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NTI NUCLEAR SECURITY INDEX

Theft / Sabotage / Radiological

Agenda for a New Era of Leadership

Nuclear Threat Initiative

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan global security organization focused on reducing nuclear, biological, and emerging technology threats imperiling humanity. Sam Nunn serves as founding chair of the organization, and Christine E. Wormuth serves as president and chief executive officer.



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We also thank our long-standing partners at Economist Enterprise (EE)—especially Katherine Stewart, Shubhangi Pandey, and EE’s global network of analysts—for their hard work translating research into measurable indicators and collecting data from around the world.

We appreciate each member of the International Panel of Experts, whose breadth of experience informs the development of each edition of the NTI Index. This year’s esteemed group engaged substantively and considerately with difficult questions and lent their deep knowledge and unique perspective to strengthen the rigor and quality of this tool.

We are also grateful to the many government officials from around the world who participated in briefings and reviewed data. Their engagement helped ensure that the 2026 NTI Index is as accurate and current as possible.

Countless colleagues at NTI have made valuable contributions to this edition of the NTI Index. We thank Carmen MacDougall for her support and guidance throughout the process. Abigail Koch, Catherine Donovan, and Darby FitzSimmons supported research, analysis, and quality assurance efforts. Eric Brewer, Ross Matzkin-Bridger, and Nickolas Roth played pivotal roles in shaping the ideas and analysis at the heart of this edition of the NTI Index. NTI’s communications team—particularly Mary Fulham, Ryan Cahill, and Mimi Hall—have been instrumental in helping the NTI Index reach and inform its intended audiences. Individually and collectively, their work has made the 2026 NTI Index possible.

With appreciation,

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Foreword

By Christine E. Wormuth, President and CEO,
Nuclear Threat Initiative

Right now, somewhere in the world, nuclear material is sitting in a facility whose security systems have not been sufficiently tested, whose employees are not adequately trained in insider threat protocols, or whose government has not yet joined the international agreements designed to protect it. In the wrong hands, even a small amount of highly enriched uranium or plutonium could be fashioned into a weapon capable of devastating many lives—and even upending the global order. The gap between nuclear material being secured and harnessed responsibly or left vulnerable to threats and weaponization is a matter of political will. Incentivizing governments to close that gap is the animating concern of the 2026 NTI Nuclear Security Index (NTI Index).

This seventh edition of the NTI Index arrives at a moment when the global ambition to expand nuclear energy is increasing and novel threats to nuclear facilities are growing, but the political will to sustain nuclear security is eroding and uneven. This trend is most apparent in the overall scores of Russia and the United States, the countries that bear the greatest responsibility for global nuclear security as the custodians of the vast majority of the world's weapons-usable nuclear materials. The NTI Index captures precipitous drops in both countries' overall scores. The United States' score, in particular, has declined more steeply than the NTI Index has ever recorded for any country or area. The data point to a historic lapse in nuclear security leadership in these countries at a moment when nuclear dangers are rising.

Geopolitical rivalry is undermining the bilateral and multilateral nuclear security frameworks that have been central to reducing nuclear risks. The demands of securing nuclear facilities in an environment of constantly evolving threats are straining even the most capable governments. Commitments from new countries to pursue nuclear energy as a source of clean, reliable energy will test the security frameworks and regulatory capacities critical to protecting these facilities and the materials within them. These are not easy circumstances to navigate. The work of implementing nuclear security remains critically important.

The gap between nuclear material being secured and harnessed responsibly or left vulnerable to threats and weaponization is a matter of political will.

Despite the challenges, a handful of countries are demonstrating that it is still possible to build political will for nuclear security and make meaningful progress. This group—Australia, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, Senegal, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom—is prioritizing leader-level engagement with international institutions and government partners, strengthening national nuclear security frameworks, and reinforcing fundamental nuclear security laws and norms. Their example affirms that all governments can—and must—contribute to strengthening global nuclear security. When governments choose to engage, the international frameworks underpinning nuclear security can still work.

The 2027 Review Conference of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) represents the most significant opportunity in years to strengthen global nuclear security. The Amended CPPNM binds states to implement security measures for civilian nuclear materials and facilities—yet too many countries have still not joined, and implementation among those that have is uneven. The upcoming review conference is a moment for governments to act on both fronts. By providing a rigorous, data-driven accounting of where 176 countries and areas stand and what steps remain for them to take, the NTI Index provides a clear checklist of who should prioritize what to make the review conference a success.

After 14 years, NTI continues to produce new editions of the NTI Index because we have seen its power to guide governments toward policies and actions that make the world safer. This year, the data on Russia and the United States reveal a concerning lack of commitment to maintaining nuclear security. At the same time, we are heartened by the emergence of a set of nations who are demonstrating that building the necessary political will for nuclear security remains possible. NTI is steadfast in our commitment to turning that political will into tangible progress around the world. Join us—we all have a role to play.

Executive Summary

Agenda for a New Era of Leadership

The 2026 NTI Nuclear Security Index (NTI Index) proposes an agenda for a new era of leadership at a moment when the risk environment leaves no room for complacency. Nuclear facilities and materials face growing risks from complex, sustained crises—underscored by the dozens of countries with nuclear facilities that are currently affected by war or violent conflict. The moment calls for new leadership and renewed commitments from Russia and the United States.

Russia and the United States, which together hold 79 percent of the world's weapons-usable nuclear materials, have the greatest responsibility for anchoring the global nuclear security system. The NTI Index reveals a dramatic deterioration in nuclear security conditions in both countries. Russia's suspension of crucial international cooperation and production of additional weapons-usable materials are the most significant drivers of its score decline. The United States has also suspended international cooperation, but the biggest driver of its reduced score—the largest ever for any country or area between editions of the NTI Index—is the erosion of the independence of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The NTI Index also finds stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials growing in a number of countries. The biggest contributors to this trend are those operating spent fuel reprocessing facilities, which rapidly accumulate separated plutonium and create significant and unnecessary risks for global nuclear security. Highly enriched uranium stockpiles are also on the rise in several countries, even as the global total slowly shrinks.

These increases are especially concerning given that most countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials and nuclear facilities are showing slow or stalled progress on adopting and implementing fundamental nuclear security practices. Personnel-related security measures such as insider threat prevention and vetting remain weak or absent. Cybersecurity requirements in most countries are outdated, incomplete, or untested against today's rapidly evolving threats. Progress on strengthening the regulatory bodies and technical institutions that sustain nuclear security regimes has stalled entirely. Forty-seven countries have yet to ratify the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and most governments that have pledged to secure radioactive sources have not translated those pledges into national law.

Fortunately, a promising countertrend is emerging from 12 countries with the potential to define the future of nuclear security. These countries—which include established nuclear security leaders and newer entrants—have stepped forward as a driving force for global progress by sustaining domestic improvements, supporting other governments, and deepening engagement with international institutions. Their example shows that where political will exists, progress is within reach.

There are two near-term opportunities for others to follow suit: the upcoming revision of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) benchmark security guidance, Information Circular 225, and the 2027 Review Conference for the Amended CPPNM. Processes and convenings like these are key moments for governments to renew commitments, set new goals, and lay the groundwork for further progress.

Responding to the risks and opportunities of the moment requires a new era of precise, dedicated, and sustained government leadership. The 2026 NTI Index's recommendations constitute an agenda for action, identifying the priority steps that countries and areas should take to strengthen nuclear security and lead by example globally:

- The United States and Russia should urgently reverse the alarming decline in their nuclear security conditions, and the United States should reclaim its role as a global nuclear security leader.
- The countries that have emerged as the new driving force on global nuclear security should build on their recent strides with unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral efforts that consolidate their progress into a new era of enduring leadership.
- Countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities should minimize quantities of weapons-usable materials by permanently disposing of spent nuclear fuel instead of reprocessing it.
- Countries with excess stockpiles of highly enriched uranium should eliminate them through conversion and downblending.
- Countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities should strengthen personnel-related security measures that, in most countries, are currently weak or negligible.
- Countries and areas with nuclear facilities should address outdated or incomplete cybersecurity requirements by adopting comprehensive cybersecurity frameworks that keep pace with intensifying threats.
- All countries should modernize and close gaps in the IAEA's nuclear security guidance by capitalizing on the upcoming revision of Information Circular 225.
- Countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities should strengthen regulatory bodies and technical institutions to protect against evolving threats.
- Countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities should better prepare nuclear infrastructure in the event of complex and sustained crises by instituting all-hazards frameworks and leveraging legal protections for nuclear infrastructure.
- All countries should use the 2027 Review Conference of the Amended CPPNM to encourage broader ratification of the treaty and strengthen its implementation.
- All countries and areas should follow through on political commitments to secure radioactive sources by implementing national legislation and regulations.

About the NTI Nuclear Security Index and Radioactive Source Security Assessment

The NTI Nuclear Security Index (NTI Index) is the only independent, transparent assessment of global nuclear security conditions. Developed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in partnership with Economist Enterprise (EE), the NTI Index uses a rigorous methodology and publicly available information to track nuclear and radiological security across 175 countries and Taiwan.¹ First published in 2012, the NTI Index captures the nuclear security landscape through data, elevates key global trends, identifies specific actions for countries and areas to take that strengthen nuclear security, and builds accountability among governments.

The NTI Index recommends actions for governments based on data-driven findings that emerge from three rankings:



Theft: Secure Materials ranks the 22 countries with 1 kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials to assess actions to secure those materials against theft.



Theft: Support Global Efforts ranks the 154 countries and areas with less than 1 kilogram of or no weapons-usable nuclear materials to assess actions to support global nuclear security efforts.




Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranks the 48 countries and areas with nuclear facilities (e.g., nuclear power reactors and research reactors) that may or may not possess weapons-usable nuclear materials, to assess actions to protect those facilities against sabotage.

Since 2020, the NTI Index has also included a Radioactive Source Security Assessment that reviews national policies, commitments, and actions to secure radioactive sources and prevent radiological terrorism in 175 countries and Taiwan. This assessment does not score or rank countries and areas.

¹ Taiwan is included among the countries without weapons-usable nuclear materials and countries with nuclear facilities rankings because of its autonomous regulatory structure and cooperative activities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In recommendations, data-driven findings, and broad statements that include Taiwan, the NTI Index uses either “countries and Taiwan” or “countries and areas”; when Taiwan is not included, the NTI Index uses the term “countries.”

Countries and Areas in the NTI Index

-  Countries with 1 kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking
-  Countries and areas with less than 1 kilogram of or no weapons-usable nuclear materials in the Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking
-  Countries and areas with nuclear facilities that may or may not possess weapons-usable nuclear materials in the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking



What the NTI Index Captures

A resilient global nuclear security system requires every government in the world to uphold international legal commitments, global norms, and domestic laws and regulations. The NTI Index paints a clear, data-grounded picture of where that system is healthy and where it requires urgent remedial action.

After a period of progress on nuclear security achieved through the Nuclear Security Summits (held from 2010 to 2016), the current era of nuclear security is defined by significant backsliding amid increased global uncertainty, geopolitical tensions, and dangers posed to nuclear facilities in active war zones. In this environment, the NTI Index's centralized authoritative accounting of the global nuclear and radiological security landscape and prioritization of actions for governments to take is more essential than ever.

The Stakes of Theft and Sabotage

The quantity of weapons-usable nuclear material—plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)—needed to build a nuclear bomb is relatively small. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines a “significant quantity” (the approximate amount of material needed for a nuclear explosive device) of plutonium as 8 kilograms and HEU as 25 kilograms. These weapons-usable nuclear materials are in 22 countries around the world, and if stolen, the results could be disastrous. Another 153 countries and Taiwan could serve as safe havens, staging grounds, or transit routes for illicit nuclear activities.

Civil nuclear facilities in 47 countries and Taiwan face mounting risks from disruptive technologies, like uncrewed aerial vehicles, climate change–related events (like wildfires and violent storms), and military attacks during war (like those on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power

plant in Ukraine and on the Barakah nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates). The terrorist threat also remains persistent. Groups and lone-wolf actors have demonstrated a clear intent to acquire nuclear materials for terrorist purposes and have repeatedly proved capable of sabotaging nuclear facilities. Protecting these facilities requires the constant vigilance of governments, nuclear operators, and international organizations.

The Theft and Sabotage Ranking Frameworks

The NTI Index's three Theft and Sabotage rankings are each based on frameworks that assess key factors influencing nuclear security conditions. Each framework is different but draws from the same five categories of assessment factors.

1. Quantities and Sites

In the Theft: Secure Materials framework, the Quantities and Sites category captures the quantity of weapons-usable nuclear materials, the number and types of civil nuclear sites, and the frequency of transport of weapons-usable nuclear materials in a particular country—all factors related to the risk of theft of weapons-usable nuclear materials. It also measures whether a country is increasing or decreasing its stockpile of weapons-usable nuclear materials. In the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking, this category instead captures the number of civil nuclear sites in a country or area, and whether it is reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, using plutonium-based fuels in nuclear reactors, or exporting spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing abroad. This category is not included in the Theft: Support Global Efforts framework.

2. Security and Control Measures

In the Theft: Secure Materials and Sabotage: Protect Facilities frameworks, the Security and Control Measures category encompasses the core activities directly related to protection and accounting of nuclear materials. It includes indicators of physical protection, material control

and accounting, insider threat prevention, response capabilities, cybersecurity, and security culture. In Theft: Secure Materials, it also measures security during transport. This category is not included in the framework for Theft: Support Global Efforts.

3. Global Norms

The Global Norms category measures actions that contribute to the strengthening of global norms for nuclear materials security and is included in all three ranking frameworks. It captures international legal commitments, voluntary participation in global initiatives, international assurances (excluded in Theft: Support Global Efforts), and IAEA information circulars (INFCIRCs) that highlight commitments made to improve nuclear security.


4. Domestic Commitments and Capacity

The Domestic Commitments and Capacity category indicates how well a country or area has implemented its international commitments and evaluates its capacity to do so. It appears in all three ranking frameworks and includes indicators on implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the status of legislation to implement the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the presence of an independent regulatory body (excluded in Theft: Support Global Efforts).

5. Risk Environment

Across all three ranking frameworks, the Risk Environment category captures contextual factors, such as political stability, effective governance, corruption, armed conflict, and illicit activities by nonstate actors that are relevant to a country's or area's ability to implement effective security and regulatory oversight.

