Updated March 2009

Export Control Developments

2 March 2006: Kazakhstan Ratifies Border Agreement with Russia and Makes Efforts to Improve Customs Procedures

On 2 March 2006, Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbayev signed law No. 129-III ratifying the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Activity of Border Representatives, following the ratification of the agreement by the Senate (upper house of Kazakhstan's parliament) on 16 February 2006. The original agreement was signed in Astana on 9 January 2004, by Bolat Zakiyev, director of the Border Guard Service under the Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security, and Vladimir Pronichev, first deputy director of the Russian Federal Security Service and head of the Border Guard Service, during the official visit of Russian president Vladimir Putin to Kazakhstan.[1,2,3]

Under the agreement, Kazakhstan and Russia will have seven and fifteen border representatives respectively, assigned to specific sections of the Kazakhstani-Russian border. The representatives will be chosen among officials of the Kazakhstani and Russian border guard services. Each border representative will have a deputy and support personnel, including assistants, secretaries, interpreters, and couriers. Border representatives may also engage experts and other personnel, if necessary.

Border representatives from both countries are tasked with jointly taking necessary measures, including exchange of information, to prevent, investigate, and settle border incidents, such as cross-border fire, illegal border crossings, unintentional border crossings by border guard officials on duty, and other incidents. Joint decisions on measures will be taken at meetings held at the request of one of the parties. Issues that do not require meetings can be solved through written correspondence or other means of communication. According to the agreement, investigations of border incidents by border representatives will not serve to replace investigations by law enforcement agencies. However, the agreement does not define the authority of border representatives vis-à-vis these agencies.

Under the agreement, border representatives will also work jointly with relevant authorities in Kazakhstan and Russia to fight smuggling, deport illegal migrants, participate in the identification and transfer of human corpses, conduct environmental control over economic and other activities on the border, and inform one another about threats posed by fires, epidemic and epizootic outbreaks, and agricultural pests. The agreement will be in force for five years starting from the document's ratification by both parties. It will be automatically renewed for another five-year term unless either side notifies the other of its intention to terminate the agreement.[4]

In a separate development, on 10 March 2006, the Customs Control Committee (CCC) of the Ministry of Finance of Kazakhstan unveiled a computerized information system called "Electronic Customs," at its headquarters in Astana. The system is being jointly developed by the CCC and the South Korean firms KT-NET, Samsung Corporation, and a Samsung affiliate—Samsung SDS. According to CCC deputy chairman Tlegen Suntayev, the information system, which incorporates risk assessment tools, advance notifications and electronic declarations, is designed to expedite customs clearance procedures and reduce related costs for importers. The introduction of "Electronic Customs" is also expected to help increase collection of customs duties and reduce corruption. The system will also facilitate electronic document exchanges with Kazakhstani ministries, agencies, banks, and financial institutions, as well as with customs agencies of other countries and international organizations.[5,6]

In a further effort to simplify customs procedures, on 15 March 2006, the CCC opened a new checkpoint on the Kazakhstani-Russian border that incorporates an integrated control system based on the so-called "one-stop" principle. The new checkpoint, named Zhaysan and located in the Martuk District, Aktobe Oblast, incorporates customs, border guard, vehicle control, veterinary/plant pathogen control, and sanitary-quarantine control in a single building and is equipped with the Rapiscan X-ray inspection system, information monitors, a mobile radiation control laboratory, and other modern customs control tools.[7,8]

Editor's Note: [The Rapiscan X-ray, a product of Rapiscan Systems, is a high energy X-ray cargo inspection system capable of penetrating 425 mm of steel equivalent and inspecting the widest range of cargo, including densely-loaded trucks and containers, thereby eliminating the need for costly and time-consuming manual inspections. Rapiscan Systems, a subsidiary of OSI Systems, is headquartered in Hawthorne, California and has additional offices and manufacturing facilities in Finland, India, Malaysia, Singapore, United Kingdom, and the United States.][9]

Sources:
[1] "Kazakhstan ratifitsiroval mezhpravitelstvennoye soglasheniye s Rossiyey o deyatelnosti pogranichnykh predstaviteley" (Kazakhstan ratified an intergovernmental agreement with Russia on the activity of border representatives), Kazakhstan Today news agency, 2 March 2006; in Gazeta.kz, www.gazeta.kz.
[2] "Parlament Kazakhstana ratifitsiroval mezhpravitelstvennoye soglasheniye s Rossiyey o deyatelnosti pogranichnykh predstaviteley" (Kazakhstan's parliament ratified an intergovernmental agreement with Russia on the activity of border representatives), Kazakhstan Today news agency, 16 February 2006; in Gazeta.kz, www.gazeta.kz.
[3] "Mezhdu pravitelstvami Rossii i Kazakhstana podpisan ryad soglasheniy" (Governments of Russia and Kazakhstan signed a number of agreements), Kazinform news agency, 9 January 2006, www.inform.kz.
[4] "Soglasheniye mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Pravitelstvom Respubliki Kazakhstan o deyatelnosti pogranichnykh predstaviteley" (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Activity of Border Representatives), Government of the Russian Federation website, npa-gov.garweb.ru:8080/ public/ default.asp? no=1056472.
[5] Serik Kozhkenov, "Tamozhnya dayet dobro" (Customs gives its approval),Kazinform news agency, 10 March 2006, www.inform.kz.
[6] Serik Kozhkenov, "Elektronnaya tamozhnya oblegchit zhizn i prineset vygodu biznesmenam" (Electronic customs will make businessmen's lives easier and bring them benefits), Kazinform news agency, 18 March 2006, www.inform.kz.
[7] "15 marta t.g., v tselyakh realizatsii Programmy razvitiya tamozhennoy sluzhby Respubliki Kazakhstan na 2004-2006 gody, na territorii Aktyubinskoy oblasti vveden v ekspluatatsiyu eshche odin Edinyy kontrolno-propusknoy punkt 'Zhaysan'" (On March 15, 2006, another integrated checkpoint, Zhaysan, was opened in Aktobe Oblast under the development program of the customs service of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2004-2006), Kazakhstan's Customs Control Committee website, www.customs.kz/ exec/ news/ news_msg?newsid=458.
[8] Galiya Zhaldybayeva, "V 'Zhaysane' ostanovka" (The stop in Zhaysan), Kazakhstanskaya pravda online edition, 22 March 2006, www.kazpravda.kz.
[9] Rapiscan Systems website, www.rapiscansystems.com. This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ observer/index.htm.

1 February 2006: New Heads of Kazakhstani and Uzbek Customs Appointed

On 1 February 2006, Askar Shakirov was appointed new chairman of the Kazakhstani Customs Control Committee (CCC) under the Ministry of Finance. Shakirov, who previously served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, replaced Berdibek Saparbayev, who was appointed deputy head of the Prime Minister's Office. Askar Shakirov was born in 1956. He graduated from M. Lomonosov Moscow State University's Asia and Africa Institute and completed post graduate studies at the Soviet Interior Ministry's Academy. Fluent in English and Chinese, Shakirov started his career at the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1992, and has a diplomatic rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. During his career, he served as chargé d'affaires to the Republic of Korea, ambassador at large, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and ambassador to India.[1,2,3]

In an earlier development, on 11 January 2006, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov appointed Sodirkhon Nasyrov chairman of the country's State Customs Committee (SCC). Previously Nasyrov served as SCC deputy chairman. Former SCC chairman Bakhodir Matlyubov was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs.[4]

Sources:
[1] "Premyer-Ministr RK predstavil novogo predsedatelya Komiteta tamozhennogo kontrolya Minfina" (The Kazakhstani Prime Minister presented a new chairman of the Customs Control Committee under the Ministry of Finance), Kazinform news agency, 1 February 2006, www.inform.kz.
[2] "Glava pravitelstva RK predstavil novogo predsedatelya Komiteta tamozhennogo kontrolya Minfina" (Head of the Kazakhstani government presented a new chairman of the Customs Control Committee under the Ministry of Finance), Kazakhstan today news agency, 1 February 2006, www.gazeta.kz.
[3] "Eks-glava KTK Minfina Saparbayev naznachen zamestitelem rukovoditelya kantselyarii premyerministra RK" (Ex-chief of the CCC under the Ministry of Finance was appointed deputy head of the Kazakhstani Prime Minister's office), Kazakhstan today news agency, 1 February 2006, www.gazeta.kz.
[4] Edict of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, "Ob utverzhdenii Nasyrova S.Kh. predsedatelem Gosudarstvennogo tamozhennogo komiteta Respubliki Uzbekistan" (On the appointment of S.Kh. Nasyrov chairman of the State Customs Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan), President of Uzbekistan Press Service website, 11 January 2006, www.pressservice.uz/ ru/ gsection.scm? groupId=4347& contentId=16657. This item originally appeared in the International Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ observer/ index.htm.

6-8 June 2005: Almaty Hosts OPCW Regional Meeting

On 6-8 June 2005, the fourth regional meeting of National Authorities of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in Eastern Europe was organized in Almaty, Kazakhstan, by the government of Kazakhstan and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Attendees included representatives of national agencies involved in CWC implementation from more than 20 East European countries and Newly Independent States (NIS). The principal objective of the meeting, which built upon the results of the three previous meetings held in Slovakia (2002), the Czech Republic (2003), and Romania (2004), was to provide a forum to review, discuss, and understand better practical aspects of national implementation of the convention.

This year's meeting provided an opportunity for participating country representatives to receive practical assistance in finalizing the legislative and administrative procedures called for by the Plan of Action regarding the implementation of obligations under Article VII of the CWC, "National Implementation Measures." The plan requires that states parties take their own steps and set their own target dates, leading to the enactment of the necessary legislation, including penal legislation, and/or the adoption of administrative measures to implement the CWC no later than the Tenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, which will take place in November 2005.

Other topics on the agenda included experience sharing on the collection and submission of industry declarations, processing and management of data, and industry outreach. All participants in the meeting reported on their national arrangements for making industry declarations and on the concrete steps that their countries have taken to fulfill the requirements of the Plan of Action, including the interim steps and target dates called for in the plan.[1,2]

Editor's Note: The Plan of Action Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations adopted at the Eighth Session of the Conference of the States Parties can be found on the OPCW Website: www.opcw.org/ docs/ c8dec16_EN.pdf.

Sources:
[1] "Fourth Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Eastern Europe, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 6-8 June 2005," OPCW Technical Secretariat Note, 29 March 2005, OPCW Website, www.opcw.org/ docs/ snotes/ 2005/ s-485-2005.pdf.
[2] "Fourth Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Eastern Europe," Chemical Disarmament, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 2005, p. 20, OPCW Website, www.opcw.org/ docs/ publications/ cdq_jun2005.pdf. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

16-20 May 2005: Kazakhstan Hosts Seminar on Search for and Security of Radioactive Sources; Inventory of Radiation Sources to Be Held in Kazakhstan

On 16-20 May 2005, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), in cooperation with the U.S. Sandia, Argonne, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories as well as Canberra Packard Central Europe, organized a training seminar entitled "Search and Security of Orphan Radioactive Sources," at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) in Almaty, Kazakhstan.[1,2] [Editor's Notes: "Orphan radioactive sources," are radioactive materials intended for use in industry, research, or medicine that have been abandoned by their owners and are outside regulatory control, thereby posing potential public health dangers. Orphan sources may also be vulnerable to acquisition by terrorist organizations that might seek to use them in radiological dispersion devices or "dirty bombs." Canberra Packard Central Europe is an Austrian company engaged in distributing, installing, and servicing radiation measuring equipment with medical, environmental, and industrial applications in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.][3]

Twenty-six Kazakhstani participants representing the INP, the Institute of Atomic Energy, Institute of Radiation Safety and Ecology, the MAEK-Kazatomprom company, and the Ulba Metallurgical Plant attended the event. In addition to presentations by the U.S. and Austrian experts on orphan source search techniques, the training included practical search exercises. The participants were tasked to find radioactive sources hidden at the INP site, using the special radiation detection equipment brought by the U.S. side. Upon completion of the training, the equipment was donated to Kazakhstani facilities.[1,2,4]

Following the training, on 23 May 2005, Timur Zhantikin, chairman of the Kazakhstani Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC), announced that the Ministry of Health and the KAEC would start this summer a nationwide inventory of radioactive sources used at the country's industrial enterprises and institutions. According to Zhantikin, the inventory aims to check the current state of sources and their operational and storage conditions, and will include the search for orphan sources. In addition, along with the inventory of radiation sources, two projects will be launched to clean up two radioactive source burial sites—at the former Irtysh Chemical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, eastern Kazakhstan, and at the Mangystau Atomic Energy Combine located in Aktau, western Kazakhstan.[5]

As reported by Zhantikin, based on Soviet-era data, about 100,000 radiation sources were in use in Kazakhstan in 1992. However, as a result of economic decline and the transition to a market economy, which followed the breakup of the Soviet Union, no tracking of radioactive sources has been conducted since then in Kazakhstan. In the Soviet period, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Sanitary Epidemiological Service (SES) of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic were charged with the tracking of radioactive sources. However, the radiation source database of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was lost, and the KAEC had to restore the information using the SES database and the data of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Kazakhstan. The country's national register of radioactive sources currently includes information about 40,000 pieces of equipment and devices using radioactive materials that are in use at the present time. The database does not include insignificant radiation sources, such as smoke detectors, that were included in the Soviet-period database. However, the committee is still unaware of the whereabouts of almost 20,000 radiation sources thought to still be within the country. Zhantikin pointed out that the United States is assisting in training teams of specialists to conduct a search for orphan radioactive sources.[5] According to an NNSA representative, a search program is being drafted jointly by Kazakhstani and U.S. government agencies.[4]

Sources:
[1] "Amerikanskiye spetsialisty provodyat trening dlya kazakhstanskikh yadershchikov" [U.S. experts conduct a training for Kazakhstani nuclear specialists], Kazakhstan today news agency, 17 May 2005, Gazeta.kz, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=59589.
[2] "Search and Secure Training," Nuclear Technology Safety Center Website, www.ntsc.kz/ News/ May2005_1.htm.
[3] "History," Canberra Packard Central Europe Website, www.cpce.net.
[4] "RK i SShA gotovyat programmu po poisku beskhoznykh istochnikov izlucheniya" [Kazakhstan and the United States are drafting a search program for orphan ionizing radiation sources], Kazakhstan today news agency, 20 May 2005, in Gazeta.kz, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=59793.
[5] "V Kazakhstane budet provedena inventarizatsiya istochnikov ioniziruyushchego izlucheniya" [An inventory check of ionizing radiations sources will be conducted in Kazakhstan], Kazakhstan today news agency, 23 May 2005, in Gazeta.kz, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=59869. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.

14-16 March 2005: Kazakhstan to Allocate $7.7 Million for Construction of a New Customs Terminal on the Border with Uzbekistan

During a three-day inspection of the customs posts located in the Manghystau oblast (western Kazakhstan) conducted on 14-16 March 2005, the chairman of the Customs Control Committee under Kazakhstan's Ministry of Finances, Berdybek Saparbayev, announced his government's plan to build a large customs terminal to upgrade the existing Tazhen customs post on the Kazakhstan border with Uzbekistan.[1,2]

At present, the Tazhen customs office is only equipped to perform routine vehicle inspections, while passenger and cargo trains originating from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan cross the border of Kazakhstan without undergoing customs control. The trains are checked only later, after entering Kazakhstan, at the Beyneu railway station, which is located 85 km from the Tazhen border crossing.[2,3] The Beyneu station, however, also lacks special equipment to check the trains effectively.[2] In an interview with the Kazakhstani Khabar television channel, Saparbayev pointed out that, after the trains cross the border into Kazakhstan, they make several stops before Beyneu station, a process that allows smugglers from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to transport contraband commodities and drugs with impunity onto the territory of Kazakhstan or use Kazakhstan as a transit country to transport drugs to Russia.

