations reference the resources the IAEA needs to undertake its nuclear security work. The 2013 declaration recognizes the importance of the IAEA having access to appropriate resources, including through the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), but the 2016 ICONS ministerial declaration contains a stronger commitment to provide the necessary technical, human, and financial resources, including through the NSF. This is more in line with the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan, which also

contains a commitment to provide political, technical, and financial support to the IAEA. The 2018 and 2019 GC nuclear security resolutions contain weaker language, merely calling upon states to “consider providing” political, technical, and financial support, and recognizing the NSF as a vehicle. The 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration should contain both a commitment to provide technical, human, and financial resources, including through the NSF, but also a commitment to provide political support.

IAEA Advisory Services – INSSPs and IPPAS Missions: The 2016 ICONS ministerial declaration did not explicitly reference Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs) or International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions, only “acknowledging and supporting” IAEA services, including “advisory services.” The 2013 ICONS ministerial declaration contained stronger language, explicitly noting the important role of INSSPs and encouraging states to make use of them, and encouraging states to use the IAEA’s nuclear security advisory services and peer reviews. The 2014 NSS communiqué also encouraged states to use services like IPPAS, but the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan contained even stronger language committing to undertake IAEA reviews and advisory missions “periodically” (i.e., including follow-up missions), as well as to share results of those missions in a way that protects sensitive information. Both the 2018 and 2019 GC nuclear security resolutions explicitly reference INSSPs and IPPAS missions, but only encourage their use. The 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration should reverse the backsliding that took place in the 2016 ICONS ministerial declaration and encourage all states that have not done so to use INSSPs and encourage all states to host IPPAS missions. Going even further, and drawing from the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan, the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration can encourage states to undertake periodic follow-up IPPAS missions and share the results, while protecting sensitive information.

IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance: The 2013 ICONS ministerial declaration and 2018 and 2019 GC nuclear security resolutions contain language encouraging states to take into account the guidance contained in the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series. They also all mention INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5, the IAEA’s “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.” The 2014 NSS communiqué contains slightly stronger language, encouraging all states to “utilize” the guidance, but does not specifically reference INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5. The 2016 ICONS ministerial declaration contains the least ambitious language on the IAEA’s nuclear security guidance, simply acknowledging guidance development as one of the IAEA’s core nuclear security activities. The 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration could go further than previous ICONS ministerial declarations and GC nuclear security resolutions and contribute to greater adherence to IAEA nuclear security guidance. The most ambitious language related to IAEA guidance is contained in the 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan and in IAEA INFCIRC/869 on “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation,” which contain commitments to “meet the intent of” the recommendations contained in the Nuclear Security

Series. INFCIRC/869 specifically calls out INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5 and various other guidance documents,² and also commits states to realize or exceed the objectives in those guidance documents including through the implementation and enhancement of national regulations and other government measures.³

The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct) and Supplementary Guidance:

The 2013 ICONS ministerial declaration and the 2018 and 2019 GC nuclear security resolutions invite/encourage states to make a political commitment to the Code of Conduct and supplementary guidance. However, the 2016 ICONS ministerial declaration, despite containing a commitment to maintain effective security of radioactive sources consistent with the Code of Conduct, does not reference the supplementary guidance. The 2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan contains the strongest language, with a commitment to implement the Code of Conduct and to follow the supplementary guidance. The 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration could contain a political commitment (not just encourage states to make a political commitment) to implement both the Code of Conduct and the supplementary guidance. It could also draw from the strong language in INFCIRC/869 to meet the intent of and realize or exceed the objectives in the Code of Conduct, including through the implementation and enhancement of national regulations and other government measures.

