• Research Library
  • Country Profiles
  • Issues & Analysis
  • Databases
  • Source Documents
  • Securing the Bomb
  • Archives
• Teacher's Toolkit
  • Tutorials
  • WMD411
  • Glossary
  • Education Links
  • Sample Syllabi
  • Internships

Submarine Proliferation

Taiwan Current Capabilities

Capabilities | Import | Export

The Taiwanese Navy currently operates two Hai Lung-class (improved Dutch Zwaardvis-design) submarines, which were acquired from the Netherlands in the 1980s. Two former U.S. Navy Guppy II-class vessels, delivered in 1973, are also still in service, but only for training purposes.[1] The submarines operate out of Tsoying Naval Base in Kaohsiung.  Taiwan is highly interested in acquiring additional vessels, but has been unsuccessful as a result of political pressure on potential exporters by mainland China and domestic concerns about cost.

In addition to the tension between China and Taiwan over the status of the latter, Taiwan is involved in various territorial disputes concerning the Spratly, Paracel, and Senkaku Islands. The Spratly Islands dispute involves Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. The Paracel Islands are claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam, but occupied by China, while the Senkaku Islands (Senkaku-shoto/Diaoyu Tai) are occupied by Japan and claimed by China and Taiwan.

Taiwan's submarines are aimed at providing a capability to deter Chinese naval blockades and ensure its sea lines of communication, thus protecting the trade on which the island depends.[2] In addition, Taiwan's submarines could be used to block China's crucial ports and sea lines, but are not likely to be used directly to counter China's submarines.[3]

Since the acquisition of the two Hai Lung submarines in the early 1980s, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense has been exploring ways to procure new diesel submarines.  In April 2001, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush proposed the acquisition of eight diesel submarines to Taiwan.  However, European shipyards have been preventing from pursuing such a sale by national export policies (after its sale of Hai Lung submarines to Taiwan, China almost severed relations with the Netherlands).[4] Germany has also rejected the possibility of a sale.  In 2003, the US Department of Defense suggested that Taiwan might consider buying refurbished submarines:  the Italian Ministry of Defense reportedly agreed to a sale of four Sauro-class boats, and four more as they are decommissioned by the Italian Navy, but Taiwan rejected the offer, preferring new submarines instead.[5] Taiwan has also been offered Indian and Russian vessels.  In late 2004, the suggestion that the United States might build the submarines for Taiwan itself, voiced three years earlier in discussions over whether the U.S. Congress would support the Bush Administration's decision to assist in the sale, was repeated.  The refurbishment of the Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi, is one of the most likely options for US-based production.[6] Taiwan has also been exploring the possibility of building submarines itself.  A cross-ministry task force found that Taiwan's China Shipbuilding Corporation could build submarines without additional large-scale investment if provided with blueprints and submarine weapons systems.  However, Taiwanese Vice Minister of National Defense Huo Shou-yeh said that the United States had indicated it would not help Taiwan build the boats in Kaohsiung.[7]  (For more information on Taiwan's efforts to import submarines, please see the Taiwan: Import Behavior file.)

As of March 2005, Taiwanese officials were reporting that U.S. officials had assured them that the U.S. policy of assisting Taiwan in submarine procurement had not changed.  However, Taiwan will have to pay for the procurement, and the opposition Kuomintang Party has blocked passage of the relevant legislation in the Taiwanese legislature (balking at the $7-11 billion cost of the vessels).[8]  In 2005, the Ministry of National Defense has been lobbying hard for the legislature to pass a special budget of $18.23 billion for arms procurement.  The eight submarines top the list in the procurement package.[9]

Sources:
R.O.C. Navy Web Site, http://www.mnd.gov.tw/division/~defense/mil/navy/media/download/download/4.jpg.
Stephen Saunders, Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2002-2003 (Coulsdon, Jane’s Information Group, 2002).

Sources:
Stephen Saunders, Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2002-2003 (Coulsdon, Jane’s Information Group, 2002).
Photo: Peter Wang, "Equipment match ups: Navy-Submarines," Emeraldesigns Web Site, http://www.emeraldesigns.com/matchup/sub.htm.

Sources:
A.D. Baker III, Combat Fleets of the World 2000-2001 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 2000).
Stephen Saunders, Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2002-2003 (Coulsdon, Jane’s Information Group, 2002).

Sources:
[1] Stephen Saunders, Jane's Fighting Ships 2002-2003 (Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group, 2003).
[2] Anthony Leung, "The Fortress Above the Straits: Taiwan's Defence Revisited," Military Technology, April 2003, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 35; in ProQuest Information and Learning Company, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb.
[3] Hong Che-cheng, Tai-Wan Jih-Pao, 11 November 2003; in "Defense Minister Tang on Taiwan's defense capability, submarine purchase," FBIS Document CPP20031112000124.
[4] John Pomfret and Philip Pan, "U.S. Hits Obstacles in Helping Taiwan Guard Against China," Washington Post, October 30, 2003, p. 1; in ProQuest Information and Learning Company, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb.
[5] Wendell Minnick, "Submarine Decisions Show Lack of Creativity," Taipei Times, October 16, 2004; in Taiwan Security Research Website, http://taiwansecurity.org.
[6] Sharon Behn, "U.S. to Build 8 Subs in Deal with Taiwan," Washington Times, September 29, 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[7] Rich Chang, "Agencies at Odds over Submarines," Taipei Times, April 15, 2005, p. 3, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/04/15/2003250524.
[8] Luis Huang, "Taiwan Defense Ministry to Prioritize Submarine Procurement," Central News Agency (Taipei), March 9, 2005; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.
[9] C.C. Lin and P.C. Tang, "New KMT Chairman Urged to Push for Quick Passage of Arms Package," Central News Agency (Taipei), August 5, 2005; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.