Sources:
[1] "Fourth Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Eastern Europe, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 6-8 June 2005," OPCW Technical Secretariat Note, 29 March 2005, OPCW Website, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/snotes/2005/
s-485-2005.pdf>.
[2] "Fourth Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Eastern Europe," Chemical Disarmament, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 2005, p. 20, OPCW Website, <http://www.opcw.org/docs/publications/
cdq_jun2005.pdf>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

16-20 May 2005:  Kazakhstan Hosts Seminar on Search for and Security of Radioactive Sources; Inventory of Radiation Sources to Be Held in Kazakhstan

On 16-20 May 2005, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), in cooperation with the U.S. Sandia, Argonne, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories as well as Canberra Packard Central Europe, organized a training seminar entitled "Search and Security of Orphan Radioactive Sources," at the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) in Almaty, Kazakhstan.[1,2] [Editor's Notes: "Orphan radioactive sources," are radioactive materials intended for use in industry, research, or medicine that have been abandoned by their owners and are outside regulatory control, thereby posing potential public health dangers. Orphan sources may also be vulnerable to acquisition by terrorist organizations that might seek to use them in radiological dispersion devices or "dirty bombs." Canberra Packard Central Europe is an Austrian company engaged in distributing, installing, and servicing radiation measuring equipment with medical, environmental, and industrial applications in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.][3]

Twenty-six Kazakhstani participants representing the INP, the Institute of Atomic Energy, Institute of Radiation Safety and Ecology, the MAEK-Kazatomprom company, and the Ulba Metallurgical Plant attended the event. In addition to presentations by the U.S. and Austrian experts on orphan source search techniques, the training included practical search exercises. The participants were tasked to find radioactive sources hidden at the INP site, using the special radiation detection equipment brought by the U.S. side. Upon completion of the training, the equipment was donated to Kazakhstani facilities.[1,2,4]

Following the training, on 23 May 2005, Timur Zhantikin, chairman of the Kazakhstani Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC), announced that the Ministry of Health and the KAEC would start this summer a nationwide inventory of radioactive sources used at the country's industrial enterprises and institutions. According to Zhantikin, the inventory aims to check the current state of sources and their operational and storage conditions, and will include the search for orphan sources. In addition, along with the inventory of radiation sources, two projects will be launched to clean up two radioactive source burial sites—at the former Irtysh Chemical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, eastern Kazakhstan, and at the Mangystau Atomic Energy Combine located in Aktau, western Kazakhstan.[5]

As reported by Zhantikin, based on Soviet-era data, about 100,000 radiation sources were in use in Kazakhstan in 1992. However, as a result of economic decline and the transition to a market economy, which followed the breakup of the Soviet Union, no tracking of radioactive sources has been conducted since then in Kazakhstan . In the Soviet period, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Sanitary Epidemiological Service (SES) of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic were charged with the tracking of radioactive sources. However, the radiation source database of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was lost, and the KAEC had to restore the information using the SES database and the data of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Kazakhstan. The country's national register of radioactive sources currently includes information about 40,000 pieces of equipment and devices using radioactive materials that are in use at the present time. The database does not include insignificant radiation sources, such as smoke detectors, that were included in the Soviet-period database. However, the committee is still unaware of the whereabouts of almost 20,000 radiation sources thought to still be within the country. Zhantikin pointed out that the United States is assisting in training teams of specialists to conduct a search for orphan radioactive sources.[5] According to an NNSA representative, a search program is being drafted jointly by Kazakhstani and U.S. government agencies.[4]

Sources:
[1] "Amerikanskiye spetsialisty provodyat trening dlya kazakhstanskikh yadershchikov" [ U.S. experts conduct a training for Kazakhstani nuclear specialists], Kazakhstan today news agency, 17 May 2005, Gazeta.kz, http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=59589.
[2] "Search and Secure Training," Nuclear Technology Safety Center Website, <http://www.ntsc.kz/News/May2005_1.htm>.
[3] "History," Canberra Packard Central Europe Website, <http://www.cpce.net/>.
[4] "RK i SShA gotovyat programmu po poisku beskhoznykh istochnikov izlucheniya" [ Kazakhstan and the United States are drafting a search program for orphan ionizing radiation sources], Kazakhstan today news agency, 20 May 2005, in Gazeta.kz, <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=59793>.
[5] "V Kazakhstane budet provedena inventarizatsiya istochnikov ioniziruyushchego izlucheniya" [An inventory check of ionizing radiations sources will be conducted in Kazakhstan ], Kazakhstan today news agency, 23 May 2005, in Gazeta.kz, <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=59869>
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

14-16 March 2005: Kazakhstan to Allocate $7.7 Million for Construction of a New Customs Terminal on the Border with Uzbekistan

During a three-day inspection of the customs posts located in the Manghystau oblast (western Kazakhstan) conducted on 14-16 March 2005, the chairman of the Customs Control Committee under Kazakhstan's Ministry of Finances, Berdybek Saparbayev, announced his government's plan to build a large customs terminal to upgrade the existing Tazhen customs post on the Kazakhstan border with Uzbekistan.[1,2]

At present, the Tazhen customs office is only equipped to perform routine vehicle inspections, while passenger and cargo trains originating from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan cross the border of Kazakhstan without undergoing customs control. The trains are checked only later, after entering Kazakhstan, at the Beyneu railway station, which is located 85 km from the Tazhen border crossing.[2,3] The Beyneu station, however, also lacks special equipment to check the trains effectively.[2] In an interview with the Kazakhstani Khabar television channel, Saparbayev pointed out that, after the trains cross the border into Kazakhstan, they make several stops before Beyneu station, a process that allows smugglers from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to transport contraband commodities and drugs with impunity onto the territory of Kazakhstan or use Kazakhstan as a transit country to transport drugs to Russia.