The Role of Industry: The role of nuclear industry was featured prominently during the NSS process, including at the parallel Nuclear Industry Summits, as seen in both the 2014 NSS and 2016 NSS communiqués. Given nuclear industry’s role in implementing nuclear security, it makes sense to acknowledge that role and promote greater engagement between governments and industry and between the IAEA and industry. The role of industry was mentioned in the 2013 ICONS ministerial declaration and in the 2018 and 2019 GC nuclear security resolutions, particularly in the context of enhancing nuclear security culture. The 2016 ICONS ministerial declaration was completely silent on the role of industry. Acknowledging the important role of nuclear industry—and promoting more engagement with industry—would be a positive addition to the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration. Including nuclear industry in ICONS itself would also be reflective of nuclear industry’s stake in the outcomes of official discussions.

Introducing More Forward-leaning and Ambitious Terminology: In addition to the aforementioned substantive elements of the declaration, a more ambitious approach could also

² NSS 14, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Materials and Associated Facilities;” the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources; and NSS 15, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Out of Regulatory Control.”

³ INFCIRC/869 could be a good reference for ideas on this and other ways to inject more ambitious language into the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration.

come from upgrading terminology such as “acknowledge,” “recognize,” “support” or “reaffirm” to more active and forward-leaning words such as “encourage” or, even better, “commit.” The word “commit” appeared in two of sixteen paragraphs in the 2016 ICONS declaration, one on commitment to effective security of radioactive sources consistent with the Code of Conduct (which is not legally binding), and another on commitment to take steps to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material. Adopting stronger and more active language would help create a more leader-like tone that would be more consistent with a high-level declaration that ministers would be more enthusiastic about supporting.

III. A CULTURE OF DELIVERABLES

In addition to strengthening the language of the 2020 ICONS ministerial declaration, there are other ways to promote a more ambitious and forward-leading ministerial segment. First, countries should send their relevant ministers to the ministerial segment. Signaling that more ambitious outcomes and deliverables are expected in 2020 might make a better case for sending ministers, which would in turn incentivize more ambitious outcomes and deliverables.

Ministers could use ICONS to announce new commitments, perhaps aligning with other ministers to make joint commitments in areas that are unable to achieve consensus or where progress requires action by a subset of countries, similar to the “gift basket” concept that was an important feature of the NSS process. For instance, there could be commitments to continue HEU minimization efforts, to implement IAEA nuclear security guidance, to provide support for the IAEA’s nuclear security mission through the Nuclear Security Fund, or to engage in confidence-building activities and information sharing. One possible vehicle for delivering commitments at ICONS is through signing up to support nuclear security [INFCIRCS](#), such as INFCIRC/869 (including through submitting diplomatic notes to the IAEA indicating support for those INFCIRCS).

Ministers could also use the ICONS platform to promote ways their country has made progress in nuclear security, perhaps highlighting recent domestic achievements, or by showcasing examples of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Celebrating achievements in nuclear security can inspire other countries to do the same.

IV. CONCLUSION

The IAEA’s ICONS provides its Member States an important opportunity to demonstrate commitments to nuclear security and showcase progress, achievements, and future steps. Following the end of the leader-level NSS process, it also provides one of the only platforms for high-level political attention on nuclear security. Countries should take advantage of this platform to capture and leverage this attention to make further advances in nuclear security,

build further support for the IAEA's nuclear security mission, and enhance public awareness and perceptions of the benefits of peaceful use of nuclear technology.

APPENDIX: LANGUAGE AND REFERENCES IN PRIOR STATEMENTS

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
Assurances and Building Confidence				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>We have identified a range of voluntary measures States may consider taking to show that they have established effective security of their nuclear materials and facilities while protecting sensitive information. [Lists range of activities] We note that many of the States participating in this summit already take such measures, in some cases in a regional context, and are using them to showcase their nuclear security efforts, thereby building national and international</p>	None	None	None	None

