Thank you for this generous welcome. I want to thank Jessica Mathews, Joe Cirincione and the Endowment for making the effort year-in and year-out to sponsor this important annual conference. We at NTI are honored to have Jessica Mathews on our Board of Directors. Jessica and Joe and their team have made great contributions to public debate, public understanding and public policy in the nonproliferation arena, and I thank them. I thank all of you for your dedication and effective work in this critical area.

This morning I will make a few assertions on nonproliferation and suggest several public policy imperatives that I believe flow directly from these assertions:

(1) The gravest danger in the world today is the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
(2) The likeliest use of these weapons is in terrorist hands.
(3) Preventing the spread and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons should be the central organizing security principle for the 21st century.

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union created a vulnerable supply of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, as well as know-how. The rise of global terrorists created a new demand for these weapons and the willingness to use them. The acceleration of scientific discovery and the increased access to new technology – combined with this rising supply and demand – has put us in a perilous new arms race: terrorists are racing to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons -- we ought to be racing to stop them.

Biologists tell us that strong, healthy organisms have a sophisticated system of stimulus and response: they are quick to perceive danger, the perception of danger creates a stimulus, and the stimulus triggers an instant and effective response. If a species is slow to perceive a danger and respond to a threat, it is threatened with extinction. Without taking this analogy too far, suffice it to say that I think we have been slow to perceive this danger and respond to this threat.

Much of our military, diplomatic, and national security experience has been designed to engage and defeat an adversary that seeks to take or conquer land, defend its borders, protect its people, and control its territory. Terrorists have none of these aims or
objectives. They aim to destroy and disrupt. They do not need armies, warplanes, battleships, or tanks. But if they gain nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, they can destroy lives, destabilize economies and change history.

The media tells us that in October of 2001, top U.S. government officials received a highly classified intelligence report, warning that terrorists had acquired a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb and planned to smuggle it into New York City, where it could – if detonated – destroy much of lower Manhattan and kill hundreds of thousands of people.

This intelligence report – thank God – was later judged to be false. But it was never judged to be impossible or implausible. This should focus our attention on two fundamental questions:

First, if the report had been accurate, and the bomb had been real and had gone off, what would we wish we had done to prevent it?

Second, why aren’t we doing that now?

Last November, standing with President Putin at the White House, President Bush said: “Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.” At the summit this past May, President Bush and President Putin agreed first, that the greatest danger in the war on terror is the prospect of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and second, the United States and Russia should spare no effort at preventing all forms of proliferation.

These are encouraging words, but if this is our priority, what is our strategy? Where are we putting our resources? Have we rallied our friends and the world behind this “highest priority” to meet this “greatest danger?”

This is not just an American question. This is a global question. If a catastrophic terrorist strike could hit New York, it could hit Paris, Moscow, London or Tokyo.

We may not be able to make these terrorists less evil, but we must make them less powerful. We must keep them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

How difficult is it for terrorists to attack us with a nuclear weapon? That depends on how difficult we make it. It becomes obvious from analyzing the terrorist path to a nuclear attack that the most effective, least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure nuclear weapons and materials at the source. Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take, and harder for us to stop. Once they gain access to nuclear materials, they’ve completed the most difficult step -- and our nightmare begins. That is why homeland security and the defense against catastrophic terrorism must begin with securing weapons and fissile materials in every country and every facility that has them. Yes, this is an awesome challenge, but it is finite and doable.
It is important to recognize that a small improvement in security can make a big difference in our future. Let me give you an example. Warren Buffett, who is financially supporting NTI’s work, recently wrote me a letter containing some revealing statistics. He notes that:

- “If the chance of a weapon of mass destruction being used in a given year is 10 percent and the same probability persists for 50 years…the chance of getting through the 50 year period without a disaster is .51 percent.” [that is one-half of one percent]
- If the chance can be reduced to one percent each year, there is a 60.5 percent chance of making it through 50 years.
- My math is obviously not as good as Warren’s, but according to my calculations, this means that if we make it ten times harder for terrorists or nations to use a weapon of mass destruction in any given year, we can make it 120 times less likely that we will suffer from a use of these weapons for the next fifty years. As Warren Buffett would say, that’s real leverage.

As we move to reduce the threat, we must remember that this is a global problem. The threat includes but extends well beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union. Large amounts of civilian highly enriched uranium exist in dozens of civilian research facilities around the world, yet there are no international standards for securing these nuclear materials within a country. We are talking about the raw material of nuclear terrorism. Some of it is secured by nothing more than an underpaid guard sitting inside a chain-link fence. This presents a global security imperative. A wide alliance of nations must work together to identify it all, account for it all and secure it all – as soon as physically possible. This will not happen without active leadership from Russia and the United States.