How the Theft Rankings Measure Nuclear Security Conditions



The Theft: Secure Materials ranking assesses countries with 1 kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials based on these five categories. The Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking assesses countries and areas with less than 1 kilogram of or no weapons-usable nuclear materials based on three of these categories.

KEY



Theft: Secure Materials



Theft: Support Global Efforts

* This indicator does not apply to countries and areas in the Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking.

Note: For information about data sources used for scoring, see the full methodology at www.ntiindex.org.

How the Sabotage: Protect Facilities Ranking Measures Nuclear Security Conditions



The Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking assesses countries and areas with nuclear facilities based on these five categories.

Note: For information about data sources used for scoring, see the full methodology at www.ntiindex.org.

New Elements in 2026

NTI updates the ranking frameworks for each edition of the NTI Index to account for progress on nuclear security, incorporate new best practices, and acknowledge emerging challenges and risks. Previous editions of the NTI Index are then backscored to enable consistent comparison and tracking over time. Key changes this year include the following:

- New subindicators spanning multiple categories have been introduced to assess the nuclear security impact of national nuclear fuel cycles, including whether
 - Enrichment and reprocessing facilities are present
 - Spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed
 - Plutonium-based fuels are used in nuclear reactors
 - Spent nuclear fuel is exported for reprocessing abroad
 - Progress has been made on developing capacity for permanent disposition of spent nuclear fuel.
- Governments receive credit for establishing institutions that support regulatory capacity, including Nuclear Security Support Centers and cybersecurity research centers.
- Subindicators in the Security and Control Measures category have been revised to provide additional credit for regulatory requirements that mandate regular testing of security plans and systems in line with principles of continuous improvement and realistic threat assessment.
- A major revision of cybersecurity subindicators in the Security and Control Measures category has aligned them with modern practices in sensitive digital asset protection and supply chain cybersecurity risk management.
- New subindicators in the Global Norms category capture ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions and support for the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict, reflecting lessons learned and new efforts to protect nuclear facilities from attack during war.

- Subindicators in the Risk Environment category have been revised to draw data from sources that allow higher-fidelity measurement of risk, such as the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's Conflict Barometer and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data conflict dataset. Armed conflict and violent demonstrations are now geo-mapped to enable scoring based on the proximity of those events to nuclear facilities.

Theft and Sabotage Methodology

The full methodology for each ranking is available on the NTI Index website. Key points are summarized below.



[Read the methodology](#)

Defining Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities

The Theft: Secure Materials ranking assesses conditions in countries with 1 kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials. The NTI Index considers the following to be weapons-usable nuclear materials:

- HEU, which is uranium enriched to at least 20 percent in the isotope U-235 (including spent fuel)
- Separated plutonium, which is plutonium separated from irradiated nuclear fuel by reprocessing. This includes plutonium content in fresh fuel, even when blended with uranium or other transuranic elements.

The Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking includes the 48 countries and areas with nuclear facilities where sabotage could result in a dangerous release of radiation. The NTI Index includes the following types of nuclear facilities in this ranking:

- Operating nuclear power reactors or nuclear power reactors that have been shut down in the past five years

- Research reactors with a capacity of at least 2 megawatts thermal
- Reprocessing facilities
- Spent fuel pools, where the fuel has been discharged in the past five years and the pools are not associated with an operating reactor.

Government Engagement

NTI prioritizes transparency with governments throughout the NTI Index development process. NTI offered briefings on the process and methodology behind the NTI Index to the 50 countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, or both. Those governments later had the opportunity to review and comment on preliminary results for their countries and areas to confirm data and improve the accuracy of the NTI Index's assessment. Of the 50 countries and areas, 22 reviewed and provided comments on preliminary research results.

Score Calculation

The scores of 100 and 0 are the highest and lowest possible outcomes, respectively, for countries and areas in the Theft and Sabotage rankings. A score of 100 does not indicate that a country or area has perfect nuclear security conditions, and a score of 0 does not mean that a country or area has no security.

Countries and areas receive an overall score of between 0 and 100 that is the weighted sum of their category scores. Category scores are the sum of all indicators within the category, normalized on a scale of 0 to 100 based on the sums of underlying indicator scores, then weighted. Indicator scores are the raw sum of subindicator scores (ranging from 0 to 8, depending on the subindicator).

Each ranking uses a different profile of mathematical weights to determine which indicators and categories have the largest impact on overall score, determined by NTI experts and the International Panel of Experts. Weights reflect the relative importance and relevance of each category and indicator.

Information Sourcing

All scores are based on publicly available sources, including the following:

- Primary legal texts and reports
- Government publications and reports
- Academic publications and reports
- Websites of government authorities, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations
- Interviews with experts
- Local and international news media reports
- Publicly available databases
- EE proprietary rankings and reports.

To overcome the lack of publicly available information on Iran, Israel, and North Korea—countries that rely on military or civil defense force protection for nuclear sites—NTI and EE assigned scores using a proxy indicator: military capability or sophistication. In some cases, scores for these countries are the result of expert input. See the full methodology for a detailed description of scoring processes for countries where data were limited.

The Radioactive Source Security Assessment Framework

The Radioactive Source Security Assessment does not score or rank the 176 countries and areas it includes. It is a qualitative overview of measures relevant to the security of radioactive sources in those countries and areas. The framework for the Radioactive Source Security Assessment comprises four categories.

A. 🛡️ National Measures

This category assesses a country's or area's domestic policies, commitments, and actions for managing and securing radioactive sources. It asks whether countries and areas have the following:

- An independent regulatory body to provide oversight over radioactive sources
- Domestic laws and regulations that explicitly require security (not just safety) measures to be in place to protect radioactive sources
- A maintained national registry of radioactive sources, a key step in tracking and accounting for sources at the national level
- Authority to inspect facilities with radioactive sources
- Licensing requirements for the export of IAEA Category 1 radioactive sources.

B. 🌐 Global Norms

This category assesses a country's or area's international commitments and support for global norms around radioactive sources. It examines each country's and

area's commitments in the context of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, including the Supplemental Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and Supplemental Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources. It also asks whether a country or area participates in international organizations or conferences and is a party to key international legal agreements related to radiological security.

C. 🚧 Commitment to Adopt Alternative Technologies

This category assesses a country's or area's commitment to supporting the development and implementation of alternative technology to high-activity radioactive sources through clear political commitments or national policies.

D. ⚠️ Risk Environment

The Radioactive Source Security Assessment uses the same risk environment measures as the Theft and Sabotage rankings of the NTI Index.

Radioactive Source Methodology

The full methodology for the assessment is available on the NTI Index website.



[Read the methodology](#)

How the Radioactive Source Security Assessment Measures Radiological Security



The Radioactive Source Security Assessment assesses countries and areas based on these four categories.

Note: For information about data sources used for scoring, see the full methodology at www.ntiindex.org.

Expert Consultations

NTI and EE engage a wide array of experts throughout the development of each edition of the NTI Index. Participation in this process does not imply endorsement of the NTI Index by the individuals or the organizations with which they are affiliated.

International Panel of Experts

This panel of highly respected nuclear security experts played an advisory role in their personal capacities, ensuring that the NTI Index reflects a global perspective with accurate political and technical details of current nuclear security best practices.

Nasser bin Nasser, Founder and CEO, Ambit Advisory

Facundo Ciampagna Molina, Specialized Nuclear Security Advisor, Ministry of Security of the Republic of Argentina, National Cybercrime and Cyber Affairs Directorate

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Margarita Kalinina-Pohl, Director, CBRN Security Program, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Yuki Kobayashi, Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation

Dmitry Kovchegin, Independent Consultant

Alfredo Labbé, Vice President, International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission

Frans Mashilo, Chief Operations Officer, CAPRO Security Services

Ruhee Neog, Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Sitara Noor, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard Belfer Center

Pamela West, Nuclear Security Officer for the National Security Advisor of Nigeria

Risk Environment Experts

This group of practitioners, academics, nongovernmental researchers, and government officials advised on changes to the Risk Environment framework category.

Muhammed Ali Alkiş, Research Affiliate, Odesa Center for Nonproliferation

Seth Baum, Executive Director, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute

Facundo Ciampagna Molina, Specialized Nuclear Security Advisor, Ministry of Security of the Republic of Argentina, National Cybercrime and Cyber Affairs Directorate

Darya Dolzikova, Senior Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute

Sarah Laderman, Senior Analyst, Open Nuclear Network

Frans Mashilo, Chief Operating Officer, CAPRO Security Services

Ruhee Neog, Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Michiru Nishida, Professor, Nagasaki University Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

Sitara Noor, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard Belfer Center

Sonja Schmid, Professor, Department of Science, Technology, and Society, Virginia Tech

Pamela West, Nuclear Security Officer for the National Security Advisor of Nigeria

Cybersecurity Technical Experts

These experts in the technical dimensions of cybersecurity and development of national and international security guidance helped inform the revision of cybersecurity measures in accordance with current best practice.

William Gross, Chief Information Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute

Michael Rowland, Principal Member of Technical Staff, Sandia National Laboratories

Go Deeper Online



How does your country perform on nuclear security—and what should it prioritize next? The NTI Index website features individual profiles for all 176 countries and areas, with detailed scores, ranking breakdowns, and specific recommended actions for every government. Visit www.ntiindex.org to explore.

Recommendations and Data Findings

RECOMMENDATION

Russia and the United States should urgently reverse the alarming decline in their nuclear security conditions, and the United States should reclaim its role as a global nuclear security leader.

APPLIES TO

**Theft: Secure Materials**

FINDING

Nuclear security conditions are dramatically declining in Russia and the United States due to the suspension of crucial international cooperation, increases in quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials, and weakened security oversight.

Collectively holding 79 percent of the world's weapons-usable nuclear materials, Russia and the United States have historically anchored international nuclear security efforts. For decades after the Cold War, the United States led global efforts to reduce quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials, improve security measures, and galvanize support for nuclear security—beginning with the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in 1991 that upgraded security at dozens of Russian nuclear facilities and led to the removal of hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials from vulnerable locations. This cooperation expanded through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), a partnership of 89 countries cochaired by Russia and the United States that was announced at the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 2006 and designed to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.

Such cooperation began to erode in 2014, however, when Russia ceased all domestic nuclear security cooperation with the United States after it imposed economic sanctions related to Russia's annexation of Crimea.²

Two years later, Russia suspended its participation in the joint Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, under which both countries committed to disposing of 34 metric tons of their plutonium inventories.³ Following Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, all cooperative efforts ended, including the repatriation of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) from third countries and official activities by the GICNT. Although the United States and Romania began a replacement initiative to the GICNT, the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, only 63 countries participate and Russia is not among them.

Domestic nuclear security conditions in each country are deteriorating as well. Since the 2023 NTI Index, Russia has produced enough new weapons-usable nuclear materials for more than 300 weapons (4,000 kilograms); half of the material comes from the modernization and expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal, a clear indication that strategic competition is reversing long-running efforts to minimize weapons-usable materials. Russia's overall score in the 2026 Nuclear Security Index declined by seven points, driven by the renewed

² United States Department of State, "Ukraine and Russia Sanctions", December 28, 2016, <https://2021-2025.state.gov/division-for-counter-threat-finance-and-sanctions/ukraine-and-russia-sanctions/>.

³ United States Department of State, "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation," July 13, 2011, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/11-713.1-Russian-Federation-Nuclear-Material.pdf>.

production of weapons-usable nuclear materials and by disengagement from multilateral initiatives.

In the United States, a series of executive orders enacted by the White House in 2025 has compromised the political independence and oversight authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)—an institution long seen as a global exemplar of independent regulation. One of the orders has undermined the NRC's independent rulemaking process by requiring all "final significant regulatory actions" to be submitted to the Executive Office of the President for review and approval. Another has blurred the separation between promotion of nuclear technology and independent oversight by directing the NRC to review and revise its regulations and guidance documents on a mandatory 18-month timeline and establish an expedited licensing pathway for nuclear reactor designs tested by the Pentagon and Department of Energy. A third has triggered a broad review and rescission of NRC guidance on organizational culture, workforce reliability, and fitness for duty.⁴ These changes have moved the United States out of alignment with internationally recognized principles of nuclear security culture that emphasize trust, openness, and reporting unusual behavior.

These executive orders are a significant driver of the United States' overall score in the 2026 NTI Index decreasing by 10 points, the largest negative change ever shown by a country between editions of the NTI Index. The full ramifications of these orders will emerge in time, but evidence already shows that they are undermining the U.S. regulatory environment. The NRC has moved to decrease the frequency of cybersecurity assessments and phase out regulator-led force-on-force exercises, replacing them with industry-led exercises—weakening independent oversight of a critical method of assessing security system effectiveness.⁵

This dangerous combination of backsliding and prioritization of competition over shared nuclear security interests creates a worrying void in global nuclear security leadership at a time of accelerating and increasingly complex domestic and global threats. The frequency of terror attacks is on the rise in Russia and the United States, with the number of incidents doubling in Russia and tripling in the United States from 2024 to 2025.⁶ Although some of these attacks represent lone-wolf actions with no nuclear ambitions, U.S. domestic violent extremist groups—historically interested in nuclear and radiological terrorism—have also become significantly more active since 2020.⁷ Globally, the Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates remain the deadliest terrorist organizations, accounting for 17 percent of all terrorist fatalities worldwide. The IS has explicitly declared its intent to engage in radiological terrorism and has demonstrated a willingness to use weapons of mass destruction through repeated chemical weapons attacks. Its ability to influence and organize global terrorist activities represents a paradigm shift in the terrorist threat, with the IS increasingly diffusing attack strategies, target priorities, and an apocalyptic worldview to splinter groups and lone-wolf actors worldwide.

Cyberattacks on energy infrastructure in Russia doubled between 2023 and 2026 and increased by one-third in the United States over the same period.⁸ In the United States, this included persistent threat campaigns to establish access to energy systems to enable future, large-scale cyberattacks in the event of a geopolitical conflict. State-backed hacking groups, including Chinese Volt Typhoon and Iranian CyberAv3ngers have gained access to power grids, telecommunications hubs, and water infrastructure—demonstrating their ability to establish prepositioned footholds to disrupt critical systems. Ukraine has carried out coordinated cyberattacks and drone attacks against Russian energy infrastructure, knocking

⁴ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request, FOIA-2025-000420 (Response 2), June 11, 2025, www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2514/ML25143A104.pdf.