According to customs officials and police officers supervising the Beyneu station, the region is on the drug trafficking route that crosses Aqtau (the administrative center of the Manghystau oblast) and goes towards Moscow via Astrakhan (Russia).[2] Customs officials from the Manghystau oblast Customs Directorate indicated that from the point of view of drug trafficking, the Dushanbe (Tajikistan)-Astrakhan (Russia) as well as Kungrad (Uzbekistan)-Beyneu (Kazakhstan) trains are of particular concern.[4] Kazakh transportation and law enforcement officials believe the new customs terminal at the Tazhen border crossing will help solve many of the aforementioned problems.[2]

The construction cost of the new customs terminal at Tazhen is estimated to be approximately 1 billion Kazakh tenge ($7.7 million), and the terminal is slated to begin operating in 2006.[1,2] According to Saparbayev, the new terminal will operate according to the so-called "one-stop principle"[1] In this regard, Saparbayev noted, "As you might know, customs officials are not the only ones who work on the border.… We want to set up a single center to enable all services at the border [customs, sanitary-epidemiological, veterinary services, etc.] to work at one place. And they will work based on the 'one-stop' principle, which means that a vehicle, or any other mode of transportation will be stopped only once and controlled only once [by the various services present at the border]."[2]

Sources:
[1] Alla Loginova, "Berdybek Saparbayev inspektiruyet posty tamozhennogo kontrolya Mangistau" (Berdybek Saparbayev is inspecting the customs control offices of the Manghystau), Kazakh National Information Agency Kazinform, 15 March 2005, www.inform.kz/ showarticle.php?lang= rus&id=115067.
[2] "Boleye milliyarda tenge poluchat Mangistauskiye tamozhenniki na stroitelstvo kontrolno-propusknogo punkta na granitse s Uzbekistanom. Ob etom soobshchil predsedatel Komiteta tamozhennogo kontrolya Berdybek Saparbayev v khode inspektsionnoy poezdki v Mangitauskuyu oblast" [Manghystau customs officials will receive more than one billion tenge for the construction of a new customs control post on the border with Uzbekistan. The chairman of the Customs Control Committee, Berdybek Saparbaev, revealed the plan during the inspection tour of the Manghystau oblast], Khabar news agency and television channel (Kazakhstan), 17 March 2005, www.khabar.kz/ index.php3?chapter= 1111075064& date=2005-03-17& lang=rus& parent_id= 1003479943#1111075064.
[3] CNS phone communication with the Kazakh customs officials at the Beyneu customs office, 22 April 2005.
[4] "Devyat mesyatsev tamozhny" [Customs is nine months old], Lada [weekly newspaper of the city of Aqtau] online edition, No. 42 (337), 17 October 2002, www.lada.kz/ text.asp?num=337&st=3. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

February 2005: Kazakhstan and Russia Test Joint Customs Control Procedures

In its past issues, the NIS Export Control Observer reported the establishment of joint Kazakh-Russian customs control at the Sharbakty-Kulunda checkpoint located on the border of the Pavlodar oblast, northeastern Kazakhstan, with the Russian Federation.[1,2] The initiative stemmed from recommendations made in October 2003 by the Customs Control Committee (CCC, then Customs Control Agency) of Kazakhstan after a fact-finding visit to Germany and Poland by a Kazakh interagency commission, which was set up by the Kazakhstani government in December 2002 to develop a comprehensive modernization program for Kazakh customs.[1,2]

On 4 June 2004, a bilateral agreement signed by Russia and Kazakhstan set the start date of the joint customs control experiment at the Sharbakty-Kulunda port of entry for 1 July 2004. However, due to the reorganization of the Russian government in spring 2004, the establishment of joint customs control was delayed until 24 August 2004.[1,2,3,4] Since then, Kazakh customs officials and their Russian counterparts have been jointly carrying out the inspection of vehicles crossing the border at the Sharbakty-Kulunda customs control post. The introduction of the simplified customs inspection procedures is aimed at boosting the cross-border trade between the two countries. The Kazakh and Russian customs services intend to increase the volume of bilateral trade by simplifying the rules for the movement of goods across the Kazakh-Russian border. The joint customs control experiment is supposed to show the benefits of cooperation in the customs area, and, if it is proved successful, joint customs control will be extended to the other border posts on the Kazakh-Russian border. In this regard, CCC Deputy Chairman Baurzhan Abdishev noted, "If the experiment produces good results and if our laws are harmonized, this rule will be applied to the entire border."[5]

Editor's Note: The agreement between the Siberian Customs Directorate (Russian Federation) and the Department of Customs Control for the Pavlodar Oblast (Kazakhstan), which was signed in Pavlodar on 4 June 2004, provided the legal foundation for the introduction of the pilot joint customs control at the Sharbakty-Kulunda vehicular point of entry. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, the Russian and Kazakh customs officials jointly examine the commodities and vehicles crossing the border in both directions. The agreement also stipulates constant exchange of information on the volume of goods and vehicles crossing the border, which is aimed at helping in identifying illegal cross-border transactions. To avoid violations, customs officials from each side compare their records on commodities and vehicles crossing the border in both directions and launch search if necessary. The agreement specified that the length of the experiment was limited to six months, and therefore ended in late February 2005.

Pavlodar Oblast customs officials sent a report on the results of the experiment to the CCCand Russia's Federal Customs Service outlining their achievements and identifying areas for improvement. As of April 2005, there was no information on when the joint customs control will resume. Note however that unlike joint control, exchange of information is continuing.[3,4,6,7,8]

Sources:
[1] "Customs Control Agency of Kazakhstan to Reform Border Checkpoints," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 11, November 2003, pp. 3-4, cns.miis.edu/ nis-excon.
[2] "Joint Customs Checkpoint Opened on Kazakhstani-Russian Border," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 20, September 2004, p. 2, cns.miis.edu/ nis-excon.
[3] "Na Altaye startoval eksperiment po oformleniyu tamozhennykh gruzov" [Cargo customs registration experiment began in Altay], Ekspert-Sibir online edition, 24 August 2004, www.expert-sibir.ru:8080/ es/ News/ a2081/Show.
[4] "Rossiyskiye i kazakhstanskiye tamozhenniki provedut eksperiment po sovmestnomu tamozhennomu kontrolyu" [Russian and Kazakh customs officials will conduct an experiment in joint customs control], Regnum news agency (Russia), 17 June 2004; in International Road Transport Union Website, www.iru-cis.ru/ news/ v1/ printitem.php?newsid=181.
[5] Kazakh TV1 (Astana, Kazakhstan), 19 March 2005; in "Kazakhstan, Russia Test Simplified Border Customs Procedures," FBIS Document CEP20050320000109.
[6] "Kazakhstanskiye i rossiiskiye tamozhenniki provedut eksperiment po kontrolyu za gruzami, vyvozimymi s territorii Kazakhstana v RF" [Kazakh and Russian customs officials will conduct an experiment in control over cargo transfers from the territory of Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation ], RIA Novosti, 24 August 2004; in FTInform Website, www.ftinform.com/ Russian/ news/ read.asp?id=10427.
[7] "Altayskiy kray: tamozhennyy eksperiment pomozhet uvelichit tovarooborot s Kazakhstanom" [Altay kray: customs experiment will help increase the trade volume with Kazakhstan ], Alliance-Media news agency, 24 August 2004; in Russian Web Portal of Information Support for Foreign Economic Activities "VneshMarket," http://vneshmarket.ru/ NewsAM/ NewsAMShow.asp?ID=140988.
[8] CNS communication with Pavlodar Oblast customs directorate officials, Kazakhstan, 2 May 2005. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer:cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

8 December 2004: United States and Kazakhstan Expand Proliferation Prevention Agreement to Cover Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism

On 8 December 2004, the United States and Kazakhstan signed an amendment to the Agreement between the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Department of Defense of the United States of America Concerning the Elimination of Infrastructure of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which was signed on 3 October 1995. The amendment extends bilateral cooperation "to counter the threat of bioterrorism and prevent proliferation of biological weapons technology, pathogens, and expertise at their source."[1] Under the terms of the amendment, BW proliferation prevention assistance will be provided to Kazakhstan through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program with the purpose of achieving the following five key objectives:

(1) preventing the proliferation of BW expertise through the cooperative biological research program;
(2) securing dangerous pathogens and strains by strengthening biosafety and biosecurity at facilities;
(3) consolidating dangerous pathogens at secure central repositories;
(4) eliminating BW-related equipment and infrastructure; and
(5) reinforcing Kazakhstan's biological threat agent detection and response system to protect against bioterrorist attacks.[1]

The new initiatives introduced by the amendment include the construction of a diagnostic reference laboratory and disease surveillance system that will allow Kazakhstan to detect, diagnose, and respond to outbreaks of dangerous diseases that could occur naturally or result from a terrorist attack; launch of a joint study of dangerous pathogens with the aim of developing better medical countermeasures for protecting the populations of the United States and Kazakhstan from such deadly diseases; and the development and testing of new molecular diagnostics and therapies to cure diseases endemic to Central Asia.[1,2,3]

In his public comments, U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Indiana) hailed the signing of the amendment and praised the U.S. Department of Defense, the Bush administration, and the government of Kazakhstan.[1,4] Senator Lugar also noted, "I congratulate President Nazarbayev and his government on having joined Georgia and Uzbekistan in partnership with the United States to work toward successfully eliminating the risk of biological weapons and preventing bioterrorism. This is a critical step forward in addressing the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."[1] In response, in his comments regarding the signing of the amendment, Kazakhstan's ambassador to the United States, Kanat Saudabayev, noted, "Kazakhstan's signing of the amendment is a testimony of the firm and consistent commitment of President Nursultan Nazarbayev and our people to the cause of nonproliferation. The people of Kazakhstan, who experienced firsthand the horrifying consequences of weapons of mass destruction, are determined to be at the forefront of the global fight against proliferation of these deadly weapons."[5]

In August 2003, prior to the signing of the amendment, Senator Lugar visited Kazakhstan and met with Kazakh government officials. During their discussions, Senator Lugar emphasized the urgent need to establish cooperation in preventing BW proliferation and combating bioterrorism. In the course of his visit, Senator Lugar toured the M. Aikimbayev Kazakh Scientific Center for Quarantine and Zoonotic Diseases in Almaty, a former Soviet anti-plague institute specializing in epidemiological monitoring and control of especially dangerous diseases on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.[1]

Sources:
[1] "U.S. and Kazakhstan Sign Nunn-Lugar Agreement Amendment to Prevent Biological Weapons Proliferation," Office of the U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Indiana) press release, 8 December 2004, U.S. Senator for Indiana Richard G. Lugar (R) Website, http://lugar.senate.gov/ pressapp/ record.cfm?id=229682.
[2] "Kazakhstan i SShA rasshiryayut sotrudnichestvo v borbe s rasprostraneniyem oruzhiya massovogo unichtozheniya" [Kazakhstan and the United States broaden cooperation in the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction], Embassy of Kazakhstan in the United States of America press release, 8 December 2004. CNS communication with Roman Y. Vassilenko, First Press Secretary and Assistant to the Ambassador, 18 January 2005.
[3] "Kazakhstan i SShA podpisali popravku k soglasheniyu o sotrudnichestve v sfere nerasprostraneniya oruzhiya massovogo unichtozheniya" [Kazakhstan and the United States signed an amendment to the agreement on cooperation in the sphere of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction], Kazakhstan today news agency, 9 December 2004; in Gazeta.kz, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=53501.
[4] "Kazakhstan Signs Agreement to Prevent Spread of Bioweapons," U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, Press Release, 10 December 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/ is/ Archive/ 2004/ Dec/10-99730.html.
[5] "Kazakhstan, U.S. Expand Cooperation to Fight Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Washington Post, Special Advertising Section, 16 December 2004; in Diplomatic Traffic, www.diplomatictraffic.com/ kazakh_ad1-1.pdf. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.

5 October 2004: Kazakhstani Expert Warns of Radiation Danger

In a 5 October 2004, interview to the Kazakhstani daily Ekspress K, Larisa Ptitskaya, director of the Institute of Radiation Safety and Environment in the city of Kurchatov, warned of a radiation danger posed by a gamma-irradiator located in the former Semipalatinsk test site area. The gamma-irradiator, which she calls "a delayed time bomb," was built in the 1950s and used to test radiation effects on animals. It was abandoned after the test site was closed in August 1991. According to Ptitskaya, the gamma-irradiator consists of 160 radiation sources located one and a half meters underground. The site is not properly protected, and there is only an old brick laboratory building above the sources surrounded with a barbed-wired fence. According to Ptitskaya, the gamma-irradiator poses a significant radiological threat to people and the environment; however, it is unknown how much radioactive material the sources contain since no documented records are left.[1]

Institute specialists suggested building a concrete sarcophagus above the gamma-irradiator, but the Kazakhstani Ministry of Environment rejected the suggestion, arguing that concrete would not provide 100% protection from radiation. Russian nuclear scientists offered assistance, suggesting that the gamma-irradiator be transported to a burial site near Lake Baikal, provided the Kazakhstani side pays for the disposal, estimated to cost more than 20 million tenge (more than $150,000 as of October 2004). East Kazakhstani Oblast authorities promised to find the necessary funds in the oblast budget.[1]

Environmentalists are also concerned about local residents, who disregard health hazard and breach sealed underground testing tunnels in search of scrap metal, thus increasing the threat of radioactive contamination. An existing special group that patrols the area is useless, according to Ptitskaya, since it has no right to punish intruders. Ptitskaya proposes the creation of a radiation rescue service in the former test site area to deal with possible radioactive incidents. She did not elaborate on the exact role and specific responsibilities of the proposed rescue service.[1,2]

Sources:
[1] Svetlana Mikhaylova, "Besshumnaya gibel" [Quiet death], Ekspress K, 5 October 2004, No. 191 (15598), p. 4.
[2] Interfax, 3 October 2004; in "Kazakhstani Official Proposes Forming Rescue Radiation Service in Semipalatinsk," FBIS Document CEP20041003000022. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

29 September 2004: Kazakhstani Agency for Customs Control Transformed into Committee

On 29 September 2004, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev signed Edict No. 1449 On Measures for Further Improvement of the System of State Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan that changed the organizational structure and responsibilities of key state agencies.[1] This government reform follows the recent Russian government reorganization pattern by assigning strategic responsibilities to "ministries" and implementation of state policy to "committees" under those ministries.[1,2] In accordance with the edict, the Agency for Customs Control (ACC) of Kazakhstan was transformed into a committee under the Ministry of Finance, thus losing its independent status.[1] A similar change took place in Russia, where the State Customs Committee was transformed into the Federal Customs Service subordinated to the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade as a result of the March 2004 government reform.[3]

On 18 November 2004, 51-year old Berdibek Saparbayev, ACC chairman since 29 August 2002, was appointed deputy minister of finance and chairman of the newly created Committee for Customs Control.[4, 5]

Editor's Note: The ACC was created by Presidential Edict No. 931 On Measures for Further Improvement of the System of State Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 28 August 2002 on the basis of the Customs Committee under the Ministry of State Revenues of the Republic of Kazakhstan.[6]

Sources:
[1] Edict of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 1449 of 29 September 2004, "O merakh po dalneyshemu sovershenstvovaniyu sistemy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya Respubliki Kazakhstan " [On measures for further improvement of the system of state administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan], YurInfo Company Website, www.zakon.kz.
[2] "Russian Government Reorganizes, Restructures Nuclear Agencies," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 19, August 2004, pp. 9-14, CNS Website, cns.miis.edu/ nis-excon.
[3] "New Customs Head Appointed in Russia," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 19, August 2004, pp. 4-5, CNS Website, cns.miis.edu/ nis-excon.
[4] "Berdibek Saparbayev naznachen vitse-ministrom, predsedatelem Komiteta tamozhennogo kontrolya Minfina RK" [Berdibek Saparbayev was appointed vice minister of finance and chairman of the Committee for Customs Control of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan], Kazakhstan Today news agency, 18 November 2004, Gazeta.kz Website, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=52567.
[5] Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 949 of 29 August 2002, "O Saparbayeve B. M." [About Sabarbayev B. M.], YurInfo company Website, www.zakon.kz.
[6] Edict of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 931 of 28 August 2004, "O merakh po dalneyshemu sovershenstvovaniyu sistemy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya Respubliki Kazakhstan " [On measures for further improvement of the system of state administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan], PlyusMikro Company Website, www.pmicro.kz/ DB/ Busn/ Govern/ Laws/ Ukase/ 2002/ Control.htm. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

August 2004: Joint Customs Checkpoint Opened on Kazakhstani-Russian Border

In late August 2004, a joint Kazakhstani-Russian customs checkpoint was opened in Sharbakty, Pavlodar Oblast, in northeast Kazakhstan. The opening of this joint post, agreed to in 2003 and originally scheduled for early July 2004, was delayed due to structural changes in the Russian government and, more particularly, in the Russian State Customs Committee, which was transformed into the Federal Customs Service.[1,2]

According to Seytgali Mulkin, head of the Pavlodar Oblast, Kazakhstan Customs Control Department, an integrated control system based on the so-called "one stop shop" principle will be implemented in Sharbakty. Under the arrangement, Kazakhstani and Russian customs, border guard, vehicle control, veterinary-phytosanitary control, sanitary-quarantine control, and goods certification control officials will conduct necessary control procedures in a single building at the checkpoint. Inspection certificates must be recognized by both parties.[2] According to Berdibek Saparbayev, chairman of the Kazakhstani Customs Control Agency, five additional joint checkpoints will be built if the Sharbakty post is deemed a success.[3]

Sources:
[1] "Na kazakhstansko-rossiyskoy granitse otkrylsya pervyy sovmestnyy tamozhennyy terminal" [First joint customs terminal opened at the Kazakhstani-Russian border], Interfax-Kazakhstan, www.interfax.kz/ index.php?id= zag&zagid=2396.
[2] Gulmira Matkhalikova, "Derzhat post" [They are keeping watch], Ekspress K, No. 132 (15539), 13 July 2004. [3] Igor Vorotnoy, "Printsip odnogo okna" [The one window principle], Izvestiya-Kazakhstan, No. 125 (910), 14 July 2004, p. 2. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

24-28 May 2004: Kazakhstani Customs Officials Visit South Korea

On 24-28 May 2004, a delegation of Kazakhstani customs officials headed by Berdibek Saparbayev, chairman of the Agency for Customs Control, visited South Korea to learn about the country's customs system. During talks between Saparbayev and his Korean counterpart, Kim Yong-Duk, head of the Korean Customs Service (KCS), the parties discussed the status of bilateral customs cooperation and prospects for future interaction in this field, including the organization of training sessions for Kazakhstani customs officers in South Korea and exchanges of personnel. The Kazakhstani officials also met with Shin Dong-Oh, president of KT Net (Korea Trade Network), to discuss the possible participation of his company in automating Kazakhstani customs processes.

