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Updated June 2008
Azerbaijan Profile
Export Control Developments
Please click here for the text of an archived report on Azerbaijan's export controls.
21 September 2005: Two Radar Stations Become Operational in Azerbaijan under the U.S.-Funded Caspian Guard Initiative
In an interview given to Agence France Presse on 21 September 2005, the U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan, Reno Harnish, provided details about the current status of U.S.-Azerbaijani border defense and maritime security assistance programs.[1] Ambassador Harnish stated that the U.S. government provided funds for the construction of two radar stations in the northern and southern parts of Azerbaijan in the framework of the Caspian Guard Initiative (CGI). One radar station is located near the town of Khizi (also spelled Khyzy, Xizi or Chyzy) in the mountainous northern part of Azerbaijan, approximately 50 km from the border with Russia. The other radar station is located near the town of Astara, located on Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea coastline in close proximity to the border with Iran. The Astara radar station is about 20 km from the town with the same name on the Iranian side of the border.[1,2,3] According to Ambassador Harnish, the new radar stations are operational and have been integrated into the radar network that Azerbaijan inherited from the Soviet era.[1]
Developed by the European Command (EUCOM) of the U.S. armed forces (headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany) and financed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the CGI (also referred to as the Caspian Guard) is aimed at strengthening air, ground, and maritime border defense of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan by addressing proliferation, terrorism, and trafficking threats around the Caspian Sea. Since its launch in the fall of 2003, the CGI has evolved from the concept development phase to full implementation with the establishment of an integrated airspace, maritime, and border control regime for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. With a primary focus on maritime security and border defense, the CGI represents a unique effort in which the U.S. military, civilian agencies, and commercial entities are engaged in partnership arrangements with host countries to protect key offshore oil industry infrastructure and to counter regional security threats emanating from weapons proliferation, terrorism, and illicit trafficking of narcotics, small arms and contraband commodities.[4,5,6,7,8]
The Khizi and Astara radar stations are capable of spotting objects within a 400-450-km area at a maximum altitude of 300 km. The Astara radar station is designed to monitor the entire southern coastline of the Caspian Sea and the northern and northeastern parts of Iran, whereas the Khizi radar station covers the southern part of the Russian Federation, including Chechnya and Dagestan, as well as the entire northern coastline of the Caspian Sea. While the stated purpose for the construction and operation of the Astara and Khizi radar stations is to monitor the borders of Azerbaijan, these stations are also capable of detecting ballistic missile launches and intercepting radio communications and cellular phone conversations, not only on the territory of Azerbaijan, but also in the aforementioned parts of Russia and Iran.[1,3,9,10]
In his discussion of U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan, Ambassador Harnish also noted that the U.S. government has already spent US$30 million on upgrading Azerbaijan's coast guards' equipment with a sophisticated radar system, personnel training, and ship repair, and that the United States intends to spend the same amount on strengthening the Azerbaijani navy.[1,9,11,12] Over the next six years, the U.S. government plans to invest US$135 million to strengthen the naval forces of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan within the framework of the CGI.[1,4,9,11,12] Other complementary U.S. maritime border defense assistance programs include the US$20-million program launched in July 2004 and implemented by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to train the Azerbaijani maritime border guards, as well as exercises organized by the U.S. Navy SEALS to train Azerbaijan's elite 41st Special Naval Warfare Unit in June 2004.[4,10] The focus of these programs is to train the Azerbaijani maritime border guards and naval forces to intercept terrorists, weapons, and narcotics on the Caspian Sea.[5] Ambassador Harnish emphasized that the CGI is not directed against any country in the region.[1,11,12]
In Iran, the news about the construction of the two radar stations in Azerbaijan initially elicited a negative reaction. On 25 September 2005, the Iranian English-language newspaper Iran News featured an editorial stating that by allowing the United States to increase its military presence in the region under the guise of border defense cooperation, the Azerbaijani leadership was jeopardizing the country's long-term national security interests. The author of the editorial argued that the growing U.S. military presence will ultimately curtail the influence of such regional powers as Russia, Iran, and China, which would inevitably lead to increased competition over the oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea.[13]
The official reaction of the Iranian government, however, was milder. On 7 October 2005, at the 18th meeting of government officials from the Caspian Sea littoral states held in Baku, Azerbaijan, Mohsen Baharvend, head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry's legal department, told the press that "Iran has no problem with countries that are cooperating to fight terrorism and drug trafficking. These are issues which all five Caspian nations are interested in resolving."[14,15,16]
Considering that Russia operates an early-warning radar installation in Azerbaijan, Moscow has shown some concern about the construction of two U.S.-funded radar stations in Azerbaijan. On 26 September 2005, an unnamed top Russian military official told the Interfax news agency that, while the construction of any radar station in close proximity to Russian borders is undesirable, the radar station built in Azerbaijan "will not affect the combat readiness of the Russian Defense Ministry's units and subunits deployed in the North Caucasus."[17] The Russian official added that the main concern for the Russian side would be possible electromagnetic interference between the frequencies of Russian radar stations and the Khizi radar station in Azerbaijan.[17]
In a strategic move, the Russian delegation at the aforementioned meeting in Baku of the working group on the status of the Caspian Sea, which was held on 6-7 October 2005, called for the establishment of a new joint naval operations group—CasFor—that would include the naval forces of all five Caspian Sea littoral states. Closely mirroring the objectives of the CGI, the purpose of CasFor would be to protect the Caspian Sea from terrorism and to fight against trafficking in WMD, arms, and narcotics. The important condition embedded in the CasFor proposal is that it rules out the participation of non-regional powers, such as the United States. Clearly intended to serve as a potential counterweight to the CGI, CasFor would allow Russia to dominate this arrangement, since its naval forces would dwarf the combined naval forces of the remaining Caspian Sea littoral states.[18] According to the Russian Minister of Defense, Sergey Ivanov, the first meeting of government representatives of all Caspian Sea littoral states for the creation of the CasFor will take place in Moscow on 14 November 2005.[19]
Editor's Note: The legal status of the Caspian Sea, including the central issue of delimitation of maritime borders, has not yet been determined by the five littoral states. The negotiations on the legal status of the Caspian Sea have been under way for more than a decade since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Rich in oil and gas resources, the Caspian Sea represents a strategically important area for all five littoral states. In this context, whether the Caspian Sea is a lake or a sea spells out either benefits or losses for each of the five states. If the Caspian Sea is classified as a 'sea', under international law, each state would have a 'territorial sea', an exclusive economic zone, and a continental shelf. If on the other hand, it is treated as a 'lake' the sovereignty, rights of navigation, and terms of use of waters for non-navigation purposes would have to be determined by the border states.[20,21]For a comprehensive discussion of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, see: Barbara Janusz, The Caspian Sea: Legal Status and Regime Problems, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Briefing Paper REP BP 05/02, August 2005, <http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/rep/BP0805caspian.pdf>.