⁵ Michael F. King, executive director for operations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, memorandum to the Commissioners on "Recommendations for Revising the Security Baseline Inspection Program Including the Force-On-Force Inspection Program," February 3, 2026, www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2527/ML25279A192.pdf.

⁶ Vision of Humanity, Global Terrorism Index Score, www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/.

⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, "Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism," October 2022, www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/2022_10_FBI-DHS_Strategic_Intelligence_Assessment_and_Data_on_Domestic_Terrorism.pdf.

⁸ European Repository of Cyber Incidents, Critical Infrastructure Tracker, cit.eurepoc.eu/.

out 700,000 barrels per day of capacity across 16 major Russian petroleum refineries. This trend is made more concerning by the proven ability of adversaries to conduct cyberattacks on nuclear facilities. Between 2012 and 2018, state-sponsored Russian hackers penetrated digital systems in the United States at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wolf Creek nuclear power plant, and more than 500 energy sector entities. Russian nuclear facilities experienced similar cyberattacks, with Ukrainian hackers reaching networks at the Belyarsk nuclear power plant and Rosatom in 2022 to exfiltrate information, including physical protection systems and architectural blueprints.

Recalling lessons learned through decades of cooperation to secure nuclear materials around the world, Russia and the United States should set a positive example by addressing their declining domestic security conditions and reinvesting in cooperative efforts to reduce nuclear risks worldwide.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Russia and the United States should urgently reverse the alarming decline in their nuclear security conditions with the following actions:

- Reverse legal measures in the United States that conflict with the internationally accepted principle that nuclear regulatory bodies must remain politically

independent, and encourage regulators to develop security measures that align with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security guidance

- Drive continuous improvement in nuclear security implementation through regulatory requirements for universal training programs on insider and cyber threats, protocols for personnel to report suspicious behavior, and mandated security culture assessments in nuclear facilities
- Reduce uncertainty around national inventories of weapons-usable nuclear materials by regularly and publicly sharing information about civilian stockpiles of HEU and plutonium through IAEA Information Circulars 549 and 912 and regulatory reports
- Identify excess quantities of HEU and plutonium in their stockpiles and declare a clear process and timeline for elimination or disposition
- Renew efforts to work with countries globally to minimize weapons-usable nuclear materials in civilian use
- Use national statements delivered at high-level political convenings to reinforce the message that excess production of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a source of global nuclear security risk.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

- › The United States' overall score decreased by 10 points, the largest negative change ever shown by a country between editions of the NTI Index.
- › Three executive orders issued by the United States in 2025 have undermined the political independence of its nuclear regulator and implementation of internationally accepted principles of security culture.
- › Russia's overall score decreased by seven points between 2023 and 2026, continuing a trend of decline that began in 2020.
- › Since the 2023 NTI Index, Russia has produced enough new weapons-usable nuclear materials for more than 300 weapons (4,000 kilograms).

RECOMMENDATION

The countries that are leading efforts to improve nuclear security should build on their recent strides with unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral efforts that consolidate their progress into a new era of enduring leadership.

APPLIES TO

**Theft: Secure Materials****Theft: Support Global Efforts**

FINDING

A geographically varied group of 12 countries has emerged as the new driving force for global progress on nuclear security by sustaining domestic progress, offering support to other governments, and increasing engagement with key international institutions.

Countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials have the greatest responsibility for nuclear security. However, all countries and areas have a role to play and a vested interest in reducing associated risks. Historically, countries and areas without weapons-usable nuclear materials have focused on supporting global nuclear security norms and strengthening national legal and regulatory frameworks—following the agenda rather than setting it. The 2026 NTI Index captures a potential shift in that paradigm. With tensions between China, Russia, and the United States disrupting the established dynamics of nuclear security leadership, several countries are newly stepping forward and driving global progress: Australia, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Hungary, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, Senegal, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.

Many of these countries have long modeled responsible management of nuclear security risks and shown a readiness to fill the void created by rising geopolitical tensions. NTI Index data show that Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have maintained comprehensive nuclear security regulatory frameworks reflecting international best practice since at least 2018, requiring regular testing of security systems against realistic threats, mandatory cybersecurity programs, and insider threat mitigation measures. Since 2023, all have reinforced their political commitment through high-level participation

at international nuclear security forums and monetary contributions to nuclear security efforts, particularly the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund.

The NTI Index also finds that other countries, which have modeled responsible nuclear security stewardship from the outset of their relatively recent civil nuclear programs, are continuing to strengthen regulatory regimes and engagement with relevant international institutions over time. The United Arab Emirates, for example, has had a strong baseline of nuclear security regulatory frameworks since it opened the Barakah nuclear power plant in 2020. Since the 2023 NTI Index, the country has elevated its cybersecurity requirements to include construction-phase protections and has made its first contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Jordan has built on its mandatory comprehensive tests and assessments of security systems, insider threat awareness programs, and security culture assessments (in place since 2020) by joining the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (the body that develops and reviews IAEA nuclear security guidance).

Ukraine offers perhaps the most striking example of this trend. Despite operating the largest fleet of nuclear power plants in Europe under conditions of active armed conflict—including direct military strikes on energy infrastructure—Ukraine has maintained its international

nuclear security commitments. Ukraine has continued to participate in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, has sustained regulatory oversight of its facilities, and has even improved its nuclear security regulations during this time. Ukraine's continuous commitment to nuclear security amid extreme circumstances is a singular example of leadership and demonstrates the value of sustained investment in nuclear security resilience.

Together, these governments are laying the foundation for a new era of nuclear security leadership defined by mutually reinforcing participation from countries with and without weapons-usable nuclear materials. The potential global expansion of nuclear energy makes this moment particularly consequential. The nuclear security frameworks these countries establish will define the security baseline for a generation of new nuclear infrastructure. Countries currently modeling strong nuclear security implementation have both the credibility and responsibility to leverage their bilateral relationships, regional influence, and institutional engagement to raise the floor for the global nuclear security system.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

The countries that are leading efforts to improve nuclear security should build on their recent strides with the following actions:

- Form a nuclear security leaders' group—in the spirit of the Nuclear Security Contact Group—with high-level political representation that can shape and drive the global agenda for nuclear security progress

- Commit to a coordinated effort to provide long-term financial and technical support for developing strong nuclear security regimes to countries embarking on new nuclear applications, leveraging specific national expertise to provide relevant support where needed
- Provide consistent financial contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, nominate experts to participate in the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service peer review missions, and fund junior professional officer positions within the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Security to strengthen the IAEA's central role in global nuclear security
- Actively participate in the revision process of IAEA Information Circular 225 through the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee and advocate for stronger guidance on cybersecurity, insider threat prevention, and continuous threat assessment
- Use regional and bilateral relationships to advance universalization of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—the only legally binding international agreement governing security of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities—and encourage participation in the treaty's 2027 Review Conference
- Advocate regionally and internationally for new commitments by countries to strengthen their nuclear security frameworks for cybersecurity, insider threat prevention, and threats posed by new technologies.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

- › Between 2018 and 2026, Finland improved requirements for tests and assessments of security systems, insider threat awareness programs, security culture assessments, and joint exercises between on-site and off-site response forces.
- › Since the creation of the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking in 2016, Hungary has maintained strong regulatory frameworks (including construction-phase cybersecurity and security culture assessment requirements) and has participated consistently in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee. In 2026, Hungary contributed to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund for the first time since 2018.

- Jordan established requirements for comprehensive tests and assessments of security systems, insider threat awareness programs, and security culture assessments in 2020, and joined the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in 2023.
- Since the 2023 NTI Index, Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have contributed to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, have become founding members of the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, have participated in the G7 Global Partnership, and have sent ministerial-level representation to the 2024 IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security.
- Since the 2023 NTI Index, 13 countries (Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Mongolia, Morocco, Qatar, Senegal, and Uruguay) without weapons-usable nuclear materials have joined the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, bringing the total number of participating countries to 52.
- Ghana, the Philippines, and Senegal—countries planning civil nuclear energy programs—participate in the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, sent ministerial-level representation to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2024, and attended the 2022 Review Conference for the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

RECOMMENDATION

Countries and areas should minimize their current and future quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material by committing to permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel.

APPLIES TO



Theft: Secure Materials



Sabotage: Protect Facilities

FINDING

Countries operating the largest spent fuel reprocessing facilities are posing significant and unnecessary risks to global nuclear security by rapidly accumulating stocks of separated plutonium and falling short of international nuclear security standards.

Two general strategies exist for managing spent nuclear fuel—and they have fundamentally different nuclear security implications. Most countries pursue a once-through fuel cycle, where spent fuel assemblies are removed from reactors, cooled in spent fuel pools, and permanently disposed of. This pathway avoids weapons-

usable material by keeping nuclear material comingled with highly radioactive fission products, making theft or diversion extremely difficult.⁹

The alternative is reprocessing, an economically costly endeavor to chemically separate fission products

⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Storing Spent Fuel Until Transport to Reprocessing or Disposal* (Vienna: IAEA, 2019), <https://www.iaea.org/publications/12302/storing-spent-fuel-until-transport-to-reprocessing-or-disposal>.

from spent fuel to isolate potentially reusable nuclear materials, primarily plutonium and uranium, with the goal of fabricating fresh fuel to be burned in reactors. Separated plutonium from reprocessing is a weapons-usable material. Four countries—France, India, Japan, and Russia—engage in commercial-scale reprocessing efforts, whereas China, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan operate pilot-scale or military reprocessing facilities. Since the 2023 NTI Index, global inventories of separated plutonium have grown by a net 17,721 kilograms, with the countries operating reprocessing facilities responsible for 99 percent of that increase. Just 8 kilograms of separated plutonium is sufficient to build a nuclear weapon,¹⁰ meaning that the increase is enough for more than 2,200 bombs. Because just a small amount of separated plutonium could be directly used in a nuclear weapon, countries that choose reprocessing thereby commit to operating and securing the highest-consequence category of nuclear facility for as long as their separated plutonium stockpiles exist, an ongoing security burden that direct disposal avoids.

The 2026 NTI Index finds that nearly every country that reprocesses spent fuel is falling short of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) security guidance for necessary security measures to protect these facilities. Reprocessing involves regular shipment of separated plutonium between facilities, but India, Israel, and North Korea do not have national laws or regulations that align with the IAEA's transportation security best practices. Even fewer countries meet standards for effectively tracking nuclear materials through inventory accounting protocols, which raises significant concerns for reprocessing facilities handling separated plutonium. When materials arrive at facilities, the international standard is for them to be moved through designated "material balance" areas, or zones within nuclear facilities where all incoming and outgoing nuclear materials are tracked to reduce the risk of theft or diversion. France is the only country with reprocessing that has met the full international standard for securing material balance areas. Japan's regulations do not require the designation of a single custodian and alternate backup to oversee the area and track inventories

of nuclear materials. This additional oversight is an essential tool for maintaining the chain of custody when nuclear materials move into and out of facilities. Neither India, Israel, nor Pakistan have ever defined material balance areas within their facilities, a necessary step for strengthening security measures in these zones. Of the eight countries with reprocessing, only Japan has regulatory requirements for insider threat awareness programs at nuclear facilities—which helps reduce the risk of theft or diversion by insiders.

Several countries that currently employ a once-through fuel cycle, including China and the United States, have shown a renewed interest in large-scale reprocessing, which would increase global separated plutonium inventories even further. A once-through fuel cycle, where spent nuclear fuel is permanently disposed of, is the only available path that keeps weapons-usable material out of the fuel cycle. The significant financial burdens associated with reprocessing are compounded by the additional costs of increased nuclear security measures. Countries have shown in nearly every case that they do not have the capacity to manage these issues.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

All countries and areas should advance efforts to minimize weapons-usable nuclear materials with the following actions:

- Commit to spent fuel strategies that keep weapons-usable material out of the fuel cycle and reject reprocessing technologies that separate plutonium from fission products
- Update nuclear waste management guidance to clearly classify spent nuclear fuel as waste for disposal
- Cap separated plutonium inventories and designate any existing material for emplacement in a deep geological repository, using a dilute-and-dispose approach

¹⁰ International Atomic Energy Agency, *IAEA Safeguards Glossary*, 2022 ed. (Vienna: IAEA, 2022), <https://www.iaea.org/publications/15176/iaea-safeguards-glossary>.

- Conduct feasibility studies and initiate consent-based siting processes for placement of deep geological repositories
- Exchange technical and political lessons learned with international partners who have made significant progress on deep geological repositories (e.g., Canada, Finland, and Sweden).
- Establish a government body to be responsible for long-term management of spent nuclear fuel and associated facilities

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

- Eight countries currently operate reprocessing facilities (China, France, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia), down from nine in 2022 following the United Kingdom's closure of the Sellafield facility.
- Of the eight reprocessing countries, only Japan has regulatory requirements for insider threat awareness programs at nuclear facilities.
- India, Israel, and North Korea have no regulatory requirements for nuclear facilities to maintain inventory records.
- France, the world leader in reprocessing by tonnage, has accumulated 32,900 kilograms of civil separated plutonium since 2020, enough for over 4,000 nuclear weapons.¹¹ This brings its total stockpile of separated plutonium to 119,700 kilograms.
- Stockpiles of civil separated plutonium have grown rapidly in India, Pakistan, and Russia. These three countries produced an additional 3,960 kilograms of separated plutonium since 2023. Russia holds the world's largest stockpile of separated plutonium at 193,000 kilograms.
- Of the 47 countries and Taiwan with nuclear facilities, 40 maintain a once-through fuel cycle. Ten of the 40 countries and areas that maintain a once-through fuel cycle have explicitly committed to forgoing reprocessing (Australia, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom).

¹¹ Following the IAEA's measure of a "significant quantity," which defines the approximate amount of nuclear material needed to make a nuclear weapon as 8 kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU.

RECOMMENDATION

Countries with excess stockpiles of highly enriched uranium should eliminate them through conversion and downblending, and they should publish regular inventory declarations.

APPLIES TO

**Theft: Secure Materials****Sabotage: Protect Facilities**

FINDING

Stockpiles of highly enriched uranium are increasing in a handful of countries, despite the downward trend in total global inventories.