The South Koreans demonstrated to the Kazakhstani officials advanced scanning technologies used during customs control to detect dangerous and sensitive cargoes, and the process of data transfer and information sharing between regional customs posts with the central KCS control desk. The hosts organized tours of the customs dog-training center as well as of Inchon International Airport and Inchon Seaport to familiarize Kazakhstani guests with customs procedures at these locations.

Source:
"V Yuzhnoy Koreye obsuzhdeny perspectivy kazakhstansko-koreyskogo sotrudnichestva v oblasti tamozhennogo kontrolya" [Prospects for Kazakhstani-Korean cooperation in the sphere of customs control were discussed in South Korea], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan weekly press release, 16 June 2004, www.mfa.kz/ rus/ index.php?page= 2&arch=1&selected=96. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

27 April 2004: Kazakhstani Customs Officer Shares His Impressions after Attending International Border Interdiction Training (IBIT) in Texas

In an 27 April 2004, interview with Kazinform, Maksim Dyusembayev, head of the Anti-Drug Smuggling Division of the Customs Control Department of East Kazakhstan Oblast, discussed the International Border Interdiction Training (IBIT) session organized earlier this year under the auspices of the U.S. Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program in the towns of McAllen and Hidalgo, Texas.[1]

On 11-24 January 2004, eight representatives of the Kazakhstani customs and border defense agencies took part in a two-week IBIT training course conducted by the Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP). This was the second such training session offered to Kazakhstani customs officers and border guards.[1] The first three-week training course was organized for approximately 80 customs officials and border guards from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Hidalgo, Texas on 21 August – 8 September 2001.[2] The lectures given by CPB customs officers and border patrol agents addressed such issues as the war against terrorism, the fight against drug trafficking and illegal currency imports, profiles of international terrorist organizations and their leaders, weapons of mass destruction, and vehicle inspection methods.[1]

Dyusembayev noted that he found the parts of the training that featured the analysis of psychological characteristics of potential violators and the examination of concealment methods used for smuggling illegal commodities across the border particularly useful. According to Dyusembayev, lectures on these topics were delivered by experienced customs officers, who used photos and slides to enhance their presentations graphically. The Kazakhstani border guards and customs officials also had the opportunity to test their newly acquired knowledge during joint inspections at one of the busiest U.S. points of entry—the International Border Crossing at Hidalgo, Texas.[1,3]

Dyusembayev noted that the training seminar helped him better appreciate the importance of consistent training of customs and border control personnel, the acquisition of appropriate equipment, and the role of interagency cooperation in combating cross-border crime. In this regard, Dyusembayev pointed out that in 2003, the Customs Control Department of East Kazakhstani Oblast prevented 40 attempts to traffic in drugs and seized more than 111 kg of narcotics. He added, however, that soaring drug production in Afghanistan and growing demand in Kazakhstan foster drug trafficking and require intensified and coordinated efforts to curb the drug flow more effectively.

Editor's Note: Since 2001, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) has administered the IBIT course, as part of the EXBS program, for more than 115 customs officers and border guards from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The IBIT course includes classroom theory and hands-on practice in anti-terrorist operations, inspection of passenger and cargo vehicles, use of high-tech detection equipment, and analysis of suspicious behavior and other critically important areas.[2]

In addition to thousands of pedestrians crossing the border in both directions, up to 25,000 cars and 1,500 cargo vehicles use the Hidalgo border crossing on a daily basis. On 2 June 2003, the World Customs Organization recognized the outstanding contributions from the CBP officials of the Hidalgo port of entry with an award for developing and providing the IBIT training course.

Source:
[1] Lyudmila Malko, "Otechestvennyye siloviki proshli master-kursy po borbe s narkotrafikom v Tekhase na granitse s Meksikoy" [Kazakh law enforcement officials took master-courses in the fight against drug trafficking in Texas on the border with Mexico], Kazakh National Information Agency Kazinform, 27 April 2004, www.inform.kz/ showarticle.php?id=76293.
[2] "Curbing Smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Central Asia," U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Information Programs Press Release, 22 August 2001, http://usinfo.state.gov.
[3] U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency press release, "U.S. Customs Service in Hidalgo Earns World Customs Organization Award," 2 June 2003, www.customs.gov/ xp/ cgov/newsroom/ press_releases/ 022003/02062003_2.xml. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

22 April 2004: Working Group to Facilitate Ratification and Implementation of IAEA Additional Protocol in Kazakhstan

On 22 April 2004, officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Committee for Atomic Energy (CAE) under the Kazakhstani Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources created a working group to facilitate ratification and implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol, signed by Kazakhstan on 6 February 2004.[1,2,3,4] Apart from CAE officials, the group consists of representatives from the Ministries of Energy and Mineral Resources and Foreign Affairs, the Joint Stock Company Kazatomprom, the sole national export and import organization for uranium and other dual-use materials, and the Kazakhstani National Nuclear Center. According to Kazakhstani media, this is the third such working group to be created internationally, after similar groups were formed in Canada and Ukraine.[1,2,3] According to Kenji Murakami, director of the IAEA Safeguards Department, this working group is necessary because the implementation of the Additional Protocol is "a complex political and technical issue."[2]

After Kazakhstan ratifies the protocol, the country will have to provide annual declarations on all nuclear activity within its territory. After the ratification, according to Murakami, the IAEA will not only oversee all nuclear materials present in the country, but will also verify the legitimacy of all activities that are in any way related to nuclear materials, including oversight of research work and experimental facilities, uranium mining activities, and export of nuclear and non-nuclear materials that might be used in nuclear weapons. Short notice inspections with 2-24 hours advance notification will be widely used. According to CAE chairman Timur Zhantikin, Kazatomprom, which has never before been inspected by the IAEA, will be subject to an extensive IAEA audit of its activities. Based on the information obtained from the inspections, the IAEA will verify the correctness of the declarations provided by Kazakhstan and will certify that Kazakhstan is not engaged in any covert nuclear activities.[1,2,3,4,5]

Sources:
[1] Tatyana Koroleva, "Kazakhstan povyshayet prozrachnost svoyey yadernoy deyatelnosti" [Kazakhstan increases transparency of its nuclear activities], Panorama, No. 16 (582), 23 April 2004, p. 5.
[2] "RK pristupil k prakticheskoy rabote po vnedreniyu dopolnitelnogo protokola k soglasheniyam o primenenii garantiy k DNYaO" [The Republic of Kazakhstan started practical work to implement the additional protocol to agreements on application of safeguards related to the NPT], Kazakhstan Today news agency, 22 April 2004, Gazeta.kz Website, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=43950.
[3] Anna Pavlova, "Doveryay, no proveryay" [Trust but verify], Ekspress K online edition, No. 78 (15485), 24 April 2004, www.express-k.kz/ 2004/ 04/ 24/ 20.php.
[4] "Kazakhstan Signs IAEA Additional Protocol," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 14, March 2004, pp. 2-3, cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.
[5] Interfax, 22 April 2004; in "IAEA To Increase Nonproliferation Control in Kazakhstan," FBIS Document CEP20040422000440. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.

2 March 2004: Kazakhstani Experts Disagree on Threat Level from Semipalatinsk Test Site

On 2 March 2004, the Kazakhstani daily Ekspress-K quoted Larisa Ptitskaya, director of the Institute of Radiation Safety and Environment in the city of Kurchatov, as saying that there is a high risk of theft of radioactive materials from the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapon test site for possible use in nuclear weapons. Speaking to the board of the East Kazakhstani Oblast Directorate for Environmental Protection, she announced that 109 out of 181 sealed underground testing tunnels located in the former test site area have been breached by local scrap metal hunters, who detonate gas cylinders to open tunnels and steal contaminated scrap metal. She stated that 120 kg of plutonium remain in the unguarded test site area and that there is a threat that this plutonium could be stolen.

In response, Shamil Tukhvatulin, director general of the Kazakhstani National Nuclear Center, told Ekspress-K in a telephone interview that Ptitskaya's statement is not entirely true and that the threat is exaggerated. He said that it was impossible to make a bomb of what he called "decayed plutonium" unless a special facility is built in the area. He also denied Ptitskaya's allegations that the sealed tunnels are unguarded and have been breached. According to Tukhvatulin, a special patrol regularly inspects the tunnels and pursues scrap metal collectors, who have only managed to penetrate a few of the tunnels.

Editor's Note: Semipalatinsk nuclear test site facilities are under the jurisdiction of the National Nuclear Center (NNC) of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is involved in civilian activities and conversion of the site to civilian use. The Semipalatinsk test range, covering an area of 18,000 sq. km, was officially closed by President Nazarbayev on 29 August 1991. Between 1949 and 1989, 456 nuclear tests, including 340 underground and 116 atmospheric tests, were conducted at Semipalatinsk. Semipalatinsk's Degelen Mountain nuclear test facility in the southern portion of the test site was the largest underground nuclear test site in the world, consisting of 186 separate tunnels in natural mountain formations. Two hundred and twenty-four tests were conducted there between 11 October 1961 and 10 October 1989. Aside from Degelen Mountain, underground tests were also conducted at Balapan in vertical holes drilled in the ground rather than in tunnels. These holes were about 500-600 meters deep and the bottoms of the holes were up to 900 meters in diameter. The last nuclear test conducted at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site took place at Balapan in November 1989. From 1997 to 2000, a series of calibrated non-nuclear explosions destroyed testing infrastructure at Degelen and Balapan as part of a joint U.S.-Kazakhstan effort under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Initiative of the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program. There are no fences around the perimeter of the test site, allowing persons and animals to roam freely throughout the area. According to Kazakhstani nuclear physicists, extensive conventional mining operations are under way at the site: beryllium, coal, and gold are mined and table salt is produced from a lake located near the main test field. In addition, scrap metal is gathered illegally from the site, although in the past, NNC officials denied that bore holes at Degelen Mountain have been breached by scrap metal gatherers.

Sources:
[1] Andrey Kratenko, "Stalkery rvutsya k plutoniyu" [Scrap metal hunters try to get hold of plutonium], Ekspress-K online edition, 2 March 2004, No. 41 (15448), www.express-k.kz/ 2004/ 03/ 02/ 18.php.
[2] Aleksey Bantsikin, "Zlyye yazyki strashneye… boyegolovki?" [Are evil words more terrible than warheads?] Ekspress-K online edition, 4 March 2004, No. 43 (15450), www.express-k.kz/ 2004/ 03/ 04/ 23.php.
[3]. CNS, " Kazakhstan: Semipalatinsk Test Site," Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, www.nti.org/ db/ nisprofs/ kazakst/ weafacil/ semipala.htm. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

March 2004: Plutonium Traffickers in Kazakhstan Convicted of Lesser Offense

As reported in the September issue of the NIS Export Control Observer, in July 2003 Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security (KNB) arrested three men—two Kazakhstani nationals and a Russian citizen from Saratov Oblast—attempting to sell an ampoule allegedly containing weapon-grade plutonium-239 for $20,000 in Pavlodar, northern Kazakhstan.[1] According to the Kazakhstani daily Ekspress-K, since the substance in question was not weapon-grade plutonium, but plutonium designed for use in smoke detectors, the Kazakhstani court meted out light punishments—one of the two Kazakhstani nationals and the Russian national were sentenced to two years of probation.[2]

Editor's Note: If the substance involved in fact came from smoke detectors, it is, most probably, the artificially produced radioisotope americium-241, a decay product of plutonium-241, rather than plutonium itself. There are two types of smoke detectors currently in use: a photoelectric detector, which does not contain radioactive material and uses a photoelectric sensor to detect the change in light level caused by smoke, and an ionizing detector, or "ion chamber smoke detector," which uses the radiation from a small amount of radioactive material to detect the presence of smoke or heat sources. The latter usually contains a very small quantity of americium-241, which has a half-life of 433 years. The first sample of americium was produced by bombarding plutonium with neutrons in a nuclear reactor at the University of Chicago in 1945. One gram of americium oxide provides enough active material for more than 5,000 household smoke detectors. The radiation dose to the occupants of a house from a domestic smoke detector is essentially zero, and in any case very much less than that from natural background radiation.[3]

Sources:
[1] "Kazakhstani Security Service Prevents Attempt to Sell Radioactive Material," NIS Export Control Observer, September 2004, No. 9, p. 8, cns.miis.edu/ nis-excon.
[2] Stanislav Pesnev, "Kakiye uslovnosti!" [What sentences?], Ekspress-K online edition, 4 March 2004, No. 43 (15450), www.express-k.kz/ 2004/ 03/ 04/ 15.php.
[3] "Smoke Detectors and Americium," Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 35, May 2002, Uranium Information Center Website (Melbourne, Australia): www.uic.com.au/ nip35.htm. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

26 February 2004: Kazakhstan Denies Allegations of Involvement in Uranium Smuggling

On 18 February 2004, Kazakhstan today news agency quoted the Arizona Daily Sun as reporting that the U.S. administration suspects SMB Computers, a Dubai-based company with a branch in Kazakhstan, of smuggling uranium from Kazakhstan to Iran and Libya for use in nuclear weapons programs. According to the Arizona Daily Sun article, Sri Lankan businessman Bukhari Sayed Abu Tahir, owner of SMB Computers, a supplier of computer equipment and a Hewlett-Packard distributor for CIS countries, including Kazakhstan, used his company as a front for the uranium smuggling operation.[1] In 11 February 2004 remarks, U.S. President George Bush declared Tahir a financier of an international illicit nuclear materials trafficking network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan after it was determined that Tahir's computer company ordered Malaysian-made centrifuge parts that were later interdicted in October 2003 en route to Libya, presumably for use in Tripoli's nuclear weapons program.[2]

Kazakhstani authorities were quick to refute the allegations. A representative of the Almaty Justice Department stated that no such company was registered in the city. Rustem Tursunbayev, deputy president of Kazatomprom, the sole manufacturer of uranium products in Kazakhstan, ruled out any possibility of uranium smuggling from the country.[3] On 20 February Minister of Foreign Affairs Kasymzhomart Tokayev denied allegations that Kazakhstan was involved in illegal exports of uranium. "A system of export control operates in our country, and a relevant government commission is in place. The government and the president [Nursultan Nazarbayev], personally, are following these issues. Kazakhstan has been entirely responsible in its approach to these issues since giving up its nuclear legacy," Tokayev told a briefing in Almaty.[4]

The most vehement denial came from the Committee for National Security (KNB) of Kazakhstan. In its 26 February 2004 press release, KNB stated that SMB Computers and its branches are not registered in Kazakhstan and that the company is not on the list of the companies that have permission from the Ministry of Industry and Trade to conduct export-import deals with nuclear materials that are subject to export control. The press release says that "the republic's system of export control of nuclear, radioactive, and dual-use materials enables the government to maintain strict control over nuclear exports, including the transfer of atomic energy technologies to foreign nations." KNB also reported that it "repeatedly approached" foreign partners regarding these facts with a request to provide documentary evidence and conduct joint investigations. However, "none of the allegations has been confirmed by appropriate documentary evidence of the law-enforcement bodies of the foreign states that accuse Kazakhstan of repeatedly breaching the nonproliferation regime," the KNB document points out. The press release concludes by saying: "It is not ruled out that it was an intentional act designed to undermine Kazakhstan's political image."[5]

Sources:
[1] "Administratsiya SShA podozrevayet kompaniyu SMB Computers v kontrabande urana iz Kazakhstana" [U.S. administration suspects SMB Computers in smuggling uranium from Kazakhstan], Kazakhstantoday news agency, 18 February 2004, Gazeta.kz Website, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=40994.
[2] Rohan Sullivan, "Malaysia: Bush Overplaying Nuclear Role," Associated Press, 12 February 2004; in Lexis Nexis Academic Universe, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[3] Kazakh TV1, 19 February 2004; in "Kazakhstan: Kazatomprom Official Rules Out Uranium Smuggling," FBIS Document CEP20040219000378.
[4] Interfax-Kazakhstan, 20 February 2004; in "Kazakh Foreign Minister Denies Illegal Exports of Uranium," FBIS Document CEP20040220000111.
[5] Press Service of the Committee for National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "Soobshcheniye" [Announcement], 26 February 2004, KNB Website, www.knb.kz/ index.php?parent_id= 1016181650& date=& chapter=1077771532. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.