According to customs officials and police officers supervising the Beyneu station, the region is on the drug trafficking route that crosses Aqtau (the administrative center of the Manghystau oblast) and goes towards Moscow via Astrakhan (Russia).[2] Customs officials from the Manghystau oblast Customs Directorate indicated that from the point of view of drug trafficking, the Dushanbe (Tajikistan)-Astrakhan (Russia) as well as Kungrad (Uzbekistan)-Beyneu (Kazakhstan) trains are of particular concern.[4] Kazakh transportation and law enforcement officials believe the new customs terminal at the Tazhen border crossing will help solve many of the aforementioned problems.[2]

The construction cost of the new customs terminal at Tazhen is estimated to be approximately 1 billion Kazakh tenge ($7.7 million), and the terminal is slated to begin operating in 2006.[1,2] According to Saparbayev, the new terminal will operate according to the so-called "one-stop principle"[1] In this regard, Saparbayev noted, "As you might know, customs officials are not the only ones who work on the border.… We want to set up a single center to enable all services at the border [customs, sanitary-epidemiological, veterinary services, etc.] to work at one place. And they will work based on the 'one-stop' principle, which means that a vehicle, or any other mode of transportation will be stopped only once and controlled only once [by the various services present at the border]."[2]

Sources:
[1] Alla Loginova, "Berdybek Saparbayev inspektiruyet posty tamozhennogo kontrolya Mangistau" (Berdybek Saparbayev is inspecting the customs control offices of the Manghystau), Kazakh National Information Agency Kazinform, 15 March 2005, <http://www.inform.kz/showarticle.php?lang=
rus&id=115067>.
[2] "Boleye milliyarda tenge poluchat Mangistauskiye tamozhenniki na stroitelstvo kontrolno-propusknogo punkta na granitse s Uzbekistanom. Ob etom soobshchil predsedatel Komiteta tamozhennogo kontrolya Berdybek Saparbayev v khode inspektsionnoy poezdki v Mangitauskuyu oblast" [Manghystau customs officials will receive more than one billion tenge for the construction of a new customs control post on the border with Uzbekistan. The chairman of the Customs Control Committee, Berdybek Saparbaev, revealed the plan during the inspection tour of the Manghystau oblast], Khabar news agency and television channel (Kazakhstan), 17 March 2005, <http://www.khabar.kz/index.php3?chapter=
1111075064&date=2005-03-17&lang=rus&parent_id=
1003479943#1111075064>.
[3] CNS phone communication with the Kazakh customs officials at the Beyneu customs office, 22 April 2005.
[4] "Devyat mesyatsev tamozhny" [Customs is nine months old], Lada [weekly newspaper of the city of Aqtau] online edition, No. 42 (337), 17 October 2002, <http://www.lada.kz/text.asp?num=337&st=3>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

February 2005: Kazakhstan and Russia Test Joint Customs Control Procedures

In its past issues, the NIS Export Control Observer reported the establishment of joint Kazakh-Russian customs control at the Sharbakty-Kulunda checkpoint located on the border of the Pavlodar oblast, northeastern Kazakhstan, with the Russian Federation.[1,2] The initiative stemmed from recommendations made in October 2003 by the Customs Control Committee (CCC, then Customs Control Agency) of Kazakhstan after a fact-finding visit to Germany and Poland by a Kazakh interagency commission, which was set up by the Kazakhstani government in December 2002 to develop a comprehensive modernization program for Kazakh customs.[1,2]

On 4 June 2004, a bilateral agreement signed by Russia and Kazakhstan set the start date of the joint customs control experiment at the Sharbakty-Kulunda port of entry for 1 July 2004. However, due to the reorganization of the Russian government in spring 2004, the establishment of joint customs control was delayed until 24 August 2004.[1,2,3,4] Since then, Kazakh customs officials and their Russian counterparts have been jointly carrying out the inspection of vehicles crossing the border at the Sharbakty-Kulunda customs control post. The introduction of the simplified customs inspection procedures is aimed at boosting the cross-border trade between the two countries. The Kazakh and Russian customs services intend to increase the volume of bilateral trade by simplifying the rules for the movement of goods across the Kazakh-Russian border. The joint customs control experiment is supposed to show the benefits of cooperation in the customs area, and, if it is proved successful, joint customs control will be extended to the other border posts on the Kazakh-Russian border. In this regard, CCC Deputy Chairman Baurzhan Abdishev noted, "If the experiment produces good results and if our laws are harmonized, this rule will be applied to the entire border."[5]

Editor's Note: The agreement between the Siberian Customs Directorate (Russian Federation) and the Department of Customs Control for the Pavlodar Oblast (Kazakhstan), which was signed in Pavlodar on 4 June 2004, provided the legal foundation for the introduction of the pilot joint customs control at the Sharbakty-Kulunda vehicular point of entry. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, the Russian and Kazakh customs officials jointly examine the commodities and vehicles crossing the border in both directions. The agreement also stipulates constant exchange of information on the volume of goods and vehicles crossing the border, which is aimed at helping in identifying illegal cross-border transactions. To avoid violations, customs officials from each side compare their records on commodities and vehicles crossing the border in both directions and launch search if necessary. The agreement specified that the length of the experiment was limited to six months, and therefore ended in late February 2005.