Sources:
[1] Simon Ostrovsky, "U.S. Working to Boost Sea Forces in Oil-rich Caspian: Envoy," Agence France Presse, 21 September 2005; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[2] Sevindzh Abdullaeva and Viktor Shuman, "U.S. Embassy Confirms Radar Station Building in Azerbaijan," ITAR-TASS, 23 September 2005; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[3] Iason Athanasiadis, "Stirrings Near Iran's Oil Fields in Khuzestan," Daily Star (Lebanon) (online edition), 17 October 2005, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/>.
[4] Russ Rizzo, "Pentagon Aims to Bolster Security in Caspian Sea Region," Stars and Stripes [European Edition], 10 August 2005, <http://www.estripes.com/>.
[5] Beth Jones, "Expanding the Borders of Europe to the Black Sea Region" [Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Beth Jones for the Harvard University's Black Sea Security Program (BSSP)], 23 April 2004, BSSP website, <http://harvard-bssp.org/publications/?id=108>.
[6] "Caspian Guard," GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ops/caspian-guard.htm>.
[7] John J. Fialka, "Search for Crude Comes With New Dangers; U.S. Strategic and Diplomatic Thinking Adjusts to Handle Hot Spots With Oil Potential," Wall Street Journal, 11 April 2005, p. A4; in ProQuest Database, <http://proquest.umi.com>.
[8] Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, United States European Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1 March 2005, Part III, U.S. European Command Strategy: Theater Security Cooperation, European Regional Initiatives and Programs, Senate Arms Services Committee website, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2005/March/Jones%2003-01- 05.pdf>.
[9] "Iran Is Not Concerned over Caspian Radar Stations," AzerNEWS.net [Azerbaijan's English online newspaper], 13 October 2005, <http://www.azernews.net/>.
[10] Taleh Ziyadov, "Will Increasing U.S. Presence in Azerbaijan Mean More Trouble for Russia and Iran?" Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 190, 13 October 2005, Jamestown Foundation website, <http://www.jamestown.org/edm/index>.
[11] "U.S. to Assist Baku in Fleet Building," AssA-Irada news agency (Azerbaijan), 22 September 2005; UNDP Azerbaijan Development Bulletin, <http://www.unaz. org/undp/bulnews30/fleet.php>.
[12] "U.S. to Assist Baku in Fleet Building," AZERNews.net, 29 September 2005, <http://www.azernews.net/>.
[13] "Daily Warns Baku Against Blind Support for U.S.," Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 25 September 2005, <http://www.irna.ir/en/>.
[14] "Azerbaijan: Military Cooperation Does Not Target Neighbors," Agence France Presse, 7 October 2005; in DefenseNews.com, <http://www.defensenews.com/>.
[15] "Iran Unconcerned By U.S.-Funded Azerbaijani Radars," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 October 2005, <http://www.rferl.org/>.
[16] "Iran does not object to U.S. radar station in Azerbaijan," Interfax, October 7, 2005, <http://www.interfax.ru/>.
[17] "New Azeri Radar Station Will Not Affect Russian Units – Defense Official," MosNews.com, 27 September 2005; in BakuToday.net [Azerbaijani online newspaper], <http://www.mosnews.com/>.
[18] Vladimir Socor, "Russia Pressing for Exclusionary Naval Grouping in Caspian Sea," Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 198, 25 October 2005, Jamestown Foundation website, <http://www.jamestown.org/edm/index>.
[19] "V noyabre proydet soveshchaniye predstaviteley prikaspiyskikh gosudarstv" [Meeting of representatives of the Caspian littoral states will take place in November], RIA Novosti, 31 October 2005, <http://www.rian.ru/>.
[20] Sergei Vinogradov, "The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: A Card in the New 'Great Game'?" Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections [web portal of analytical information on global energy industry issues], <http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/speeches/vinogradov.htm>.
[21] Barbara Janusz, The Caspian Sea: Legal Status and Regime Problems. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Briefing Paper REP BP 05/02, August 2005, <http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/rep/ BP0805caspian.pdf>.
This item originally appeared in International Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/index.htm>.
January 2005: DOE Conducts Workshops in Azerbaijan
A team of DOE/NNSA technical export control specialists traveled to Baku, Azerbaijan, to conduct a Nuclear CIT workshop on 24-26 January 2005. The opening ceremony for the workshop was attended by the head of the Export Control Department of the Azerbaijani State Customs Committee (SCC), and the director and deputy director of the Institute of Radiation Problems (IRP). The three-day Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Commodity Identification Training course was organized in cooperation with Azeri technical specialists from the IRP. Twenty-three trainees representing the SCC (12), the Border Guard (6) and the Maritime Brigade (5) stationed at posts around the country attended the training. The course was conducted at the SCC Regional Training Center, a state-of-the-art facility outside of Baku. The course included modules on international nonproliferation regimes, nuclear and dual-use commodities subject to export control, and Azeri export control legislation. Also included were several sets of practical exercises, worksheets that had to be filled out by the students during the lectures, and a final exam.
Participant evaluations of the course showed a high level of satisfaction with the content of the course and noted its usefulness and relevance for fulfilling professional duties. The results of a test administered to the participants at the conclusion of the workshop suggested an adequate level of material assimilation. A manual with copies of all presentations was given to each workshop participant. It is expected that the attendees will use the manual at their posts as a basic reference guide.
[NIS Export Control Observer, March 2005, CNS website, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.]
October 2004: Azerbaijan Passes New Export Control Law
On 26 October 2004, President of Azerbaijan Ilkham Aliyev signed an edict approving a new law, On Control over Exports. The law was drafted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan in 2002 and submitted to government agencies for review and comments. After interagency review, the amended draft was sent to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce for external review. Many of the BIS suggestions were incorporated into the final draft, which was then passed for review by the Milli Mejlis (Azerbaijani parliament). On 29 December 2004, President Aliyev issued another edict by which he tasked the Cabinet of Ministers to submit proposals within three months on adjusting existing legal norms to the new law.
[NIS Export Control Observer, December 2004-January 2005, CNS website, <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.]
March 2004: New Azerbaijani Export Control Law under Parliamentary Review
In 2002 a new law On Export Control, consisting of 14 articles and covering all aspects of a national export control system, was drafted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan and submitted to government agencies for review and comments. After interagency review, the amended draft was sent to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce for external review. Many of the BIS suggestions were incorporated into the final draft, which is now under review by the Milli Mejlis (Azerbaijani parliament), in session since March 2004. The draft law has already passed through two readings, and most likely will be adopted as a law in 2004. When the law is adopted, the Cabinet of Ministers will have to issue a series of implementing decrees adjusting existing legal norms to the new law.