6 February 2004: Kazakhstan Signs IAEA Additional Protocol

On 6 February 2004, in Vienna, Rakhat Aliyev, Kazakhstani ambassador to Austria and Vienna-based international organizations, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei signed an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994.[1,2,3]

As a legally binding document, the Additional Protocol grants the IAEA complementary inspection authority to verify that Kazakhstan's declared nuclear materials are not being diverted for nuclear explosive purposes. Expanded rights of access to sites and information related to all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle in Kazakhstan will allow the IAEA to determine that there are no undeclared nuclear materials in the country. By fulfilling requirements of the Additional Protocol, Kazakhstan is demonstrating commitment to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology.[4]

Editor's Notes: When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, Kazakhstan inherited 1,410 nuclear warheads and the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapon test site. Kazakhstan transferred all of its nuclear warheads to Russia by April 1995 and destroyed the nuclear testing infrastructure at Semipalatinsk by July 2000. Weapons-grade nuclear material remains in Kazakhstan, however, including three metric tons of plutonium contained in spent fuel at a shutdown breeder reactor in western Kazakhstan and small amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at two nuclear research institutes. Approximately 600 kg of weapons-grade HEU was transferred to the United States from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in 1994 under a joint U.S.-Kazakhstani operation known as Project Sapphire.[5]

Kazakhstan has been a member of the IAEA since 1994. In May 1992, Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon Protocol, along with other USSR successors —Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine — and became a party to the 1991 U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Having committed itself in that Protocol to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state "in the shortest possible time," Kazakhstan formally acceded to the NPT in February 1994.[6]

Sources:
[1] "6 fevralya s. g. v Venskom mezhdunarodnom tsentre sostoyalos podpisaniye Dopolnitelnogo protokola k Soglasheniyu o vseobyemlushchikh garantiyakh" [On 6 February 2004, the signing of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement on comprehensive safeguards took place in the Vienna International Center], 12 February 2004, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Website, www.mfa.kz/ rus/ PHP/ news.php?news= 1&selected=240.
[2] "Podpisan dopolnitelnyy protocol" [Additional Protocol was signed], Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 28 (24338), 11 February 2004, p. 2.
[3] "Agreement of 26 July 1994 Between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," INFCIRC/504, March 1996, IAEA Website, www.iaea.org/ Publications/ Documents/ Infcircs/ 1996/ inf504.shtml.
[4] IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA Website, www.iaea.org/ Publications/ Factsheets/ English/ sg_overview.html.
[5] CNS, "Kazakhstan Overview," Research Library: Country Profiles, Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, www.nti.org/ e_research/ e1_kazakhstan_1.html.
[6] "START I: Lisbon Protocol and The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," U.S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, 20 January 2001, U.S. Department of State Website, www.state.gov/ t/ np/ rls/ fs/ 2001/ 3523.htm. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

27 December 2003: New Customs Information Center Created in Kazakhstan

On 27 December 2003, the Kazakhstan Customs Control Agency (CCA) Information Center officially opened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The ceremony was attended by Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev.[1,2,3] The construction of the center, which is located in a four-story building, cost about 1.78 billion tenge ($12.75 million as of 27 December 2003).[1]

The information center is designed to help the CCA monitor cargo transportation and reduce the time spent on freight examination. The center has a control room, which allows real-time electronic monitoring of cargo movement and transit vehicles entering and exiting Kazakhstan.[1,3] CCA employees will collect and process information from customs posts on cargoes and vehicles, including their license plate numbers, weights, and sizes. Customs officers will scan vehicles and transportation documents and place an electronic seal on transit vehicles. When a vehicle leaves the country's territory, customs posts will check whether the seal was tampered with. Components of this system are currently in place at the Korgas customs post on the Kazakhstani-Chinese border, and two more posts are expected to be equipped with this system in 2004—the Korday post on the Kazakhstani-Kyrgyz border and the Gani Muratbayev post on the Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani border.[2,3]

The center is also equipped with a television studio, affording it a direct link with all customs posts equipped with ground satellite stations. According to CCA head Berdibek Saparbayev, in 2003, the studio broadcast two live CCA board meetings and 10 distance-learning sessions to the customs posts to explain to regional customs officers the provisions of the new customs code.[1] Saparbayev also announced that the CCA is in the process of developing electronic customs software that will be accessed by exporters, importers, freight forwarders, brokers, and customs officers to exchange customs documentation electronically.[1,3]

Sources:
[1] "Prezident RK posetil informatsionnyy tsentr Agentstva tamozhennogo kontrolya" [President of Kazakhstan visited information center of the Customs Control Agency], Kazakhstan Today news agency, 27 December 2003, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=38530.
[2] Khabar TV, 27 December 2003; in " Customs Control Agency Information Center Opens in Kazakhstan," FBIS Document CEP20031227000061.
[3] "Prezident otkryl Informatsionnyy tsentr Agentstva tamozhennogo kontrolya" [President opened information center of the Customs Control Agency], 27 December 2003, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan Website, www.government.kz. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.

November 2003: Trafficker Prosecuted in Kazakhstan

In November 2003, a Kazakh national was convicted and sentenced to three years of probation in Shymkent, southern Kazakhstan in accordance with Article 247, Part 2 of the Kazakhstani Criminal Code Illicit Sale of Radioactive Materials; Their Illegal Acquisition, Storage, and Transportation with the Purpose of Sale.[1,2] The culprit was arrested on 5 August 2003, by operatives of Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security (KNB) while he was attempting to sell radioactive materials in Shymkent for $400,000, advertising it as plutonium.[1] During a search of the suspect's house, the KNB officers discovered a container with a highly radioactive substance that the unemployed resident of Shymkent had kept in his house for at least a month and a half.[1,2]

According to the analysis of the material made by experts at the Kazakhstani Institute of Nuclear Physics, the seized container included isotopes of curium-243, curium-245, and cesium-137 with a total radiation of 40,000 microroentgens per hour.[1] According to KNB officers, the container is likely a piece of equipment previously used in the mining industry or in oil and gas extraction. The suspect stole the container from a warehouse in which the retired equipment was being stored.[1,2]

Editor's Note: Based on the reported radiation emission, the container would not pose an immediate health risk. A person would have to be exposed to this radiation source for almost two months before he or she absorbed enough radiation for the onset of noticeable near term health effects, such as radiation sickness.

Sources:
[1] Nataliya Braun, "Konteynernaya operatsiya" [Container operation], Ekspress K (Kazakhstan), 25 November 2003; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.com.
[2] "KNB obnarodoval informatsiyu o predotvrashchennoy popytke prodat radioaktivnyy material" [KNB released information about the thwarted attempt to sell radioactive material], TV Khabar (Kazakhstan), 22 November 2003; in KNB Website, 26 November 2003, www.knb.kz/ index.php?parent_id=1016251312& chapter=1069814047. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.

3 October 2003: Customs Control Agency of Kazakhstan to Reform Border Checkpoints

On 3 October 2003, the Customs Control Agency (CCA) of Kazakhstan organized a briefing for Kazakhstani journalists in Astana, Kazakhstan, entitled "On the Joint Customs Control Organization and the Joint Work of Controlling Agencies on the German-Polish Border: Results of the Official Visit of the Kazakhstani Interagency Delegation to the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland." Heads of the CCA and other Kazakhstani agencies engaged in border control, as well as heads of their local units, participated in the event.[1]

The briefing concentrated on two issues. First, CCA head Berdibek Saparbayev announced that Kazakhstan would establish an integrated control system at its state borders based on the so-called "one stop shop" principle. Under the arrangement, necessary control procedures at the border will be implemented jointly by officers of all agencies involved – customs, border guards, Ministry of Transport and Communication (vehicle control), Ministry of Agriculture (veterinary-phytosanitary control), Sanitary and Epidemiological Service (sanitary-quarantine control), and Ministry of Industry and Trade (goods certification control) – at one place. The new approach seeks to expedite the clearance process and improve its quality.[1,2,3,4]

The forthcoming introduction of integrated control is based on recommendations made by the Interagency Commission, established in December 2002 by governmental Decree No. 1256 of 26 November 2002, to provide suggestions for the development of integrated checkpoints at the vehicle entry-exit points of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The government charged the CCA with coordinating and monitoring the construction of integrated checkpoints.[4,5] According to Saparbayev, recent visits to Germany and Poland helped Kazakhstani control agencies better understand the practice of integrated control.[6]

There are currently 96 customs control checkpoints, 42 border guard checkpoints, 38 vehicle control checkpoints, 61 veterinary-phytosanitary control checkpoints, and 35 sanitary-quarantine control checkpoints along Kazakhstan's borders. Pending the construction of integrated checkpoints, the heads of Kazakhstan's controlling agencies agreed to locate their controllers under one roof at the customs checkpoints.[2] It is planned that five integrated control checkpoints will be built in 2004, and 20 by late 2006. The estimated cost of a fully equipped "one stop shop" checkpoint is about 450-530 million tenge ($3.14-3.7 million as of 3 October 2003). The construction of the checkpoints will be covered by the state budget.[3]

The fact-finding visits to Germany and Poland also led the CCA to come forward with the initiative to open joint customs posts with Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, which was the second topic of the briefing.[1,3,6] In cooperation with customs officials of Kyrgyzstan and Russia, the CCA plans to establish two pilot joint customs posts – Korday-Akzhol with Kyrgyzstan and Sharbakty-Kulunda with Russia – by the end of 2003.[3,4,7,8] According to Saparbayev, the creation of joint customs posts is aimed at reducing delays at the border and increasing the transit traffic at Kazakhstan's borders.[3] He also noted that joint customs posts could serve as a way to reorganize customs services within the Single Economic Space called for by the Organization of Regional Integration.[7,9]

Editor's Note: Although Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia are members of the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), which aims eventually to establish a customs union among its members, customs posts between EURASEC member states are likely to be maintained until 2010. For more information on regional organizations, see "Interstate Cooperation in the NIS" in the September 2003 issue of the NIS Export Control Observer.

Sources:
[1] Astana dauysy – Golos Astany (Voice of Astana) news agency (Kazakhstan), 3 October 2003, asdaus.astanainfo.kz/ news/ allnews.htm?menu= view& id=3pBxV8qq8c& type=as_news_capirtal.
[2] "Na granitse Kazakhstana budut deystvovat yedinyye kontrolno-propusknyye punkty" [Integrated checkpoints will operate at Kazakhstani border], Gazeta.kz, 3 October 2003, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp? aid=34610.
[3] Karina Mikoyan, "Edinaya krysha" [A single roof], Ekspress K, 4 October 2003, No. 189 (15349), p. 2.
[4] "Informatsiya o deyatelnosti tamozhennykh organov Respubliki Kazakhstan" [Information about the activity of the customs bodies of the Republic of Kazakhstan], Customs Control Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan Website, www.customs.kz/ bin/ stat/ stat_htm? tip=8&id=129.
[5] Postanovleniye Pravitelstva Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 26 noyabrya 2002 goda No. 1256 Ob obrazovanii Mezhvedomstvennoy komissii po vyrabotke predlozheniy po obustroystvu i razvitiyu yedinykh kontrolno-propusknykh punktov v avtomobilnykh punktakh propuska Respubliki Kazakhstan, [Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 1256 of 26 November 2002 On establishing an Interagency Commission on suggestions for development of integrated checkpoints at the vehicle entry-exit points of the Republic of Kazakhstan], Almaty Customs Control Department Website, almaty.keden.kz/ zakonadat/ zakon.cgi?doc=783.
[6] Nikolay Zhorov, "Tamozhnya po evropeyski" [Customs the European way], Argumenty i Fakty Kazakhstan, 10 October 2003; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.com.
[7] "V dekabre na granitse Kazakhstana s Rossiyey i Kyrgyzstanom budut sozdany dva sovmestnykh tamozhennykh posta" [Two joint customs posts will be created at the Kazakhstani border with Russia and Kyrgyzstan in December], Gazeta.kz, 8 October 2003, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=34816.
[8] "Agentstvo tamozhennogo kontrolya RK rassmatrivayet vopros o vvedenii na granitse sovmestnogo oformleniya" [Customs Control Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan discusses the introduction of joint customs clearance at the border], TV Channel Khabar, 10 October 2003, TV Channel Khabar Website, www.khabar.kz/ index.php3?date= 2003-10-10& parent_id=1003479943.
[9] For more information on the Organization of Regional Integration and Single Economic Space, see: "Inter-State Cooperation in the NIS," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 9, September 2003, pp. 18-22, cns.miis.edu/ nis-excon. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

2 September 2003: Kazakhstani State Commission on Export Control Personnel Changes

The appointment of Daniyal Akhmetov as Kazakhstani prime minister in June 2003, reported in August by the NIS Export Control Observer, has led to new appointments in the country's export control system.[1] On 2 September 2003, governmental Decree No. 891, On Amending Decree No. 1917 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 14 December 1999 replaced several members of the State Commission on Export Control Issues of the Republic of Kazakhstan.[2] According to Decree No. 891, Deputy Prime Minister Sauat Mynbayev was appointed commission chairman and Yerik Utembayev, who is a deputy secretary of the Security Council and head of the Security Council Secretariat, was appointed deputy chairman. Minister of Industry and Trade Adilbek Dzhaksybekov became a member of the commission. Former commission chairman Karim Masimov, deputy chairman Omarkhan Oksikbayev, and commission member Mazhit Yesenbayev, who had served in the former government as deputy prime minister, Security Council secretary, and minister of Industry and Trade respectively, were removed from the commission.[2]

Sources:
[1] "Personnel Change in Export Control System of Kazakhstan," NIS Export Control Observer, August, 2003, No. 8, p. 4: cns.miis.edu/nis-excon.
[2] Postanovleniye Pravitelstva Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 2 sentyabrya 2003 goda No. 891, O vnesenii izmeneniy v postanovleniye Pravitelstva Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 14 dekabrya 1999 goda No. 1917 [Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 891 of 2 September 2003, On Amending the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 1917 of 14 December 1999], YurInfo Website, www.zakon.kz/ law/ ssylki20037/ pp%20891% 2002092003.rtf. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.

July 2003: Kazakhstani Security Service Prevents Attempt to Sell Radioactive Material

In July 2003, Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security (KNB) prevented an attempt to sell a radioactive substance in Pavlodar, northern Kazakhstan.[1] According to media reports, two Pavlodar natives met at the city railway station with a former Pavlodar resident, now living in Russia's Saratov Oblast, to sell him an ampoule allegedly containing plutonium-239 for $20,000. All three were arrested by KNB officers during the attempted transaction.[2] The KNB was aware of the illegal transaction beforehand and was conducting outdoor surveillance of the suspects.[1] Preliminary tests reportedly indicated that the substance contained in the ampoule was indeed plutonium-239.[1,2] In accordance with Article 247 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan Illegal Handling of Radioactive Materials, KNB launched an investigation that was expected to be completed in September 2003.[1,3]

Sources:
[1] "V Pavlodare pri popytke prodazhi izotopa plutoniya-239 sotrudniki KNB zaderzhali 3 cheloveka" [KNB operatives detained three people attempting to sell plutonium-239 isotope in Pavlodar], Kazakhstan Today, 30 July 2003; in Gazeta.kz, www.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=31949.
[2] Andrey Prokopyev, "Da u nas etogo plutoniya - prosto zavalis!" [We have plenty of this plutonium!], Komsomolskaya pravda (Kazakhstani edition), 1 August 2003, No. 139/31 (379), p. 5.
[3] "V KNB utverzhdayut, chto radioaktivnyy material, izyatyy v Pavlodare, primenyayetsya v sisteme pozharnoy signalizatsii" (KNB asserts that the radioactive material seized in Pavlodar is used in smoke detectors), Kazinform news agency, 30 July 2003; in KNB official Website, www.knb.kz/ index.php? parent_id=1016251312 & chapter=1059641439. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

23 June 2003: Kazakhstan and China to Boost Customs and Border Cooperation

According to a 23 June 2003 report from the Kazakh TV channel Khabar, Kazakhstani customs officials, border guards, scientists from the Sanitary and Epidemiology Service, managers of the national railway company Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, and their Chinese counterparts organized a conference at Kazakhstan's Dostyk (Friendship) railway station on the Kazakhstani-Chinese border to discuss prospects for expanding cooperation in bilateral railway cargo shipments.[1] The parties plan to install high-tech equipment on the border to minimize the time spent on customs procedures. As the first step, Kazakhstani authorities installed the Yantar (Amber) radiation control system at Dostyk railway station. It is expected that the new equipment, which is capable of detecting sources of ionizing radiation without requiring trains to stop, will help reduce the number of cases in which Chinese firms have demanded Kazakhstan take back shipments of scrap metal, on the grounds that they are contaminated with radioactive materials. Chinese companies have already returned 40 trains of scrap metal with suspected radiation to Kazakhstan this year alone.[1,2] The parties agreed that experts from the Kazakhstani Sanitary and Epidemiology Service would participate in the joint certification of Kazakhstani goods shipped to China at the Chinese railway station Alashankou.