Pavlodar Oblast customs officials sent a report on the results of the experiment to the CCCand Russia's Federal Customs Service outlining their achievements and identifying areas for improvement. As of April 2005, there was no information on when the joint customs control will resume. Note however that unlike joint control, exchange of information is continuing.[3,4,6,7,8]

Sources:
[1] "Customs Control Agency of Kazakhstan to Reform Border Checkpoints," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 11, November 2003, pp. 3-4, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon>.
[2] "Joint Customs Checkpoint Opened on Kazakhstani-Russian Border," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 20, September 2004, p. 2, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon>.
[3] "Na Altaye startoval eksperiment po oformleniyu tamozhennykh gruzov" [Cargo customs registration experiment began in Altay], Ekspert-Sibir online edition, 24 August 2004, <http://www.expert-sibir.ru:8080/es/News/
a2081/Show>.
[4] "Rossiyskiye i kazakhstanskiye tamozhenniki provedut eksperiment po sovmestnomu tamozhennomu kontrolyu" [Russian and Kazakh customs officials will conduct an experiment in joint customs control], Regnum news agency (Russia ), 17 June 2004; in International Road Transport Union Website, <http://www.iru-cis.ru/news/v1/
printitem.php?newsid=181>.
[5] Kazakh TV1 (Astana, Kazakhstan), 19 March 2005; in "Kazakhstan, Russia Test Simplified Border Customs Procedures," FBIS Document CEP20050320000109.
[6] "Kazakhstanskiye i rossiiskiye tamozhenniki provedut eksperiment po kontrolyu za gruzami, vyvozimymi s territorii Kazakhstana v RF" [Kazakh and Russian customs officials will conduct an experiment in control over cargo transfers from the territory of Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation ], RIA Novosti, 24 August 2004; in FTInform Website, <http://www.ftinform.com/Russian/news/
read.asp?id=10427>.
[7] "Altayskiy kray: tamozhennyy eksperiment pomozhet uvelichit tovarooborot s Kazakhstanom" [Altay kray: customs experiment will help increase the trade volume with Kazakhstan ], Alliance-Media news agency, 24 August 2004; in Russian Web Portal of Information Support for Foreign Economic Activities "VneshMarket," <http://vneshmarket.ru/NewsAM/NewsAMShow.asp?ID=140988>.
[8] CNS communication with Pavlodar Oblast customs directorate officials, Kazakhstan, 2 May 2005.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

8 December 2004: United States and Kazakhstan Expand Proliferation Prevention Agreement to Cover Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism

On 8 December 2004, the United States and Kazakhstan signed an amendment to the Agreement between the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Department of Defense of the United States of America Concerning the Elimination of Infrastructure of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which was signed on 3 October 1995. The amendment extends bilateral cooperation "to counter the threat of bioterrorism and prevent proliferation of biological weapons technology, pathogens, and expertise at their source."[1] Under the terms of the amendment, BW proliferation prevention assistance will be provided to Kazakhstan through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program with the purpose of achieving the following five key objectives:

(1)  preventing the proliferation of BW expertise through the cooperative biological research program;
(2)  securing dangerous pathogens and strains by strengthening biosafety and biosecurity at facilities;
(3)  consolidating dangerous pathogens at secure central repositories;
(4)  eliminating BW-related equipment and infrastructure; and(5)  reinforcing Kazakhstan 's biological threat agent detection and response system to protect against bioterrorist attacks.[1]

The new initiatives introduced by the amendment include the construction of a diagnostic reference laboratory and disease surveillance system that will allow Kazakhstan to detect, diagnose, and respond to outbreaks of dangerous diseases that could occur naturally or result from a terrorist attack; launch of a joint study of dangerous pathogens with the aim of developing better medical countermeasures for protecting the populations of the United States and Kazakhstan from such deadly diseases; and the development and testing of new molecular diagnostics and therapies to cure diseases endemic to Central Asia.[1,2,3]

In his public comments, U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Indiana) hailed the signing of the amendment and praised the U.S. Department of Defense, the Bush administration, and the government of Kazakhstan.[1,4] Senator Lugar also noted, "I congratulate President Nazarbayev and his government on having joined Georgia and Uzbekistan in partnership with the United States to work toward successfully eliminating the risk of biological weapons and preventing bioterrorism. This is a critical step forward in addressing the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."[1] In response, in his comments regarding the signing of the amendment, Kazakhstan 's ambassador to the United States , Kanat Saudabayev, noted, " Kazakhstan 's signing of the amendment is a testimony of the firm and consistent commitment of President Nursultan Nazarbayev and our people to the cause of nonproliferation. The people of Kazakhstan , who experienced firsthand the horrifying consequences of weapons of mass destruction, are determined to be at the forefront of the global fight against proliferation of these deadly weapons."[5]

In August 2003, prior to the signing of the amendment, Senator Lugar visited Kazakhstan and met with Kazakh government officials. During their discussions, Senator Lugar emphasized the urgent need to establish cooperation in preventing BW proliferation and combating bioterrorism. In the course of his visit, Senator Lugar toured the M. Aikimbayev Kazakh Scientific Center for Quarantine and Zoonotic Diseases in Almaty, a former Soviet anti-plague institute specializing in epidemiological monitoring and control of especially dangerous diseases on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.[1]