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>confidence in the effectiveness of their nuclear security regimes. (Para. 20)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan:</u></p> <p>Use information sharing mechanisms managed by the IAEA to build domestic, regional and international confidence in the effectiveness of national nuclear security regimes. (Section E.4)</p>				
IAEA INFCIRCs on Nuclear Security				
n/a	n/a	n/a	None Reference to Nuclear Security Summits and their role in the area of nuclear security. (Para. k)	None Reference to Nuclear Security Summits and their role in the area of nuclear security. (Para. m)

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
CPPNM/A and Article 14				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>No reference to Article 14 commitment.</p> <p>Encourage states to become party to the CPPNM and ratify the 2005 Amendment. Stress the need for all contracting parties to comply fully with all its provisions. (Para. 9)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan:</u></p> <p>Encourage the earliest possible entry-into-force of the amended CPPNM and seek its universalization. (Section C, Para. 1)</p> <p>Advocate for the IAEA to play a role in assisting states in implementation of</p>	<p>No reference to Article 14 commitment.</p> <p>Invite states to become party to and fully implement the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment. (Para. 9)</p>	<p>No reference to Article 14 commitment.</p> <p>Welcome entry into force of the Amendment, look forward to its full implementation, and encourage IAEA’s continued efforts to promote universalization.</p> <p>Encourage states to become parties to the Amended CPPNM. (Para. 10)</p>	<p>No reference to Article 14 commitment.</p> <p>Encourages all parties to the CPPNM and its Amendment to fully implement their obligations thereunder, encourages States to become party to the CPPNM and its Amendment, further encourages the Agency to continue efforts to promote further adherence to the Amendment with the aim of universalization. (Para. 9)</p> <p>Also referenced in preamble. (Para. m)</p>	<p>References both CPPNM/A ratification and Article 14 commitment.</p> <p>Encourages all parties to the CPPNM and its Amendment to fully implement their obligations thereunder, encourages States to become party to the CPPNM and its Amendment, further encourages the Agency to continue efforts to promote further adherence to the Amendment with the aim of universalization, and reminds all Parties to inform the depositary of their laws and regulations which give</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>the CPPNM and its Amendment, including states parties informing the IAEA of their laws and regulations in accordance with Article 14.1. (Section C, Para. 2)</p>				<p>effect to the Convention. (Para. 10)</p> <p>Also referenced in preamble. (Para. o)</p>
Central Role of the IAEA				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Reaffirm the essential responsibility and the central role of the IAEA in the international nuclear security architecture. Welcome the increased prominence of nuclear security in the Agency’s work and its leading role in coordinating activities among international organizations and other</p>	<p>Affirm the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in leading the coordination of international activities in the field of nuclear security, while avoiding duplication and overlap. (Para. 17)</p>	<p>No mention of the IAEA’s central role. Reference to “core nuclear security activities.” (Para. 8)</p>	<p>Affirms the central role of the Agency in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security, while avoiding duplication and overlap. (Para. 1)</p>	<p>Affirms the central role of the Agency in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security, while avoiding duplication and overlap. (Para. 1)</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>international initiatives. (Para. 12)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Reaffirm the essential responsibility and the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the global nuclear security architecture and its leading role in facilitating and coordinating nuclear security activities among international organizations and initiatives and supporting the efforts of states to fulfill their nuclear security responsibilities.</p> <p><u>2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan:</u></p> <p>Notes the IAEA’s central role in strengthening the international nuclear security architecture and</p>				