In addition, Kazakhstan and China also consider resuming the passenger rail service between the two countries given that China succeeded in stemming the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).[1] According to Khabar, cargo shipments through the Dostyk-Alashankou transport corridor reached 5.8 million tons in 2002. Experts believe that the corridor's capacity can be increased to 7 million tons in 2003 and to 12 million tons over the next two or three years. Kazakhstan now imports almost four times less cargo from China than it exports.[1]

In June 2003, Kazakhstani and Chinese customs officers met at the Horgos border checkpoint (Kazakhstan) to discuss bilateral customs cooperation and developed a data-sharing mechanism in the form of an information bulletin designed by the Kazakhstani side. The bulletin contains information on transport vehicles such as type of vehicle and license plate numbers, as well as value and volume of trans-border shipments. The information exchange will take place twice a month and will allow a comparative analysis of shipments that cross the Kazakhstani-Chinese border as well as a more effective collection of customs duties. The parties also agreed to cooperate in fighting the smuggling of goods, arms, ammunition, drugs, and other psychotropic substances, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, currency and valuables, literature of extremist nature, as well as human trafficking.[3,4]

Sources:
[1] "Na stantsii Dostyk tamozhenniki, pogranichniki, vedushchiye spetsialisty sanitarno-epidemiologicheskogo kontrolya i natsionalnoy kompanii Kazakhstan temir zholy obsuzhdali, kak uluchshit rabotu mezhdunarodnogo koridora" [At Dostyk station, customs officers, border guards, leading specialists of the sanitary and epidemiological control and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy national company discussed ways to improve the work of the international corridor], TV Channel Khabar, 23 June 2003, TV Channel Khabar Website, www.khabar.kz/ index.php3? date= 2003-06-23& parent_id= 1003479943.
[2] For more information on the return of scrap metal to Kazakhstan, see "Scrap Metal Returned to Kazakhstan," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 2, February 2003, p. 13: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon.
[3] "Dostignuta dogovorennost" [Agreement reached], Kazakhstanskaya pravda online edition, 12 June 2003: www.kazpravda.kz/ archive/ 12_06_2003 nr.html#nr5.
[4] "Tamozhenniki Kazakhstana i Kitaya reshili sotrudnichat" [Customs officers from Kazakhstan and China decided to cooperate], Panorama, No. 23, 13 June 2003. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

18 June 2003: Kazakhstan's Lower House of Parliament Approves Draft Amendments to Export Control Law

On 18 June 2003, a plenary meeting of the Kazakhstani Majilis (lower house of parliament) approved a draft bill On Amendments to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan On Export Control.[1] The bill, which was introduced to parliament by the Ministry of Industry and Trade in May 2003, proposes the removal of Paragraph 9, Article 5, from the existing law On Export Control.[3] The explanatory note to the bill cited a number of inconsistencies in the licensing of exports. Paragraph 9, Article 5 of the export control law states that permits for export, import, and transit of goods subject to export control are issued by the government. At the same time, Paragraph 6, Article 5-1 of the same law delegates licensing of export and import operations on such goods to a specially designated export control authority. This means that exporters and importers of controlled goods must first obtain a permit from the government and then seek a license from the export control authority. Also, Paragraph 11 of Article 5-1 creates an overlap in functions between the export control authority and the government, as it tasks the export control authority with issuing transit permits for controlled goods in accordance with the existing government classification.[2]

In view of these deficiencies, the bill proposes the removal of Paragraph 9, Article 5, from the export control law. The designated export control authority will issue permits for export, import, and transit operations (Paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 5-1 and Paragraph 11, Article 5-1). Currently, the designated authority is the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Kazakhstan.

Editor's Note: Kazakhstan passed the law On Export Control of Weapons, Military Technology, and Dual-Use Goods of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 18 June 1996. The law On Amendments and Additions to the Law on Export Control of the Republic of Kazakhstan came into effect on 24 November 2000.[3] The 2003 and earlier amendments suggest that there is a consistent effort to improve the legal framework underpinning the export control system in Kazakhstan.

Sources:
[1] "Mazhilis odobril izmeneniya v zakon 'Ob eksportnom kontrole'," [Majilis approved amendments to the export control law], Kazakh Information Agency, No. 56, 18 June 2003, www.kazaag.kz.
[2] "Kto vydast litsenziyu?" [Who will issue a license?], Kazakhstani Parliament Official Website, www.parlam.kz/ Document.asp? Recno= 481& ln=WithKz.
[3] Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Introducing Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, On Export Control of Weapons, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Goods', Plusmicro Website, www.pmicro.kz/ DB/ Busn/ Govern/ Laws/ Act/ 2000/ Change20.htm. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

13 June 2003: Personnel Change in the Export Control System of Kazakhstan

According to Presidential Edict No. 1108 of 13 June 2003, Danial Akhmetov replaced Imangali Tasmagambetov as the new Kazakhstani Prime Minister.[1] On 17 June Akhmetov signed Order No. 129-r On the Distribution of Duties among the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, and Head of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan.[2] According to this document, Sauat Mukhametbayevich Mynbayev, appointed as a deputy prime minister by Presidential Edict No. 1115 of 13 June 2003, will supervise issues related to export controls, the accession of Kazakhstan to the World Trade Organization, information systems of state agencies, geology, subsoil use, protection of mineral resources, and the Baikonur space launch facility.[2,3] In addition, Mynbayev will coordinate the activities of state agencies in the following areas: industrial development; development of infrastructure and new technologies (industry, energy, construction, transport, and communication); interaction with CIS countries and regional associations within the CIS; and oversight of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Transport and Communication, and the Agency on Information Systems and Communications.[2]

Editor's Note: Sauat Mynbayev was born in 1962. He graduated from the M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University and has a Ph.D. in economics. Mynbayev previously worked as the president of the state-owned "Kazakhstan" stock exchange, first deputy chairman of the management board of Kazkommertsbank, first deputy minister and minister of finance, deputy head of the administration of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan, minister of agriculture, and chairman of the management board of the joint stock company Bank of Development of Kazakhstan. His most recent position was director general of Caspian Industrial Finance Group Ltd. In June 2003, he became deputy prime minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan.[4]

Sources:
[1] Edict No. 1108 of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 13 June 2003, On Appointment of D. K. Akhmetov Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Database of Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan, www.zakon.kz.
[2] Order of Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 17 June 2003, No. 129-r, On the Distribution of Duties among the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and Head of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 176 (24116), 18 June 2003, p. 1.
[3] Edict No. 1115 of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 13 June 2003, On Appointment of S. M. Mynbayev Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Database of Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan, www.zakon.kz.
[4] Official Website of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, www.government.kz. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

5 June 2003: Commodity Identification Training in Kazakhstan

In 2003, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) International Nuclear Export Control Program (INECP) initiated a commodity identification training (CIT) program with customs and enforcement agencies in the former Soviet Union. INECP began discussions on establishing a CIT with representatives of the Baltic States, the Caucasus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in 2003. The goal of this program is to establish a permanent and indigenous nuclear export control training program in INECP-partner countries that introduces and familiarizes inspectors, managers, and officers of export control enforcement agencies with the domestic and international nuclear export control obligations of their respective countries, as well as with the nuclear-related, dual-use commodities that may transit their customs houses or border posts. CIT is not designed to turn customs inspectors into nuclear scientists. Instead, its goal is to establish a core of indigenous technical experts who can familiarize customs authorities with commodities on a continuous basis, while serving as a dependable technical resource for enforcement agencies to rely on when nuclear dual-use commodities are intercepted. Once the initial program is in place, the INECP envisions that the partner country would then sustain the program indefinitely.

In a meeting with Kazakhstani government representatives on 5 June 2003, Director of the U.S. Department of State Office of Export Control Cooperation John Schlosser established a commitment between the Kazakhstani and U.S. governments on the creation of CIT for both the Kazakhstani Customs Control Agency and Border Guards. The certification of Kazakhstani nuclear export control experts as CIT trainers, as well as the initial training of inspectors will be partly funded by the Export Control and Border Security program. Schlosser was joined by a team of DOE National Nuclear Security Administration representatives, led by Mark A. Scheuer, deputy program manager of the International Nuclear Export Control Program.

Previous low-level discussions with the government of Kazakhstan had resulted in recognition that high-level support for CIT in Kazakhstan was necessary. To this end, First Deputy Chairman of the Customs Control Agency Amaniaz Yerzhanov and Deputy Director of the Border Guard Service Major-General Tursyn Uazhanov participated in the 5 June meeting. Representatives of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee also participated. Both Yerzhanov and Uazhanov had been briefed about the CIT, and enthusiastically endorsed the assignment of implementation of CIT to the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee and the Nuclear Technology Security Center, a Kazakhstani non-governmental organization. Yerzhanov and Uazhanov recognized the value not only of the training itself for their inspectors, but also the value of strengthening relations between their agencies and Kazakhstan's technical community.

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the U.S. implementing body, and the Nuclear Security Technology Center are negotiating the statements of work for identifying organizations and planning training strategies. The initial "train-the-trainer" certification of Kazakhstan's nuclear export control experts is anticipated to take place in spring 2004. U.S. nuclear export control experts from the U.S. national laboratories will participate in this certification, and likely provide a U.S. perspective in the initial CIT workshops for enforcement authorities.

3 June 2003: Kazakhstan May Join MTCR

On 3 June 2003, Mariusz Handzlik, the Chairman of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), met with representatives of the Kazakhstani government in Almaty while visiting Kazakhstan for the 7th Regional Forum on Export Controls. In a report on Handzlik's visit, Kazakh Television announced that Kazakhstan may join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) very soon, becoming the third CIS country after Russia and Ukraine to join the Regime.[1] According to Handzlik, the decision to include Kazakhstan in the MTCR must be agreed upon by all member states and will be considered at the next MTCR Plenary Meeting to be held 22-26 September 2003 in Buenos Aires, Argentina.[1,2]

Sources:
[1] Kazakh Television 1st Channel; in "Kazakhstan May Join Global Missile Control Body Soon," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 3 June 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://lexis-nexis.com.
[2] Interview with Bruce Webb, senior trainer on export control issues at Commonwealth Trading Partners, Inc., 1 July 2003. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.

1 May 2003: New Customs Code Adopted in Kazakhstan

A new Customs Code entered into force on 1 May 2003 in Kazakhstan. The Code was enacted by Law 401-II, which was signed by Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev on 5 April 2003.[1] According to Berdibek Saparbayev, head of the Kazakhstani Customs Control Agency, "until now customs authorities have been guided by the Law on Customs and several other legal acts, of which there are nearly 100."[2] Saparbayev said that the new Code is different in that "it is a regulatory document that reduces the number of by-laws. In general, this will simplify customs procedures."[2]

The Code assigns customs authorities the responsibility for conducting radiation checks on the border.[3] This clause of the Code, however, as well as the clause explaining how the radiation checks will be performed, will not come into effect until 1 January 2004.[4,5] The Customs Code also includes a provision on priority customs clearance of radioactive materials.[6] The new Code draws on Russian and international experience, as well as on provisions of the Kyoto Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures.[2]

Editor's note: the International Convention on Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Kyoto Convention) was adopted on 18 May 1973 in Kyoto (Japan) and came into effect on 25 September1974. Later, it was revised by the World Customs Organization (WCO) to bring it in line with current practices of international trade. The protocol of the amendment was adopted on 26 June 1999 in Brussels (Belgium). Today, the revised Kyoto Convention is an important international instrument for improving customs procedures.[7,8]

Sources:
[1] Customs Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 102-104 (24042-24044), 11 April 2003, pp. 4-18.
[2] "Novyy tamozhennyy kodeks napravlen na uproshcheniye tamozhennykh protsedur" (New Customs Code aims to simplify customs procedures), Kazinform, 5 May 2003, www.kazaag.kz.
[3] Customs Code of the Republic of Kazakhtsan, Article 19, Item 12, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 102-104 (24042-24044), 11 April 2003, pp. 4-18.
[4] Customs Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Article 433, Item 2, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 102-104 (24042-24044), 11 April 2003, pp. 4-18.
[5] Customs Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Article 529, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 102-104 (24042-24044), 11 April 2003, pp. 4-18.
[6] Customs Code of the Republic of Kazakhsan, Article 370, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 102-104 (24042-24044), 11 April 2003, pp. 4-18.
[7] Aleksandr Grebeshov, "VTO i mezhdunarodnaya torgovlya" (Aleksandr Grebeshov, "WTO and international trade") Zakony. Finansy. Nalogi, No. 20 (86), 16 May 2003, www.zfn.nizhny.ru/ archive/ 000520/ s8.shtm.
[8] Protocol of the Amendment to the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (World Customs Organization), Official Website of the Kazakhstani Ministry of State Revenue, www.mgd.kz. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

17 April 2003: Kazakhstan Ratifies Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement with EU

The Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement between Kazakhstan and the European Union was ratified on 17 April 2003 at a plenary session of the Senate (upper chamber) of the Kazakhstani Parliament.[1] The Kazakhstani government and the EU signed the Agreement in early 1999. The Agreement envisages EU cooperation and assistance to Kazakhstan in environmental remediation of areas contaminated by radioactive waste and regulates some aspects of cooperation between Kazakhstani scientists and their Western European colleagues.[2]

Addressing the Parliament on 24 February 2003, Vladimir Shkolnik, Kazakhstani Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, said that ratification of the Agreement was essential to economic and scientific development in Kazakhstan. He stressed that "the Agreement has nothing to do with transportation of radioactive waste in and out of Kazakhstan. These are two different things."[3]

The Agreement will remain in effect for 10 years and will be automatically extended unless one of the parties expresses its intention to terminate participation in the Agreement by providing written notification.[3]

Sources:
[1] "Ratifitsirovany soglasheniya" [Agreements Are Ratified], Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 111 (24051), 16 April 2003, p. 1.
[2] "Ob ekologicheskoy bezopasnosti" [On Environmental Safety], Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 102 (24042-24044), 11 April 2003, p. 2.
[3] "Soglasheniye mezhdu Kazakhstanom i Yevropeyskim soobshchestvom po atomnoy energii v oblasti yadernoy bezopasnosti: argumenty v polzu ratifikatsii" [Nuclear Energy Agreement on Nuclear Safety between Kazakhstan and the European Community: Arguments in Favor of Ratification], KazInform, 23 April 2003, www.kazaag.kz/ search.php. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

9 April 2003: New State Holding Company Established in Kazakhstan

On 14 March 2003, the government of Kazakhstan issued a decree establishing a state holding company, OAO Kazoboronprom, which will bring under its umbrella 23 (according to other sources – 24) defense enterprises, which were formerly subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, and the Defense Industry Committee of the Ministry of Industry and Trade.[1] The newly created national holding company was later renamed Kazakhstan-Engineering.[2] The holding company will also include scientific research institutes, once part of the Soviet Ministry for Medium Machine-Building (Minsredmash) system, as well as the state enterprise RGP Kazspetseksport, aircraft repair plants in Aktyubinsk and Almaty, and an armored vehicles plant in Semipalatinsk.[1]

The former Akim (governor) of East Kazakhstan Oblast, Vitaliy Mette, was appointed president of Kazakhstan-Engineering. His nomination was announced on 26 February 2003, by Kazakhstani Prime Minister Imangaly Tasmagambetov, during the inauguration ceremony of the new East Kazakhstan Akim, Talgatbek Abaydildin that took place in Ust-Kamenogorsk. According to the prime minister, Mette was chosen because he has a military background, a degree in engineering, and experience in nuclear power plants. In 1970, Mette graduated from the Naval Academy of Engineering in Sevastopol and later served on nuclear submarines.[3]

The Board of Directors of Kazakhstan-Engineering was approved by a government decree on 9 April 2003. Head of Presidential Administration Nurtay Abykayev was appointed Chairman of the Board. Other members are First Vice Minister of Industry and Trade Aleksandr Andryushchenko, Deputy Defense Minister Nikolay Pospelov, and Chairman of the Committee for State Property and Privatization at the Ministry of Finance Maksutbek Rakhanov.[4] The government believes that the new state company will help revitalize Kazakhstani defense enterprises and the defense industry as a whole.[5]

Sources:
[1] "Sozdannaya natsionalnaya kompaniya 'Kazoboronprom' obyedinit 23 predpriyatiya oboronnogo kompleksa respubliki" (Newly created national company 'Kazoboronprom' will unite 23 enterprises of the defense complex of the republic), Kazinform, 15 March 2003, www.kazaag.kz/ showarticle2.php? articleID=28064.
[2] CNS Interview with a representative of the Defense Industry Committee of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Industry and Trade, April 2003.
[3] "V strane sozdayetsya novaya natsionalnaya kompaniya. Proizoshla smena rukovodstva VKO" (New national company created. New Akim in East Kazakhstan Oblast), Panorama online edition, No.8, February, 2003, www.panorama.kz/ info/ index.asp? yearfolder= 2003&num=08&NumArticle=04.
[4] "Postanovleniyem Pravitelstva proizvedeny naznacheniya v sovety direktorov natskompaniy" (Government decree appoints members of the board of directors of the national company), Kazinform, 9 April 2003, www.kazaag.kz/ showarticle2.php? articleID= 30821.
[5] Adil Dzhalilov, "Sozdana natsionalnaya kompaniya 'Kazoboronprom,'" (National company 'Kazoboronprom' established), Panorama online edition, No.11, March, 2003 www.panorama.kz/ info/ index.asp. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

April 2003: Radioactive Cargo Temporarily Held in Almaty

According to Kazakhstani media reports in early April, customs officials at Almaty airport seized a cargo arriving by air from Tashkent. A customs inspection revealed a radiation level of 100 microroentgen per hour, several times the normal background level. Closer examination showed that radiation was being emitted from a box weighing 5 kilograms and containing radioactive materials. The box was put in a special container and placed under guard.