Currently, export controls in Azerbaijan are regulated by various documents comprised of presidential decrees and government resolutions that contain provisions pertaining to various aspects of export controls. The most important of them is Presidential Decree No. 609 On Further Liberalization of Foreign Trade in Azerbaijan, which was signed in June 1997 and established rules for exporting and importing goods, including special rules for transfers of sensitive goods and materials.
In accordance with Article 7.1 of Presidential Decree No. 609, exporters of weapons, military technology, and the essential spare parts for their production, nuclear materials, technology, equipment, special non-nuclear materials, and radiation sources, including radioactive waste, must obtain explicit permission from the Cabinet of Ministers. Unfortunately, the draft of the Law on Export Control does not clearly specify interagency process as a part of the licensing mechanism, which can be considered a serious deficiency of the draft law.
Presidential Decree No. 609 provides a list of goods subject to export controls. Appendix I of the Decree specifies goods, the export of which has to be licensed by the Cabinet of Ministers. The Appendix also lists corresponding "foreign trade nomenclature codes," which were used in Soviet times for customs commodity identification purposes. The current lists are derived, if not directly taken, from the Soviet control lists. However, Azerbaijan is currently in the process of replacing the outdated lists and codification system with a list based on the European Union (EU) Unified Control List. In the summer of 2002, the U.S. Department of Commerce began a series of training workshops with Azerbaijani government officials to persuade Baku to introduce the EU list. The Azerbaijani government has agreed in principle to the idea, and a national control list, based on the EU model list, is expected to be approved by the president as a follow-up to the anticipated adoption of the law On Export Control.
It is fair to say that Azerbaijan is still in the early stages of developing its nonproliferation export control mechanisms. It is not a member of any multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, or Wassenaar Arrangement), although it is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Chemical Weapons Convention. Although Section 907 of the U.S. Freedom Support Act limits the ability of the U.S. government to provide assistance to Azerbaijan, the U.S. Congress has granted a waiver that allows for provision of nonproliferation assistance that is in the national security interests of the United States. Taking advantage of this, the United States has been providing funding for export control workshops in Azerbaijan, purchasing hardware and equipment for Azerbaijani customs and border guards, and conducting counterproliferation training.
[Victor Zaborsky, Senior Research Associate, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia]
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
February 2004: U.S.-Sponsored Export Control Meetings Organized in Azerbaijan in February 2004
In February 2004, the U.S. Departments of Energy, State, and Commerce sponsored several meetings to promote export controls and WMD nonproliferation in Azerbaijan. This article provides a summary of the export control-relevant workshops that took place in Baku, Azerbaijan.
Conference on "Transit Controls as a Nonproliferation Tool"
The conference entitled "Transit Controls as a Nonproliferation Tool" was organized on February 18, 2004, in Baku by the University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) and the Baku Center for Foreign Trade Security with funding from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation. The list of participants included managers from Azerbaijani freight forwarding companies, who were the target audience of the conference, and representatives from governmental agencies, including the licensing office of the Cabinet of Ministers.
The main theme of the conference was the acknowledgement of the role that freight forwarders should play in controlling transfers of dual-use goods and equipment. The business community and government representatives were introduced to export control basics such as elements of an effective export control system, multilateral regimes, nonproliferation challenges and responses, and current Azerbaijani export control infrastructure. Through their questions and comments at the conference, the freight forwarders demonstrated inadequate knowledge of nonproliferation and export control, but showed interest in learning more about the subject and actively participated in Q&A sessions.
A survey distributed among the participants demonstrated that the conference made a difference in terms of providing the participants with initial basic information on such important security issues as nonproliferation export controls. At the same time, the survey also revealed the need for follow-up activities and more detailed discussions with Azerbaijani companies engaged in cargo transit.
"Nuclear Export Control Enforcement Workshop—Maritime Nuclear-Related Commodity Identification"
On 19-20 February 2004 the "Nuclear Export Control Enforcement Workshop—Maritime Nuclear-Related Commodity Identification" was organized in Baku for Azerbaijani land and maritime Border Guard officers. Sixteen representatives of each division attended the workshop, which concentrated on the identification of nuclear-related dual-use materials and equipment during inspections of ships or on-land cargoes. At the end of the training sessions, the participants were given certificates of completion.
The workshop was the fourth training exercise of its kind organized in Azerbaijan by the DOE's International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), which operates under the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). INECP conducted "Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Commodity Identification Training Workshops" for Azerbaijani Customs and Border Guards officers in June and September 2002, and in February 2003. In 2003, INECP awarded a contract to the Baku-based Institute of Radiation Problems (IRP) under the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan to develop a training plan for an indigenous version of the commodity classification course. A letter from the State Customs Committee of Azerbaijan to the National Academy of Sciences officially designated the IRP as a National Training Center for customs in the areas of nuclear and dual-use items. The IRP is also the principal consulting organization for customs when it comes to practical identification of seized goods.
Export Control Legislative Briefing
On 23 February 2004, CITS conducted an export control briefing for members of the Azerbaijan parliament in Baku under a grant given by the U.S. State Department. A similar meeting was previously organized in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in October 2003.
More than 20 Milli Mejlis (Azerbaijani Parliament) members from seven key standing parliamentary committees (Security and Defense Issues Standing Committee; Economic Policy Standing Committee; Legal and Political System Standing Committee; Social Policy Standing Committee; Human Rights Standing Committee; Natural Resources, Energy, and Ecological Issues Standing Committee; and Regional Issues Standing Committee) attended the briefing. Formal presentations addressed such issues as general WMD proliferation threats, the basics of export control systems, the importance of export control legislation, and the role of the U.S. Congress in development, implementation, and enforcement of export control legislation in the United States. A group of Azerbaijani lawyers also presented a legal assessment of the draft of the Law on Export Control scheduled to be reviewed during the next parliamentary session, which started in March 2004. The Milli Mejlis is expected to adopt the law later in 2004.
Another event, the U.S.-Azerbaijan National Control List and Classification Workshop sponsored by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce, originally planned for 24-26 February was rescheduled for a later date—9-11 March 2004.