The most difficult step in making a nuclear weapon is obtaining the weapons-usable nuclear material—as little as 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is sufficient.¹² Since the 1990s, national and international efforts have tracked and secured HEU stockpiles, removed thousands of kilograms of material that were used to fuel research reactors worldwide, and converted more than 100 of those reactors to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. HEU minimization is a remarkable global success story for nuclear security, evidenced by the elimination of HEU inventories from 35 countries and Taiwan.

However, momentum on HEU minimization appears to be slowing. The 2026 NTI Index shows that the global HEU inventory decreased by just 6 percent (81,200 kilograms) since 2023. India, Pakistan, and Russia are responsible for generating 4,479 kilograms of additional HEU for military purposes, and Iran produced 440 kilograms with no civilian purpose. Belgium's and Germany's national

stockpiles also increased slightly because of fresh fuel imports for research reactors that are due to be converted to LEU fuels in coming years.

A consistent lack of information sharing about national inventories of HEU creates uncertainty about the rationale for increasing quantities and undermines confidence in responsible stewardship of weapons-usable nuclear materials. The 2026 NTI Index finds that of the 22 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials, only Australia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have made annual public inventory declarations in the past decade. Less frequent declarations diminish the value of information sharing, as they create opportunities to obscure changes in inventories year-over-year and reduce government accountability to declared LEU downblending targets.

¹² International Atomic Energy Agency, *IAEA Safeguards Glossary*, 2022 ed. (Vienna: IAEA, 2022), <https://www.iaea.org/publications/15176/iaea-safeguards-glossary>.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

All countries and areas, with and without HEU stockpiles, should support the elimination of those materials and increase transparency with the following actions:

- Publish annual declarations of national HEU inventories—even if they have none—to support good accountancy and information-sharing practices
- Strengthen norms against enrichment beyond the threshold needed for civil purposes
- Accelerate downblending programs and designating additional quantities of material as excess available for downblending in the countries with the largest stocks of HEU
- Explore downblending of excess HEU into high-assay low-enriched uranium for use as advanced reactor fuel
- Provide consistent funding for the development of advanced LEU fuels to enable conversion of remaining HEU-fueled research reactors, particularly by Belgium, France, Germany, the United States, and other countries with test reactors and technical expertise in HEU minimization, fuel development, and fuel fabrication
- Develop a neutral, internationally hosted mechanism through the International Atomic Energy Agency to coordinate funding, technical expertise, transport capacity, and material elimination capabilities to simplify access to support for research reactor conversions.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

- Global inventories of HEU exceed 1,254,000 kilograms, enough for more than 50,000 nuclear weapons.¹³
- Global HEU inventories decreased by just 6 percent (81,200 kilograms) since 2023.
- National stockpiles of HEU increased collectively by over 5,000 kilograms from 2023 to 2026 in Belgium, Germany, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia.
- Of the 22 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials, just 4 (Australia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have made annual public declarations of their HEU inventories over the past decade.

¹³ Following the International Atomic Energy Agency's measure of a "significant quantity," which defines the approximate amount of nuclear material needed to make a nuclear weapon as 8 kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium.

RECOMMENDATION

Countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities should prioritize personnel-related security measures that are essential for effective nuclear security.

APPLIES TO

**Theft: Secure Materials****Sabotage: Protect Facilities**

FINDING

Personnel-related nuclear security measures—including insider threat prevention, security culture, and comprehensive vetting programs—are weak or absent in most countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities.

In nearly every documented case of nuclear theft or sabotage, insiders who have authorized access to and deep knowledge of a given nuclear facility have played a role in facilitating the crime. Insiders' access and trust make them the most credible and dangerous threat vector. Regardless of its design or technical sophistication, a security system is only as reliable as the people who work within it.

Three fundamental personnel-related security measures for preventing theft and sabotage are:

- Regular, comprehensive personnel vetting
- Security culture assessments, which measure gaps in performance, attitude, and behavior that could jeopardize security and inform improvements to personnel vetting and awareness programs
- Incident and suspicious activity reporting protocols.

These measures are mutually reinforcing, as employees are more likely to effectively implement their nuclear security responsibilities when a healthy security culture exists. Unfortunately, the 2026 NTI Index finds that countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities have a median score of only 50 out of 100 on both Security Culture and Insider Threat

Prevention. These scores consistently lag scores for other core elements of security. For example, the same group of countries and areas has a median score of 71 out of 100 on On-Site Physical Protection Measures.

Those low scores reveal an alarming reality. For example, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, and South Africa have no regulatory requirements to screen personnel before hiring them, a first-line defense against insider threats. The countries that do require personnel vetting have uneven protocols: Only 20 countries have comprehensive programs that include background checks, drug tests, and psychological or mental fitness evaluations, and 21 countries have no specified regular intervals for personnel vetting. Since the 2023 NTI Index, Canada, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan are the only countries that have made any improvements to their personnel vetting requirements.

Every day that governments delay implementation of these human-focused security requirements, they are leaving known, addressable vulnerabilities exposed to highly credible threats. Despite the established record of serious and consequential insider threats, government efforts to implement essential human factor security requirements still lag international best practice.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities should close the gaps in human-focused security requirements with the following actions:

- Mandate annual self-assessments of security culture at nuclear facilities and create positions solely responsible for managing security culture, in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency security guidance
- Establish comprehensive personnel vetting programs that require background checks, psychological screening, and drug testing of personnel on a regular, defined basis
- Design employee assistance programs that help personnel facing personal or mental health challenges and enable early identification of concerning behaviors
- Require incident reporting at the personnel and institutional level, with facility operators reporting incidents to the appropriate regulatory authority and individuals reporting any suspicious behavior to a security authority within the facility
- Create formal, anonymous mechanisms for personnel to report security concerns, near-misses, and suspicious behavior and establish legal protections against retaliation
- Connect security responsibilities to the broader mission of the organization, empowering employees to take ownership of security outcomes, encouraging feedback and participation in improvement efforts, and fostering ongoing dialogue on security performance and emerging challenges
- Institute requirements for all personnel to participate in awareness programs on cybersecurity and insider threat prevention to raise awareness and promote a security culture.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

Among the 50 countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities:

- Just 14 countries (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Norway, Slovenia, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom) have implemented requirements for nuclear facility operators to conduct security culture assessments. Thirty-five countries and Taiwan still have no such requirement.
- Seven countries (Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, and South Africa) have no regulatory requirements to screen personnel before hiring them. Just 20 countries require personnel vetting that includes background checks, drug tests, and psychological or mental fitness evaluations. Canada, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan were the only countries to improve their personnel vetting requirements since the 2023 NTI Index.
- Twenty-five countries and Taiwan (52 percent) require employees to report suspicious activities at nuclear facilities. Progress has stagnated with no additional countries having introduced these requirements since 2023.
- Twenty-eight countries (56 percent) do not require personnel to participate in training programs on both insider threat and cyber threat awareness. Since 2020, Belgium, Japan, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan are the only countries that have introduced new requirements for both types of programs.

RECOMMENDATION

Countries and areas with nuclear facilities should adopt comprehensive cybersecurity frameworks that keep pace with rapidly intensifying cyber threats.

APPLIES TO

**Sabotage: Protect Facilities**

FINDING

Most countries and areas with nuclear facilities have cybersecurity requirements that are outdated in design, incomplete in scope, and insufficiently tested to keep pace with evolving threats.

Cyberattacks targeting energy infrastructure and industrial control systems have rapidly intensified in frequency and sophistication over the past decade, outpacing countries' ability to adapt to threats. The energy sector accounted for nearly 40 percent of all cyberattacks on critical infrastructure globally in 2023, and in the United States, such attacks increased by 70 percent between 2023 and 2024.¹⁴

Supply chain security during procurement and construction is the most significant security vulnerability; nuclear facilities rely on complex networks of vendors, subcontractors, hardware manufacturers, software developers, and system integrators, each creating potential entry points for adversaries before a facility even comes online. Despite the clear risks, among the 48 countries and areas with nuclear facilities, the 2026 NTI Index finds that only 11 require facility operators to establish cybersecurity programs during facility construction. That is up from 7 in the 2023 NTI Index, with Belgium, Slovenia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States accounting for the increase—but it is still far too low.

Cybersecurity continues to be essential once facilities are online, and the 2026 NTI Index also finds some progress in this area, but many remaining gaps leave facilities vulnerable to persistent digital threats. Eleven countries have no requirements for identifying and protecting

sensitive digital assets: the programmable electronic devices, networks, and software that support safety, security, and emergency preparedness, including alarm and communication systems, surveillance systems, and access controls. The omission of these requirements is a substantial risk in 2026, as connected Internet of Things devices that play specific roles in maintaining nuclear security have been consistently exploited by adversaries. For example, closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems used for video surveillance have been exploited by hacking groups as an entry point to access sensitive systems (as occurred at the Monju nuclear power plant in Japan in 2014), and to map out security systems and gather personnel details from security logs (an approach used in the Energetic Bear attacks in 2014 and 2017). The vulnerability of connected devices has been shown more recently by Hezbollah-aligned hacking groups' effective exploitation of CCTV systems to gather targeting intelligence for precise drone strikes. Among the 37 countries and areas that do have such requirements, only 14 use a modern "function-based" approach that protects assets on the basis of the function of the system they support, the probability that they could be compromised, and the potential severity of that outcome (up from 11 in the 2023 NTI Index).

More promisingly, the number of countries and areas with nuclear facilities that require tests and assessments of cybersecurity measures has grown from 16 to 29 since

¹⁴ European Repository of Cyber Incidents, Critical Infrastructure Tracker, cit.eurepoc.eu/.

the 2016 NTI Index, but frequency matters as much as the requirement itself. Of those 29, only 11 require assessments at least annually—a low bar, given that cyber threats evolve on a timeline measured in weeks and months, not years.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Countries and areas with nuclear facilities should mitigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities with the following actions:

- Require an active cybersecurity program during the construction of nuclear facilities that helps limit supply chain vulnerabilities and third-party risk through vendor vetting, equipment testing, and detection of potential zero-day vulnerabilities, undisclosed hardware or software flaws unknown to the developer for which no available security fixes exist
- Update regulations for sensitive digital asset protection to ensure that all safety- and security-related systems in nuclear facilities are included in cybersecurity planning and that protective measures are applied on the basis of the probability and potential impact of cyberattacks
- Establish requirements for annual tests and assessments of cybersecurity measures at all nuclear facilities, using realistic threat scenarios developed from current intelligence
- Mandate the inclusion of cyber threats in design basis threat documents to establish a consistent, regularly updated basis for security plans, tests, and assessments
- Require facility operators to implement mandatory cybersecurity awareness programs for all personnel with access to digital systems as a condition of licensing.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

Among the 47 countries and Taiwan with nuclear facilities:

- Nine countries have no basic requirements to protect nuclear facilities from cyberattacks (Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, North Korea, and Peru).
- Eleven countries have comprehensive requirements that include a cybersecurity program during facility construction to address supply chain vulnerabilities (Belgium, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Iran, Jordan, Slovenia, South Korea, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States).
- Fourteen countries (up from 11 in 2023) have a modern approach that protects assets on the basis of the function of the system they support, the probability that they could be compromised, and the potential severity of that outcome.
- Nineteen countries have requirements for mandatory cybersecurity awareness programs for personnel with access to digital systems.
- Twenty-nine countries and areas require tests and assessments of cybersecurity measures, but only 11 require that they be conducted at least annually.

RECOMMENDATION

All countries should capitalize on the upcoming revision of Information Circular 225 as an opportunity to strengthen and modernize nuclear security guidance.

APPLIES TO

**Theft: Secure Materials****Theft: Support Global Efforts**

FINDING

The International Atomic Energy Agency has not updated its benchmark guidance for nuclear security in 15 years, leaving growing gaps in its coverage of insider threats, cybersecurity, and emerging technologies. The revision of this guidance, initiated in 2024, presents an opportunity for countries to provide input on the development of new best practices addressing modern threats.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Information Circular 225 Revision 5 (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) guides governments on establishing and maintaining a national physical protection program. Last updated in 2011, it is the internationally recognized benchmark for preventing theft of nuclear materials and sabotage to nuclear facilities; its recommendations are directly incorporated into many states' domestic laws and bilateral agreements, and 39 countries have made a clear political commitment to using INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 as the baseline for their national nuclear security implementation.

However, today's threat environment is fundamentally different from the 2011 environment reflected in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. In 2016, six countries with nuclear facilities or weapons-usable nuclear materials experienced armed conflict or explosions within 10 miles of their nuclear facilities. By 2026, that number more than tripled to 23. Cyber capabilities, uncrewed aerial vehicles, and artificial intelligence tools have matured into widely available commercial technologies that pose major challenges to national nuclear security regimes,

but INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 does not recognize emerging technologies as a threat vector. Uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), for example, now frequently integrate other developing technologies, such as artificial intelligence and fiber-optic control systems, which render traditional response strategies ineffective.¹⁵

The consequences of outdated guidance are measurable. The areas where INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 guidance is less comprehensive correspond with gaps in nuclear security that the 2026 NTI Index identifies. Thirty-three countries and areas with nuclear facilities have no insider threat awareness program, an issue inadequately covered by INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Similarly, INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 offers limited specifics on cybersecurity and the concept of continuous improvement in contrast to detailed physical protection guidance, and 19 countries lack basic requirements for assessments of cybersecurity measures. Countermeasures to protect nuclear facilities from emerging technologies, including UAVs, are entirely absent from INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and other IAEA nuclear security guidance. Standards for addressing these

¹⁵ DroneSec, "Global Drone Threat Report," white paper, January 22, 2026, www.dronesec.com/resources/d479e340-f78f-11f0-ab58-9f.

emerging threats need to be developed. These are not intentional gaps—they reflect the limits of guidance written 15 years ago.

The stakes are rising as nuclear energy is poised to change and expand in ways that existing guidance does not anticipate. Dozens of new reactor designs are progressing through licensing processes in several countries, including small modular reactors, microreactors, and floating reactors designed for colocation at industrial facilities and data centers, deployment in remote areas, and other locations substantially different from currently operating reactors. The novel conditions introduced by these designs and deployment scenarios require new guidance that reflects the full range of contexts in which nuclear facilities may operate.