Later, however, it was found that the cargo was not smuggled material. Accompanying documentation listed Scientific Production Enterprise Izotop as the recipient, and stated that the radioactive material was intended for medical purposes.[1]

Source:
[1] Elena Koemets, "Radioaktivnyy import" [Radioactive Import], Karavan, No. 14 (672), 4 April 2003, p. 3. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

March 2003: Export Control Center in Kazakhstan Expands Activities

With the help of a new grant from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IBT-Astana Information and Analytical Center for Export Control and Information Technology, established in Astana in 2001, will expand its work in the coming year. The primary goal of the Center is to facilitate foreign economic relations through research, analysis, consulting, training, and other activities in the areas of export control, export licensing, and information technologies. The Center works in cooperation with U.S. and Kazakhstani government agencies, international organizations, and scientific research centers, focusing on export controls, international trade, and information technologies. The Center is headed by Mr. Sagadat Bralin, formerly chief specialist at the Department of Export Controls and Licensing, Ministry of Energy, Industry and Trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and has a staff of five specialists, with expertise in information technology and export controls.

At present, the Center is involved in three main projects:

The adaptation and installation of internal compliance software at companies exporting military and dual-use products;
The adaptation and fine-tuning of the Tracker automated export control and licensing system adopted by the Kazakhstani government;
The introduction of amendments and supplements to export control legislation, including revision of the national control list, export control rules and procedures.

The other short-term and long-term projects of the Center include:

Implementation of a low-earth orbit satellite-based information system to track the transit of goods in Central Asia and the Caucasus;
Dissemination of and provision of technical support for the Tracker system;
Establishment of a division within the Center that would focus on training and consulting on World Trade Organization issues;
Creation of a web-based export control resource and the upgrade of the Center's telecommunication infrastructure;
Other IT projects on automation and monitoring solutions for export controls, information security, etc.

For more information on the Center's activities, contact Sagadat Bralin (telephone: 7-3172-398-145; email: sbralin@mail.ru).

Source:
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

March 2003: Kazakhstani, Chinese Customs Agree to Share Statistics, Cooperate on Scrap Metal Issues

At a 21 February 2003 meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Chinese and Kazakhstani customs officials signed an agreement, under which the two countries will exchange customs information on a quarterly basis. The information exchange is intended to help both sides detect violations of export control laws. The two sides also agreed to meet annually to discuss further areas of cooperation in the field of customs and border security.[1] Until the two countries determine a formal procedure for information exchange between their customs administrations, communications and information exchange will be conducted through diplomatic channels.[2]

At a follow-up meeting in March 2003 in Almaty, customs officials from both countries expressed the need for additional cooperation to resolve recurring problems, such as the return of Kazakhstani scrap metal from China. Chinese customs officials have been returning train carriages filled with scrap metal to Kazakhstan, alleging that the metal is radioactive. The Kazakhstani side claims all scrap metal sent to China from Kazakhstan is adequately screened before it is sent. According to Nysangali Kozhakhmetov, head of the Radiological Department of the Kazakhstani Sanitary-Epidemiological Service, the Chinese replace non-radioactive Kazakhstani scrap metal with radioactive scrap believed to originate in Russia or Kyrgyzstan, which they then send to Kazakhstan in the returned cars.[3,4,5]

In an attempt to find a temporary solution to the problem, in November 2002, Kazakhstani Prime Minister Imangali Tasmagambetov ordered Kazakhstani customs not to accept returned railcars from China without a ruling from the Kazakhstani Ministry of Health. Tasmagambetov also recommended that radiation detection equipment be set up on the border with China. Tasmagambetov's attempts to curtail the return of railcars from China was unsuccessful, however, as Chinese authorities returned 80 railcars, allegedly containing radioactive material, to Kazakhstan between December 2002 and January 2003. Kozhakhmetov indicated that he will propose that the Chinese government form a special commission to help resolve the matter.[4]

Sources:
[1] Kazakh TV1, 21 February 2003; in "Kazakhstani, Chinese customs sign agreement on exchange of statistics," FBIS Document CEP20030222000006.
[2] CNS Communication with Daniyar Kerimbekov, Kazakhstani Customs Administration, 16 April 2003.
[3] Interfax-Kazakhstan, 19 March 2003; in "Kazakhstani, Chinese customs discuss ways of dealing with radioactive cargo," FBIS Document CEP20030319000355.
[4] "Lomovaya istoriya: Radioaktivnaya napryazhennost na kazakhstansko-kitayskoy granitse" (Scrap Metal Saga: Radioactive Tension on the Kazakhstani-Chinese Border) Ekspress K, No. 12 (15172), 22 January 2003, p. 2.
[5] "Scrap metal returned to Kazakhstan," NIS Export Control Observer, February 2003, p. 13, cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ pdfs/ ob_0302e.pdf. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

March 2003: United States Donates Dosimeters to Kazakhstan

In March 2003 the United States presented the Kazakhstani Border Guards Service and Customs Control Agency 22 sets of dosimeters valued at $200,000. U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan Larry Napper said that the U.S. administration attaches great significance to developing border control systems in Kazakhstan. Napper noted that in 2001, the United States gave 30 vehicles, over 70 telecommunications sets, and over 300 binoculars and night vision goggles to both Kazakhstani agencies.[1]

Source:
[1] "SShA peredali pogranichnoy i tamozhennoy sluzhbam RK dosimetricheskoye oborudovaniye na summu $200 tys" (The United States gave the border and customs services of the Republic of Kazakhstan dosimeters worth $200,000), Kazakhstan Today online edition, 6 March 2003, www.gazeta.kz. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

25 February 2003: Dispute between Canadian World Wide Minerals Ltd. and Kazakhstan over Export License Settled by U.S. Supreme Court

On 25 February 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a ruling ending a dispute between the Canadian company World Wide Minerals Ltd. (WWM) and the Republic of Kazakhstan. According to a press release circulated on 6 March 2003 by state-owned Kazatomprom, the Supreme Court refused to permit WWM and its subsidiary, Nuclear Fuel Resources Corporation, to appeal a previous ruling by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in favor of Kazakhstan and Kazatomprom.[1]

WWM began its activities in Kazakhstan on 7 October 1996, when it signed a contract with the Kazakhstani State Property Committee. Under the agreement, the Kazakhstani government transferred to WWM a government-owned package of shares in the Stepnogorsk-based Tselinnyy Mining and Chemical Combine for uranium processing, and granted the Canadian company the right to manage the Combine. A disagreement arose in 1997, when WWM applied for an export license from the Kazakhstani government to sell uranium concentrate to Michigan-based Consumers Energy, with which it concluded a contract on 27 March 1997.[2]

The Kazakhstani government denied the export license after WWM refused to comply with amendments to the contract and recommendations made by a working group of experts who reviewed the contract between WWM and Consumers Energy and noted a number of violations. These included:

The contract did not provide guarantees that the buyer would abide by the provisions of the U.S.-Kazakhstani Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Investigation on Uranium from Kazakhstan, particularly Section VII, Item A, which obliges a buyer to report to the Kazakhstani Government any subsequent transactions involving sale, exchange, or loan to the United States of uranium from Kazakhstan;
WWM failed to submit an end-user import certificate (in accordance with Article 7 of the Kazakhstani Law On the Export Control of Arms, Military Equipment, and Dual-Use Materials) issued by an authorized government body and containing assurances from the receiving country that the imported goods will be used for peaceful purposes to meet national needs;
According to the contract, payment was to be wired to bank accounts at U.S. or Canadian banks, not a Kazakhstani bank, which the experts deemed unacceptable.[2]

After the export license was denied, WWM stopped production in July 1997, and did not pay wages to workers for several months on the grounds that it was impossible to sell the mined uranium. The Kazakhstani government took over the enterprise and terminated its contract with WWM due to the latter's default on obligations and in view of difficulties facing the Combine. Government Decree No. 213 of 30 July 1997, transferred operational management of the Tselinnyy Mining and Chemical Combine to Kazatomprom.[3]

World Wide Minerals Ltd. considered the actions of the Kazakhstani government unlawful and on 13 May 1998, filed a lawsuit against the Republic of Kazakhstan, the State Property Committee, and Kazatomprom in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The suit was dismissed because U.S. courts do not examine cases in which it is required to assess the legitimacy of decisions made by sovereign states on their territory. The court ruled that it is the sovereign right of the Republic of Kazakhstan to grant or deny export licenses, as well as to nationalize property on the basis of domestic laws and bylaws.[4] In spite of the ruling, WWM filed claims and appeals to U.S. courts three times, increasing the claim amount from $29 million to $1 billion.[5] To settle the dispute once and for all, Kazatomprom filed a counter petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals on 27 October 2001, requesting the accelerated dismissal of the WWM claim.[4,5,6] Less than a year later, on 8 August 2002, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued a final decision in favor of Kazakhstan and Kazatomprom.[4] On 25 February 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the D.C. Court of Appeals decision by refusing to permit WWM to file an appeal of the Court of Appeals ruling.[1]

Sources:
[1] Kazatomprom National Atomic Company. Press-release on the declaration of World Wide Minerals Ltd following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Kazatomprom Website, 6 March 2003, www.kazatomprom.com.
[2] E. Butyrina, "Verkhovnyy sud SShA otkazal WWM v appelyatsii na sudebnoye resheniye v spore s 'Kazatompromom' i RK" (U.S. Supreme Court denied WWM permission to appeal the court decision in the lawsuit against Kazatomprom and the Republic of Kazakhstan), Panorama, No. 9, 2 March 2003; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.com.
[3] "'Kazatomprom': intsident ischerpan" ("Kazatomprom: Incident is Over"), Izvestiya, No. 40 (26357), 6 March 2003, p. 8.
[4] "12 avgusta 2002 Appelyatsionnyy sud SShA okruga Kolumbiya vynes okonchatelnoye resheniye ob otklonenii predyavlyayemogo iska kanadskoy kompanii 'World Wide Minerals' protiv Natsionalnoy atomnoy kompanii 'Kazatomprom'" (On 12 August 2002 the U.S. Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia issued a final decision to dismiss the claim of the Canadian company World Wide Minerals against Kazatomprom National Atomic Company), Russian Nuclear Website Nuclear.ru, 12 August 2002, old.nuclear.ru/ news/ full/ 1150.shtml.
[5] "Milliard – tuda, milliard – syuda" (A billion here, a billion there), Novosti nedeli online edition, No. 35 (101), 4 September 2002, www.nn.kz/ cgi-bin/ newsweek.cgi? menu=view& id=flXHAZPJ2W.
[6] N. Baygozhina, "Ne vashe delo" (None of your business), Ekspress K online edition, No.149 (15062), 9 August 2002, www.express-k.kz/ 2002/ 08/ 09/ 01.php. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

20 February 2003: Kazakhstan Joins the Basel Convention

On 20 February 2003, Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed into law a bill on Kazakhstan's accession to the Basel Convention on Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. The bill had been discussed and approved at a 27 November 2002 plenary session of the Majilis, the lower chamber of the Kazakhstani Parliament.[1,2] By acceding to the Convention, Kazakhstan has committed to notifying and consulting the other member countries on projects that may have significant harmful effects on the environment.[2]

The Basel Convention was adopted in 1989 and entered into force in 1992. The Convention regulates all aspects of interstate relations regarding control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal. It aims to reduce transboundary shipments of industrial waste through environmentally sound and effective management, and the use of low-waste production technologies.[3]

Waste management is a pressing issue in Kazakhstan given the country's extensive mineral extraction and processing industries. This, combined with a lack of modern technologies for collection, storage, disposal, and recycling of generated waste, causes pollution problems. Accession to the Basel Convention will help Kazakhstan handle the issue of import and export of hazardous waste and its disposal, establish regulations and control over import, export, and transit of hazardous waste through the territory of the country, and gain access to new recycling technologies.

Kazakhstanis the fourth Central Asian country to join the Basel Convention, after Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The other NIS members of the convention are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. For more information on the Basel Convention visit the official Website of the Secretariat of the Basel Convention: www.basel.int.

Sources:
[1] Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 389-11 ZRK, On the Accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Basel Convention on Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 15 February 2002, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 5, 20 February 2003, p. 1.
[2] "Prisoyedinyayemsya k konventsii" (Joining the convention), Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 256 (23906), 28 November 2002, p. 1.
[3] "O Bazelskoy konventsii o kontrole za transgranichnoy perevozkoy opasnykh otkhodov i ih udaleniyem" (On the Basel Convention on Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal), Press-release of the Majilis Press Service, Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, September 2002, Kazakhstani Parliament Website, www.parlam.kz/ Document.asp? Recno=135& ln=WithKz. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/index.htm.

January 2003: Dump with Radioactive Metal Scrap Found in Kazakhstan

An unauthorized dump containing 25 tons of non-corrosive metals was discovered in Mangistau Oblast, Kazakhstan in January 2003, according to a 16 January 2003 article in Izvestiya. Examination of the dump showed radiation levels of 0.4-25 microroentgen per hour. A police cordon was deployed around the radioactive site. The city administration (akimat) formed a special commission that visited the dump and declared an emergency situation in Aktau and adjacent villages.[1]

Source:
[1] "V Mangistau obnaruzhena svalka" [Dump Discovered in Mangistau], Izvestiya, No. 6 (26323), 16 January 2003, p. 9. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm..

January 2003: Kazakhstani National Security Committee Releases Statement on Illegal Trade

In a January 2003 statement to the media, the Kazakhstani Committee for National Security (KNB) indicated that in 2002, it seized 5,412 kg of radioactive thorium concentrate and 12.7 kg of uranium oxide. The report did not specify where and when these materials were seized.[1]

Source:
[1] "KNB Kazakhstana v 2002 g. iz nezakonnogo oborota izyato bolee 5 tys. kg radioaktivnogo torievogo kontsentrata i 12,7 kg oksida urana" [Kazakhstan's National Security Committee seized over 5000 kg of radioactive thorium concentrate and 12.7 kg of uranium oxide in 2002], KNB Website, www.knb.kz/ index.php? parent_id=1016164644& date=& chapter=1043236810. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

January 2003: Media Reports Claim Smuggled Kazakhstani Osmium-187 Threatens Russia

Since September 2002, several reports in the Russian and Kazakhstani press have revived the controversy over the possible use of osmium in nuclear weapons. The Russian media, for example, have reported allegations of osmium smuggling from Kazakhstan into Russia and have raised concerns over the use of osmium in producing nuclear arms.

Kazakhstani authorities have challenged the allegations that osmium is being illegally exported from Kazakhstan. Osmium-187 is controlled by Kazakhstan as a dual-use material.[2] However, osmium-187 is not a controlled material under U.S. law or the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and cannot be used in the production of nuclear weapons. Osmium-185, osmium-191m, osmium-191, and osmium-193 are controlled in the United States by Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations.[3,4] Osmium-187 is frequently used in scams by con artists, however, who claim that it has nuclear weapons applications.

Osmium is a hard metal of the platinum group and is used almost exclusively to produce very wear-resistant alloys for fountain pen tips, instruments pivots, or electrical contacts.[5] Because osmium-187, which is one of the least abundant of the seven naturally-occurring osmium isotopes, is very dense, it might be thought to be an excellent material for a nuclear weapon's tamper, which allows the nuclear explosive material to stay compact for a relatively long period of time, increasing the explosive yield. However, osmium-187 would not be a logical choice for a tamper because it is very expensive, costing from $50,000 to $100,000 per gram, and other materials, such as uranium-238, are much cheaper and more readily available. In addition, osmium-187 would be too dense to be used as a neutron reflector, which aids in increasing the yield of a nuclear weapon. Instead, beryllium, a lighter material, is typically used to make reflectors because it is less expensive and has better neutron reflecting properties. Finally, osmium-187 is not radioactive, which excludes its use as a component of a "dirty bomb," or radiological dispersal device. For a summary of Russian media reports on the topic, see the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database at www.nti.org/ db/ nistraff.