Sources:
[1] "U.S. and Kazakhstan Sign Nunn-Lugar Agreement Amendment to Prevent Biological Weapons Proliferation," Office of the U.S. Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-Indiana) press release, 8 December 2004, U.S. Senator for Indiana Richard G. Lugar (R) Website, <http://lugar.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm?id=229682>.
[2] "Kazakhstan i SShA rasshiryayut sotrudnichestvo v borbe s rasprostraneniyem oruzhiya massovogo unichtozheniya" [Kazakhstan and the United States broaden cooperation in the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction], Embassy of Kazakhstan in the United States of America press release, 8 December 2004. CNS communication with Roman Y. Vassilenko, First Press Secretary and Assistant to the Ambassador, 18 January 2005.
[3] " Kazakhstan i SShA podpisali popravku k soglasheniyu o sotrudnichestve v sfere nerasprostraneniya oruzhiya massovogo unichtozheniya" [ Kazakhstan and the United States signed an amendment to the agreement on cooperation in the sphere of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction], Kazakhstan today news agency, 9 December 2004; in Gazeta.kz, <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=53501>.
[4] "Kazakhstan Signs Agreement to Prevent Spread of Bioweapons," U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, Press Release, 10 December 2004, <http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Dec/10-99730.html>.
[5] " Kazakhstan , U.S. Expand Cooperation to Fight Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Washington Post, Special Advertising Section, 16 December 2004; in Diplomatic Traffic, <www.diplomatictraffic.com/kazakh_ad1-1.pdf>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

5 October 2004: Kazakhstani Expert Warns of Radiation Danger

In a 5 October 2004, interview to the Kazakhstani daily Ekspress K, Larisa Ptitskaya, director of the Institute of Radiation Safety and Environment in the city of Kurchatov, warned of a radiation danger posed by a gamma-irradiator located in the former Semipalatinsk test site area. The gamma-irradiator, which she calls "a delayed time bomb," was built in the 1950s and used to test radiation effects on animals. It was abandoned after the test site was closed in August 1991. According to Ptitskaya, the gamma-irradiator consists of 160 radiation sources located one and a half meters underground. The site is not properly protected, and there is only an old brick laboratory building above the sources surrounded with a barbed-wired fence. According to Ptitskaya, the gamma-irradiator poses a significant radiological threat to people and the environment; however, it is unknown how much radioactive material the sources contain since no documented records are left.[1]

Institute specialists suggested building a concrete sarcophagus above the gamma-irradiator, but the Kazakhstani Ministry of Environment rejected the suggestion, arguing that concrete would not provide 100% protection from radiation. Russian nuclear scientists offered assistance, suggesting that the gamma-irradiator be transported to a burial site near Lake Baikal, provided the Kazakhstani side pays for the disposal, estimated to cost more than 20 million tenge (more than $150,000 as of October 2004). East Kazakhstani Oblast authorities promised to find the necessary funds in the oblast budget.[1]

Environmentalists are also concerned about local residents, who disregard health hazard and breach sealed underground testing tunnels in search of scrap metal, thus increasing the threat of radioactivecontamination. An existing special group that patrols the area is useless, according to Ptitskaya, since it has no right to punish intruders. Ptitskaya proposes the creation of a radiation rescue service in the former test site area to deal with possible radioactive incidents. She did not elaborate on the exact role and specific responsibilities of the proposed rescue service.[1,2]

Sources:
[1] Svetlana Mikhaylova, "Besshumnaya gibel" [Quiet death], Ekspress K, 5 October 2004, No. 191 (15598), p. 4.
[2] Interfax, 3 October 2004; in "Kazakhstani Official Proposes Forming Rescue Radiation Service in Semipalatinsk," FBIS Document CEP20041003000022.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

29 September 2004: Kazakhstani Agency for Customs Control Transformed into Committee

On 29 September 2004, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev signed Edict No. 1449 On Measures for Further Improvement of the System of State Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan that changed the organizational structure and responsibilities of key state agencies.[1] This government reform follows the recent Russian government reorganization pattern by assigning strategic responsibilities to "ministries" and implementation of state policy to "committees" under those ministries.[1,2] In accordance with the edict, the Agency for Customs Control (ACC) of Kazakhstan was transformed into a committee under the Ministry of Finance, thus losing its independent status.[1] A similar change took place in Russia, where the State Customs Committee was transformed into the Federal Customs Service subordinated to the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade as a result of the March 2004 government reform.[3]

On 18 November 2004, 51-year old Berdibek Saparbayev, ACC chairman since 29 August 2002, was appointed deputy minister of finance and chairman of the newly created Committee for Customs Control.[4, 5]

Editor's Note: The ACC was created by Presidential Edict No. 931 On Measures for Further Improvement of the System of State Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 28 August 2002 on the basis of the Customs Committee under the Ministry of State Revenues of the Republic of Kazakhstan.[6]

Sources:
[1] Edict of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 1449 of 29 September 2004, "O merakh po dalneyshemu sovershenstvovaniyu sistemy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya Respubliki Kazakhstan " [On measures for further improvement of the system of state administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan], YurInfo Company Website, <http://www.zakon.kz/>.
[2] "Russian Government Reorganizes, Restructures Nuclear Agencies," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 19, August 2004, pp. 9-14, CNS Website, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon>.
[3] "New Customs Head Appointed in Russia ," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 19, August 2004, pp. 4-5, CNS Website, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon>.
[4] "Berdibek Saparbayev naznachen vitse-ministrom, predsedatelem Komiteta tamozhennogo kontrolya Minfina RK" [Berdibek Saparbayev was appointed vice minister of finance and chairman of the Committee for Customs Control of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan], Kazakhstan Today news agency, 18 November 2004, Gazeta.kz Website, <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=52567>.
[5] Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 949 of 29 August 2002, "O Saparbayeve B. M." [About Sabarbayev B. M.], YurInfo company Website, <http://www.zakon.kz/>.
[6] Edict of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 931 of 28 August 2004, "O merakh po dalneyshemu sovershenstvovaniyu sistemy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya Respubliki Kazakhstan " [On measures for further improvement of the system of state administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan], PlyusMikro Company Website, <http://www.pmicro.kz/DB/Busn/Govern/Laws/Ukase/ 2002/Control.htm>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

