Global Enterprise to Strengthen Nonproliferation and Disarmament Joint Voluntary Commitments (JVCs)

In 2018, NTI launched the Global Enterprise to Strengthen Nonproliferation and Disarmament (GE), a Track 1.5 initiative that has regularly convened officials—along with a small number of non-government experts—from more than 20 countries. The objective of the GE is to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ensure a successful 10th NPT Review Conference (RevCon)—one that includes specific commitments to practical and achievable actions that will advance the NPT’s goals now and in future review cycles. Based on initial discussions with participants, the focus of the GE was narrowed to risk reduction, transparency, and fissile material management. As part of the discussion of each of these areas, the GE participants identified and discussed options for cooperative commitments that could be made before or during the RevCon by groups of countries known as “Joint Voluntary Commitments (JVCs)” and/or be reflected in a RevCon Final Declaration. This paper provides the set of draft JVCs that were prepared by the NTI team and discussed by the group. The NTI team believes that they continue to warrant consideration as promising contributions to thinking about how to achieve a productive RevCon. Some of the JVCs are drafted as potential P5 statements; others include possible language that could be used by the NPT nuclear weapon states and/or by some or all the NPT States Parties. We recognize that not all options may ultimately enjoy consensus support. In some cases, elements of these JVCs could be adopted or otherwise drawn upon as NPT Parties work toward a productive RevCon that advances their shared interest in a robust NPT regime.
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Risk Reduction

Option on Avoiding Nuclear Use

All countries have a shared interest in avoiding the use of nuclear weapons. A recognition of that shared interest is at the core of the NPT, whose Preamble states: “Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples…” The humanitarian impacts of that devastation were underscored by the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons as was the growing risk of using nuclear weapons in a world of heightened political-military confrontation.

The NPT nuclear weapon states (NWS) have a unique and special responsibility to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used. All NPT States Parties, however, can contribute to ensuring non-use, including by supporting robust non-proliferation measures as well as physical protection of fissile materials.

At the height of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev stated that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” That clear, simple statement affirmed both countries’ commitment to avoiding use of nuclear weapons, reassured allies and other countries, and signaled a new readiness to find negotiated solutions to resolve the political-military confrontations that divided them. A reaffirmation of that statement today would have similar impacts and would be a foundational risk reduction action.

Acknowledging the vast devastation that would be visited on all mankind by a nuclear war as well as the need to make every effort to avert that danger,

China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation¹:

- Recognize our unique and special responsibility to
- Welcome the affirmation of the NWS of their unique and

¹ This statement could be made in the P-5 statement or independently in the course of the Review Conference deliberations.
ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again;

• Affirm our belief that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought;

• State our commitment to be guided in our rhetoric, doctrines, policies, postures, and actions by this belief and our commitment to avoiding use of nuclear weapons; and

• Announce the initiation of follow-on discussions within the P5 process (including establishment of a working group on risk reduction) as well as through bilateral engagement in order to avoid use of nuclear weapons, including as a result of misperception and miscalculation.

• Affirm their belief that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought;

• Call for the NWS to be guided in their rhetoric, doctrines, policies, postures, and actions by this belief and their commitment to avoiding use of nuclear weapons;

• Welcome the actions of the NWS to initiate follow-on discussions within the P5 process as well as through bilateral engagement on risk reduction in order to avoid use of nuclear weapons, including as a result of misperceptions and miscalculations; and

• Welcome the commitment of all States Parties to support robust non-proliferation measures as well as measures for the physical security of fissile materials to help ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again.
Option on Reinvigorated Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament

Article VI of the NPT obligates all Parties to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict effective international control.” In the context of the Indefinite Extension of the NPT in 1995, “the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm[ed] their commitment, as stated in Article VI...” and they made in 2000 “[a]n unequivocal undertaking...to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”

On the 50th anniversary of the NPT in 2018, the Foreign Ministers of the Depositary Governments, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, and the United States reaffirmed that “The NPT continues to help create conditions that would be essential for further progress on nuclear disarmament. We remain committed to the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, as set forth in the NPT, and are committed to working together to make the international environment more conducive to such progress.”

Nonetheless, despite very significant reductions of nuclear weapons since the Cold War by both the Russian Federation and the United States, disarmament progress is increasingly difficult. Given the obligations of the NPT, lack of such progress has been a great cause of concern for NPT non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Successfully creating an environment that leads to reenergized nuclear disarmament progress will reduce nuclear risks and strengthen support for the NPT, thereby helping to ensure that it continues to effectively serve the security and interests of the nations and peoples of the world.