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>leading role in developing international nuclear security guidance, coordinating nuclear security activities among international organizations and other international initiatives and providing support to states upon their request. A strengthened role of the IAEA is crucial for the continuing delivery of outcomes and actions from the nuclear security summits. (Preamble)</p>				
IAEA Resources				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u> The role of the IAEA will be crucial in the years ahead. Encourage greater political, technical, and financial support for the IAEA,</p>	<p>Recognize the importance of the IAEA having access to appropriate resources and expertise to undertake its work, including through further</p>	<p>Will continue providing the necessary technical, human and financial resources, including through the Nuclear Security Fund, in line with our</p>	<p>Calls upon Member States to consider providing the necessary political, technical and financial support to the Agency’s efforts to enhance nuclear security through various</p>	<p>Calls upon Member States to consider providing the necessary political, technical and financial support to the Agency’s efforts to enhance nuclear security</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>including through its Nuclear Security Fund, to ensure that it has the resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities. (Para. 16)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan:</u></p> <p>Provide the appropriate political, technical and financial support and continue to contribute, on a voluntary basis, to the Nuclear Security Fund. (Section A.3)</p>	<p>voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund by existing and new donors. (Para. 18)</p>	<p>respective capacities and commitments, as required for the Agency to implement its nuclear security activities and to provide, upon request, the support needed by Member States. (Para. 11)</p>	<p>arrangements at the bilateral, regional and international levels, and recalls the decision of the BOG on support for the Nuclear Security Fund. (Para. 8)</p> <p>The preamble also emphasizes the need for appropriate technical, human, and financial resources, including through the Nuclear Security Fund, for the Agency to implement its nuclear security activities and enable it to provide, upon request, the support need by Member States. (Para. s)</p>	<p>through various arrangements at the bilateral, regional and international levels, and recalls the decision of the BOG on support for the Nuclear Security Fund. (Para. 9)</p> <p>The preamble also emphasizes the need for appropriate technical, human, and financial resources, including through the Nuclear Security Fund, for the Agency to implement its nuclear security activities and enable it to provide, upon request, the support need by Member States. (Para. v)</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
IAEA Advisory Services - INSSPs				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Welcome INSSPs and encourage states to use their INSSPs for making progress in nuclear security. (Para. 14)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan:</u></p> <p>Advocate for the IAEA to continue to use INSSPs to assist states' efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes. (Section E.1)</p>	<p>Recognize and support the IAEA's continuing work to assist, upon request, States' efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, and note the important role that INSSPs play in this regard. Encourage states to make further use of such assistance. (Para. 6)</p>	<p>No specific mention.</p> <p>Acknowledge and support the IAEA's core nuclear security activities that assist States, upon request, in their efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, including guidance development, advisory services, and capacity building. (Para. 8)</p>	<p>Encourages States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, including, as appropriate, through the establishment of INSSPs. (Para. 25)</p>	<p>Encourages States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, including, as appropriate, through the establishment of INSSPs. (Para. 29)</p>
IAEA Advisory Services - IPPAS Missions				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Underline the benefits of IAEA review and advisory</p>	<p>Encourage states to use, on a voluntary basis, the IAEA's nuclear security advisory services and</p>	<p>No specific mention. See Para. 8 for general</p>	<p>Encourages Member States to voluntarily use, and make available experts to the Agency to</p>	<p>Encourages Member States to voluntarily use, and make available experts to the Agency to</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>services provided through mechanisms such as IPPAS. While acknowledging the voluntary nature of these services, encourage all States to utilize them and share the lessons learned without detriment to the protection of sensitive information. (Para. 15)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan:</u></p> <p>Use the IAEA’s extensive nuclear security services and make available experts to the IAEA to carry out these services, including the IPPAS. (Section E.1)</p> <p>Undertake IAEA review and advisory missions of nuclear security periodically and take into account the resulting</p>	<p>peer reviews based on internationally accepted guidance and tailored to national needs, welcome the increased recognition of the value of IPPAS missions, and encourage the IAEA to foster the sharing of experience and lessons learned from IPPAS missions. (Para. 13)</p>	<p>support for IAEA services.</p>	<p>carry out, the Agency’s nuclear security advisory services for exchanges of views and advice on nuclear security measures, welcomes the increased recognition of the value of IPPAS missions, and notes with appreciation the organization by the Agency of meetings, to allow interested Member States to share experience and lessons learned, with due regard to the principle of confidentiality, and to make recommendations for improvement of these missions. (Para. 42)</p>	<p>carry out, the Agency’s nuclear security advisory services for exchanges of views and advice on nuclear security measures, welcomes the increased recognition of the value of IPPAS missions, and notes with appreciation the organization by the Agency of meetings, to allow interested Member States to share experience and lessons learned, with due regard to the principle of confidentiality, and to make recommendations for improvement of these missions. (Para. 47)</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>recommendations, communicate the results of missions in a manner that does not compromise the confidentiality of sensitive information, contribute to the pool of experts available to these missions. (Section E.2)</p>				
IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Encourage all states to utilize the IAEA’s nuclear security guidance, contained in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series of publications. (Para. 13)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan:</u></p> <p>Meet the intent of the Fundamentals and Recommendations</p>	<p>Urge the IAEA to continue developing and publishing nuclear security guidance, and encourage all States to take the guidance into account, as appropriate, in their efforts to strengthen and continuously improve their nuclear security. (Para. 20)</p>	<p>Limited mention.</p> <p>Acknowledge and support the IAEA’s core nuclear security activities, including guidance development. (Para. 8)</p>	<p>Encourages all Member States to take into account, as appropriate, the Nuclear Security Series publications, including the Nuclear Security Fundamentals, and to make use of them at their national discretion in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security. (Para. 17)</p>	<p>Encourages all Member States to take into account, as appropriate, the Nuclear Security Series publications, including the Nuclear Security Fundamentals, and to make use of them at their national discretion in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security. (Para. 21)</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>contained in the Nuclear Security Series. (Section D.1)</p> <p>The Action Plan also contains reference to guidance in several areas, such as radioactive source security, transport, security culture, forensics, and nuclear security.</p>	<p>Note the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), and look forward to the preparation of further guidance. (Para. 21)</p>		<p>The preamble references INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. (Para. u)</p>	<p>The preamble references INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. (Para. x)</p>
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and Related Guidance				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Considerably more states have amended their national legislation and regulations, taking into account the guidance in the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and Nuclear Security Series</p>	<p>Invite states to make a political commitment to implement the non-legally-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources,</p>	<p>No reference to supplementary guidance.</p> <p>We commit to maintain effective security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle, consistent with the Code of Conduct on the</p>	<p>Encourages member states to make political commitments to the non-legally binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and its Guidance on the</p>	<p>Encourages member states to make political commitments to the non-legally binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and its Guidance on the</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>recommendations. We are committed to promoting this guidance, first and foremost through the IAEA. We seek to secure all radioactive sources consistent with international guidance. (Para. 23)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan:</u></p> <p>Implement the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, if not yet done so, and to follow its Supplementary Guidance. (Section I, Para. 1)</p>	<p>and encourage all States to implement these instruments and to maintain effective security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle. (Para. 10)</p>	<p>Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (Para. 13)</p>	<p>Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, and to implement these, as appropriate, in order to maintain effective safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle. (Para. 29)</p>	<p>Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, and to implement these, as appropriate, in order to maintain effective safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle. (Para. 34)</p>
<p>Role of Industry</p>				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Nuclear operators have the primary responsibility to</p>	<p>Note the potential contribution of industry initiatives in developing, fostering, and</p>	<p>None</p>	<p>The preamble recognizes the importance of maintaining a dialogue, as appropriate, between</p>	<p>The preamble recognizes the importance of maintaining and strengthening the</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>secure their nuclear material and as such have an important role to play in maintaining and strengthening nuclear security. Support a more intensive dialogue between operators and government bodies, including the national regulator with a view to improving nuclear security regulations and regulatory effectiveness. (Para. 27)</p> <p>Recognize Nuclear Industry Summit as a positive engagement by the industry with nuclear security issues. (Para. 28)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Encourage the continued engagement of relevant</p>	<p>maintaining a robust national nuclear security culture. (Para. 7)</p>		<p>government bodies and nuclear industry at national level on strengthening nuclear security. (Para. g)</p> <p>Encourages initiatives to further enhance nuclear security culture, as well as skills and knowledge of personnel through nuclear security education and training, and through dialogue with the nuclear industry. (Para. 22)</p>	<p>dialogue between relevant government bodies and the nuclear industry at national level on nuclear security. (Para. i)</p> <p>Encourages initiatives to further enhance nuclear security culture, as well as skills and knowledge of personnel through nuclear security education and training, and through dialogue with the nuclear industry. (Para. 26)</p>