[Victor Zaborsky, Senior Research Associate, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia]
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
February 2004: United States and Azerbaijan Sign Agreement on Cooperation in WMD Nonproliferation
On 2 January 2004, U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Reno L. Harnish and Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev signed an agreement On Cooperation between the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan and U.S. Department of Defense in Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.[1,2] According to the Agreement, the United States will provide Azerbaijan with $10 million in technical assistance intended to strengthen Azerbaijani borders and enhance the country's ability to detect WMD and related materials, and prevent their transportation across or storage on the territory of Azerbaijan.[3] Specifically, the funds allocated under the U.S. Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program will be spent on the purchase of equipment and spare parts for the Azerbaijani border guard service, personnel training, improvements in border infrastructure, repairs of patrol ships, and upgrades to their surveillance and communication systems.[4,5] According to Trend news agency, the United States will allocate $800,000 in 2004 alone to help Azerbaijan secure its borders.[6] In 2004, the United States will also supply Azerbaijan with three Ribcraft Mitigator 5.85 patrol boats, each worth about $60,000.[7,8] These boats equipped with diesel engines are capable of speeds in excess of 35 miles per hour with a capacity of more than six people. They offer increased maneuverability and functionality, and can easily be transported by land, air, and sea.[9] The Azerbaijani border guard service has two similar boats in service.[8]
This Agreement followed the 30 December 2003, extension of the waiver of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act for Azerbaijan by President George Bush.[10] According to Presidential Determination No. 2004-18 granting the extension, the waiver "is necessary to support United States efforts to counter international terrorism; is necessary to support the operational readiness of United States Armed Forces or coalition partners to counter international terrorism; is important to Azerbaijan's border security; and will not undermine or hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia."[10]
This is not the first time the United States and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on cooperation in preventing WMD proliferation. On 28 September 1999, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre and Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Tofiq Zulfugarov signed a cooperation agreement on the counterproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and related materials.[11,12]
[The Freedom Support Act was passed by the U.S. Congress in October 1992 to facilitate economic and humanitarian aid to the countries of the former Soviet Union. Section 907 of this law banned direct U.S. government assistance to the Azerbaijani government until it relieved pressure on Armenia and the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. President Bush waived this section on 25 January 2002, after the U.S. Congress passed legislation as part of the Foreign Operations Appropriation for fiscal year 2003 granting him the authority to do so.][11]
Sources:
[1] "SShA i Azerbaydzhan budut sotrudnichat v oblasti predotvrashcheniya rasprostraneniya oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya" [The U.S. and Azerbaijan will cooperate in the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction], Bilik Dunyasy news agency (Azerbaijan), January 5, 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[2] TV 1 Channel (Baku, Azerbaijan), January 2, 2004; in "Azerbaijan, US Sign Agreement on Preventing Proliferation of WMD," FBIS Document CEP20040102000084.
[3] Sevindzh Abdullayeva, Viktor Shulman, "V Baku podpisano azerbaidzhano-amerikanskoye soglasheniye o sotrudnichestve v oblasti predotvrashcheniya rasprostraneniya OMU" [Azerbaijani-U.S. agreement on cooperation in preventing WMD proliferation signed in Baku], ITAR-TASS, January 2, 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[4] G. Mustafayeva, "SShA vydelili Azerbaydzhanu $10 mln na sferu borby s rasprostraneniyem oruzhiya massovogo unichtozheniya" [United States allocates $10 million to Azerbaijan for the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction], Trend news agency (Baku), January 5, 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[5] Nurani, "Bush prodlil otmenu 907-y popravki" [Bush extended the waiver of Section 907], Ekho electronic newspaper, No. 247 (739), January 6, 2003, <http://www2.echo-az.com/archive2/739/facts.shtml#10>.
[6] G. Azizogly, "SShA v 2004 godu vydelyat 800 tys. dollarov na okhranu granits Azerbaydzhana" [In 2004, the United States will allocate $800,000 for the protection of Azerbaijani borders], Trend news agency (Baku), January 16, 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[7] "Beregovaya gvardiya SShA peredast v dar vooruzhennym silam Azerbaidzhana neskolko katerov" [U.S. Coast Guard will provide Azerbaijani armed forces with several boats], Centran information agency, January 9, 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>. [8] "S pomoshchyu SShA" [With U.S. help], Krasnaya zvezda, January 22, 2004; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[9] "Ribcraft Signs Contracts with United States Coast Guard and United States Air Force," Ribcraft USA press release, January 5, 2004, Ribcraft USA website, <http://www.ribcraftusa.com/news01_05_04.html>.
[10] Memorandum for the Secretary of State: Extension of Waiver of Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act with Respect to Assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan, Presidential Determination No. 2004-18, White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, December 30, 2003, White House website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031230-6.html>.
[11] "Lifting Restrictions on Azerbaijan Permits More Cooperation," White House statement on Presidential Waiver of Section 907, January 30, 2002, U.S. Department of State's Office of International Information Programs website, <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02013006.htm>.
[12] "U.S. and The Republic of Azerbaijan Sign WMD Counterproliferation Agreement," U.S. Department of Defense Press Release No. 467-99, October 6, 1999, U.S. Department of Defense website, <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/1999/b10061999_bt467-99.html>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
May 2003: Russia Opens New Checkpoint on Border with Azerbaijan
On 17 May 2003, Russia opened the Yarag-Kazmalyar checkpoint on its border between the Russian Republic of Dagestan and Azerbaijan. The checkpoint is an 11.5 hectare complex located near a bridge crossing the Samur River, and represents an investment of 250 million rubles ($8.24 million as of June 30, 2003) approved by the Russian State Duma in 1996.[1,2] In the past, the area was used by groups for criminal cross-border activities. The new checkpoint will permit a flow of 500 vehicles per day – 300 cargo trucks, 180 automobiles, and 20 buses, as well as 1,000 passengers and pedestrians. Officials expect that the new checkpoint will promote the development of trade relations between Russia and the Caucasian states while simultaneously facilitating the activities of customs officials, border guards, and other enforcement agencies.[1]
Sources:
[1] "17 maya 2003 goda na rossiysko-azerbaydzhanskom uchastke gosgranitsy RF otkryvayetsya novyy kompleks punkta propuska 'Yarag-Kazmalyar' Dagestanskoy tamozhniy" [17 May 2003 on the Russian-Azerbaijani border the Dagestani customs checkpoint complex "Yarag-Kazmalyar" is opened], Finmarket novosti, 18 May 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.ru>.