August 2004: Joint Customs Checkpoint Opened on Kazakhstani-Russian Border

In late August 2004, a joint Kazakhstani-Russian customs checkpoint was opened in Sharbakty, Pavlodar Oblast, in northeast Kazakhstan. The opening of this joint post, agreed to in 2003 and originally scheduled for early July 2004, was delayed due to structural changes in the Russian government and, more particularly, in the Russian State Customs Committee, which was transformed into the Federal Customs Service.[1,2]

According to Seytgali Mulkin, head of the Pavlodar Oblast, Kazakhstan Customs Control Department, an integrated control system based on the so-called "one stop shop" principle will be implemented in Sharbakty. Under the arrangement, Kazakhstani and Russian customs, border guard, vehicle control, veterinary-phytosanitary control, sanitary-quarantine control, and goods certification control officials will conduct necessary control procedures in a single building at the checkpoint. Inspection certificates must be recognized by both parties.[2] According to Berdibek Saparbayev, chairman of the Kazakhstani Customs Control Agency, five additional joint checkpoints will be built if the Sharbakty post is deemed a success.[3]

Sources:
[1] "Na kazakhstansko-rossiyskoy granitse otkrylsya pervyy sovmestnyy tamozhennyy terminal" [First joint customs terminal opened at the Kazakhstani-Russian border], Interfax-Kazakhstan, <http://www.interfax.kz/index.php?id=
zag&zagid=2396>.
[2] Gulmira Matkhalikova, "Derzhat post" [They are keeping watch], Ekspress K, No. 132 (15539), 13 July 2004. [3] Igor Vorotnoy, "Printsip odnogo okna" [The one window principle], Izvestiya-Kazakhstan, No. 125 (910), 14 July 2004, p. 2.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

24-28 May 2004: Kazakhstani Customs Officials Visit South Korea

On 24-28 May 2004, a delegation of Kazakhstani customs officials headed by Berdibek Saparbayev, chairman of the Agency for Customs Control, visited South Korea to learn about the country's customs system. During talks between Saparbayev and his Korean counterpart, Kim Yong-Duk, head of the Korean Customs Service (KCS), the parties discussed the status of bilateral customs cooperation and prospects for future interaction in this field, including the organization of training sessions for Kazakhstani customs officers in South Korea and exchanges of personnel. The Kazakhstani officials also met with Shin Dong-Oh, president of KT Net (Korea Trade Network), to discuss the possible participation of his company in automating Kazakhstani customs processes.

The South Koreans demonstrated to the Kazakhstani officials advanced scanning technologies used during customs control to detect dangerous and sensitive cargoes, and the process of data transfer and information sharing between regional customs posts with the central KCS control desk. The hosts organized tours of the customs dog-training center as well as of Inchon International Airport and Inchon Seaport to familiarize Kazakhstani guests with customs procedures at these locations.

Source:
"V Yuzhnoy Koreye obsuzhdeny perspectivy kazakhstansko-koreyskogo sotrudnichestva v oblasti tamozhennogo kontrolya" [Prospects for Kazakhstani-Korean cooperation in the sphere of customs control were discussed in South Korea], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan weekly press release, 16 June 2004, <http://www.mfa.kz/rus/index.php?page=
2&arch=1&selected=96>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

27 April 2004: Kazakhstani Customs Officer Shares His Impressions after Attending International Border Interdiction Training (IBIT) in Texas

In an 27 April 2004, interview with Kazinform, Maksim Dyusembayev, head of the Anti-Drug Smuggling Division of the Customs Control Department of East Kazakhstan Oblast, discussed the International Border Interdiction Training (IBIT) session organized earlier this year under the auspices of the U.S. Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program in the towns of McAllen and Hidalgo, Texas.[1]

On 11-24 January 2004, eight representatives of the Kazakhstani customs and border defense agencies took part in a two-week IBIT training course conducted by the Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP). This was the second such training session offered to Kazakhstani customs officers and border guards.[1] The first three-week training course was organized for approximately 80 customs officials and border guards from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in Hidalgo, Texas on 21 August – 8 September 2001.[2] The lectures given by CPB customs officers and border patrol agents addressed such issues as the war against terrorism, the fight against drug trafficking and illegal currency imports, profiles of international terrorist organizations and their leaders, weapons of mass destruction, and vehicle inspection methods.[1]

Dyusembayev noted that he found the parts of the training that featured the analysis of psychological characteristics of potential violators and the examination of concealment methods used for smuggling illegal commodities across the border particularly useful. According to Dyusembayev, lectures on these topics were delivered by experienced customs officers, who used photos and slides to enhance their presentations graphically. The Kazakhstani border guards and customs officials also had the opportunity to test their newly acquired knowledge during joint inspections at one of the busiest U.S. points of entry—the International Border Crossing at Hidalgo, Texas.[1,3]

Dyusembayev noted that the training seminar helped him better appreciate the importance of consistent training of customs and border control personnel, the acquisition of appropriate equipment, and the role of interagency cooperation in combating cross-border crime. In this regard, Dyusembayev pointed out that in 2003, the Customs Control Department of East Kazakhstani Oblast prevented 40 attempts to traffic in drugs and seized more than 111 kg of narcotics. He added, however, that soaring drug production in Afghanistan and growing demand in Kazakhstan foster drug trafficking and require intensified and coordinated efforts to curb the drug flow more effectively.