Sources:
[1] Dmitriy Starostin, "FSB bespokoit osmiy," Vremya novostey, 27 September 2002; in WPS Yadernyye Materialy, No. 33, 4 October 2002.
[2] Kuat Ibrayev, "Kazakhstan oprovergayet obvineniya v nezakonnom eksporte osmiya-187," Panorama online edition, www.panorama.kz, No. 36, 16-20 September 2002.
[3] U.S. Defense Special Weapons Agency.
[4] Carleton E. Thorne, "A Guide to Nuclear Export Controls," (Proliferation Data Services, 2001), p. 354. [5] CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, www.speclab.com/ elements/ osmium.htm. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm.

December 2002: Second Line of Defense: Kazakhstani Customs Officers Receive Training

A five-day training course for officers of the Kazakhstani Customs Agency was conducted in August 2002, at the Zhibek Zholy customs post, the largest in Yuzhno-Kazakhstan Oblast. The training was sponsored and organized by the U.S. Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Program in cooperation with the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Embassy in Almaty, Kazakhstan.[1] The training course aimed to assist Kazakhstani customs officers in interdicting illegal trafficking of arms, weapons, drugs, and other banned items. Practical training focused on development of basic skills in using modern customs inspection equipment, such as the fiberendoscope and "Buster" detectors, which allow users to view an object inside a metal casing. [1] At the end of the course, Zhibek Zholy customs post received a "Consolidated Inspection Kit," a $38,000 set of detection equipment designed for customs officials and border guards.[1,2] The United States plans to distribute 14 such kits to other customs posts in Kazakhstan.

In December 2002, a large group of customs officials and cadets from the Kazakhstani Financial Police Academy attended a training course in the United States on combating smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. This course was also organized under the U.S.-Kazakhstani Second Line of Defense Program. Specialists from Pacific Northwest, Sandia, and Los Alamos National Laboratories, as well as customs and police officials from Washington State, provided training during the course. U.S. officials offered to equip an auditorium at the Kazakhstani Financial Police Academy, so that those who received training in the United States could hold training workshops for their colleagues at home. All participants in the training program in the United States received radiation pagers and portable gamma radiation detectors.[3]

Equipment procurement and establishment of a training facility for the Kazakhstani Customs Agency has been another focus of the Second Line of Defense Program. Stationary systems for detection of fissile and radioactive materials, and digital cameras will be arriving in Korday and Karasu customs posts in Yuzhno-Kazakhstan Oblast, as well as the airport and the sea port in Aktau on the Caspian Sea, in early 2003. By the end of 2003, 15 additional Kazakhstani border posts will receive new equipment.[3]

Sources:
[1] "Eksportnyy control i bezopasnost gosudarstvennykh granits" (Export control and state border security),," KazAAG, 26 August 2002; in Integrum Techno, afnet.integrum.ru.
[2] Aleksey Goncharov, "Krupneyshiy tamozhennyy post YuKO 'Zhibek-Zholy' osnashchen novym amerikanskim oborudovaniyem, Panorama, No. 33, August 2002; in Integrum Techno, afnet.integrum.ru.
[3] Zhanna Oyshymbayeva, "Liniya zashchity," (The line of defense), Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 277-278 (23926-23927), 21 December 2002, p. 6. Second Line of Defense: Kazakhstani Customs Officers Receive Training.

31 October 2002: Changes in the State Commission on Export Control of the Republic of Kazakhstan

In late October 2002, the government of Kazakhstan issued a decree (No. 1155 of 31 October 2002) that introduced amendments to Government Decree No. 1917 of 14 December 1999, On Improving the Export Control System of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The changes primarily reflect new appointments at the State Commission on Export Control (SCEC), which now includes the following members:

Karim Kazhimkanovich Masimov	Deputy Prime Minister, Chairman of State Commission on Export Control
Omarhan Nurtayevich Oksikbayev	Secretary of the State Security Council, Deputy Chairman of the State Commission on Export Control
Nartay Nurtayevich Dutbayev	Chairman of National Resources Committee
Vladimir Sergeyevich Shkolnik	Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources
Berdibek Mashbekovich Saparbayev	Chairman of Customs Control Agency
Mazhit Tuleubekovich Esenbayev	Minister of Industry and Trade
Azamat Aytkaliyevich Nurseytov	Deputy Head of External Relations Department of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, Secretary of the State Commission on Export Control
Georgiy Vladimirovich Kim	Minister of Justice
Mukhtar Kapashevich Altynbayev	Minister of Defense
Kayrat Khuatovich Abuseitov	First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

The decree also made changes to Section 5 of the Commission Statute on Organization of Work of the Commission. Specifically, paragraph 7 was modified to transfer the duty of chairing Commission meetings in the absence of the chairman, from the first deputy chairman, as previously stated, to the deputy chairman of the SCEC.

In addition, the two SCEC subcommissions—the Subcommission on Export, Import, and Transit Operations Involving Goods Subject to Export Control and the Subcommission on Improvement of the Export Control System—were disbanded (paragraph 8).

Government Decree No. 1155 of 31 October 2002 also confirmed a list of legislation that is no longer in force, including Government Decree No. 338 of 24 March 1995, On Measures for the Further Development of the Export Control System in the Republic of Kazakhstan, which laid the foundation and provided legal framework for export controls in Kazakhstan.

7 October 2002: LEU Erroneously Detained on Kazakhstani Border

A large shipment containing 27,681 kg (60,898 lbs) of enriched uranium bound for Kazakhstan was seized on 7 October 2002, by Russian customs authorities at a border post in western Siberia. The Russian authorities started a criminal investigation into the incident. Initially, the seizure was reported as a successful customs operation that prevented the smuggling of a large quantity of nuclear material. Later, however, a spokesman for the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation explained that the uranium was seized due to an error in the customs declaration.

According to Timur Zhantikin, head of the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee, the uranium was sent from Minatom's Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Plant to the Ulba Metallurgy Plant (UMZ) in Kazakhstan.

Under a treaty between Russia and Kazakhstan, uranium ore from Kazakhstan is shipped to Chepetsk Mechanical Plant, where it is processed into uranium hexafluoride, then forwarded to Angarsk for enrichment and returned to Kazakhstan to be manufactured into fuel pellets at the Ulba Metallurgy Plant. The seized uranium represents one of these shipments.

Zhantikin confirmed that the shipment was legitimate and that the incident was caused by an error in the customs declaration, in which Kazakhstan was declared as the country of origin of the material, whereas according to the tax documents, the country of origin should have been Russia. Uranium transactions between Russia and Kazakhstan are conducted on a regular basis, but this was the first case in which accompanying documents were improperly completed.[1,2,3]

Sources:
[1] "Uran prednaznachalsya dlya tabletok," Delovaya nedelya, No. 39 (517), 11 October 2002, p. 9.
[2] Nuclear.ru Website, www.nuclear.ru/ news/ full.html? id=600.
[3] CNS Trafficking Database, www.nti.org/ db/ nistraff/ 2002/ 20020610.htm.

May 2002: STORKE Automated Licensing System

A ribbon-cutting ceremony held in May 2002 at the Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) celebrated the launch of a new "System TO Review Kazakhstan Exports" (STORKE). STORKE, which was developed between 2000 and 2002 by software specialists at the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan (NNC), is a technical analysis database and secure e-mail system designed to support the review of nuclear-related and nuclear dual-use license applications.

STORKE allows KAEC licensing officials in Almaty and technical experts at the Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE) in Kurchatov City to securely communicate electronically. KAEC is responsible for reviewing export license applications that are forwarded by the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) in Astana. When KAEC licensing officers require additional expertise to evaluate a license, they refer it to the IAE, one of the four institutes of the NNC, using the STORKE secure e-mail system. IAE experts are able to provide input regardless of where they are physically located. STORKE has been designed to readily support expansion to other parts of the country. In the future, STORKE information may be exchanged with other institutes and independent experts.

The system itself was developed using Lotus Notes software and comprises two technical analysis databases that aid in the processing of licenses. One of these is a reference document database that allows full-text searches of technical reference manuals, as well as national and international laws, regulations, and control lists. The second component uses Lotus Notes to track license applications and search previous licenses for related information.

The project is being funded by the U.S. Department of State. Efforts to support and enhance the system are ongoing, and day-to-day assistance is being provided by staff members at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

21 February 2002: Authorities Thwart Illegal Sale of Radioactive Material in Southern Kazakhstan

Two Uzbekistani citizens were detained in Yuzhno-Kazakhstan Oblast on 21 February 2002, while attempting to sell 1.5 kg (3.3 lb) of uranium oxide powder and 50 g (1.8 oz) of heroin. The two planned to sell the radioactive material for 2 million tenge ($13,000). According to the Kazakhstani Committee for National Security, this is the largest amount of radioactive material ever seized in the region.[1]

Kazakhstani special services had been investigating the smugglers since the end of 2001 on grounds that they were involved in regular trafficking of large amounts of heroin into Kazakhstan. Initially, security services intended to apprehend the group for illegal drug dealing. However, further investigation revealed that the criminals were looking for a potential customer interested in buying uranium.

The operation, conducted jointly with the Uzbekistani police, provided special agents with sufficient information to secretly penetrate the uranium storage area and mark uranium with a special substance so that it could be followed at a distance, Kazakhstani newspaper Novoye pokoleniye reports. To avoid compromising the undercover agents, it was decided to seize the drugs and radioactive material during a regular customs inspection at the Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani border. The radioactive material was transported in a metal cylinder 40 cm (1.6 ft) in length and 5 cm (2 in) in diameter.

The seized material was sent to the Institute of Nuclear Physics at the Kazakhstani National Nuclear Center in Almaty for examination. Experts confirmed that the radioactivity level of the packet containing uranium powder was 6,800 microroentgen/hour, which exceeds the natural background level by 340 times.[1]

The origin of the uranium oxide remains unknown. The arrested smugglers claimed they were only aware of a supplier who shipped radioactive materials from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan.[1] All of the arrested individuals were charged in violation of three articles of the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan: Article 250, Section 1 "Smuggling"; Article 247, Section 1 "Illegal handling of radioactive materials"; and Article 259, Section 4 "Large-scale illegal trafficking of narcotic substances." They are serving their sentences in Kazakhstan, where the crime was committed.[2]

Sources:
[1] "Gruz bez markirovki," Novoye pokoleniye, No. 29 (217), 19 July 2002, p. 5.
[2] "Nanesli uran," Kazakhstan Today, 13 March 2002; in Shymkent Website, www.chimkent.kz/ news130302.htm.

4 November 2001: Break-In Reported at Biological Facility in Kazakhstan

A man was arrested on 4 November 2001, in Almaty after attempting to penetrate a highly guarded facility, the Kazakhstan Scientific Center for Quarantine and Zoonotic Infections (formerly the Anti-Plague Institute). The Center, which focuses on control and prevention of dangerous diseases, houses a collection of pathogen cultures. According to the Center's security service head, the intruder cut the barbed wire on the outside fence, while several accomplices waited behind the fence. They ran away when the intruder was arrested and taken into custody by the local police.[1]

Dr. A. Aykimbayev, Deputy Director of the Center, said that the break-in was thwarted due to a set of measures taken previously to strengthen the physical protection of the facility under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Local law enforcement agencies tend to view the incident as a random break-in. Foreign experts, however, were seriously concerned about the incident and helped the Center to develop an action plan to further enhance its physical protection, Dr. Aykimbayev said.[2]

Sources:
[1] A. Prokopyev, "'Chumovoye' proisshestviye," Komsomolskaya pravda, No. 205 (22910), 11 June 2002, p. 4.
[2] CNS interview with Dr. A. Aykimbayev. This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: cns.miis.edu/ pubs/ nisexcon/ index.htm..

Export Licensing Process

The export licensing process in Kazakhstan is described in detail in Appendix I of Government Resolution No. 1037, 30 June 1997. According to this Appendix, the Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Trade was the only government body with the right to issue an export or import license. On 13 December 2000, the right to issue export or import licenses was transferred to the Department of Export Control and Special Programs of the Ministry of Economy and Trade. In order to obtain an export license, a potential exporter must submit the following documents to the Ministry of Economy and Trade:

a. A completed license application;
b. A copy of the contract or agreement as well as the original contract itself (for comparison purposes);
c. The agreement between the manufacturer and the purchaser, if the potential exporter is acting as an intermediary;
d. A certificate of state registration;
e. A document showing that the exporter has paid the license fee;
f. A license from the appropriate state body to conduct the type of operation that the potential exporter conducts;
g. Permission from the government of Kazakhstan or other ministry or government agency, if required. Those goods that can be exported only with the permission of the Kazakhstani government are outlined broadly in Appendix II of Government Resolution 1037. Those goods that can be exported only with the permission of specific government ministries or agencies, such as the Committee on Atomic Energy (formerly the KAEA), are outlined broadly in Appendix IV of Government Resolution 1037;
h. A document certifying the origin of the goods to be exported.

The Ministry of Economy and Trade must make the decision to issue or refuse a license within 10 days of receiving all the appropriate documentation. Licenses are issued for one type of good only, regardless of the number of types of goods in a given contract. This means that more than one export license may be required per contract. Licenses are non-transferable, issued for one export transaction only, and are valid for no more than one year from their date of issue. The export license serves as the basis for processing customs documentation. Licenses are issued for the export of goods to one designated country only, and can not be used to export goods to any other country. The Ministry of Economy and Trade has the right to suspend export licenses for up to six months.[1,2]

EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS FOR NUCLEAR AND DUAL-USE NUCLEAR GOODS

All nuclear exports require a license. A potential exporter of nuclear or dual-use nuclear materials must already have permission from the Committee on Atomic Energy (formerly called the KAEA) to conduct operations in the sphere of nuclear energy (including production, use, storage, or transport). The exporter then must specifically receive permission from the Committee on Atomic Energy and from the government in order to receive an export license for nuclear or dual-use nuclear materials [item g, above]. In practice, before the government gives permission for an export, it will send a license application to all the relevant ministries and agencies for interagency review. However, there do not appear to be any major decrees or resolutions that actually require an interagency review before the government gives its permission for a given export license application.

In order to receive permission to export from the Committee on Atomic Energy, a potential exporter must submit the following documents to the Committee on Atomic Energy:

a. Documents showing that the producer has permission to produce the nuclear items in question;
b. Documents confirming that the items to be exported were legally transferred from the producer to the potential exporter (applicant);
c. Documents confirming that the applicant has the right to conduct activities with nuclear materials and radiation sources in general;
d. An initialed contract (agreement) on delivering the nuclear export to the receiving country;
e. Documents showing that the export transaction does not violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or any other international treaties or agreements to which Kazakhstan is a signatory. In addition, if the export involves a non-nuclear weapon state, the competent authorities in the receiving country must provide assurances that the exported nuclear goods, or materials produced on the basis of those goods:

a. will not be used for any military ends, including the production of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives;
b. will be placed under IAEA safeguards;
c. will be secured under physical protection at levels not less than those recommended by the IAEA;
d. will be re-exported from the recipient country to a third country only if the above three conditions are met in the third country; Re-export of HEU (enriched above 20 percent), plutonium, or heavy water by the recipient country to a third can proceed only if the recipient country receives written permission from the Committee on Atomic Energy.

The Committee on Atomic Energy also must know the route used to ship the export and be convinced of the reliability of the end-user, in order to recommend that an export license be issued.[3] After all the above documentation has been received, the Committee on Atomic Energy will make a judgment as to whether or not to recommend to the Ministry of Economy and Trade that it issue an export license to the applicant. Only one-time licenses are issued for nuclear exports.[2]

Exporters are required to inform the Committee on Atomic Energy not later than five days after the goods are actually dispatched across the border.

EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS FOR MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (NON-NUCLEAR)

There is a two-stage process for licensing the export of military goods and technologies.

Stage One: A potential exporter from the defense industry must obtain preliminary permission from the government in order to conclude contracts with foreign customers. In order to receive permission, the potential exporter must go through the following steps:

Defense industry organizations must apply to the Defense Industry Committee for permission to conclude a contract;
The Defense Industry Committee will review the application, noting the type of goods in question, the amount of goods, and the importing country. If everything is in order, the Defense Industry Committee will prepare a draft decision for the government on permitting the applicant to conclude a contract for military goods;
The draft resolution of the government has to be approved by the following ministries and organizations: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Committee for National Security; the Ministry of Economy and Trade; the Customs Committee; the Ministry of Finance; and the Ministry of Justice. In approving this resolution, the ministries and organizations take into account Kazakhstan's international obligations, as well as its national laws and legislation.