[2] Azertac, 18 May 2003; in "New Checkpoint Opens on Russian-Azerbaijani Border," FBIS Document CEP20030518000024.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
21 March 2003: New Border Guard Facility at Georgian-Azerbaijani Border Opens with U.S. Assistance
On 21 March 2003, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze participated in a ceremony marking the opening of the new border checkpoint at Red Bridge on the Georgian-Azerbaijani border.[1,2]
According to a 20 March 2003 press release from the U.S. Embassy in Georgia, the newly built border guard station is a fully fenced-in compound designed to accommodate 65 people and comprised of administrative and command buildings, single and joint housing, a kitchen-dining facility, laundry, warehouses, an ammunition storage area, a vehicle maintenance area, dog kennels, and a recreation area for physical training of checkpoint personnel.[1] In addition, the new border guard station comes with two helipads for the deployment of Georgian Border Guard aircraft.[1]
At the ceremony, Chairman of the Georgian State Border Guard Department Lieutenant General Valeriy Chkheidze noted that the new border guard station fully meets international standards and has no analogies in the entire expanse of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[3] Chkheidze also emphasized that the Red Bridge border checkpoint is equipped with monitoring systems that allow control of the entire perimeter of the Azerbaijani-Georgian border.[3] The new border guard station also constitutes a significant improvement in the working and living conditions of the Georgian Border Guards deployed at the border with Azerbaijan. Since 1997 the Georgian Border Guards had been living in tents in the Khrami River plain, which is regularly flooded and where the temperatures fluctuate from -15◦ C in winter to 45◦ C in summer.[1]
The construction of the Red Bridge border checkpoint, a $3.5 million project, [3,4] is part of the Georgian Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) assistance program funded by the U.S. government. The Georgian State Border Guard Department initially approached the GBSLE program for assistance in 1999. In 2001, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began project site planning and construction oversight. The Red Bridge border checkpoint was built by the Zafer Construction Company (Turkey), which won an international tender and began construction in March 2002.[1]
On 25 March 2003, Chkheidze told the Georgian news agency Prime-News that during a visit to the United States planned for summer 2003, he intends to discuss with his American counterparts the modernization of the border posts along the Chechen sector of the Georgian-Russian border.[3] In particular, a new border guard command post is planned for the mountain village of Shatili. It is envisioned that the border guard duties on the Chechen sector of the Georgian-Russian border will be assumed by soldiers who have received special military training in the U.S. Department of Defense "Train and Equip" program.[3] Head of Command Headquarters of the Georgian State Border Guard Department Colonel Korneli Salia also indicated to Prime-News that total U.S. assistance to Georgian border guards in 2003 will amount to $14 million.[4]
Past examples of GBSLE assistance to the Georgian border guards include the $3.2 million renovation of an aircraft maintenance facility at the Alekseyevka airbase, which is essential for the upkeep of the Mi-8 and Mi-2 helicopters employed by the Georgian border guards.[5] The Alekseyevka airbase is located adjacent to Tbilisi's commercial airport and supports the aircraft assets of the Georgian Border Guard forces, including a rapid reaction group positioned in Tbilisi. The renovation of the aircraft maintenance facility was completed in August 2002 by the Morrison Construction Company, Ltd. (UK), which began the project on April 6, 2001.[5]
The GBSLE program also provides assistance to the Georgian Customs Department. On 20 March 2003, Acting Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia Tom C. Adams (U.S. Department of State) met with Chairman of the Georgian Customs Department Aleksander Aslanikashvili. The U.S. and Georgian officials met to discuss progress in implementing the GBSLE assistance program and to resolve questions of continued financing.[6] According to the press service of the Georgian Customs Department, the U.S. government started to provide technical assistance to Georgian customs under the auspices of the GBSLE program in 2002. This includes the installation of the "Asycuda" computerized customs management system and the planned construction of new border checkpoints.[6] In particular, the U.S. government will provide assistance in building border checkpoints at Sadakhlo (on the Georgian-Azerbaijani border), Kazbegi (on the Georgian-Russian border), and Vale (on the Georgian-Turkish border). In addition, U.S. assistance will include the modernization of the border checkpoint at the Tbilisi airport.[6]
[The Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) assistance program was launched in 1998 to support Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity by enabling the Georgian government to control the movement of people and goods across its land borders, coastline, and ports of entry, to reduce weapons smuggling and other illicit trafficking, and to increase the Georgian government's ability to collect customs revenues.[5] The GBSLE program is funded by the U.S. government, administered by the U.S. State Department and coordinated by the U.S. Customs Service through GBSLE program country director James Kelly. Under the auspices of the GBSLE program, the U.S. government has provided Georgian border guards, Georgian customs officials and the Georgian Ministry of Defense with communications equipment, vehicles and helicopters, spares parts for transport and patrol, surveillance and detection equipment, computers for automation of application, licensing and regulatory systems, and forensics laboratory assistance.[5] Since its launch in 1998, the GBSLE program has provided $70 million in assistance to the Georgian border protection, law enforcement, defense and customs agencies.][6]
Sources:
[1] "American and Georgian Authorities Inaugurate New Border Guard Facility at Red Bridge," U.S. Embassy in Georgia, Official Press Release, 20 March 2003, <http://web.sanet.ge/usembassy/releases/mar20_03.htm>.
[2] "US-Funded Border Guard Checkpoint Opened at Border with Azerbaijan," Civil Georgia, 21 March 2003, <http://www.civil.ge>.
[3] "SShA profinansirovali sooruzheniye sovremennoy pogranzastavy v Gruzii, vydeliv 3,5 milliona dollarov" (The U.S. financed construction of modern border checkpoint in Georgia, providing $3.5 million), Prime-News News Agency (Georgia), 21 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[4] "Na chechenskom uchastke granitsy s Rossiyey, pri finansovoy podderzhke SShA, sozdayetsya novaya komendatura" (A new border post is being created on the Chechen section of Georgia's border with Russia with U.S. financial support), Prime-News News Agency (Georgia), 25 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[5] Grant Sattler, "Europe District rebuilds Russian hanger," Engineer Update, August 2002, Vol.26, No. 8; [Engineer Update is an unofficial publication published monthly for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers], <http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/pubs/aug02/story7.htm>.
[6] "Predsedatel tamozhennogo departamenta i predstavitel Gosdepartamenta SShA obsudili khod sovmestnoy programmy" (Customs department chairman and U.S. State Department representative of the discussed progress of joint program), Prime-News News Agency (Georgia), 20 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
6 February 2003: EFFORTS TO INCREASE BORDER SECURITY
On 6 February 2003, Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev met with senior border guard officials to discuss new border security measures. The major reasons for this initiative, according to State Border Guard Commander Major General Elchin Guliyev, are recent attempts by Middle Eastern terrorists to enter Azerbaijan on their way to Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. Guliyev noted that border regions in the northern part of the country are particularly vulnerable to such incursions.
[Richard Giragosian "New Efforts to Increase Border Security," TransCaucasus: A Chronology, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 2003.]