It is my hope that those attending this conference -- with your considerable expertise and knowledge -- will begin to build the intellectual and political support to meet this challenge at home and abroad. I’d like to leave you with five essential steps to consider as we begin to map out a new strategy for global security in the 21st century.

(1) The first step is to put our own houses in order – identifying, accounting for, and securing weapons and materials in Russia and the United States. Both the U.S. and Russia should pledge to ensure that nuclear, chemical and biological materials and weapons in both countries are safe, secure and accounted for with reciprocal monitoring sufficient to assure each other and the rest of the world that this is the case. This would require rapid security upgrades, accelerated blend-down of weapons materials and consolidating weapons materials in fewer sites. Each President should appoint one high-level person, reporting directly to the President, to take full responsibility for this issue, and this issue alone. And both Presidents should pledge to complete this task at the fastest possible pace and urge other nations to do likewise.
(2) The United States and Russia should insist on accurate accounting and adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons, including a baseline inventory of these weapons and reciprocal monitoring. Tactical nuclear weapons have never been covered in arms control treaties. We can only guess at the numbers in each other’s inventories. Yet these are the nuclear weapons most attractive to terrorists – even more valuable to them than fissile material and much more portable than strategic warheads. The relations between our two heads of state are warm. Our perception of our common interest is closer than it has ever been. If this new relationship is going to improve our security, then we must be able to melt the suspicion that for so many years has kept us from an accurate accounting and assured protection of these weapons.

(3) Both President Bush and President Putin should order their military leaders, in joint consultation and collaboration, to devise operational changes in the alert status of their nuclear forces that would reduce toward zero the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation and expand the decision time available to each president before they would be forced to make the fateful decision to launch. They should begin by quickly identifying weapons designated for reduction under the Moscow Treaty signed in May, and then immediately stand them down.

(4) Our two nations should combine our biodefense knowledge and scientific expertise and apply these joint resources to defensive and peaceful biological pursuits starting with a joint fight against infectious disease in Russia. The two Presidents could promote a bilateral effort to cooperate on our defensive research agendas and build upon what both nations know. This is an endeavor that should begin with Russia and the United States and expand to include the rest of the world.

I want to close with a fifth point, which includes all of the rest and goes beyond them. It is the heart of the new initiative Senator Lugar, Senator Domenici and I launched last year.

(5) The United States and Russia should launch and lead a Global Partnership against Catastrophic Terrorism. The Global Partnership would be based on the fundamental premise that the greatest dangers of the 21st century are threats all nations face together and no nation can solve on its own. We must never forget: the chain of worldwide security is only as strong as the link at the weakest, least-protected site.

Clearly, this can’t be done by one, two, or even a dozen countries. It has to be done by a worldwide coalition that would include every nation that has something to safeguard or that can make a contribution to safeguarding it. Terrorists seeking the raw material of nuclear terrorism won’t necessarily look where there is the most material; they will look where that material is the most vulnerable. Our goal must be to see that all nations come under a system of international standards and inspection for the protection of dangerous materials.

This global effort must involve every state with nuclear weapons and weapons usable materials – and assist them in establishing standards and cooperative programs for
inventory control, safety, and security. It would improve border and export controls, and train international teams to respond in the event of terrorist nuclear explosion or the loss of control of nuclear weapons or materials.

On the biological front -- to deny terrorists access to dangerous biological materials without hindering important medical research -- the Partnership would establish standards for safeguarding biological materials. It would devise approaches for limiting the spread of biological weapons know-how. It would develop effective measures to prevent bioterrorism and minimize the effects of any potential attack with effective responses, including developing more effective vaccines and medicines. It would direct more resources and attention to global infectious disease surveillance and prevention – improving worldwide efforts in detecting and reporting disease outbreaks, reporting findings, and bringing forth an effective global response.

In addition to the moral imperative of stepping up the fight against infectious disease around the globe, we now have a security imperative. From the Pentagon to HHS, to the CIA and the NSC, to the local police, fire and public health officials, the fight against infectious disease and bioterrorism are linked and vital to our national security. To succeed we must encourage and stimulate unprecedented cooperation from the private sector at home and abroad.