The next iteration of INFCIRC/225—Rev.6—is now under development. This process offers a direct channel for states to shape the content and ambition of global nuclear security guidance for the future.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

All countries should capitalize on the opportunity presented by the revision of international physical protection guidance with the following actions:

- Contribute to the revision process of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 with specific input on how to strengthen provisions regarding insider threat mitigation, cybersecurity systems, continuous threat assessment, and emerging technologies
- Host regional discussions that enable dialogue between nuclear security professionals about significant nuclear security gaps in daily facility operation and elevate lessons learned into the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 revision process
- Engage regulators, especially those involved in approving new reactor designs, in the INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 revision process
- Implement more stringent nuclear security regulations than INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 calls for, based on regular threat assessments and the principle of continuous improvement.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

- Thirty-two countries and Taiwan with nuclear facilities have no insider threat awareness program, an issue inadequately covered by INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
- Only 11 countries and Taiwan require cybersecurity assessments to be conducted at least annually.
- Nineteen countries lack basic requirements for assessments of cybersecurity measures, although six have implemented such requirements since 2023 (Belgium, Chile, Indonesia, Slovenia, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan).

RECOMMENDATION

Countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities must strengthen their regulatory bodies and technical institutions to sustain their nuclear security regimes and keep pace with rapidly evolving threats.

APPLIES TO

**Theft: Secure Materials****Sabotage: Protect Facilities**

FINDING

Progress has stalled on developing technical support institutions, requiring threat-based testing, regularly updating design basis threat, and building cybersecurity capacity among regulatory bodies and technical support organizations in countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

Sustaining a nuclear security regime requires governments to follow a cycle of continuous improvement by developing human resources, maintaining equipment, fostering a robust security culture, and strengthening regulatory oversight. Technical expertise is necessary to effectively execute the processes that support these functions, through regularly reassessing threats, testing security measures, and acting on findings to strengthen their requirements. The institutions and frameworks that support this continuous process are the tools governments need to sustain regimes capable of addressing modern, emerging threats.

The 2026 NTI Index finds that 41 of the 50 countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear material or nuclear facilities have institutions that provide nuclear security technical support to regulatory bodies—a necessary foundation—but that number has plateaued since the 2020 NTI Index. Amid escalating cyber threats to nuclear facilities, progress is also stalled on the number of countries and areas that have indigenous technical cybersecurity institutions to translate national cyber strategies into specific guidance. Fourteen countries

are still without this support—a figure that has not changed since the 2023 NTI Index.

Simply having support institutions does not mean countries and areas are capturing their benefits to strengthen nuclear security implementation. Harnessing the capabilities of technical support organizations requires national legal frameworks—including requirements for regular updates to design basis threat (DBT), threat-based testing of security systems, security culture programs, and training and certification of security personnel—that give oversight authorities the mandate to fully use them.

At the core of every nuclear security regime is the DBT: the profile of adversary tactics, capabilities, and motivations that security systems are designed to protect against. A well-developed DBT requires input from regulatory bodies, intelligence and security services, technical and legal experts, facility operators, law enforcement, and other stakeholders. Dedicated technical support organizations are an asset for both their expertise and stakeholder coordination capabilities. DBTs should inform testing requirements, security system

design, regulatory guidance, and force-on-force exercises. Developing security plans without a DBT creates reliance on a prescriptive list of measures that may not effectively deter the full scope of potential threats.

Unfortunately, 13 countries and Taiwan do not require a regularly updated DBT. Among the 36 countries that do require a regularly updated DBT, 5 (Algeria, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Peru, and Turkey) do not explicitly include cyber threats in the threat assessment process. In a rapidly evolving threat environment defined by drone strikes, sophisticated cyberattacks, terrorist risks, and insider threats, a DBT that is outdated, incomplete, or absent creates a compounding failure where security systems are designed and tested against threats that no longer represent the actual risk environment.

Without robust mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of security measures, even well-resourced regulatory institutions cannot guarantee that nuclear security keeps pace with an evolving threat environment. Technical support organizations have the unique expertise to translate threat assessments into testing and assessment requirements, validating whether physical protection and cybersecurity systems can realistically mitigate or defeat credible threats. But just 12 countries require both realistic threat-based evaluations and regular force-on-force exercises to assess nuclear security systems' effectiveness—and no country or area has added this requirement since the 2023 NTI Index.

Sustaining a nuclear security regime is a permanent responsibility for all governments. Developing institutions that can support continuous improvement and the legal and regulatory frameworks that give them a mandate to do so is the foundation of upholding this responsibility.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities should take the following actions to sustain their nuclear security regimes:

- Conduct a national needs assessment to inform the development of indigenous technical support organizations or Nuclear Security Support Centers that ensure access to the expertise necessary to translate an accurate threat picture into effective security regulations
- Require a process to regularly update the DBT in use that includes cyber and insider threats and draws on technical expertise from support organizations to identify and assess emerging and rapidly evolving threats
- Establish regulatory requirements for tests and assessments of security systems conducted by a competent authority, including force-on-force exercises, designed with realistic threat considerations
- Mandate regular cybersecurity system tests informed by input from a technical support organization in coordination with the national regulator and based on a current understanding of threat vectors and the tactics, techniques, and procedures adversaries may use
- Develop institutions that can conduct research and strategic planning on cybersecurity in coordination with nuclear regulatory authorities, translating technical expertise into regulations and guidance.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

Among the 50 countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear material or nuclear facilities:

- Forty countries and Taiwan have established institutions to provide nuclear security technical support to their regulatory bodies.
- Fourteen countries do not have technical cybersecurity institutions with a nuclear security role.
- Only 16 countries require personnel with security responsibilities to undergo additional training or certification.
- Just 12 countries require both realistic threat-based evaluations and regular force-on-force exercises to assess nuclear security systems' effectiveness. Since 2020, Finland and France are the only countries that have strengthened their regulations to include these requirements.
- Thirteen countries and Taiwan do not require use of a regularly updated DBT.
- Five countries that require a regularly updated DBT do not explicitly include cyber threats in the threat assessment process (Algeria, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Peru, and Turkey). Just two countries have added these requirements since 2023 (Armenia and Ukraine).

RECOMMENDATION

Countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities should institute all-hazards frameworks and leverage legal protections for nuclear infrastructure, building on the existing foundation of physical protection systems.

APPLIES TO

**Theft: Secure Materials****Sabotage: Protect Facilities**

FINDING

Countries and areas with weapons-usable materials or nuclear facilities have not consistently adopted and implemented measures designed to protect nuclear infrastructure from complex and sustained crises.

Today, nuclear facilities face a broad range of complex and evolving risks that their nuclear security frameworks were not designed to address. Natural and human-made disasters, armed conflict, and other severe, sustained disruptions can occur simultaneously, compromising

security systems, straining personnel, and creating conditions that malicious actors can exploit.

The 2026 NTI Index finds that 27 countries with nuclear facilities are currently engaged in a full-fledged war, limited war, or violent crisis. Between March 2025

and May 2026, 16 of those countries (Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates) experienced confirmed battles or explosions within 10 miles of their nuclear facilities. The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war is perhaps the most significant example of this trend. Since 2022, the conflict has led to strikes on nuclear facilities in both countries, and Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant poses a major nuclear security risk. The potential for a nuclear facility to be disrupted by these compounding risks is not limited to active conflict zones. In January 2024, the Noto Peninsula earthquake caused tremors at Japan’s Shika nuclear power plant that exceeded design expectations, despite the country’s implementation of safety upgrades following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident.

The complexity and unpredictability of these events speak to the need for an all-hazards framework, enabling governments to manage sustained crises and mitigate nuclear security risks regardless of their specific cause. An all-hazards framework is a common approach in global crisis response that treats security, safety, and emergency preparedness as interconnected subsystems that share resources and coordinate directly through a unified command structure so that a response in one area does not compromise operations in another.

Thirty-eight out of the 50 countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or facilities have all-hazards plans in place to protect nuclear infrastructure in the event of a disaster, leaving 11 countries and Taiwan with no plan at all. Given the complex nature of an all-hazards plan and the speed with which climatic events are worsening, effective implementation of such a plan requires regular testing. However, only 18 of the 38 countries with plans in place require testing at defined intervals. Progress in this area is concerningly slow: since the 2023 NTI Index, Slovakia is the only new country to develop a nuclear infrastructure protection plan, and only Brazil, India, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates have instituted annual testing requirements.

Coordinated exercises that bring together on-site and off-site response teams are essential stress tests for these plans. Thirty-three of the 50 countries and areas with

weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities conduct joint exercises between on-site and off-site responders, but only 21 do so annually. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommends holding joint exercises annually to prevent “perishable skills” from degrading and to improve operational readiness by promoting skill retention, verifying that vital equipment is functional, and building trust between coordinating response forces. Unless nuclear infrastructure protection plans and joint exercises between on-site and off-site response forces are updated and tested at routine, defined intervals, coordinated crisis response capabilities can become dangerously misaligned with actual conditions in a short time.

Some governments have recognized the severity of complex risks through their support for relevant international principles and treaties. Thirty-one of the 50 countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities have endorsed the IAEA’s Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict. Forty-one of those 50 have ratified Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, a 1977 treaty that, among other commitments, prohibits attacks on nuclear facilities, demonstrating broad—if incomplete—support for this principle. The reality of today’s risks calls for governments to prioritize the translation of political commitments and statements of support into an accepted international code of conduct. By working at local, national, and international levels, countries can mitigate the chances that worst-case scenarios occur and can proactively build resilience in the event that they happen.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

Countries and areas with weapons-usable materials or nuclear facilities should address complex risks with enforceable national requirements with the following actions:

- ➔ Adopt an all-hazards framework that emphasizes common functional capabilities rather than planning for specific disasters, including designation of nuclear facilities as a critical infrastructure sector and identification of a coordinating government authority

- Require that nuclear infrastructure protection plans be tested annually to translate awareness and prioritization of risks into operational readiness
- Conduct annual joint exercises between on-site and off-site responders to improve coordination capabilities and to correct any problems before a real emergency
- Reinforce international norms against targeting nuclear facilities during war by promoting universal endorsement of and adherence to the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security during an Armed Conflict
- Encourage compliance with existing legal protections under Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions and additional ratification and translation of these principles into bilateral and multilateral agreements, as modeled by the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement
- Translate normative concepts captured in IAEA principles and international humanitarian law into a durable international code of conduct on protection of nuclear facilities during times of war.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

- › Twenty-seven countries with nuclear facilities are currently in conflict. From March 2025 to May 2026, 16 (Belarus, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates) experienced confirmed battles or explosions within 10 miles of their facilities.
- › Thirty-eight of the 50 countries and areas with nuclear facilities or weapons-usable nuclear materials have all-hazards plans in place to protect nuclear infrastructure in the event of natural or human-made disasters, leaving 11 countries and Taiwan with no plan at all.
- › Of the 38 countries with all-hazards plans, only 18 require that the plans be tested at defined intervals.
- › Since the 2023 NTI Index, Slovakia is the only country that has developed an all-hazards plan to protect nuclear infrastructure, and Brazil, India, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates are the only countries that have instituted annual testing requirements.
- › Thirty-three of the 50 countries and areas with nuclear facilities or weapons-usable nuclear materials (66 percent) conduct joint exercises between on-site and off-site responders, but only 21 conduct their exercises annually. No new country has instituted a requirement for joint exercises since 2023, and only Finland and Switzerland have introduced annual testing requirements.
- › Thirty-one of the 50 countries and areas with nuclear facilities or weapons-usable nuclear materials have endorsed the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict. Of those 50, 41 have ratified Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.
- › Forty of the 50 countries and areas with nuclear facilities or weapons-usable nuclear materials participated in the IAEA's 2025 ConvEx-3 field exercises, a multilateral exercise that stress-tests domestic, regional, and international emergency preparedness.

RECOMMENDATION

All countries should use the 2027 Review Conference for the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to advance the treaty's universal ratification and strengthen its implementation.

APPLIES TO

**Theft: Secure Materials****Theft: Support Global Efforts**

FINDING

Forty-seven countries have not ratified the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and implementation remains uneven among those that have.

In 1982, the original Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) became the only legally binding international agreement that requires the physical protection of nuclear materials during international transport, criminalizes offenses such as theft or robbery, and requires states to cooperate in recovering stolen material. In 2005, the CPPNM was amended and considerably strengthened. The Amended CPPNM expanded coverage to nuclear material in domestic use and storage, broadened criminalization provisions to include sabotage of nuclear facilities, established the basis for increased international cooperation, and required states to establish and maintain legislative and regulatory frameworks for physical protection.

The Amended CPPNM became a cornerstone of the international nuclear security architecture when it entered into force in 2016 and required a review conference five years later. After a productive review conference in 2022, states-parties requested a second review conference that will occur in 2027. Membership has grown to 137 states-parties, but 47 countries in the NTI Index have yet to join—including Egypt, Iran, and North Korea, all of which have nuclear facilities. The biggest remaining ratification gaps are concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa (18 countries),

Asia-Pacific (14 countries), and Latin America and the Caribbean (10 countries).

Among the countries that have ratified the Amended CPPNM, implementation remains uneven. Sixteen countries in the NTI Index that have ratified the treaty have not met its requirement to designate a competent authority to be responsible for implementing it and serving as the point of contact for international cooperation—a statistic that has not improved since 2023. Without the institutional infrastructure to carry out the agreement's obligations, ratification is functionally useless.