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm> {Entered 13 March 2003 AD}
15-18 April 2002: SIXTH FORUM ON EXPORT CONTROLS: BARRIER AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, PROLIFERATION, AND TERRORISM
The Sixth Central Asia and Caucasus Nonproliferation Export Control Forum, Export Control: a Barrier against Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism was held on 15-18 April 2002 in Tashkent. The Forum was co-sponsored by the U.S. and Uzbekistani governments, and gathered representatives from Central Asia, Caucasus, the United States, and Europe, as well as experts in the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Forum addressed the risks of WMD proliferation and terrorism, and the role of interagency coordination and international cooperation to ameliorate these risks.[1] During the plenary sessions, country representatives highlighted the progress made by their governments in strengthening their export control systems in the past year. Discussions focused on national export control regulations and licensing processes, the possibility of adopting the European unified control list, the regional Transit Agreement currently under discussion among Central Asian and Caucasus countries, and border security. At the end of the meeting, the delegates produced a list of recommendations to bring back to their respective capitals, stressing, among other things, the importance of completing and signing the Transit Agreement; harmonizing export control systems by adopting the European Union control list and standardizing end-user certificates; encouraging interagency cooperation and involvement of the scientific community in the export control process; customs officials training and creating export control command centers to assist their work at the borders. The delegates also underscored the importance of facilitating information sharing and coordination, particularly when trafficking incidents occur in the region.[2]
In his speech to the Forum, Ali Isa Mamedov, Senior Advisor on International Economic Relations to the Azerbaijani Cabinet of Ministers, reported that measures to establish an effective export control system in Azerbaijan are underway. The Azerbaijani Parliament, the Milli Medzhlis, is reviewing the draft of a comprehensive, 14-article export control law. Azerbaijan is also developing a control list based on that of the European Union, as well as export licensing procedures, an automated licensing system, and supporting legislation that will go into effect once the export control law is in place. In addition, Mamedov noted that the Azerbaijani customs service has signed regional cooperation agreements with Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.[3]
Sources:
[1] "US Department of State and the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan Hosts Forum "Export Controls: Barriers Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism", The United States Embassy in Uzbekistan website, <http://www.usembassy.uz/2002/020412.htm>, 12 April 2002.
[2] "Materialy VI foruma po eksportnomy kontrolyu," Tashkent Institute of Strategic and International Studies website, <http://www.uzstrateg.info/frontend/index.cfm?CFID=171466&CFTOKEN=86894031>.
[3] "Doklad Ali Isa Mamedova, Starshego sovetnika Departamenta mezhdunarodnykh ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy Kabineta Ministrov Azerbaydzhana," Tashkent Institute of Strategic and International Studies website, <http://www.uzstrateg.info/frontend/index.cfm?target=analysis&asection_id=8>. {Entered 5 December 2002 AI}
5 July 2000: U.S. ALLOCATES $100,000 AND PATROL BOATS TO AZERBAIJAN
During a visit to the United States, Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Ramiz Melikov announced that the United States has agreed to provide Azerbaijan with two U.S. patrol boats and $100,000 in aid to Azerbaijan's border and customs services. The U.S. assistance is the result of a joint Azerbaijani-U.S. declaration on military cooperation that was adopted by the U.S. Congress during Melikov's stay in the United States. Melikov noted that the aid is being provided in spite of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which prohibits the U.S. from providing aid to Azerbaijan.
[MPA, 5 July 2000; in "US Allocates $100,000 in Aid Despite Section 907," FBIS Document CEP20000705000174.]{Entered 7 March 2001 KB}
17 June 2000: AZERBAIJANI ENVOY TO SAUDI ARABIA DENIES REPORT ON SMUGGLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Dr. Aylman Arasli, the Azerbaijani ambassador to Saudi Arabia, denied rumors that Azerbaijan is involved in the smuggling of nuclear weapons and warheads to Islamic countries in the Middle East. For more information, see the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database.
[Umar al-Zubaydi, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 17 June 2000; in "Azerbaijani Envoy to Saudi Denies Reports on Smuggling Nuclear Weapons," FBIS Document GMP20000617000008.]{Entered 7 March 2001 KB}
28 September 1999: U.S., AZERBAIJAN SIGN NONPROLIFERATION ACCORD
On 28 September 1999, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre and Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Tofik Zulfugarov signed an agreement pledging cooperation on the counterproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and related materials. Under terms of the agreement, the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Customs Service will train and equip Azerbaijani officials in preventing, deterring, and investigating incidents involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction materials. Zulfugarov noted that this was the first bilateral agreement in the field of security signed by Azerbaijan and the United States.[1,2].
Sources:
[1] "US, Azerbaijan Sign Counterproliferation Pact," The Post-Soviet States & Eastern Europe Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 23, 11 October 1999, p. 14.
[2] Ivan Lebedev, ITAR TASS, 29 September 1999; in "US, Azerbaijan Sign Accord on Arms Non-Proliferation," FBIS Document FTS19990929000377.{Entered 7 March 2001 KB}
2 February 1999: TURKISH SECRET SERVICES CONFISCATE URANIUM
Turkish agents in the western Turkish city of Bursa seized 100g of enriched uranium from four dealers who had smuggled it into Turkey from Azerbaijan.[1] The Azerbaijani National Security Ministry refused to comment on the case, arguing that since Azerbaijan has no uranium the material must have originated in Russia.[2] For more information, see the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database.
Sources:
[1] Andrey Palariya, ITAR-TASS, 2 February 1999; in "Turkish Secret Services Confiscate Enriched Uranium," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>.
[2] Elkhan Shahinoglu, Azadlyg, 3 February 1999; in "No Comment by Azeri Security Ministry on Uranium Smuggling" FBIS Document FTS19990205000134. .{Entered 7 March 2001 KB}
16 February 1998: U.S. DOE AND DOD OFFER EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE
At the third forum for coordinating technical support to the NIS in Vienna, the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy expressed their willingness to help set up border checkpoints in Azerbaijan to control the export and import of radioactive materials.
[D. Karakmazli, Sharg, 17 February 1998; in "Swedish experts to help Azerbaijan on nuclear safety laws," FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-98-049.]{Entered 7 March 2001 KB}
15 July 1997: CUSTOMS TO TIGHTEN CONTROL OVER RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES
In July 1997, the government of Azerbaijan issued a decree requiring the installation of automated radiation detection equipment at all customs control posts at the nation's airports and seaports, and on its highways and railroads. The equipment will be installed in 1997-1998. The decree requires all organizations and enterprises that operate in Azerbaijan to inform the appropriate ministries and state agencies of any imported or exported radioactive material. In addition, special insurance documents will be required for the transport of such materials. All organizations and enterprises in Azerbaijan in possession of radioactive materials are required to submit an inventory to the appropriate ministries and state agencies before 15 December 1997.
["Uzhestochayetsya kontrol za radiatseyey na tamozhennykh postakh," Informatsionnyy bulleten pravozaschitnogo tsentra Azerbaidzhana, 13-19 July 1997.]{Entered 7 March 2001 KB}
19 August 1996: REPORT OF ATTEMPTED SMUGGLING DENIED
The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Security of Azerbaijan both denied a Russian NTV report that a group of scientists had been arrested for attempting to smuggle four kilos of uranium from Azerbaijan.