Recognizing the deep concerns of NNWS, China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation:

- Reaffirm their commitment to the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear weapons and their legal obligation as NPT Parties for its good faith pursuit;
- Call attention to their joint commitment to discussions within the P5 process focused on avoiding nuclear war;
- Remind NWS of their “unequivocal undertaking” made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons;

Given our deep concern about the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, the States Parties to the NPT [or some subset thereof]:

- Reafﬁrm their commitment to the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear weapons and their legal obligation as NPT Parties for its good faith pursuit;
• Welcome the extension of the New START Treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation;

• Announce their intention to intensify government-to-government engagement to address outstanding issues whose resolution would be an important step in creating that more conducive international environment for additional steps toward further reductions of nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination;

• State their readiness to work together to make the international environment more conducive to reenergized progress on nuclear reductions as an essential element of nuclear disarmament;

• State their intention to set out at the first Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2025 Review Conference their appraisal of near-term pathways (including reductions) to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons as a basis for interactive dialogue with NNWS and resumed progress; and

• State their intention to report to the first Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2025 Review Conference and to other Preparatory Committee Meetings on progress made.

• Welcome the extension of the New START Treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation and call for the NWS to initiate multilateral discussions of future arms control arrangements among them with the goal of further reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons;

• Urge them to work together to address their differences and to make the international environment more conducive to reenergized progress on nuclear disarmament;

• Call for all the NWS to set out at the first Preparatory Commitment Meeting for the 2025 Review Conference their appraisal of near-term pathways (including reductions) to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons as a basis for interactive dialogue with NNWS and resumed progress; and

• Call for the NWS to report to the first Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2025 Review Conference on steps taken toward further reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons and, if there has been little or no progress, on the reasons for lack of progress.
Option on Crisis Avoidance and Management

The avoidance of crises among NWS and in the event of a crisis its successful management and peaceful resolution have long been recognized as essential to reducing nuclear risks. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union put in place the “hot line” to make possible reliable crisis communications and negotiated several crisis avoidance agreements. These instruments remain in place. Bilateral U.S.-Russian or NATO-Russian dialogue on crisis avoidance, however, has been disrupted in recent years by broader political and security differences. Crisis communication mechanisms now are also in place between the United States and China, as are agreements to facilitate such communications and a limited dialogue on crisis avoidance and management between the two countries.

The best approach to avoid crises among NWS is to address diplomatically the underlying political and security differences that could lead to a crisis. Absent progress in those efforts, it is especially important to regulate cooperatively the interaction of opposing military forces to avoid unintended confrontation; to pursue bilateral and multilateral dialogues to identify and alleviate possible misunderstandings and misinterpretations of military doctrines, postures, and activities that could lead to a crisis, including with participation of defense and military personnel; and for all nuclear-armed countries to signal their commitment to avoiding crises that could raise the risk of a nuclear confrontation.

The robust dialogue on their respective nuclear doctrines of China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation has provided opportunities for each of the NWS of the NPT to describe its nuclear doctrine and for other NWS to seek clarifications and amplifications of certain aspects. In that manner, this dialogue has helped to reduce misunderstandings and misinterpretations that could lead to a crisis or confrontation involving P5 states. Its scope, however, has been limited to matters related to nuclear doctrines.

Recognizing the importance of crisis avoidance and crisis management for reducing the risks of nuclear weapons, China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation:

- Affirm our commitment to exercise restraint in rhetoric as well as in military programs, posture, and activities so

Recognizing the importance of crisis avoidance and crisis management for reducing the risks of nuclear weapons, the States Parties to the NPT [or some subset thereof]:

- Urge the NWS to exercise restraint in rhetoric as well as in military programs, posture, and activities so as to avoid
as to avoid unintended actions that could heighten the risk of a crisis;

- Affirm our commitment to ensure the existence of unambiguous pathways and mechanisms for communication should a crisis occur;

- Have agreed to establish a Working Group on Crisis Avoidance and Management with participation by defense and military officials, the purpose of which will be to identify actions that could lead to misinterpretation and possible escalation (including possible responses); to review existing crisis avoidance and management mechanisms and agreements, identify gaps or shortcomings, and propose solutions;

- State our intention to report to States Parties on the results of this broadened dialogue.