Improving implementation and closing the ratification gap is a strategic necessity for strengthening the global nuclear architecture, especially as additional countries develop nuclear energy capabilities. The 2027 Amended CPPNM Review Conference offers more than an opportunity to cultivate additional treaty members—it offers a proven pathway. Of the 17 countries that attended the 2022 Review Conference as observers, 7 have since ratified the treaty (Belarus, Laos, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, South Africa, and Zimbabwe). States-parties should begin efforts now to ensure that the 2027 Review Conference continues this momentum.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

All countries should advance the universal ratification of the Amended CPPNM and strengthen its implementation with the following actions:

- Attend the 2027 Review Conference, regardless of whether they are a party to the agreement
- Use the 2027 Review Conference to address implementation of the treaty's legal framework and to exchange strategies for improving implementation and identifying gaps
- Seek technical assistance from the International Atomic Energy Agency or partner countries to establish the implementation infrastructure the treaty requires for states-parties without a designated competent authority
- Send delegations to the 2027 Review Conference that comprise senior-level officials representing the full breadth of organizations with responsibilities for nuclear security, including leadership from regulators and law enforcement bodies
- Deliver robust national statements at the 2027 Review Conference with clear new nuclear security commitments
- Encourage nonparties to ratify and implement the treaty, leveraging existing relationships with countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean where ratification gaps are largest
- Commit to reviewing the treaty again in 2032.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

- Forty-seven countries have not yet ratified the Amended CPPNM, with the largest gaps in Sub-Saharan Africa (18 countries), Asia-Pacific (14 countries), and Latin America and the Caribbean (10 countries).
- Sixteen states parties to the Amended CPPNM have not designated a competent authority to be responsible for implementing the treaty, a statistic that has not improved since the 2023 NTI Index.
- Five of the 46 countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities that are party to the Amended CPPNM (Bangladesh, India, Morocco, South Africa, and Uzbekistan) have not met their treaty requirement to submit reports to the IAEA describing the national legislation implemented to give effect to the treaty. Of the 17 countries that attended the 2022 Review Conference for the Amended CPPNM as observers, 7 have since ratified the treaty: Belarus, Laos, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

RECOMMENDATION

Countries and areas should follow through on political commitments to secure radioactive sources by implementing national legislation and regulations.

APPLIES TO



Radioactive Source Security Assessment

FINDING

The gap between political commitment and national implementation of radiological security is widening, with governments pledging adherence to international best practices but lagging in the development and implementation of security measures.

Radioactive sources have a variety of applications worldwide, including medicine, agriculture, and industrial radiography. Although most radioactive sources are benign, high-activity sources can threaten human health if improperly secured. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has identified more than 20,000 operators of significant radioactive sources worldwide.¹⁶ Terrorist groups have historically expressed interest in gaining access to high-activity sources to build a dirty bomb—a source of radiation capable of spreading radioactivity over a large area coupled with a conventional explosive device. Some groups have come dangerously close to detonating this kind of weapon, including two incidents in the 1990s where Chechen rebels placed devices in Moscow's Izmaylovsky Park and near a local railway line in Argun, Chechnya. More recently, the Islamic State nearly came into possession of two cobalt-60 radiotherapy devices during the occupation of Mosul, Iraq, in 2014, both of which could have provided high-activity radioactive material for use in a dirty bomb.

Fortunately, political commitment to abide by international guidance on radioactive source security continues to grow. Since the 2023 assessment, 8 additional countries support the IAEA's Code of Conduct

on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, increasing the total to 148 countries. Twenty-six new countries have signed on to the IAEA's Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, bringing the total to 75 countries.

However, these political commitments are nonbinding, and the regulatory frameworks that give them operational effect have not kept pace. Fifty-four countries and areas still lack any legal requirements for security measures to protect radioactive sources against illicit access, with just 3 countries improving on this measure since the 2023 assessment. This gap extends to basic oversight capacity: 90 countries and areas do not maintain a registry of radioactive sources—a foundational tool for tracking what needs to be secured.

Minimizing this gap between words and actions is the defining challenge for radioactive source security. Radiological terrorism is a serious global threat, and with roughly hundreds of thousands of high-activity radioactive sources worldwide, sustained gaps in tracking systems and security requirements are a vulnerability that governments must address.

¹⁶ Emma Midgley, "IAEA Hosts Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Nuclear and Radioactive Material," IAEA Office of Public Information and Communication, March 23, 2026, www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-hosts-conference-on-the-safe-and-secure-transport-of-nuclear-and-radioactive-material.

SUPPORTING RECOMMENDATIONS

All countries and areas should strengthen security measures to protect radioactive sources with the following actions:

- Establish a regulatory body with clear authority and a statutory mandate for overseeing the security of radioactive sources across all applications
- Enact regulations that require security for all applications of high-activity radioactive sources
- Maintain a national registry of radioactive sources through the designated regulatory body to facilitate effective oversight of licensing, security, import, and export
- Develop and implement political commitments to replace high-activity radioactive sources with safer alternatives not suitable for use in a dirty bomb and facilitate the replacement process by seeking financial and in-kind support for partner governments and international institutions.

DATA HIGHLIGHTS

Among the 176 countries and areas in the Radioactive Source Security Assessment:

- Eight countries have made political commitments in support of the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources since the 2023 assessment, increasing the total to 148 countries.
- Twenty-six countries have committed to abide by the IAEA's Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources since the 2023 assessment, increasing the total to 75 countries.
- Fifty-four countries and areas lack any security requirements for radioactive sources, with just three countries improving since the 2023 assessment.
- One hundred forty-six countries have a dedicated regulatory body with oversight for safety and security of radioactive sources, though no new countries have established one since the 2023 assessment.
- Ninety countries and areas do not maintain a registry of radioactive sources to support regulatory oversight, with just one country enacting laws to require a national registry since the 2023 assessment.

Results Tables

The tables on the following pages show overall and category ranks and scores for the countries and areas included in the Theft: Secure Materials, Theft: Support Global Efforts, and Sabotage: Protect Facilities rankings, and the high-level results of the Radioactive Source Security Assessment. Because the assessment does not rank or score countries and areas, those results are shown as the percentage of countries and areas receiving each answer.



Explore individual country and area scores and the key actions they should prioritize at www.ntiindex.org.



Theft: Secure Materials

OVERALL SCORE

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Australia	92	0
2	Canada	91	2
2	Switzerland	91	2
4	Netherlands	83	-1
4	Norway	83	1
6	United Kingdom	82	5
7	Germany	81	-5
8	Japan	80	1
9	Italy	79	0
10	Belgium	77	-5
11	Kazakhstan	72	0
12	Belarus	70	7
13	France	69	2
14	United States	66	-10
15	China	65	1
16	South Africa	61	2
17	Israel	51	-2
18	Pakistan	47	-1
18	Russian Federation	47	-7
20	India	37	-2
21	Iran	31	0
22	North Korea	25	5

1. QUANTITIES AND SITES

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Australia	93	0
1	Norway	93	3
1	Switzerland	93	0
4	Canada	83	5
5	Belarus	76	0
6	South Africa	74	0
7	Italy	73	0
7	Netherlands	73	0
9	Kazakhstan	67	-6
10	North Korea	55	20
11	Germany	52	-27
12	Japan	49	0
13	Belgium	48	-27
14	United Kingdom	47	20
15	Iran	46	-5
16	United States	40	0
17	Israel	35	0
18	China	33	0
19	India	19	0
20	France	18	0
21	Pakistan	17	0
22	Russian Federation	0	-20

2. SECURITY AND CONTROL MEASURES

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Canada	96	6
2	United Kingdom	94	0
3	Australia	85	0
3	United States	85	-2
5	Belgium	84	7
5	Germany	84	7
7	Switzerland	81	7
8	France	79	9
8	Japan	79	0
10	China	77	0
11	Italy	73	3
12	Russian Federation	71	0
13	Netherlands	70	-4
14	Belarus	66	0
15	Kazakhstan	65	0
16	Pakistan	58	0
17	Norway	49	0
18	India	39	1
19	South Africa	36	2
20	Iran	28	4
21	Israel	26	0
22	North Korea	17	0

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

In the NTI Index, scores of 0 and 100 represent the lowest or highest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Scores are normalized (0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear materials security conditions).



Theft: Secure Materials (cont'd)

3. GLOBAL NORMS

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Australia	96	0
2	Japan	93	-1
2	United Kingdom	93	0
4	Canada	92	2
5	Germany	90	0
5	Switzerland	90	2
5	United States	90	2
8	Netherlands	89	1
9	Norway	86	0
10	Italy	85	0
10	Kazakhstan	85	6
12	Belgium	84	-1
13	France	83	-1
14	China	68	0
15	Belarus	60	9
16	Israel	59	0
17	South Africa	56	8
18	India	50	-8
19	Pakistan	47	5
20	Russian Federation	42	-9
21	Iran	30	4
22	North Korea	4	0

4. DOMESTIC COMMITMENTS AND CAPACITY

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Australia	100	0
1	Belarus	100	25
1	Belgium	100	0
1	Canada	100	0
1	China	100	0
1	France	100	0
1	Germany	100	0
1	Italy	100	0
1	Japan	100	0
1	Netherlands	100	0
1	Norway	100	0
1	Pakistan	100	0
1	Russian Federation	100	0
1	Switzerland	100	0
1	United Kingdom	100	0
16	Kazakhstan	95	0
17	Israel	91	0
18	South Africa	75	0
19	United States	61	-39
20	India	36	0
21	Iran	24	0
22	North Korea	5	0

5. RISK ENVIRONMENT

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Switzerland	91	-1
2	Netherlands	88	2
3	Australia	86	-1
3	Canada	86	-1
5	Japan	85	6
5	Norway	85	-1
7	Germany	84	-1
8	United Kingdom	81	-1
9	France	77	-2
10	Belgium	73	-2
11	Italy	69	1
12	South Africa	65	-1
13	United States	60	-13
14	Israel	55	-8
15	China	54	4
16	Kazakhstan	48	4
17	Belarus	44	3
17	India	44	-8
19	North Korea	40	2
20	Russian Federation	30	-4
21	Iran	25	-2
22	Pakistan	17	-11

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

In the NTI Index, scores of 0 and 100 represent the lowest or highest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Scores are normalized (0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear materials security conditions).



Theft: Support Global Efforts

OVERALL SCORE

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Finland	97	-1
2	Sweden	94	-2
3	South Korea	93	0
4	Denmark	92	-3
4	New Zealand	92	0
6	Czech Republic	91	0
7	Lithuania	90	3
7	Poland	90	2
9	Spain	89	0
10	Hungary	87	-1
10	Luxembourg	87	1
10	Slovenia	87	-1
13	Chile	86	2
13	Romania	86	-3
15	Singapore	85	-3
15	United Arab Emirates	85	2
17	Jordan	84	0
18	Austria	82	-1
19	Georgia	81	-5
19	Mexico	81	2
19	Slovak Republic	81	1
22	Armenia	80	1
22	Ireland	80	0
22	Philippines	80	0
25	Morocco	79	2
25	Portugal	79	0
25	Thailand	79	0
28	Estonia	77	-3
28	Latvia	77	-1
30	Iceland	76	-3
30	Ukraine	76	1
30	Uruguay	76	1
33	Cyprus	75	-5
33	Ghana	75	9
35	Argentina	74	0
35	Bulgaria	74	-1
35	Croatia	74	-3
35	North Macedonia	74	1

3. GLOBAL NORMS

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Armenia	100	5
1	Czech Republic	100	0
1	Finland	100	0
1	Georgia	100	0
1	Hungary	100	0
1	Jordan	100	0
1	Mexico	100	5
1	Morocco	100	5
1	Poland	100	6
1	Romania	100	0
1	South Korea	100	0
1	Spain	100	0
1	Sweden	100	0
14	Chile	95	6
15	Lithuania	94	6
15	Ukraine	94	0
17	Denmark	89	-5
17	New Zealand	89	0
17	Nigeria	89	0
17	Philippines	89	0
17	Thailand	89	5
22	United Arab Emirates	88	5
23	Slovenia	83	-5
24	Vietnam	78	6
25	Slovak Republic	77	6
26	Indonesia	73	0
26	Singapore	73	0
28	Ghana	72	28
28	Turkey	72	5
30	Austria	71	0
30	Bosnia and Herzegovina	71	5
30	Kenya	71	16
30	North Macedonia	71	5
34	Argentina	67	0
34	Ireland	67	0
36	Albania	66	11
36	Bulgaria	66	0
36	Croatia	66	-5

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

In the NTI Index, scores of 0 and 100 represent the lowest or highest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Scores are normalized (0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear materials security conditions).



Theft: Support Global Efforts (cont'd)

4. DOMESTIC COMMITMENTS AND CAPACITY

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Albania	100	0
1	Algeria	100	0
1	Argentina	100	0
1	Austria	100	0
1	Bosnia and Herzegovina	100	0
1	Brazil	100	0
1	Bulgaria	100	0
1	Croatia	100	0
1	Cuba	100	0
1	Cyprus	100	0
1	Czech Republic	100	0
1	Denmark	100	0
1	Estonia	100	0
1	Finland	100	0
1	Ghana	100	0
1	Greece	100	0
1	Hungary	100	0
1	Iceland	100	0
1	Ireland	100	0
1	Jamaica	100	0
1	Jordan	100	0
1	Latvia	100	0
1	Lithuania	100	0
1	Luxembourg	100	0
1	Malta	100	0
1	Mexico	100	0
1	Moldova	100	0
1	New Zealand	100	0
1	North Macedonia	100	0
1	Philippines	100	0
1	Poland	100	0
1	Portugal	100	0
1	Romania	100	0
1	Saudi Arabia	100	0
1	Serbia	100	0
1	Singapore	100	0
1	Slovak Republic	100	0
1	Slovenia	100	0

5. RISK ENVIRONMENT

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Luxembourg	96	8
2	Finland	89	-4
3	Denmark	87	-4
4	New Zealand	86	-2
5	Singapore	84	-9
6	Sweden	81	-5
7	Iceland	80	-3
8	South Korea	78	1
8	Uruguay	78	-1
10	Slovenia	77	3
11	Austria	76	-2
11	Lithuania	76	6
13	Taiwan	75	1
14	Botswana	74	-2
15	Bhutan	73	-2
15	Ireland	73	-1
17	Brunei Darussalam	72	-7
17	Latvia	72	-2
17	Seychelles	72	1
20	Czech Republic	71	1
20	Estonia	71	-3
20	Portugal	71	0
23	Chile	70	1
23	Costa Rica	70	3
25	Poland	69	0
26	Mauritius	68	-1
27	Cabo Verde	67	0
27	Qatar	67	-1
29	Barbados	66	0
29	Dominican Republic	66	6
31	Namibia	65	-3
31	Slovak Republic	65	-5
31	United Arab Emirates	65	0
34	Cyprus	64	-5
34	Spain	64	0
36	Saudi Arabia	63	14
37	Bahamas	61	-3
37	São Tomé and Príncipe	61	1

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

In the NTI Index, scores of 0 and 100 represent the lowest or highest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Scores are normalized (0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear materials security conditions).



