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G8 SUMMIT PREVIEW: ARE G8 LEADERS DOING ENOUGH
TO PREVENT NUKE, CHEM, BIO TERRORISM?
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The Nuclear Threat Initiative is proud to sponsor the “Strengthening the Global Partnership” project, an unprecedented consortium of 21 research institutions in 16 European, Asian and North American countries. This consortium started in 2001 as Senator Lugar and I and others called for a global partnership against catastrophic terrorism.

In June 2002 at their Kananaskis Summit, the Group of 8 Nations announced the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. They pledged to raise up to \$20 billion over the next 10 years (including the annual Nunn-Lugar programs of the United States) to reduce the risk that unsecured weapons or materials of mass destruction might fall into the hands of terrorists. Since then, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Poland and The Netherlands have become members of the Partnership. Canada has been a very active and effective leader. Our 21 non-governmental member consortium, led by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has hosted conferences in Moscow, London and, most recently, hosted the *Black Dawn* nuclear terrorism exercise with Europeans in Brussels. In addition, under CSIS leadership, it has put out a four-volume report setting forth the threat and a plan of action to close the gap between the threat and the response. This morning, this report is being updated.

In two weeks (June 8-10), G-8 leaders will meet in Sea Island, Georgia, for their annual summit meeting. This is an opportunity for the G-8 to show leadership and give renewed impetus to efforts to address the most urgent threat we face -- the threat of WMD terrorism.

Prior to Kananaskis, the U.S. had been working on this problem for close to a decade, under what are now called the Nunn-Lugar programs. But the challenge of securing potentially vulnerable weapons and materials was not seen as a global problem, and others were content to let the U.S. shoulder the burden essentially by itself.

9/11 changed that. It exposed our vulnerabilities, and it finally motivated other countries to consider playing a more significant role in addressing them.

Real progress has been made under the Global Partnership. CSIS is releasing today a Global Partnership “Scorecard” that outlines what has been done and what remains to be done.

What the Scorecard shows, however, is that there is a dangerous gap between the progress being made and the scope and urgency of the threat.

We know, for example, that al Qaeda has been interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. We know that it is well within al Qaeda's operational capabilities to recruit the technical expertise needed to build a crude nuclear device. The hardest part for the terrorists is getting the nuclear materials necessary to build a bomb. Making it impossible should be our goal.

The good news is that we know where the potentially vulnerable materials are located, and we know how to make them secure against theft or seizure. Unlike many terrible problems we face today, this one is finite and can be solved.

The bad news is that our efforts to solve it are moving much too slowly:

- Hundreds of metric tons of inadequately secured bomb-making materials remain dispersed throughout Russia's network of nuclear facilities.
- The problem is not confined to Russia or even the former Soviet Union. There are about 130 nuclear research reactors and other facilities in 40 countries using highly enriched uranium. Many of these facilities have only the most rudimentary security measures.

Programs are underway to address these problems. But so far they are not being pursued with the necessary sense of urgency -- as if our lives depended on them. At the current rate, it will be many years before we can rest easy that terrorists cannot readily get their hands on the ingredients for building nuclear bombs.

At the outset of the Nuclear Threat Initiative in January 2001, NTI identified what we believed was a dangerous gap between the threat from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and our response to these dangers. Today Department of Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced in Vienna a significant global effort to close that gap by securing nuclear and radiological materials in civilian research reactors.

I commend the Secretary for this initiative and for his candid recognition that past efforts have not been adequate to protect against the perils presented by these materials. I also note with approval that the Department of Energy's initiative intends to "work in partnership with Russia" on these matters. Through my work in the Senate and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, I believe that US-Russian cooperation and leadership in this vital area is fundamental and imperative.

It is incumbent on Secretary Abraham, Presidents Putin and Bush, and the leadership of the G8 to work strenuously to deliver on these and other promises and translate these commitments to concrete and urgent action.

Even, however, if you assume that Secretary Abraham and his Russian Counterpart, Alexander Rumyansev, do their job and the IAEA does their job, only sustained focused leadership from President Bush and President Putin and the G-8 leaders can remove obstacles and assure success.

This morning, I am pleased to be joined by Michelle Flournoy and Bob Einhorn, two outstanding CSIS leaders who are spearheading this effort. They will update us on the Global Partnership --

and they also will outline the positive developments as well as the huge challenges that remain. They will make it clear that pledges have not reached the \$20 billion goal and most pledges have yet to be turned into actual dollars and actual programs.

Let me leave you with a few of my hopes in the form of announcements that I hope will emerge from the discussions in Sea Island among the world leaders in early June.

1. Will the world leaders announce that they will each appoint senior officials in their governments with direct access to the President or Prime Minister who will be responsible and accountable for ensuring that terrorists do not acquire weapons of mass destruction? And will they order their staffs to eliminate obstacles to cooperation?
2. Will the leaders announce that they have reached their goal stated two years ago at the summit in Canada to add \$10 billion to the U.S. \$10 billion over the next 10 years to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or key materials to produce weapons of mass destruction?
3. Will the leaders announce that they will make it a top priority to:
 - a. Accelerate efforts to consolidate and secure weapons usable nuclear materials wherever they exist in the world?
 - b. Will the G-8 leaders endorse the commitment by the United States and Russia to accelerate the securing and removing of HEU from research reactors all over the globe?
4. Will the leaders announce plans for ensuring the safety and security of nuclear fuel from dismantled Russian submarines?
5. Will the G-8 leaders announce their plans for improving the physical security of all chemical weapon stocks awaiting destruction on an urgent basis? (Only 35% of Russia's most vulnerable nerve gas stockpiles have received full security upgrades.)
6. Will the leaders announce increased funding and an accelerated pace for demilitarization of Russia's stockpile of 40,000 tons of chemical agents – there is now a \$6 billion shortfall of funds -- and support for conversion and environmental cleanup of chemical weapon production sites?
7. Will the leaders announce immediate steps to secure dangerous biological pathogen collections across Russia and the former Soviet Union?
 - a. Will this include military and civilian -- openness and transparency -- and will the United States be willing to add a meaningful level of reciprocity?
8. Will President Bush and President Putin announce bilateral transparency of both countries' Biological Defense Research efforts which are viewed with suspicion of

offensive intent by each other and by much of the world? (This would be a major breakthrough and would unlock the backlog of problems and suspicion that affect the entire effort to prevent catastrophic terrorism.)

9. Will the United States and Russia announce increased transparency and assurances of safety and security of tactical battlefield nuclear weapons in and around Europe?
10. Will the U.S. and Russia make progress on what I call the "Man from Mars test." As President Reagan's former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle has observed, a man from Mars comparing the U.S. and Russian nuclear postures today with that at the height of the Cold War would find them essentially indistinguishable.
11. Will we begin a step by step series of measures among the G-8 and other countries to wage an all-out effort against infectious diseases and biological terrorism that includes significant and accelerated help to the poorer nations of the world where tens of thousands are dying each day from infectious diseases?

I view this not as a list of impossible dreams but as essential and imperative global security challenges. The outcome depends on dedicated, effective leadership by the President of the United States, the President of Russia, the leaders of the G-8 and other partner countries around the globe.

The real question -- is preventing catastrophic terrorism a global security priority or an afterthought. If it is an afterthought -- after what?

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