- Call for them to ensure the existence of unambiguous pathways and mechanisms for communication among them should a crisis occur;

- Urge them to broaden their dialogue within the P5 process to include issues related to crisis avoidance and crisis management;

- Urge them for that purpose to establish a Working Group on Crisis Avoidance and Management (with participation by diplomats as well as defense and military officials) to identify actions that could lead to misinterpretation and possible escalation (including possible responses) as well as to review existing crisis avoidance and management mechanisms and agreements, identify gaps or shortcomings, and propose solutions;

- Urge them to strengthen government-to-government dialogue on crisis avoidance and crisis management, including between defense and military officials; and

- Call for them to report to States Parties on the results of this broadened dialogue.
Option on Strengthening Dialogue on Nuclear Doctrines and Strategic Stability (P5)

Within the P5 process, China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation have been conducting a robust dialogue on their respective nuclear doctrines. This dialogue has provided opportunities for each of the NWS of the NPT to describe its nuclear doctrine and for other NWS to seek clarifications and amplifications of certain aspects. Engagement among personnel from each of these countries also has provided less formal insights into their respective thinking about the role, risks, and management of nuclear weapons. As a result, this dialogue has helped clarify ambiguities, while reducing misunderstandings and misinterpretations that could adversely impact strategic stability.

Great interest continues on the part of NPT NNWS in the nuclear doctrines, policies, postures, and activities of the NWS, in particular the nuclear use and declaratory policies of different NWS, their thinking about the roles of nuclear weapons, measures to reduce those roles, and NWS judgments about the overall strategic situation and its impact on nuclear disarmament. NNWS have welcomed initiatives by NWS to provide information about the ongoing nuclear doctrine dialogue as well as these wider aspects of NWS thinking about nuclear weapons, including the P5 side-event on nuclear doctrine that took place during the 10th Review Conference.

Recognizing the importance of the nuclear doctrine dialogue among the NWS and the interest of the NNWS in understanding better what is occurring in the P5 dialogue as well as the nuclear doctrines, policies, and posture of the NWS, China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation:

- Affirm our intention to continue and deepen our dialogue on nuclear doctrine within the P5 process as a means to reduce nuclear risk and create an environment for future progress on nuclear disarmament, with our next meeting to take place [......];

- Decide to expand our dialogue to include explicitly the issue of strategic stability, initially with the objectives of exchanging views on our respective conceptions of strategic stability; on systems, programs, and activities thought to undermine strategic stability; and on possible ways to reduce, eliminate, or avoid the deployment of destabilizing systems;

- Announce the creation of a P5 Working Group on Nuclear Doctrine and Strategic Stability, which will meet at least twice per year, with participation by foreign affairs, defense, and military personnel and will include exchanges of concept papers;

- Affirm our readiness to engage with NNWS in an interactive discussion of our respective nuclear doctrines, policies, postures, and activities, including joint presentations beginning at the first Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2025 Review
Conference; and

• State our readiness to engage with NNWS, bilaterally and in the P5 process, to identify those questions about our respective nuclear doctrines, policies, postures, and activities that are of most interest or concern to NNWS as well as respond to those questions bilaterally, in the P5 process, or through interaction in the NPT Review process.
Fissile Material Management

Reaffirming the Importance of Fissile Material Management with Priority Actions

Strong fissile material management (FMM) includes effective physical protection, accounting and control, safeguarding, and reporting of fissile materials. FMM is integral to achieving the non-proliferation, peaceful uses, and nuclear disarmament goals of the NPT. By reassuring NNWS that neighboring countries are using fissile materials only for peaceful purposes and by fostering robust protection against access to nuclear-weapon usable materials by terrorists or non-State actors, strong FMM contributes to non-proliferation. Confidence that fissile materials are being used by NNWS only for peaceful purposes, that there is no diversion of those materials from civilian applications in NWS, and ultimately that both civilian and military fissile materials and production infrastructure are effectively controlled and cannot be diverted to military purposes, is essential for the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon free world and its sustainment. Assurance of effective safeguards and physical protection of fissile material in civilian applications in NNWS is a precondition for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Robust physical security also creates public confidence needed for application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The importance of strong FMM is widely recognized and acknowledged overall. Nonetheless, differences also persist among States about what next steps to take to strengthen FMM, whether on a national basis or multilaterally.

Recognizing the importance of FMM, the States Parties to the NPT:

- Acknowledge that robust and effective FMM advances the goals of the NPT;
- Call for a discussion in the Conference on Disarmament and other fora of the relationship of FMM to achievement of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with a view to ensuring that this relationship is well understood and to identifying near-term priority actions to be taken to strengthen FMM;
- Express their belief that in any discussion of possible priorities to strengthen FMM, particular attention should be given to steps to establish and strengthen national nuclear security regimes; incremental actions to begin to work toward a baseline of information about civilian and military stocks of fissile material, including its production and disposition; and other innovative actions; and
• Urge that discussion of the linkages between FMM and non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy be included with activities devoted to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament education.