Theft: Support Global Efforts (cont'd)

OVERALL SCORE

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
35	Qatar	74	2
40	Saudi Arabia	73	5
41	Botswana	72	0
42	Albania	71	4
42	Costa Rica	71	0
42	Malta	71	-1
42	Montenegro	71	1
42	Turkey	71	2
47	Greece	70	0
47	Serbia	70	0
49	Bosnia and Herzegovina	69	1
49	Indonesia	69	-3
51	Brazil	68	0
51	Moldova	68	2
51	Nigeria	68	0
54	Namibia	67	-1
54	Peru	67	5
56	Mongolia	66	4
56	Vietnam	66	3
58	Bahrain	65	-1
58	Paraguay	65	-5
60	Cuba	64	-5
60	Dominican Republic	64	2
60	Jamaica	64	-1
60	Kenya	64	8
60	Seychelles	64	0
60	Taiwan	64	1
60	Tajikistan	64	2
67	Colombia	63	2
68	Azerbaijan	62	-2
69	Kuwait	61	1
69	Mauritania	61	0
69	Senegal	61	0
72	Côte d'Ivoire	60	2
72	Tunisia	60	2
74	Algeria	59	-6
74	Fiji	59	2
74	Gabon	59	0
74	Uzbekistan	59	-4

3. GLOBAL NORMS

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
36	Luxembourg	66	-6
36	Montenegro	66	0
36	Paraguay	66	-5
36	Portugal	66	0
43	Malaysia	65	5
44	Estonia	61	-5
44	Qatar	61	5
46	Costa Rica	60	0
46	Cyprus	60	-11
46	Latvia	60	0
46	Libya	60	5
46	Peru	60	11
46	Serbia	60	0
46	Tajikistan	60	5
46	Uruguay	60	5
54	Azerbaijan	55	-6
54	Bahrain	55	-5
54	Bangladesh	55	0
54	Brazil	55	0
54	Côte d'Ivoire	55	6
54	Cuba	55	0
54	Ecuador	55	11
54	Greece	55	0
54	Malta	55	0
54	Moldova	55	0
54	Niger	55	0
54	Saudi Arabia	55	0
54	Zimbabwe	55	20
67	Cameroon	52	0
68	Burkina Faso	50	6
68	Colombia	50	5
68	Iceland	50	-5
68	Senegal	50	0
72	Botswana	49	0
72	Jamaica	49	0
72	Kuwait	49	0
72	Kyrgyz Republic	49	-6
72	Lesotho	49	5
72	Madagascar	49	-6

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

In the NTI Index, scores of 0 and 100 represent the lowest or highest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Scores are normalized (0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear materials security conditions).



Theft: Support Global Efforts (cont'd)

4. DOMESTIC COMMITMENTS AND CAPACITY

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	South Korea	100	0
1	Spain	100	0
1	Sweden	100	0
1	Taiwan	100	0
1	Tajikistan	100	0
1	Thailand	100	0
1	Turkey	100	0
1	Ukraine	100	0
1	United Arab Emirates	100	0
48	Armenia	92	0
48	Azerbaijan	92	0
48	Benin	92	61
48	Botswana	92	0
48	Burkina Faso	92	0
48	Cameroon	92	0
48	Chad	92	0
48	Chile	92	0
48	Colombia	92	0
48	Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	92	0
48	Fiji	92	0
48	Georgia	92	0
48	Indonesia	92	0
48	Kyrgyz Republic	92	0
48	Malawi	92	0
48	Mali	92	0
48	Mauritania	92	0
48	Mongolia	92	0
48	Montenegro	92	0
48	Morocco	92	0
48	Namibia	92	0
48	Niger	92	0
48	Nigeria	92	0
48	Peru	92	0
48	Qatar	92	0
48	Syrian Arab Republic	92	0
48	Uruguay	92	0
48	Uzbekistan	92	0
76	Afghanistan	84	0
76	Bahrain	84	0

5. RISK ENVIRONMENT

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
39	Malaysia	60	-4
40	Hungary	59	-3
40	Malta	59	-2
40	Oman	59	4
43	Croatia	57	-2
43	Mongolia	57	3
45	Bahrain	56	3
45	Kuwait	56	2
45	Panama	56	1
45	Romania	56	-8
49	Argentina	54	-1
49	Bulgaria	54	-5
49	Greece	54	1
49	Montenegro	54	5
49	Suriname	54	2
54	Ghana	53	-2
54	Zambia	53	-2
56	Rwanda	52	1
57	North Macedonia	51	-1
58	Eswatini	50	0
58	Jordan	50	0
58	Moldova	50	8
58	Tunisia	50	4
62	Belize	49	4
62	El Salvador	49	6
62	Georgia	49	-14
62	Senegal	49	0
62	Serbia	49	-1
67	Brazil	48	1
67	Gabon	48	-1
67	Philippines	48	-1
67	Vietnam	48	0
71	Lesotho	47	-3
71	Peru	47	2
73	Albania	45	2
73	Armenia	45	-2
73	Colombia	45	-1
73	Thailand	45	-6
77	Paraguay	44	-8

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

In the NTI Index, scores of 0 and 100 represent the lowest or highest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Scores are normalized (0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear materials security conditions).



Theft: Support Global Efforts (cont'd)

OVERALL SCORE

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
78	Benin	58	15
78	Cabo Verde	58	-2
78	Kyrgyz Republic	58	-2
78	Malawi	58	0
82	Cameroon	57	-1
82	Ecuador	57	1
82	Madagascar	57	-3
85	Burkina Faso	56	2
85	Niger	56	-3
85	Rwanda	56	1
85	Togo	56	3
89	Bangladesh	55	-4
89	Malaysia	55	1
91	Libya	54	3
92	Tanzania	53	-1
93	Bolivia	52	1
93	Guatemala	52	0
95	Mozambique	51	0
95	Nicaragua	51	0
95	Uganda	51	1
98	Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	50	-1
98	Mali	50	-3
100	Chad	48	0
101	Afghanistan	47	-5
101	Lebanon	47	1
103	Syrian Arab Republic	46	0
104	Panama	43	-4
105	Oman	42	1
106	Lesotho	40	1
107	El Salvador	39	2
107	Zambia	39	-4
109	Mauritius	38	-2
109	Sudan	38	-2
111	Eswatini	37	0
111	Turkmenistan	37	2
111	Zimbabwe	37	9
114	Brunei Darussalam	36	0
114	Cambodia	36	-2
114	Egypt	36	0

3. GLOBAL NORMS

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
72	Mauritania	49	0
72	Mongolia	49	10
72	Turkmenistan	49	5
72	Uzbekistan	49	-11
82	Algeria	45	-16
82	Cambodia	45	0
82	Lebanon	45	0
82	Togo	45	11
86	Benin	44	-5
86	Comoros	44	0
86	Dominican Republic	44	0
86	El Salvador	44	0
86	Fiji	44	6
86	Gabon	44	0
86	Guatemala	44	0
86	Iraq	44	0
86	Malawi	44	0
86	Mali	44	0
86	Mozambique	44	5
86	Namibia	44	0
86	Oman	44	0
86	Panama	44	-11
86	Tunisia	44	0
101	Central African Republic	39	0
101	Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	39	0
101	Eswatini	39	0
101	Liberia	39	14
101	Rwanda	39	0
106	Congo, Rep.	38	9
106	Djibouti	38	0
106	Nicaragua	38	0
106	Seychelles	38	-1
110	Egypt	36	0
111	Honduras	35	6
111	Tanzania	35	0
113	Afghanistan	34	-10
113	Bolivia	34	5
113	Chad	34	0
113	Guinea-Bissau	34	0

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

In the NTI Index, scores of 0 and 100 represent the lowest or highest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Scores are normalized (0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear materials security conditions).



Theft: Support Global Efforts (cont'd)

4. DOMESTIC COMMITMENTS AND CAPACITY

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
76	Bangladesh	84	0
76	Bolivia	84	0
76	Cabo Verde	84	0
76	Costa Rica	84	0
76	Côte d'Ivoire	84	0
76	Dominican Republic	84	0
76	Ecuador	84	0
76	Gabon	84	0
76	Guatemala	84	0
76	Kenya	84	0
76	Madagascar	84	0
76	Mozambique	84	0
76	Nicaragua	84	0
76	Paraguay	84	0
76	Senegal	84	0
76	Seychelles	84	0
76	Tanzania	84	0
76	Togo	84	0
76	Tunisia	84	0
76	Uganda	84	0
98	Kuwait	77	0
98	Lebanon	77	0
98	Libya	77	0
98	Rwanda	77	0
102	Sudan	69	0
102	Vietnam	69	0
104	Malaysia	39	0
105	Cambodia	31	0
105	Central African Republic	31	0
105	Egypt	31	0
105	Ethiopia	31	0
105	Iraq	31	0
105	Lao PDR	31	0
105	Panama	31	0
105	Sri Lanka	31	0
105	Zambia	31	0
114	Brunei Darussalam	23	0
114	Burundi	23	0
114	Comoros	23	0

5. RISK ENVIRONMENT

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
77	Samoa	44	0
77	Sri Lanka	44	-5
77	Trinidad and Tobago	44	-2
81	Solomon Islands	43	0
82	Côte d'Ivoire	41	2
82	Fiji	41	2
82	Jamaica	41	-4
82	Tanzania	41	-3
86	Egypt	40	-1
86	Guyana	40	-6
86	Indonesia	40	-10
86	Mauritania	40	-1
86	Morocco	40	0
91	Angola	39	1
91	Mexico	39	-1
91	Timor-Leste	39	-2
94	Benin	38	-10
94	Djibouti	38	2
94	Gambia, The	38	-5
94	Guinea-Bissau	38	1
94	Papua New Guinea	38	4
94	Togo	38	-2
94	Turkmenistan	38	1
94	Uganda	38	3
102	Eritrea	37	6
102	Liberia	37	4
102	Malawi	37	0
102	Turkey	37	-1
106	Azerbaijan	36	-1
106	Bolivia	36	-3
106	Cuba	36	-16
106	Madagascar	36	-2
106	Tonga	36	1
111	Sierra Leone	35	-1
111	Uzbekistan	35	-1
113	Bosnia and Herzegovina	34	-2
113	Congo, Rep.	34	-2
113	Honduras	34	-3
113	Kenya	34	6

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

In the NTI Index, scores of 0 and 100 represent the lowest or highest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Scores are normalized (0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear materials security conditions).



Theft: Support Global Efforts (cont'd)

OVERALL SCORE

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
117	Bahamas	33	1
117	Comoros	33	-2
117	Djibouti	33	1
117	Sri Lanka	33	-3
121	Congo, Rep.	32	3
122	Honduras	31	1
122	Iraq	31	0
122	São Tomé and Príncipe	31	4
125	Bhutan	30	0
125	Central African Republic	30	0
125	Liberia	30	6
128	Barbados	29	0
128	Lao PDR	29	0
130	Ethiopia	28	2
130	Solomon Islands	28	0
130	Trinidad and Tobago	28	-1
133	Angola	27	0
134	Guinea-Bissau	26	0
134	Guyana	26	-2
134	Sierra Leone	26	0
134	Tonga	26	1
138	Burundi	25	0
138	Eritrea	25	2
138	Suriname	25	0
141	Belize	24	1
142	Gambia, The	22	-2
142	Guinea	22	-1
142	Samoa	22	0
142	Timor-Leste	22	3
146	Vanuatu	21	0
147	Myanmar	20	-3
147	Venezuela	20	-2
147	Yemen	20	-1
150	Equatorial Guinea	18	0
150	Haiti	18	0
150	Nepal	18	-4
150	Papua New Guinea	18	1
154	Somalia	8	0

3. GLOBAL NORMS

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
113	Syrian Arab Republic	34	0
113	Yemen	34	0
113	Zambia	34	-11
120	Sudan	30	0
121	Angola	29	0
121	Uganda	29	0
123	Bahamas	25	6
123	Ethiopia	25	5
123	Haiti	25	0
123	Mauritius	25	-5
123	Myanmar	25	-5
123	Sri Lanka	25	-6
129	Burundi	24	0
129	Cabo Verde	24	-5
129	Eritrea	24	0
129	Guyana	24	0
129	Lao PDR	24	5
134	Sierra Leone	20	0
134	Venezuela	20	0
136	Guinea	19	0
136	São Tomé and Príncipe	19	9
136	Solomon Islands	19	0
136	Taiwan	19	0
136	Timor-Leste	19	9
136	Tonga	19	0
136	Trinidad and Tobago	19	0
143	Brunei Darussalam	15	5
144	Equatorial Guinea	14	0
144	Gambia, The	14	0
144	Vanuatu	14	0
147	Barbados	10	0
147	Belize	10	0
147	Nepal	10	-6
147	Papua New Guinea	10	0
147	Samoa	10	0
147	Suriname	10	0
153	Bhutan	5	0
153	Somalia	5	0

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

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Theft: Support Global Efforts (cont'd)

4. DOMESTIC COMMITMENTS AND CAPACITY

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
114	Congo, Rep.	23	0
114	Djibouti	23	0
114	El Salvador	23	0
114	Eswatini	23	0
114	Guinea	23	0
114	Honduras	23	0
114	Lesotho	23	0
114	Mauritius	23	0
114	Myanmar	23	0
114	Oman	23	0
114	Sierra Leone	23	0
114	Solomon Islands	23	0
114	Tonga	23	0
114	Trinidad and Tobago	23	0
114	Turkmenistan	23	0
114	Venezuela	23	0
114	Zimbabwe	23	0
134	Angola	16	0
134	Bahamas	16	0
134	Barbados	16	0
134	Belize	16	0
134	Bhutan	16	0
134	Eritrea	16	0
134	Gambia, The	16	0
134	Guyana	16	0
134	Haiti	16	0
134	Liberia	16	0
134	Nepal	16	0
134	Samoa	16	0
134	São Tomé and Príncipe	16	0
134	Suriname	16	0
134	Vanuatu	16	0
134	Yemen	16	0
150	Equatorial Guinea	8	0
150	Guinea-Bissau	8	0
150	Papua New Guinea	8	0
150	Somalia	8	0
150	Timor-Leste	8	0

5. RISK ENVIRONMENT

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
113	Lao PDR	34	-4
118	Vanuatu	33	0
119	Equatorial Guinea	32	0
120	Cambodia	31	-7
120	Comoros	31	-5
120	Ecuador	31	-7
120	Kyrgyz Republic	31	0
124	Algeria	30	-3
124	Tajikistan	30	2
124	Zimbabwe	30	4
127	Ukraine	29	3
128	Burundi	28	0
128	Ethiopia	28	0
128	Nepal	28	-7
128	Nicaragua	28	-3
132	Cameroon	26	-3
133	Guinea	25	-3
134	Burkina Faso	24	-1
134	Guatemala	24	0
134	Libya	24	5
134	Mozambique	24	-5
138	Bangladesh	23	-14
139	Afghanistan	22	-3
140	Central African Republic	19	2
141	Lebanon	18	3
141	Niger	18	-9
141	Nigeria	18	0
144	Iraq	17	0
144	Venezuela	17	-4
146	Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	16	-5
147	Chad	15	0
147	Sudan	15	-7
149	Haiti	13	-1
149	Mali	13	-8
151	Myanmar	11	-2
152	Somalia	10	-1
153	Syrian Arab Republic	9	-1
153	Yemen	9	-4

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown.