Editor's Note: Since 2001, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) has administered the IBIT course, as part of the EXBS program, for more than 115 customs officers and border guards from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The IBIT course includes classroom theory and hands-on practice in anti-terrorist operations, inspection of passenger and cargo vehicles, use of high-tech detection equipment, and analysis of suspicious behavior and other critically important areas.[2]

In addition to thousands of pedestrians crossing the border in both directions, up to 25,000 cars and 1,500 cargo vehicles use the Hidalgo border crossing on a daily basis. On 2 June 2003, the World Customs Organization recognized the outstanding contributions from the CBP officials of the Hidalgo port of entry with an award for developing and providing the IBIT training course.

Source:
[1] Lyudmila Malko, "Otechestvennyye siloviki proshli master-kursy po borbe s narkotrafikom v Tekhase na granitse s Meksikoy" [Kazakh law enforcement officials took master-courses in the fight against drug trafficking in Texas on the border with Mexico], Kazakh National Information Agency Kazinform, 27 April 2004, <http://www.inform.kz/showarticle.php?id=76293>.
[2] "Curbing Smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Central Asia," U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Information Programs Press Release, 22 August 2001, <http://usinfo.state.gov>.
[3] U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency press release, "U.S. Customs Service in Hidalgo Earns World Customs Organization Award," 2 June 2003, <http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/
press_releases/022003/02062003_2.xml>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

22 April 2004: Working Group to Facilitate Ratification and Implementation of IAEA Additional Protocol in Kazakhstan

On 22 April 2004, officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Committee for Atomic Energy (CAE) under the Kazakhstani Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources created a working group to facilitate ratification and implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol, signed by Kazakhstan on 6 February 2004.[1,2,3,4] Apart from CAE officials, the group consists of representatives from the Ministries of Energy and Mineral Resources and Foreign Affairs, the  Joint Stock Company Kazatomprom, the sole national export and import organization for uranium and other dual-use materials, and the Kazakhstani National Nuclear Center. According to Kazakhstani media, this is the third such working group to be created internationally, after similar groups were formed in Canada and Ukraine.[1,2,3] According to Kenji Murakami, director of the IAEA Safeguards Department, this working group is necessary because the implementation of the Additional Protocol is "a complex political and technical issue."[2]

After Kazakhstan ratifies the protocol, the country will have to provide annual declarations on all nuclear activity within its territory. After the ratification, according to Murakami, the IAEA will not only oversee all nuclear materials present in the country, but will also verify the legitimacy of all activities that are in any way related to nuclear materials, including oversight of research work and experimental facilities, uranium mining activities, and export of nuclear and non-nuclear materials that might be used in nuclear weapons. Short notice inspections with 2-24 hours advance notification will be widely used. According to CAE chairman Timur Zhantikin, Kazatomprom, which has never before been inspected by the IAEA, will be subject to an extensive IAEA audit of its activities. Based on the information obtained from the inspections, the IAEA will verify the correctness of the declarations provided by Kazakhstan and will certify that Kazakhstan is not engaged in any covert nuclear activities.[1,2,3,4,5]

Sources:
[1] Tatyana Koroleva, " Kazakhstan povyshayet prozrachnost svoyey yadernoy deyatelnosti" [Kazakhstan increases transparency of its nuclear activities], Panorama, No. 16 (582), 23 April 2004, p. 5.
[2] "RK pristupil k prakticheskoy rabote po vnedreniyu dopolnitelnogo protokola k soglasheniyam o primenenii garantiy k DNYaO" [The Republic of Kazakhstan started practical work to implement the additional protocol to agreements on application of safeguards related to the NPT], Kazakhstan Today news agency, 22 April 2004, Gazeta.kz Website, <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=43950>.
[3] Anna Pavlova, "Doveryay, no proveryay" [Trust but verify], Ekspress K online edition, No. 78 (15485), 24 April 2004, <http://www.express-k.kz/2004/04/24/20.php>.
[4] "Kazakhstan Signs IAEA Additional Protocol," NIS Export Control Observer, No. 14, March 2004, pp. 2-3, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.
[5] Interfax, 22 April 2004; in "IAEA To Increase Nonproliferation Control in Kazakhstan," FBIS Document CEP20040422000440.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

2 March 2004: Kazakhstani Experts Disagree on Threat Level from Semipalatinsk Test Site

On 2 March 2004, the Kazakhstani daily Ekspress-K quoted Larisa Ptitskaya, director of the Institute of Radiation Safety and Environment in the city of Kurchatov, as saying that there is a high risk of theft of radioactive materials from the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapon test site for possible use in nuclear weapons. Speaking to the board of the East Kazakhstani Oblast Directorate for Environmental Protection, she announced that 109 out of 181 sealed underground testing tunnels located in the former test site area have been breached by local scrap metal hunters, who detonate gas cylinders to open tunnels and steal contaminated scrap metal. She stated that 120 kg of plutonium remain in the unguarded test site area and that there is a threat that this plutonium could be stolen.

In response, Shamil Tukhvatulin, director general of the Kazakhstani National Nuclear Center, told Ekspress-K in a telephone interview that Ptitskaya's statement is not entirely true and that the threat is exaggerated. He said that it was impossible to make a bomb of what he called "decayed plutonium" unless a special facility is built in the area. He also denied Ptitskaya's allegations that the sealed tunnels are unguarded and have been breached. According to Tukhvatulin, a special patrol regularly inspects the tunnels and pursues scrap metal collectors, who have only managed to penetrate a few of the tunnels.