**Developing a Comprehensive Baseline of Information on Fissile Material Stocks**

Strong fissile material management and the development of a comprehensive baseline of information about global fissile material stocks, both civilian and military, is an essential step in the pursuit and sustainment of nuclear disarmament. A comprehensive baseline of information will help to reduce uncertainty and build confidence necessary for nuclear disarmament. It also directly supports nuclear disarmament verification. Pursuit of a comprehensive baseline of information, however, also needs to reflect practical, technical, and non-proliferation constraints.

As an important incremental step toward establishment of such a baseline, fissile material possessing States can make regular declarations of civilian fissile materials. In that regard, the existing decisions by some States to make those declarations under INFCIRC/549 (separated plutonium) and INFCIRC/912 (HEU) are welcomed. States, including within the P5 process, also can begin to explore and develop the elements of an overall framework for a comprehensive baseline.

Acknowledging the importance of developing a comprehensive baseline of fissile material stocks, China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation undertake to:

• Continue or begin to submit annual declarations of stocks of civilian separated plutonium and civilian high-enriched uranium under INFCIRC/549 and INFCIRC/912;
• Support efforts to strengthen implementation of existing international mechanisms for regular declarations of civilian fissile materials, including using our diplomatic

Acknowledging the importance of developing a comprehensive baseline of fissile material stocks, the States Parties to the NPT [or some sub-set thereof] undertake to:

• Continue or begin to submit annual declarations of stocks of civilian fissile material under INFCIRC/549 and INFCIRC/912;
• Support efforts to strengthen implementation of existing international mechanisms for regular declarations of civilian fissile materials, including using our diplomatic
our diplomatic good offices to encourage other possessing States to make comparable declarations of stocks of civilian fissile material;

- Announce the creation of a working group within the P5 process to explore the elements of a comprehensive baseline of fissile material stocks to support nuclear disarmament, including types of information, constraints on the provision of such information, and possible ways to overcome those constraints, as well as to explore how to build incrementally toward that more comprehensive baseline of information on fissile material stocks;

- Urge the Review Conference to welcome this initiative in its Final Declaration.

good offices to encourage other possessing States to make comparable declarations of stocks of civilian fissile material;

- Encourage discussion within the NPT Review process and other appropriate fora of additional international actions to develop a comprehensive baseline of information about global fissile material stocks and associated facilities, both civilian and military;

- Encourage discussion within the P5 process and with NNWS of how to build incrementally from such declarations of civilian fissile material stocks toward a more comprehensive baseline of information of fissile material stocks, including types of information, constraints on the provision of such information, and possible ways to overcome those constraints;

- Urge the Review Conference to welcome this initiative in its Final Declaration.
Encouraging the Development of HEU Free Zones

Minimizing and eventually eliminating the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications contributes significantly to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Minimizing and eventually eliminating the use of HEU also supports pursuit of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament by reducing the overall monitoring and inspection burden to be met if countries are to be assured that all residual nuclear-weapon usable material in civilian applications is controlled, inspected, and monitored.

There has been significant progress over the past decades toward this objective. Under INFCIRC/912 (2017), in a Joint Statement on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications, its signatories committed to take a set of actions to achieve that objective, including refraining from using HEU in new civilian facilities or applications; converting or shutting down HEU civilian reactors; removing from their national territories, downblending, or disposing HEU; and developing low enriched uranium (LEU) alternatives for medical isotope production. There now are 27 countries and Taiwan that no longer use HEU in civilian applications. One region, the Caribbean, now is free of HEU use.

The development of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) has long been acknowledged to be an important nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure. NWFZs are explicitly recognized in the NPT. Building on this experience, the development of regions free of civilian uses of HEU and HEU-free zones offers another path to make progress toward the objective of minimizing and eventually eliminating civilian use of HEU.