In the NTI Index, scores of 0 and 100 represent the lowest or highest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Scores are normalized (0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear materials security conditions).

= denotes tie in rank.



Sabotage: Protect Facilities

Overall Score				1. Number of Sites				2. Security and Control Measures			
Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023	Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023	Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Finland	94	-1	1	Algeria	100	0	1	Canada	97	8
2	Canada	91	2	1	Armenia	100	0	2	Finland	96	1
3	Switzerland	88	5	1	Bulgaria	100	0	3	United Kingdom	94	0
4	Australia	87	0	1	Chile	100	0	4	Hungary	88	3
4	United Arab Emirates	87	7	1	Egypt	100	0	5	United Arab Emirates	86	20
4	United Kingdom	87	-1	1	Jordan	100	0	6	Romania	83	7
7	Hungary	86	0	1	Mexico	100	0	6	United States	83	-4
7	Romania	86	2	1	Morocco	100	0	8	Australia	82	0
9	Germany	85	7	1	Peru	100	0	9	Germany	81	9
10	Czech Republic	84	1	1	Poland	100	0	9	Belgium	81	8
10	Slovenia	84	1	1	Slovenia	100	0	11	Switzerland	79	9
12	Poland	81	1	1	Turkey	100	n/a	12	Indonesia	78	16
12	Sweden	81	2	1	United Arab Emirates	100	0	12	Japan	78	0
14	Armenia	79	3	14	Argentina	86	0	12	Brazil	78	8
14	Japan	79	2	14	Brazil	86	0	15	Slovenia	76	7
14	South Korea	79	0	14	Czech Republic	86	0	15	Bulgaria	76	0
17	Belgium	78	2	14	Finland	86	0	17	France	74	10
17	Netherlands	78	-3	14	Hungary	86	0	17	China	74	0
19	Bulgaria	77	0	14	Indonesia	86	0	19	Ukraine	73	5
20	Brazil	75	3	14	Kazakhstan	86	0	20	Jordan	72	0
20	Indonesia	75	4	14	Romania	86	0	20	Czech Republic	72	0
20	Spain	75	2	14	Slovak Republic	86	0	22	Taiwan	67	0
23	France	74	2	14	South Africa	86	0	22	Uzbekistan	67	8
23	Kazakhstan	74	2	14	Switzerland	86	14	22	Russian Federation	67	0
23	Ukraine	74	2	14	Taiwan	86	14	25	Armenia	66	6
26	Jordan	72	1	26	Canada	72	0	26	Sweden	63	0
26	Slovak Republic	72	-1	26	Germany	72	30	27	Netherlands	62	-7
28	Argentina	70	0	26	South Korea	72	0	28	Kazakhstan	61	0
29	Turkey	69	n/a	26	Spain	72	0	28	Belarus	61	n/a
30	Belarus	68	n/a	26	Sweden	72	0	30	South Korea	60	0
31	China	67	1	26	Ukraine	72	0	31	Poland	57	0
31	United States	67	-12	32	Australia	70	0	32	Spain	56	6
33	Chile	65	2	32	Bangladesh	70	0	32	Pakistan	56	0
34	Taiwan	64	12	32	Belarus	70	n/a	34	Slovak Republic	55	1
35	Morocco	61	1	32	Israel	70	0	35	Argentina	53	3
35	South Africa	61	3	32	Uzbekistan	70	0	36	Turkey	52	n/a
35	Uzbekistan	61	2	37	United Kingdom	58	0	37	India	48	1
38	Israel	59	-1	38	Iran	56	0	38	Peru	46	6
39	Mexico	58	1	38	Netherlands	56	0	39	Chile	44	5
39	Pakistan	58	0	38	North Korea	56	0	40	South Africa	41	3
41	Peru	57	3	38	Pakistan	56	0	41	Iran	32	4
42	Algeria	56	2	42	Belgium	42	0	42	Algeria	30	0
43	Russian Federation	55	-4	42	India	42	0	43	Israel	29	0
44	Bangladesh	49	0	44	United States	30	0	44	Mexico	24	0
45	Egypt	47	2	45	Japan	28	14	45	Bangladesh	23	3
46	India	45	-2	46	China	14	0	46	Egypt	22	0
47	Iran	28	2	46	France	14	0	47	North Korea	18	0
48	North Korea	21	0	46	Russian Federation	14	-14	48	Morocco	17	0

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown. All countries are scored 0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear security conditions.



Sabotage: Protect Facilities (cont'd)

3. GLOBAL NORMS

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Finland	96	0
2	Australia	95	2
2	Canada	95	3
4	Romania	93	1
4	Sweden	93	1
6	Japan	92	-1
6	United Kingdom	92	0
8	Czech Republic	91	0
8	Hungary	91	2
8	Netherlands	91	2
8	Poland	91	6
8	United States	91	4
13	France	89	-2
13	Switzerland	89	2
15	Jordan	88	3
15	South Korea	88	-1
17	Germany	87	0
18	Armenia	85	5
18	Mexico	85	1
18	Ukraine	85	0
21	Kazakhstan	84	5
21	Morocco	84	7
23	Belgium	83	-1
23	Spain	83	-2
25	United Arab Emirates	81	5
26	Chile	80	0
27	China	76	0
28	Slovenia	72	-4
29	Indonesia	69	2
30	Slovak Republic	68	4
31	Belarus	65	n/a
31	Turkey	65	n/a
33	Israel	63	0
34	Argentina	61	-3
35	India	60	-7
36	Brazil	57	1
37	Bangladesh	56	2
37	Bulgaria	56	0
37	Pakistan	56	5
37	South Africa	56	8
41	Peru	53	4
42	Russian Federation	48	-8
43	Uzbekistan	46	-1
44	Algeria	41	-12
45	Egypt	39	7
46	Iran	20	4
47	Taiwan	15	0
48	North Korea	4	0

4. DOMESTIC COMMITMENTS AND CAPACITY

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Argentina	100	0
1	Australia	100	0
1	Belarus	100	n/a
1	Belgium	100	0
1	Brazil	100	0
1	Bulgaria	100	0
1	Canada	100	0
1	China	100	0
1	Czech Republic	100	0
1	Finland	100	0
1	France	100	0
1	Germany	100	0
1	Hungary	100	0
1	Japan	100	0
1	Netherlands	100	0
1	Pakistan	100	0
1	Poland	100	0
1	Romania	100	0
1	Russian Federation	100	0
1	Slovak Republic	100	0
1	Slovenia	100	0
1	South Korea	100	0
1	Spain	100	0
1	Sweden	100	13
1	Switzerland	100	0
1	Turkey	100	n/a
1	Ukraine	100	0
1	United Arab Emirates	100	0
1	United Kingdom	100	0
30	Algeria	98	26
30	Armenia	98	0
30	Indonesia	98	0
30	Kazakhstan	98	0
34	Israel	95	0
35	Morocco	85	0
35	Taiwan	85	50
35	Uzbekistan	85	0
38	Bangladesh	83	0
39	South Africa	75	0
40	Egypt	60	0
41	Jordan	50	0
41	Mexico	50	0
41	United States	50	-50
44	Chile	47	0
44	Peru	47	0
46	India	25	0
47	Iran	12	0
48	North Korea	2	0

5. RISK ENVIRONMENT

Rank		Score / 100	Change since 2023
1	Switzerland	90	-1
2	Finland	88	-6
3	Australia	86	-1
4	Canada	85	-1
4	Japan	85	6
4	Netherlands	85	-1
7	Sweden	83	-3
8	Germany	81	-1
8	South Korea	81	0
8	United Kingdom	81	-1
11	Slovenia	78	0
12	France	77	-2
13	Taiwan	76	3
14	Czech Republic	75	4
15	Belgium	72	0
15	Chile	72	2
15	Poland	72	-1
15	Spain	72	3
19	United Arab Emirates	69	1
20	Slovak Republic	65	-8
20	South Africa	65	0
22	Hungary	64	-3
22	Romania	64	-5
24	Bulgaria	62	-1
25	Argentina	61	-2
25	United States	61	-14
27	Armenia	56	2
28	Brazil	55	5
28	Israel	55	-8
30	China	54	7
30	Mexico	54	2
32	Peru	53	2
33	Jordan	51	1
34	Kazakhstan	48	4
35	Morocco	47	1
36	India	46	-5
37	Belarus	45	n/a
37	Turkey	45	n/a
39	Indonesia	43	-7
40	North Korea	40	1
41	Egypt	39	2
42	Uzbekistan	38	0
43	Ukraine	36	0
44	Algeria	34	-3
45	Russian Federation	30	-4
46	Bangladesh	29	-7
47	Iran	26	-1
48	Pakistan	18	-10

Overall and category scores and ranks for 2026 are shown. All countries are scored 0–100, where 100 = most favorable nuclear security conditions.



Radiological

NATIONAL MEASURES

		Yes		No or no data available	
		2026	2023	2026	2023
Regulatory Oversight	Does the country/area maintain a radioactive source regulatory oversight body?	84%	84%	16%	16%
Security Measures	Are there regulations that require security measures to be in place to protect radioactive sources?	69%	57%	31%	43%
State Registry	Does the state maintain a registry of radioactive sources?	49%	28%	51%	72%
Inspection Authority	Does the state have authority to inspect facilities with radioactive sources?	67%	50%	33%	50%
Export Licenses	Are there licensing requirements for exporting IAEA Category 1 sources?	76%	52%	24%	48%

GLOBAL NORMS

		Yes		No or no data available	
		2026	2023	2026	2023
IAEA Code of Conduct Status	Has the state made a political commitment and notified the IAEA of their intent to abide by the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources?	84%	80%	16%	20%
	Has the state notified the IAEA of their intent to abide by the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources?	77%	71%	23%	29%
	Has the state nominated a Point of Contact to facilitate imports and exports of radioactive source material?	84%	81%	16%	19%
	Has the state made available their responses to the IAEA Importing and Exporting States Questionnaire?	65%	60%	35%	40%
	Has the state notified the IAEA of their commitment to implement the Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources?	43%	28%	57%	72%
International Participation	Is the country/area a member of the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism?	36%	n/a	64%	n/a
	Did the state send an official delegation to the 2022 International Conference on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources?	53%	53%	47%	47%
International Conventions	Is the country/area a state party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)?	66%	63%	34%	37%
	Is the country/area a state party to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management?	52%	50%	48%	50%



Radiological (cont'd)

		Yes		No or no data available	
		2023	2020	2023	2020
International Conventions (cont'd)	Is the country/area a state party to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency?	69%	67%	31%	33%

COMMITMENT AND CAPACITY TO ADOPT ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES

		Yes		No or no data available	
		2026	2023	2026	2023
Intent	Has the state subscribed to INFCIRC/910?	18%	18%	82%	82%
Implementation	Has the country/area publicly declared a regulatory requirement, policy, or commitment to implementing alternative technology to replace high-activity radioactive sources?	7%	6%	93%	94%

RISK ENVIRONMENT


		No data available		Very high		High		Moderate		Low		Very low	
		2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023
Political Stability	How stable is the country?	2%	4%	8%	3%	19%	16%	34%	38%	32%	25%	6%	14%
	How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?	4%	4%	19%	16%	21%	20%	13%	21%	19%	16%	24%	23%
	Is there a risk that international disputes/tensions will negatively affect the polity during the next two years?	1%	4%	7%	17%	7%	27%	50%	32%	5%	17%	30%	3%
	Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labor unrest likely to occur during the next two years?	4%	4%	11%	9%	20%	24%	29%	29%	29%	26%	9%	6%
				Territorial conflict; opposition has effective control over a region or regions		Sopradic and incursive conflict		Incursive conflict; government remains in control, but opposition engages in frequent armed incursions		Sporadic conflict; government control is firm, but opposition engages in isolated incidents of violence		No armed conflict exists	
		2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023
Is this country/area presently subject to armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict during the next two years?		4%	4%	11%	9%	7%	6%	10%	11%	31%	32%	38%	38%



Radiological (cont'd)

		No data available		Very high		High		Moderate		Low		Very low	
		2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023	2026	2023
Effective Governance	How effective is the country/area's political system in formulating and executing policy?	4%	5%	10%	9%	11%	13%	24%	24%	24%	24%	27%	26%
	What is the quality of the country/area's bureaucracy and its ability to carry out government policy?	4%	4%	7%	7%	7%	9%	30%	27%	30%	34%	21%	19%
Pervasiveness of Corruption	How pervasive is corruption among public officials?	4%	4%	28%	22%	30%	32%	15%	20%	14%	12%	10%	11%
	How pervasive is vested interests/cronyism among public officials?	4%	n/a	31%	n/a	35%	n/a	18%	n/a	10%	n/a	2%	n/a
Illicit Activities by Non-State Actors	How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption to business operations?	4%	3%	8%	8%	9%	7%	23%	24%	34%	34%	22%	23%
	How likely is organized crime to be a problem for government and/or business?	4%	0%	13%	10%	21%	27%	28%	28%	27%	27%	7%	8%
	How many firearms were seized during the interdiction of illicit weapons trafficking?	40%	45%	12%	11%	12%	11%	12%	11%	24%	11%	0%	9%

Explore the NTI Nuclear Security Index and the Radioactive Source Security Assessment at www.ntiindex.org.



See profiles for all countries and areas in the NTI Index.

Explore how specific actions would improve a country or area's score.

Review the methodologies, including detailed descriptions of NTI Index indicators.

Download Excel spreadsheets to analyze all NTI Index data.



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