Editor's Note: Semipalatinsk nuclear test site facilities are under the jurisdiction of the National Nuclear Center (NNC) of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is involved in civilian activities and conversion of the site to civilian use. The Semipalatinsk test range, covering an area of 18,000 sq. km, was officially closed by President Nazarbayev on 29 August 1991. Between 1949 and 1989, 456 nuclear tests, including 340 underground and 116 atmospheric tests, were conducted at Semipalatinsk. Semipalatinsk's Degelen Mountain nuclear test facility in the southern portion of the test site was the largest underground nuclear test site in the world, consisting of 186 separate tunnels in natural mountain formations. Two hundred and twenty-four tests were conducted there between 11 October 1961 and 10 October 1989. Aside from Degelen Mountain, underground tests were also conducted at Balapan in vertical holes drilled in the ground rather than in tunnels. These holes were about 500-600 meters deep and the bottoms of the holes were up to 900 meters in diameter. The last nuclear test conducted at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site took place at Balapan in November 1989. From 1997 to 2000, a series of calibrated non-nuclear explosions destroyed testing infrastructure at Degelen and Balapan as part of a joint U.S.-Kazakhstan effort under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination Initiative of the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program. There are no fences around the perimeter of the test site, allowing persons and animals to roam freely throughout the area. According to Kazakhstani nuclear physicists, extensive conventional mining operations are under way at the site: beryllium, coal, and gold are mined and table salt is produced from a lake located near the main test field. In addition, scrap metal is gathered illegally from the site, although in the past, NNC officials denied that bore holes at Degelen Mountain have been breached by scrap metal gatherers.

Sources:
[1] Andrey Kratenko, "Stalkery rvutsya k plutoniyu" [Scrap metal hunters try to get hold of plutonium], Ekspress-K online edition, 2 March 2004, No. 41 (15448), <http://www.express-k.kz/2004/03/02/18.php>.
[2] Aleksey Bantsikin, "Zlyye yazyki strashneye… boyegolovki?" [Are evil words more terrible than warheads?] Ekspress-K online edition, 4 March 2004, No. 43 (15450), <http://www.express-k.kz/2004/03/04/23.php>.
[3]. CNS, " Kazakhstan: Semipalatinsk Test Site," Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/weafacil/semipala.htm>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

March 2004: Plutonium Traffickers in Kazakhstan Convicted of Lesser Offense

As reported in the September issue of the NIS Export Control Observer, in July 2003 Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security (KNB) arrested three men—two Kazakhstani nationals and a Russian citizen from Saratov Oblast—attempting to sell an ampoule allegedly containing weapon-grade plutonium-239 for $20,000 in Pavlodar, northern Kazakhstan.[1] According to the Kazakhstani daily Ekspress-K, since the substance in question was not weapon-grade plutonium, but plutonium designed for use in smoke detectors, the Kazakhstani court meted out light punishments—one of the two Kazakhstani nationals and the Russian national were sentenced to two years of probation.[2]

Editor's Note: If the substance involved in fact came from smoke detectors, it is, most probably, the artificially produced radioisotope americium-241, a decay product of plutonium-241, rather than plutonium itself. There are two types of smoke detectors currently in use: a photoelectric detector, which does not contain radioactive material and uses a photoelectric sensor to detect the change in light level caused by smoke, and an ionizing detector, or "ion chamber smoke detector," which uses the radiation from a small amount of radioactive material to detect the presence of smoke or heat sources. The latter usually contains a very small quantity of americium-241, which has a half-life of 433 years. The first sample of americium was produced by bombarding plutonium with neutrons in a nuclear reactor at the University of Chicago in 1945. One gram of americium oxide provides enough active material for more than 5,000 household smoke detectors. The radiation dose to the occupants of a house from a domestic smoke detector is essentially zero, and in any case very much less than that from natural background radiation.[3]

Sources:
[1] "Kazakhstani Security Service Prevents Attempt to Sell Radioactive Material," NIS Export Control Observer, September 2004, No. 9, p. 8, <http://cns.miis.edu/nis-excon.>.
[2] Stanislav Pesnev, "Kakiye uslovnosti!" [What sentences?], Ekspress-K online edition, 4 March 2004, No. 43 (15450), <http://www.express-k.kz/2004/03/04/15.php>.
[3] "Smoke Detectors and Americium," Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 35, May 2002, Uranium Information Center Website (Melbourne, Australia): <http://www.uic.com.au/nip35.htm>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>..

26 February 2004: Kazakhstan Denies Allegations of Involvement in Uranium Smuggling

On 18 February 2004, Kazakhstan today news agency quoted the Arizona Daily Sun as reporting that the U.S. administration suspects SMB Computers, a Dubai-based company with a branch in Kazakhstan, of smuggling uranium from Kazakhstan to Iran and Libya for use in nuclear weapons programs. According to the Arizona Daily Sun article, Sri Lankan businessman Bukhari Sayed Abu Tahir, owner of SMB Computers, a supplier of computer equipment and a Hewlett-Packard distributor for CIS countries, including Kazakhstan, used his company as a front for the uranium smuggling operation.[1] In 11 February 2004 remarks, U.S. President George Bush declared Tahir a financier of an international illicit nuclear materials trafficking network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan after it was determined that Tahir's computer company ordered Malaysian-made centrifuge parts that were later interdicted in October 2003 en route to Libya, presumably for use in Tripoli's nuclear weapons program.[2]