["Azerbaijan: Security Officials Deny Uranium Smuggling Report," Turan, 19 August 1996; in FBIS-SOV-96-162.] {Entered 9 October 1996 JW}
Archived Report on the Export Control System of Azerbaijan
Parts of this report were originally prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in May 1998 under a grant from the United States Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Energy or the United States Government.
INTRODUCTION
Since declaring independence in August 1991, Azerbaijan has become known to the outside world primarily for its vast reserves of oil and its on-going conflict with Armenia over the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region. As a new state with limited financial and human resources, Azerbaijan has focused its energies on these two issues. Perhaps as a result, nonproliferation export controls have been slow to develop in Azerbaijan.
In an effort to adapt its national legislation to the demands of a market economy, the Azerbaijani Government has been striving to remove limitations in the sphere of export operations, rather than strengthen export controls. According to an Azerbaijani official, the Government of Azerbaijan is carrying out a policy of long term liberalization of foreign trade in the country.[1] Current legislation does not appear to contain any resolutions or regulations that deal specifically with export controls for nonproliferation purposes. Rather, several decrees and regulations on foreign trade policy tangentially affect the controls on sensitive, military-related goods. For the most part, however, these decrees are designed to remove restrictions on trade and facilitate the export and import of goods and services. As in many Southern Tier countries of the Newly Independent States (NIS), it is unlikely that Azerbaijan currently is able to effectively implement the few export controls that do exist on paper.
Azerbaijan's industry is dominated by petroleum- and natural gas-related enterprises. There appears to be little industry that could be considered relevant to production of weapons of mass destruction, other than a developed chemical industry.[2] According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Azerbaijan is one of only three countries in the NIS with no known nuclear or uranium mining activities. There is only one nuclear-related site in Azerbaijan: the Izotop Industrial Complex. Izotop is a six-hectare storage facility for low-level radioactive waste. Located 30km outside of Baku, it holds 510 tons of radioactive waste.[3]
In September 1999, the United States and Azerbaijan signed an agreement pledging cooperation in the counterproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and related materials. Under the agreement, the United States agreed to train Azerbaijani officials in preventing, deterring, and investigating incidents involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[5,6] Although Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act limits the ability of the U.S. government to provide assistance to Azerbaijan, the U.S. Congress granted a waiver which allows for nonproliferation assistance that is in the national security interests of the United States.[4]
Section 907 has had an effect, however. Because the U.S. Government's hands were tied, private U.S. investment in the oil and gas sector and trade promotion have been emphasized in the United States-Azerbaijan relationship. Thus, in comparison with other countries of the NIS, Azerbaijan has a lot of catching up to do in terms of developing a true understanding of the need for effective nonproliferation export controls.
Sources:
[1] CNS correspondence with Azerbaijani official, July 1997.
[2] CIA World Fact Book 1997, CIA Homepage, http://www.odci.gov/.
[3] Zerkalo, 17 February 1996, p. 13; in "Nuclear Waste Control, Handling Criticized," FBIS-TEN-96-003, 17 February 1996.
[4] NISNP Telephone Conversation with Officials from the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, May 1998.
[5] MPA, 5 July 2000; in "U.S. Allocates $100,000 in Aid Despite Section 907," FBIS Document CEP20000705000174.
[6] "U.S., Azerbaijan Sign Counterproliferation Pact," The Post-Soviet States & Eastern Europe Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 23, 11 October 1999, p. 14.{Updated 6/19/2001 KB}
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
The President of Azerbaijan has the authority to issue laws and decrees relevant to export controls. The Cabinet of Ministers grants permission to exporters regarding the export of certain controlled goods and services, including military technologies and nuclear-related materials. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations drafts regulations in the sphere of foreign trade, including the 17 December 1996 Presidential Decree "On Further Development of Foreign Trade Regulation." The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations also grants permission to exporters regarding the export of certain goods, including know-how and the results of scientific research. Finally, the Customs Service checks export documentation and inspects cargo before export.
LEGISLATION
Draft Export Control Law
Mr. Ali Isa Mamedov, senior advisor to the International Economic Relations Department at the Azerbaijani Cabinet of Ministers, presented an overview of draft export control legislation in Azerbaijan to the Sixth Central Asia and Caucasus Nonproliferation Export Control Forum, held 15-18 April 2002 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
According to Mamedov, the Azerbaijani Milli Medzhlis (Parliament) is reviewing a draft export control law, which was developed with the assistance of the United States.
The draft law, which includes 14 articles, provides a foundation for the country's export control system. The law defines WMD and the means of their delivery, other kinds of weapons, materials and raw materials, dual-use products and other categories. The draft law also defines export and import, re-export, re-import, transit, importers, and exporters. The articles stipulate the principles for controlling exports, the scope of application of the law, procedures for defining the products subject to export control, legal bases for granting licenses, participation in international organizations, and responsibilities for handling violations of the law on export control.
After the law is adopted, a presidential edict will define the authority of the governmental organizations responsible for implementing export controls. Additional normative acts, covering the following procedures, will be adopted:
1. Consideration and adoption of a control list of products subject to export control;
2. Preparation and adoption of rules for granting licenses for import, export, transit, and re-export of products subject to export control;
3. Determination of control procedures during pre-licensing and post-licensing periods, for product delivery to final customer, and for using product according to stated purpose;
4. Development of an automated licensing system;
5. Amendments to existing legislative and normative acts due to the adoption of the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Export Control.
According to Mamedov, the control list will be confirmed by a separate normative act. This will facilitate future amendments to the list if needed. A draft control list has already been developed and is based on that of the European Union.