This last summer, G-8 leaders met in Canada and took an important step toward building this Global Partnership. They said: “we commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missile, and related materials, equipment and technology.” To implement these principles, they established the “G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” committed $20 billion over ten years, and established a six-element program to guide their work.

In brief, the six elements are to:

1) promote multilateral treaties that help prevent the spread of weapons, materials and know-how;
2) account for and secure these items;
3) promote physical protection of facilities;
4) help detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking;
5) promote national export and transshipment controls; and
6) manage and dispose of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials.

It should not escape the notice of anyone here that the six-element program constitutes an important strategy and renewed dedication to the principles of “nonproliferation,” which so many of you have championed. What the G-8 recognized and what we must all recognize is that the fight against catastrophic terrorism and the fight against nonproliferation are the same fight. But this fight requires new thinking, new technologies, new techniques, and a renewed seriousness of purpose.
The establishment of the G-8 Global Partnership and the six principles are welcome and important developments, but it should concern us that this announcement received almost no attention. We must hold them to their words and their declaration – or this initial commitment will get crowded off the G-8 action agenda. All of us should press this commitment as hard as we can at the highest levels of government and with our citizens. Keeping weapons of mass destruction out of terrorists’ hands is either a priority or an afterthought. If it’s a priority, we must prove it by our actions. If it’s an afterthought, after what?

What matters most is what happens next. The G-8 governments meet again next June in France. By then, we should expect to see them turn these principles into a clear set of priorities, to establish a timeline to guide their work based on a risk-based analysis of the threats, and to dramatically increase funding to reflect the risk that catastrophic terrorism presents to the health, economy and security of every nation. Specifically, we should expect to see:

- A plan and timeline for an urgent effort to secure the most vulnerable nuclear materials through short-term emergency upgrades – either by greater protection or consolidation or both.
- An agreement on how much money each country is committing and when.
- The appointment of a very senior official in each government responsible for programs against catastrophic terrorism.
- A plan to secure material and convert research reactors that use highly enriched uranium (HEU).
- A plan with a timeline and cost estimates for blending down all the world’s excess HEU – storing what cannot be absorbed by commercial markets.
- A plan for expanding the G-8 Partnership to include all nations with something to safeguard and something to contribute to safeguarding it.
- A plan for establishing global norms and standards for the handling of dangerous biological pathogens to prevent these materials from being controlled and used by terrorists.
- A plan for international standards for the physical protection of nuclear material. There is currently no international standard or requirement for the physical protection of nuclear material within a state.
- Finally, we have to come to an agreement for how we can take full advantage of the skill and experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is the only international institution of global scope devoted to controlling access to weapons-usable material. If it didn’t exist, we would have to create it. Now that it does exist, we ought to fund it and expand it.

We’re in the race of our lives. We are well past the time where we can take satisfaction with a step in the right direction. A gazelle running from a cheetah is taking a step in the right direction. But it’s not just a question of direction; it’s a matter of speed. We’re not moving as fast as we can or as fast as we must.
Today I have focused primarily on the supply side of the weapons of mass destruction challenge – restricting access to supplies of weapons, materials and know-how. We must also, however, address the demand side of catastrophic terrorism – terrorists and rogue nations who seek these weapons, materials and know-how. This is the subject for a much longer discussion, which I will not even attempt today. Broadly speaking, however, unless we learn to think anew, and find new ways to undercut the appeal of ideologies that wish us harm, we can win every battle and still lose the war.

Some claim that discussing root causes of terrorism is blaming America. To me, looking at root causes is not about blaming America – it is about preventing our violent enemies from recruiting unlimited numbers of angry individuals who care more about killing than living. We have an obligation to do all we can to undercut those who seek our destruction.

I am not saying that poverty creates terrorism. If poverty turned people into mass murderers, we would all be dead. But we must address disparities, conditions and conflicts that breed resentment, hate and humiliation. We must develop a strategy and a plan of action designed to separate violent extremists from the vast majority of the Islamic community. At the same time, the Islamic community has an obligation to condemn, disavow and isolate their own extremists.

Keeping weapons of mass destruction out of terrorist hands requires unprecedented global cooperation. And it is very difficult to get people to address our priorities unless we are seen to be addressing theirs.

I believe that we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. Our willingness to cooperate has always depended on our sense of our own self-interest, and particularly our sense of our own security. Human beings have often adopted new and unexpected forms of cooperation when all understood that survival depended upon it.

I close with my original question – if a nuclear weapon detonated killing hundreds of thousands, what would our after-catastrophe reports say we should have done to prevent it?

Why aren’t we doing it now?