Taking into account this progress, the States Parties to the NPT [or some sub-set thereof]:

- Reaffirm the importance of minimizing and eventually eliminating the use of HEU in civilian applications;
- Urge countries using HEU in civilian applications to adhere to INFCIRC/912 and to take steps to minimize and eventually eliminate their civilian use of HEU; and
- Welcome the existence of regions free of civilian HEU use and endorse the concept of HEU-free zones as an important additional step to minimize and eliminate global civilian use of HEU.
Minimizing Stocks of Plutonium for Civilian Applications

Using plutonium in civilian applications and the associated reprocessing of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors continue to be endorsed and pursued in some countries’ programs for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For these countries, recycling plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in existing light-water power reactors generates energy. It also is part of their technical approach for nuclear waste management. Using plutonium in fast-breeder reactors continues to be seen as a longer-term option.

Because separated plutonium is a directly weapon-usable material, reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, using MOX and other plutonium-based nuclear fuels, and possessing large plutonium stocks pose special technical, operational, and economic burdens for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Large stocks of separated plutonium in storage prior to use in nuclear power plants also places greater burdens on national actions to ensure robust physical security. Even under IAEA safeguards, large stocks of separated plutonium also can create political and security uncertainties among neighboring countries.

In light of these considerations, the States Parties to the NPT [or some sub-set thereof] call on all countries using plutonium in civilian applications to:

- Work with the IAEA to ensure robust safeguards, including cooperation to implement new safeguards technologies and adapt safeguards approaches as needed;
- Take national actions to ensure robust and effective physical protection of plutonium stocks; and
- To keep stockpiles of separated plutonium to the minimum level necessary consistent with their programs for using plutonium in civilian applications.
Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications

Minimizing and eventually eliminating the use of HEU in civilian applications contributes significantly to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. In countries with significant nuclear energy programs, it also enhances public acceptance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by building confidence in countries’ safe and secure management of their nuclear programs. Minimizing and eventually eliminating the use of HEU also supports pursuit of nuclear disarmament by reducing the overall monitoring and inspection burden to be met for all countries to have confidence that any residual nuclear-weapon usable material in civilian applications is controlled, inspected, and monitored.

There have been significant achievements over the past decades in minimizing civilian uses of HEU. Prominent national and international activities have included converting research reactors to use non-HEU fuels (without loss of capacity) as well as shutting down reactors that could not be efficiently converted to non-HEU fuels; removing stocks of HEU from national territories; downblending stocks of HEU; and developing non-HEU production of medical isotopes. Under INFCIRC/912 (2017), in a Joint Statement on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications, its signatories committed to take a set of actions to achieve that objective, including refraining from using HEU in new civilian facilities or applications; converting or shutting down HEU civilian reactors; removing from their national territories, downblending, or disposing HEU; and developing LEU alternatives for medical isotope production.

Reaffirming the importance of minimizing and eliminating the use of HEU in civilian applications, the States Parties to the NPT [or some sub-set thereof]:

- Reaffirm the commitments made in INFCIRC/912 or announce their decision to undertake the commitments set out in INFCIRC/912;
- Call for all States using HEU in civilian applications to reassess the use of HEU and to initiate actions to minimize civilian use of HEU;
- Welcome the existence of regions of the globe within which use of HEU in civilian applications has already been eliminated; and
- Announce our intention to join with other current or previous HEU possessing States to discuss a target date for the elimination of all use of HEU in civilian applications, with the goal of eliminating that use at the earliest practicable date.
Robust physical protection of fissile materials is acknowledged to be a key element of FMM. Effective physical protection builds confidence needed to sustain public support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and enables international peaceful nuclear cooperation. In the case of HEU and plutonium (Pu), it also makes an essential contribution to reducing the risk of use of nuclear weapons by preventing terrorist access to directly nuclear weapon-usable materials.

Over the past decade, there has been very significant and continuing strengthening of State action and international cooperation to ensure the effective physical protection of fissile materials. Significant progress was made in the global Nuclear Security Summits. That progress is now being sustained and carried forward under the IAEA International Conferences on Nuclear Security (ICONS). Access to IAEA resources, including its Nuclear Security Series of guides and its International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions, is an essential resource for States as they meet their obligations in this area. Entry-into-Force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) was another important action to strengthen physical security of nuclear materials.