["Doklad Ali Isa Mamedova, Starshego sovetnika Departamenta mezhdunarodnykh ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy Kabineta Ministrov Azerbaydzhana," Tashkent Institute of Strategic and Inter-regional Studies Web Site, http://www.uzstrateg.info/frontend/index.cfm?target=analysis&sub=article&analysis_id=34.] {Entered 1/24/03 AD}
Presidential Decree, 24 June 1997, Rules Regulating Foreign Trade in the Republic of Azerbaijan
This document almost completely eliminates all restrictions on export operations, with the exception of limitations on the quantities of certain goods that may be exported. However, restrictions remain on the export of certain sensitive goods. The export of the following goods may be carried out only with the explicit permission of the Cabinet of Ministers: weapons, military technology, and the essential spare parts for their production; gunpowder, explosives, and pyrotechnic substances; nuclear materials, technology, equipment, special non-nuclear materials, and radiation sources, including radioactive waste; narcotics, psychotropic substances, and chemical poisons; scientific-technical information; and certain types of technology, materials and equipment which could be used in the creation of military technology or arms. These goods also may not be exported on credit or by consignment.[1]
Cabinet of Ministers Resolution, July 1997
This resolution calls for the installation of radiation control devices at all customs posts at airports, seaports, and railroads, as well as at the national borders to monitor vehicle traffic. The installation of such devices will be carried out over the course of 1997 and 1998. The resolution tasks the Customs Service and the Ministry of Health to establish the procedures for radiation monitoring at these posts. The decree further requires that all enterprises and organizations submit an inventory of all radioactive materials to the appropriate state ministries and agencies by 15 December 1997, as well as to inform the appropriate state ministries and agencies of any new imports of radioactive material. In addition, special insurance will be required in order to transport radioactive materials through the territory of Azerbaijan.[2,3]
Customs Code
The new comprehensive Customs Code, which defines the responsibilities of the customs organs in the sphere of export control, was adopted by the Milli Madzhlis (Parliament) in mid-1997.[2,3]
Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 247, 15 November 1995
This resolution decreases the bureaucratic hurdles for export licensing, removes quotas on exports of strategic goods, and eliminates the requirement for multiple Ministerial approvals for strategic goods. In addition, the decree requires that the State Customs Committee report trade transactions to certain government agencies on a monthly basis. This resolution supercedes Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 222 from June 1994.[4]
Presidential Decree, 17 December 1996, On Further Development of Foreign Trade Regulation
This decree stipulates that all foreign trade activities are allowed except those that are specifically restricted by the text of the decree. The decree addresses the rules and procedures for standard import, export, and barter operations for non-sensitive goods. It also lists those goods that can only be exported or imported with the explicit permission of the Cabinet of Ministers, (i.e. the Cabinet of Ministers must issue an official decision in order for the export or import contract to be legal). The list of goods includes arms, weapons, military equipment, and related products; nuclear material, equipment, technology, special non-nuclear material, and radioactive sources; narcotics and chemical toxins; and some types of scientific and technical information related to military production.[5]
In addition to the documents listed in this section, there is an additional regulation called Rules Regulating Import-Export Operations in the Azerbaijan Republic. According to an Azerbaijani official, this document was published in the Baku newsletter Byulleteny Bisnesmena, No. 30, 1997. The exact date and precise contents of this regulation are unclear.
Sources:
[1] CNS Correspondence with Azerbaijani Official, July 1997.
[2] "Uzhestochaetsya Kontrol Za Radiatsiye Na Tamozhennykh Postakh," Informatsionny Byulleten Pravozaschitnogo Tsentra Azerbaydzhana, 13-19 July 1997.
[3] "Customs to Tighten Control Over Radioactive Substances," Bakinskiy rabochiy, 2 August 1997, p. 2.
[4] "Government of Azerbaijan Efforts to Foster Foreign Trade," BISNIS Cables, 1 February 1996.
[5] "Presidential Decree Introduces New Foreign Trade Regulation for Azerbaijan," 21 January 1997, Harbarlar-l@usc.edu List Serve Discussion Group, provided courtesy of the Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS).
EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS
As noted in the 24 June 1997 Presidential Decree, explicit permission from the Cabinet of Ministers is required in order to export weapons, military technology, and the essential spare parts for their production; gunpowder, explosives, and pyrotechnic substances; nuclear materials, technology, equipment, special non-nuclear materials, and radiation sources, including radioactive waste; narcotics, psychotropic substances, and chemical poisons; scientific-technical information and certain types of technology, materials and equipment that could be used in the creation of military technology or arms. It is not clear whether or not there is a formal interagency process that helps to inform decisions taken by the Cabinet of Ministers regarding export of these items. According to one Azerbaijani official, there are no clear legal or procedural parameters to help guide the Cabinet in its decision to either approve or deny an export license request, "which opens up opportunities for abuse of power by some bureaucrats." In addition, there are no particular limitations regarding which companies are allowed to export sensitive goods such as dual-use items, weapons, and military technology. However--again according to the same Azerbaijani official--private companies that produce or trade in such items "practically do not exist."
Also noted in the June 1997 Presidential decree is a category of goods that requires approval from the Ministry of Trade for export. These goods include such items as wild plants, snake venom, artwork, and the results of scientific research. In order to grant approval for the export of technology and scientific inventions, the Ministry of Trade must consult with the Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology.[CNS Correspondence with Azerbaijani Official, July 1997.]
CUSTOMS AND BORDER ISSUES
As with most Southern Tier NIS, the smuggling of WMD materials across Azerbaijani borders presents a major proliferation challenge. Azerbaijan has a 179km border with Iran to the south and a 284km border with Russia to the north.[1] The following recent example serves to highlight the concerns in Azerbaijan, in particular: in March 1998, Azerbaijani customs officials detained a shipment of alloyed steel on the Azerbaijani-Iranian border because the shipping documents were not in order. The shipment was transiting Azerbaijan from Russia. The Azerbaijani government informed the United States of the interception, and the U.S. government in turn analyzed a sample of the steel. It was determined that the steel was suitable for use in the construction of liquid propellant missiles. On 7 April 1998, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that it had arrested three individuals for plotting to smuggle 22 tons of alloyed steel to Iran via Azerbaijan.[2] The good news about this case is that it shows that Azerbaijani customs agents are able to intercept suspicious cargo. However, it is still disturbing that the Russian smugglers believed they would be able to ship the illegal missile-related materials through Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan has signed border agreements with all of its neighbors: Georgia, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Turkmenistan (with whom it shares a Caspian Sea border).[3] Although Russia and Azerbaijan jointly guard their common border,[4] Russian border guards are not stationed on Azerbaijan's borders with Iran and Turkey. According to an Azerbaijani official, Azerbaijan makes no distinctions between its NIS and other external borders.[3]
Azerbaijan and Iran have held at least one discussion specifically devoted to customs relations. In March 1997, the Head of the Azerbaijani State Customs Service met with Iran's Ambassador to Azerbaijan. At the meeting, representatives of the two countries discussed training of Azerbaijani customs agents in Iran, expansion of bilateral customs relations, and an exchange of customs-related information.[5]
Sources:
[1] CIA World Fact Book 1997, CIA Homepage, http://www.odci.gov/.
[2] "Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, April 28," Department of State Off-Camera Briefing Index, Briefing by James B. Foley, 28 April 1998, http://www.fas.org/news/russia/1998.
[3] CNS Correspondence with Azerbaijani Official, July 1997.
[4] Arif Useynov, Segodnya, 16 February 1996; in "Azerbaijan Initialed Agreement on Cooperation With Russia On Border Issues," FBIS-SOV-96-044-S.
[5] "Iran, Azerbaijan Discuss Customs Relations," Iran News Economic Desk, 16 March 1997, on Harbarlar-l@usc.edu List Serve Discussion Group.
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material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
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