Once a defense industry organization has received permission from the government, it can sign a contract with a foreign customer. This process can be lengthy. According to a presentation by the Defense Industry Committee at an international export control conference, it is not unusual for the above ministries and organizations to make decisions that are not in the "economic interests of the military industrial enterprises." Presumably, this means that applications to receive permission to conclude contracts are often declined at this stage in the process.

Stage Two: Permission from the Government of Kazakhstan regarding the issuance of an export license.

After signing a contract, a defense industry enterprise must apply again to the Defense Industry Committee, requesting permission to receive an export license.

The Defense Industry Committee then prepares a draft resolution for the government, which grants permission to issue a license to the defense enterprise for exporting military or dual-use goods from the territory of Kazakhstan in accordance with the specific contract that it received permission to conclude in Stage One.
The Defense Industry Committee sends the draft resolution, together with a copy of the contract and an end-user certificate issued by an official government body of the importing country, for approval by the same ministries and organizations listed in Stage One. An end-user certificate is not required if the contract is with a foreign Ministry of Defense or with any other official government body of a foreign country. This approval process can take from two to six months.
After the government issues a resolution approving the issue of an export license, the defense enterprise must formally apply to the Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Trade for an export license.

The same procedures are required for the re-export of military goods. Re-export requires the formal permission of a competent state agency in the country where the military goods originated.

A special government resolution (Stage Two) is not required for the following four types of activities:

1) the export of spare parts, training materials, or technical repairs required in connection with military goods previously exported;
2) the export of parts required to produce military goods to countries within the CIS. These types of exports are carried out in accordance with inter-governmental agreements;
3) the transport across CIS borders of arms, military equipment, training and support equipment for the purposes of repair, which can be carried out without an export license. In this type of situation, the export is carried out under bilateral agreements between the Ministries of Defense of the CIS countries involved. The export is on the basis not of an export license, but of a "military pass;"
4) the transport across CIS borders of special equipment, produced on the territory of the CIS, intended for use by the Border Guards and necessary for the defense of the state borders of CIS countries (not including arms and military equipment).[4]

Sources:
[1] NISNP Interview with Office of Export Import Control official, 5 June 2001, KAZ010605.
[2] Statute on the Export and Import of Nuclear Materials, Technology, Equipment, Facilities; Special Non-Nuclear Materials; Dual-Use Nuclear Equipment, Materials, and Technologies; Radiation Sources and Radioactive Isotopes, approved by Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 183 from 9 March 1993.
[3] V.S. Shkolnik, T.M. Zhantikin, Ch.T. Masenov, "Control of the Export of Nuclear Materials, Technology, and Dual-Use Materials in the Republic of Kazakhstan," presentation at the U.S.-Kazakhstan Astana International Regional Export Control and Nonproliferation Forum for Central Asian and Caucasian States, 11-12 November, 1998.
[4] "The Export Control System in the Republic of Kazakhstan for Defense Industry Goods," presentation by the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense, Committee for Defense Industries at the United States - Kazakhstan Astana International Regional Forum on Export Control and Nonproliferation for Central Asia and the Caucasus Countries, November 1998. {Entered 10/19/2001 KB}.

Export Control Overview

According to Kazakhstani export control authorities, Kazakhstan's export control system meets all basic international requirements.[1] At a November 2000 export control seminar in Kazakhstan, a US Bureau of Export Administration official called Kazakhstan a regional leader in terms of export controls and suggested that the country would become a model for other countries.[2] Indeed, November 2000 amendments to the country's 1996 Law on Export Control and the introduction of a new control list have strengthened the country's ability to prevent the illicit export of sensitive materials. Nevertheless, there are still many challenges facing Kazakhstan's export control system.

The first challenge is the frequent change in personnel and agencies with export control authority. Since 1993, the central export control authority, currently known as the Office of Import and Export Controls, has been subordinate to four different ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MFER) in 1993; the Ministry of Industry and Trade from 1994 to 1997; the Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Trade from 1997 to 2000; and, since December 2000, the Ministry of Economy and Trade.[3] In March 2001, the Office of Import and Export Controls of the Department of Export Control and Special Projects was reorganized, at which time many licensing experts left government service.[4] According to Kazakhstani export control specialists, the Kazakhstani government may not understand the disruption caused by frequent reorganizations.[5]

The move of the Kazakhstani capital from Almaty to Astana in December 1997 further interfered with the country's export control system. Only two out of 22 licensing officers who worked on licensing issues for the Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Trade chose to move to Astana. Some reviewing agencies, such as the Committee on Atomic Energy, have chosen not to move altogether, which leads to fewer opportunities for face-to-face consultation between reviewing agencies and the Office of Import and Export Controls.[3]

A second challenge to Kazakhstan's export control system is the lack of resources. The staff of 10 at the Office of Export and Import Controls spends much of its time each day fielding questions from exporters regarding classification and licensing instead of developing regulations to implement the export control legislation that is in place. The Office of Export and Import Controls has plans to create a company that would provide consulting services on export licensing matters to the business community. For this to happen, however, the government must first allocate the necessary funding.[4]

A third challenge is that the licensing of scrap metal exports takes time and resources from the more important task of licensing exports of nuclear and dual-use materials. With scrap metal fetching a 200% markup at the Chinese border, the licensing of scrap metal will continue to take valuable time and resources from the Department. Some suggest that the lucrative nature of licensing scrap metal may in turn lead to a rapid turnover of licensing officials.[4,6]

Sources:
[1] Interfax, 28 November 2000; in "Kazakh export controls praised by US export control official," FBIS Document CEP20001128000112.
[2] "Sistema eksportnogo kontrolya Kazakhstana priznana luchshey sredi stran SNG," Panorama online edition, www.panorama.kz, 12 January 2001.
[3] Keith D. Wolfe, "An Evaluation of Export Control in Kazakhstan," Center for International Trade and Security Web Site, www.cits.uga.edu.
[4] NISNP Interview with Office of Export Import Control official, 5 June 2001, KAZ010605.
[5] NISNP Interview with Kazakhstani export control specialist, 12 June 2001, KAZ010612.
[6] NISNP Interview with Kazakhstani export control specialist, 7 June 2001, KAZ010607.{Entered 7/2/2001 KB}

ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

The Department of Export Control and Special Programs of the Ministry of Economy and Trade is the main government body responsible for export control policy in Kazakhstan.[1] It grants import and export licenses, works to improve export control legislation, and coordinates the activities of relevant government entities.[2] Before the Department of Export Control and Special Projects may grant a license for the export of nuclear-related material, the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources must first evaluate all aspects of the transaction and give approval for the transaction to take place. The Committee has special responsibility over the export and import of nuclear materials and technologies, special non-nuclear materials, and dual-use materials in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[3]

The responsibilities of these and other government agencies and ministries in the process of exporting nuclear materials are shown in the table below.

Governmental Export Control Responsibilities, Republic of Kazakhstan

President	broadly defines Kazakhstan's export control policies; issues edicts[4]
Government	provides general oversight for the creation and development of Kazakhstan's export control system; creates and publishes regulations; grants permission for export and transit; develops and implements state policies[4]
Office of Import and Export Controls, Department of Export Control and Special Programs, Ministry of Economy and Trade	oversees economic aspect of export policy; prepares documents granting permission for export; establishes export quotas; grants licenses to applicants; stops export transactions in the event of a violation on the part of the end user (along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Atomic Energy)[1,2,4]
Ministry of Economy and Trade	acts as the executive body for the interagency State Commission on Export Control Issues, which is made up of two subcommittees: the Subcommittee on Matters of Export-Import and Transit of Controlled Items and the Subcommittee on Improving the Export Control System;[5] the latter subcommittee includes an interagency working group that deals with technical and routine issues of the country's export control system[2]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	evaluates the political expediency of an export transaction; evaluates the end user (along with the Committee on Atomic Energy); stops an export transaction in the event of a violation on the part of the end user (along with the Committee on Atomic Energy and the Ministry of Economy and Trade)[4,6]
Committee on Atomic Energy, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources	evaluates documents and conditions of the export transaction; evaluates the end user (along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); grants approval for licenses; prevents an export transaction in the event of a violation on the part of the end user (along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and Trade);[4] oversees the collection, processing, transport, and storage of radioactive waste[7]
Ministry of the Interior	controls the movement of goods to be exported; provides security for goods to be exported[4,6]
Committee for National Security	controls the implementation of the requirements of Kazakhstani laws; accompanies export transaction operations; prevents illicit trafficking of nuclear materials[4]
Ministry of Health	regulates public health issues regarding the production, use, transport, and storage of radioactive substances[7]
Ministry of Transport and Communications	licenses the transit of hazardous materials through Kazakhstan and coordinates the transport of radioactive substances[7]
Customs Committee of the Ministry of State Revenues	controls the export of goods from the territory of Kazakhstan (checks accompanying documents and examines goods); keeps the Ministry of Economy and Trade informed[4,6]
Kazatomprom	state-owned exporter of uranium and other nuclear materials and technologies

Kazspetseksport, under the Ministry of Defense, is the state-owned company designated to export surplus weapons and other military equipment not being used by the country's armed forces.[8] In June 2000, Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev ordered the creation under the Security Council of the Interagency Commission on Issues of Export of Weapons, Military Equipment, and Dual-Use Materials. This commission must approve all sales of weapons and military equipment.[9] A separate military-technical commission sets prices for items that Kazspetseksport sells.[8] Sales of non-nuclear military technology produced by the Kazakhstani defense industry must be approved by the Defense Industry Committee of the Ministry of Economy and Trade.

Tsentr Eksportkontrolservis (Export Control Service Center), a non-governmental organization, was established in June 2000 to assist the government of Kazakhstan in creating an effective export control system.[10]

Sources:
[1] NISNP Interview with Office of Export Import Control official, 5 June 2001, KAZ010605.
[2] NISNP Interview with Department of Export Control and Licensing official, 31 October 2000, KAZ001031.
[3] Government Decree No. 1182, Ob utverzhdenii postanovleniya ob Agenstve po atomnoy energii Ministerstva nauki-Akademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan, 28 July 1997.
[4] Chingis Masenov, "Eksportnyy kontrol yadernykh materialov i materialov dvoynogo ispolzovaniya" (Kazakhstan, 2001, photocopy).
[5] Government Decree No. 1917, O sovershenstvovanii sistemy eksportnogo kontrolya v Respublike Kazakhstan, 14 December 1999.
[6] Valeriy Korablev and Chingis Masenov, "Challenges and Solutions to Export Controls in Kazakhstan," The Monitor, Vol. 5-6, No. 4-1, Fall 1999/Winter 2000, pp. 22-23.
[7] Daniyar Koshenov, Pravovoye regulirovaniye nezakonnogo oborota yadernykh veshchestv po zakonodatelstvu Respubliki Kazakhstan i mezhdunarodnomu pravu (Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute of Atomic Law), p. 6.
[8] Sergey Tunik, "Ersa Koshkarov: Kazspetseksport Sells Almost Scrap," Ekspress-K online version, express-k.inc.ru, 30 May 2000, p. 3; in "Kazakh Arms Export State Enterprise Sells Only 'Surplus Obsolete Arms,'" FBIS Document CEP20000607000019.
[9] "V Kazakhstane sozdayetsya komissiya po voprosam realizatsii vooruzheniy," Interfax, 7 June 2000.{Updated 2/22/01 KB}
[10] CNS NIS Representative Office Memorandum, 12 December 2000.{Updated 6/26/2001 KB}

EXPORT CONTROL LEGISLATION

The legal foundation for Kazakhstan's nuclear export control system consists of a series of government decrees and two laws.

Government Decree No. 183 of 9 March 1993 and Government Decree No. 1182 of 28 July 1997 set forth the requirements for nuclear exports and outline the responsibilities of the Committee on Atomic Energy in the sphere of nuclear export control. Government Decree No. 1037 of 30 June 1997 outlines the export licensing process. Government Decree No. 1919 of 14 December 1999 strengthens requirements for the export of nuclear materials and requires end-use assurances that the exported item will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or any other military goal.

The Law on Export Control of Weapons, Military Technology, and Dual-Use Goods of 18 June 1996 provides a broad legal basis for export controls. The law gives the government of Kazakhstan the authority to create and develop an export control system and to define the authority of other executive branch agencies in the sphere of export controls. It broadly defines the items subject to export control, including weapons and military technology, nuclear and dual-use nuclear materials, and chemical and biological materials that could be used in the creation of chemical and biological weapons. The law specifically states that nuclear exports must be placed under IAEA safeguards, and also addresses issues of re-export and transit. Changes and amendments to the law were signed into force on 24 November 2000.

The Law on the Use of Atomic Energy of 14 April 1997 established the legal and regulatory foundation for the use of nuclear energy in Kazakhstan. The law states that the export and import of nuclear-related goods and services is controlled by relevant state bodies in accordance with national legislation and the international obligations of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

A new export control list, which includes 1,266 items, entered into force on 18 November 2000. Provisions for the enforcement of Kazakhstan's export control system are embodied in the Criminal Code of 1 January 1998.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Kazakhstan is a party to the Minsk Accord of 26 June 1992 between eight CIS member states. According to this agreement, the parties will create national export control systems, work together to control the export of materials used in the production of weapons of mass destruction, and create uniform control lists based on international export control regimes. On 9 February 1993, Kazakhstan reached an agreement with Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to cooperate in controlling exports relevant to manufacturing weapons of mass destruction.

On 14 February 1994 Kazakhstan acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty, which requires that all exports of nuclear facilities, materials, and nuclear-unique components be subject to IAEA safeguards in the recipient country. On 11 August 1995 Kazakhstan's IAEA Safeguards Agreement entered into force, requiring Kazakhstan to inform the IAEA of any export of nuclear material subject to the Agreement.

According to its Military Doctrine of 12 February 2000, Kazakhstan will support international nonproliferation regimes, obey international nonproliferation treaties, and follow international norms in transactions involving weapons, military equipment, and dual-use items.
["Voyennaya doktrina Respubliki Kazakhstan," Kazakhstanskaya pravda online edition, www.kazpravda.kz, 12 February 2000.]

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration (BXA), under its Nonproliferation and Export Control Cooperation (NEC) Program, sponsored a series of workshops for Kazakhstani export control officials, beginning in July 1994. Kazakhstan's comprehensive export control law of 18 July 1996 was developed, in part, during a BXA-sponsored workshop in Washington, DC in March 1995. BXA-led export control seminars in Kazakhstan are funded under the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Activities Fund (NADR) under the Freedom Support Act administered by the US Department of State.[1] Under the CTR program, BXA provided Kazakhstan with equipment to create an automated license processing system, which was dedicated in April 1997.[2] In December 1999, the US Department of State and the Kazakhstani Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Trade signed a memorandum of understanding on the introduction of an automated export control system, known as Tracker.[3] According to Kazakhstani export control specialists, however, it is unlikely that Kazakhstan will ever use Tracker for its intended purpose, partly out of fears that the United States may be able to use the system to covertly gather information.[4]

The IAEA and members of the European Union, in particular, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, have also provided technical assistance and training to Kazakhstani export control organizations.[2,4]

Sources:
[1] NISNP Correspondence with BXA official, 8 December 2000, KAZ001208.
[2] NEC Team Accomplishments, NEC Website, www.nectic.bxa.doc.gov.
[3] Dauletbay Ismagulov, "Ob eksportnom kontrole v Respublike Kazakhstan," Panorama online edition, www.panorama.kz, No. 44, 10 November 2000, pg. 3.
[4] NISNP Interview with Kazakhstani export control specialist, 7 June 2001, KAZ010607.{Entered 10/18/2001 KB}

NUCLEAR-RELATED EXPORTS

Kazakhstan exports natural uranium (uranium oxide with .78% U-235), sulfuric acid solution from in-situ leaching (ISL) operations containing 22% uranium oxide, uranium dioxide powder enriched to 2.2-4.4%, beryllium and related products containing more than 50% beryllium, and high-grade bismuth (99.99% purity or higher). [Valeriy Korablev and Chingis Masenov, "Challenges and Solutions to Export Controls in Kazakhstan," The Monitor, Vol. 5-6, No. 4-1, Fall 1999/Winter 2000, pp. 22-23.]

Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at MIIS CNS: Kenley.Butler@miis.edu

About This Section

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.

	Kazakhstan Maps
	Central Asian NWFZ
	Export Control Developments
	WMD in Central Asia
	Treaties and Organizations
	Disarmament Database Profile
	Civilian HEU Reduction and Elimination
	Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center
	International Assistance for Anti-Plague Facilities
	Proposal on Commercial Imports of Radioactive Waste
	Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia and the NIS
	Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS
	Full-Text Documents
	IAEA Factsheet: Kazakhstan
	Government of Kazakhstan Website
	National Nuclear Center of KZ
	Kazakhstan's Nuclear Ambitions
	BN-350 Spent Fuel Security
	The Soviet Anti-Plague System
	Central Asia: Regional Security and WMD Proliferation Threats (UNIDIR 2007)

Advanced Search

Export Control Developments

Export Licensing Process

Export Control Overview