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partners in nuclear industry and civil society.				
Military Nuclear Material				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of states to maintain at all times effective security of all nuclear and other radioactive materials, including nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control. (Para. 4)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of states to maintain at all times effective security of all nuclear and other radioactive materials,</p>	<p>Affirm responsibility of states to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which includes nuclear material used for military purposes. (Para. 4)</p>	<p>Removes explicit language on military materials.</p> <p>Notes effective and comprehensive control of all nuclear and radioactive material under its control. (Para. 5)</p>	<p>No reference.</p> <p>Calls upon Member States to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material. (Para. 2)</p> <p>Mindful of the responsibilities of every Member State to maintain at all times effective and comprehensive nuclear security of all nuclear and other radioactive material. (Para. d)</p>	<p>No reference.</p> <p>Calls upon Member States to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material. (Para. 2)</p> <p>Mindful of the responsibilities of every Member State to maintain at all times effective and comprehensive nuclear security of all nuclear and other radioactive material. (Para. d)</p>

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including nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control.				
HEU Minimization and Plutonium Management				
<p><u>2014 NSS communiqué:</u></p> <p>Encourage states to minimize their stocks of HEU and to keep their stockpile of separated plutonium to the minimum level, both as consistent with national requirements. (Para. 21)</p> <p>Encourage states to continue to minimize the use of HEU through the conversion of reactor fuel from HEU to LEU, where technically and economically feasible, and in this regard welcome</p>	<p>No mention of plutonium.</p> <p>Encourage states to further minimize the use of HEU on a voluntary basis and to use LEU where technically and economically feasible. (Para. 12)</p>	<p>No mention of plutonium.</p> <p>Encourage states, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize HEU in civilian stocks and use LEU where technically and economically feasible. (Para. 12)</p>	<p>No mention of plutonium.</p> <p>Encourages states, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize HEU in civilian stocks and use LEU where technically and economically feasible. (Para. 41) Also referenced in preamble. (Para. o)</p>	<p>No mention of plutonium.</p> <p>Encourages states, on a voluntary basis, to further minimize HEU in civilian stocks and use LEU where technically and economically feasible. (Para. 46) Also referenced in preamble. (Para. r)</p>

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>cooperation on technologies facilitating such conversion. Continue to encourage and support efforts to use non-HEU technologies for the production of radioisotopes, including financial incentives, taking into account the need for an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes. (Para. 22)</p> <p><u>2016 NSS IAEA Action Plan:</u></p> <p>Work with the IAEA to minimize the use of HEU, where technically and economically feasible, through the conversion of reactor fuel from HEU to LEU and the development and qualification of LEU fuels for high performance</p>				

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>research reactors. (Section F.1)</p> <p>Advocate for the IAEA to support member states' efforts to further develop, promote and use non-HEU-based technologies for the production of medical radioisotopes, including through the exploration of financial incentives that may contribute to the overall goal of long-term economic sustainability. (Section F.2)</p> <p>Advocate for the IAEA to support efforts to maintain an assured and reliable supply of medical isotopes. (Section F.3)</p> <p>Advocate for the IAEA to support states' efforts to</p>				

NSS Commitments	2013 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2016 ICONS Ministerial Declaration	2018 GC Nuclear Security Resolution	2019 GC Nuclear Security Resolution
<p>keep their stockpiles of separated plutonium to the minimum level, consistent with their national requirements. (Section F.5)</p>				