Both through the national statements that we have already made during the plenary debate and in this joint statement, the governments of [.........] affirm our support for robust and effective physical protection of nuclear material, including our commitment to implement existing non-binding IAEA guidance documents and take other national actions to continuously improve security. Specifically, the States Parties to the NPT [or some sub-set thereof]:

- Reaffirm adherence to, or for those that have not yet done so, announce our signature of INFCIRC/869, the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, which sets out specific national actions to establish and strengthen national nuclear security regimes by implementing IAEA nuclear security guidance and ensuring continuous improvement on nuclear security;
- Announce our commitment to issue annual national statements on progress made and future actions to be taken to strengthen physical protection of fissile materials;
- Strongly endorse the benefits for strengthening national regulatory frameworks, expertise, competence, and implementation of hosting IAEA IPPAS missions and call for all countries to take advantage of this IAEA source of support;
• Announce the decision of those of our countries that have not yet done so to host an IPPAS mission in our country and to publish the results;

• Either reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of the Fundamental Principles contained within the Amendment to the CPPNM as well as to submit reports as called for by Article 14.1 on laws and regulations giving effect to the Convention as amended, or otherwise commit to ratify the Amendment to the CPPNM and to submit required reports; and

• Call for the Review Conference to endorse the work of the recent IAEA ICONS in identifying additional actions and commitments to strengthen nuclear security and to urge all States to implement those actions and commitments.
Transparency

Greater Transparency into the P5 Process and Its Results

Discussions among China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation, in the P5 Process have been an important means to strengthen pursuit of the goals of the NPT. Developing the Nuclear Glossary as well as the ongoing dialogue on nuclear doctrines have helped to reduce misunderstandings and misinterpretations and to clarify the thinking of respective P5 countries on broader nuclear matters. In that manner, the P5 Process is an important means to reduce nuclear risks and to help overcome the obstacles to renewed nuclear disarmament progress to which all NPT States Parties are committed.

In order to provide insights into the P5 process and how it advances the NPT’s goals, the P5 countries have provided information and engaged in dialogue with countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) after each of the annual P5 meetings. At the same time, we recognize the interest of NPT NNWS in greater transparency into the issues discussed within the P5 process. We also acknowledge the interests of NPT NNWS in obtaining more information about the nuclear policies, doctrines, and thinking of each of our countries and having opportunities for greater dialogue on these matters. For that reason, we have organized a half-day event on our respective nuclear doctrines at the 10th NPT Review Conference.

Recognizing the importance of greater transparency into the P5 Process and its results, China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Russian Federation:

- Affirm our commitment that the Chair of each of the annual P5 meetings will provide a thorough public presentation on the issues discussed and the results of each annual meeting at the conclusion of that meeting;
- State our intention, thereby complementing current engagement with the NPDI countries after each annual meeting, to invite representatives from a wider group of countries to participate in that outreach event in order to enhance transparency and foster dialogue on how the P5 Process is advancing the NPT’s goals and reducing nuclear risks;
- Commit to explore ways to increase mutual engagement between the P5 and NPT Review process officials—including, as appropriate, the Chair of the relevant Preparatory Committee Meeting and/or the President of the relevant Review Conference—including by holding briefings and participating in outreach events; and
• State our intention to jointly hold half-day events at each of the Preparatory Committee Meetings and the Review Conferences on nuclear doctrine and other NPT-related matters of mutual concern to NWS and NNWS.

**Strengthened Reporting and Interactive Dialogue on Implementation of NPT Obligations**

Transparency and reporting is a critical component of safeguarding the integrity and effectiveness of the NPT regime. Reporting on NPT implementation helps build trust and confidence among States Parties, helps clarify misperceptions among countries, and strengthens mutual understanding on key NPT obligations. The value of national reporting in these respects can be strengthened by encouraging interactive dialogue among NPT States Parties on the substance of national reports as well as more generally on NPT matters.

The governments of [........] remain committed to applying the principle of transparency in relation to the implementation of our NPT obligations. We will sustain existing reporting practices and work toward strengthening the process and value of reporting by greater provision, exchange, and discussion of information about NPT implementation.

To that end, we commit to the following actions:

• Continue to submit regular national implementation reports on how the Articles of the NPT are being implemented and do so in a manner that will facilitate the ability of States Parties to compare data on implementation and to identify updates/changes in the reports over time;

• Release our national implementation reports in a timely manner, prior to each Review Conference, to give countries an opportunity to review and informally comment on those reports before their discussion at the Review Conference;

• Support proposals to dedicate time at future Preparatory Committee Meetings to provide updates on national reports and to discuss those updates;

• Work together—and with other interested States Parties—to identify options to achieve greater consistency of data across reports from all States Parties as well as to develop a user-friendly shared factual platform/repository to facilitate access to countries’ reports and related strategic documents;
• Provide assistance, as requested, to other NPT States Parties in preparing their national reports; and

• Encourage greater interactive dialogue within the NPT Review process, not only on national implementation reports, but also on NPT-related issues of concern to all NPT States Parties.