Kazakhstani authorities were quick to refute the allegations. A representative of the Almaty Justice Department stated that no such company was registered in the city. Rustem Tursunbayev, deputy president of Kazatomprom, the sole manufacturer of uranium products in Kazakhstan, ruled out any possibility of uranium smuggling from the country.[3] On 20 February Minister of Foreign Affairs Kasymzhomart Tokayev denied allegations that Kazakhstan was involved in illegal exports of uranium. "A system of export control operates in our country, and a relevant government commission is in place. The government and the president [Nursultan Nazarbayev], personally, are following these issues. Kazakhstan has been entirely responsible in its approach to these issues since giving up its nuclear legacy," Tokayev told a briefing in Almaty.[4]

The most vehement denial came from the Committee for National Security (KNB) of Kazakhstan. In its 26 February 2004 press release, KNB stated that SMB Computers and its branches are not registered in Kazakhstan and that the company is not on the list of the companies that have permission from the Ministry of Industry and Trade to conduct export-import deals with nuclear materials that are subject to export control. The press release says that "the republic's system of export control of nuclear, radioactive, and dual-use materials enables the government to maintain strict control over nuclear exports, including the transfer of atomic energy technologies to foreign nations." KNB also reported that it "repeatedly approached" foreign partners regarding these facts with a request to provide documentary evidence and conduct joint investigations. However, "none of the allegations has been confirmed by appropriate documentary evidence of the law-enforcement bodies of the foreign states that accuse Kazakhstan of repeatedly breaching the nonproliferation regime," the KNB document points out. The press release concludes by saying: "It is not ruled out that it was an intentional act designed to undermine Kazakhstan's political image."[5]

Sources:
[1] "Administratsiya SShA podozrevayet kompaniyu SMB Computers v kontrabande urana iz Kazakhstana" [ U.S. administration suspects SMB Computers in smuggling uranium from Kazakhstan], Kazakhstan today news agency, 18 February 2004, Gazeta.kz Website, <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=40994>.
[2] Rohan Sullivan, " Malaysia : Bush Overplaying Nuclear Role," Associated Press, 12 February 2004; in Lexis Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[3] Kazakh TV1, 19 February 2004; in " Kazakhstan : Kazatomprom Official Rules Out Uranium Smuggling," FBIS Document CEP20040219000378.
[4] Interfax-Kazakhstan, 20 February 2004; in "Kazakh Foreign Minister Denies Illegal Exports of Uranium," FBIS Document CEP20040220000111.
[5] Press Service of the Committee for National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "Soobshcheniye" [Announcement], 26 February 2004, KNB Website, <http://www.knb.kz/index.php?parent_id=
1016181650&date=&chapter=1077771532>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

6 February 2004: Kazakhstan Signs IAEA Additional Protocol

On 6 February 2004, in Vienna, Rakhat Aliyev, Kazakhstani ambassador to Austria and Vienna-based international organizations, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei signed an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994.[1,2,3]

As a legally binding document, the Additional Protocol grants the IAEA complementary inspection authority to verify that Kazakhstan's declared nuclear materials are not being diverted for nuclear explosive purposes. Expanded rights of access to sites and information related to all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle in Kazakhstan will allow the IAEA to determine that there are no undeclared nuclear materials in the country. By fulfilling requirements of the Additional Protocol, Kazakhstan is demonstrating commitment to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology.[4]

Editor's Notes: When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, Kazakhstan inherited 1,410 nuclear warheads and the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapon test site. Kazakhstan transferred all of its nuclear warheads to Russia by April 1995 and destroyed the nuclear testing infrastructure at Semipalatinsk by July 2000. Weapons-grade nuclear material remains in Kazakhstan, however, including three metric tons of plutonium contained in spent fuel at a shutdown breeder reactor in western Kazakhstan and small amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at two nuclear research institutes. Approximately 600 kg of weapons-grade HEU was transferred to the United States from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in 1994 under a joint U.S.-Kazakhstani operation known as Project Sapphire.[5]

Kazakhstan has been a member of the IAEA since 1994. In May 1992, Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon Protocol, along with other USSR successors — Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine — and became a party to the 1991 U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Having committed itself in that Protocol to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state "in the shortest possible time," Kazakhstan formally acceded to the NPT in February 1994.[6]

Sources:
[1] "6 fevralya s. g. v Venskom mezhdunarodnom tsentre sostoyalos podpisaniye Dopolnitelnogo protokola k Soglasheniyu o vseobyemlushchikh garantiyakh" [On 6 February 2004, the signing of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement on comprehensive safeguards took place in the Vienna International Center], 12 February 2004, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Website, <http://www.mfa.kz/rus/PHP/news.php?news=
1&selected=240>.
[2] "Podpisan dopolnitelnyy protocol" [Additional Protocol was signed], Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 28 (24338), 11 February 2004, p. 2.
[3] "Agreement of 26 July 1994 Between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," INFCIRC/504, March 1996, IAEA Website, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/
1996/inf504.shtml>.
[4] IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, IAEA Website, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html>.
[5] CNS, "Kazakhstan Overview," Research Library: Country Profiles, Nuclear Threat Initiative Website, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/e1_kazakhstan_1.html>.
[6] "START I: Lisbon Protocol and The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," U.S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, 20 January 2001, U.S. Department of State Website, <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/2001/3523.htm>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

27 December 2003: New Customs Information Center Created in Kazakhstan

On 27 December 2003, the Kazakhstan Customs Control Agency (CCA) Information Center officially opened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The ceremony was attended by Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev.[1,2,3] The construction of the center, which is located in a four-story building, cost about 1.78 billion tenge ($12.75 million as of 27 December 2003).[1]

The information center is designed to help the CCA monitor cargo transportation and reduce the time spent on freight examination. The center has a control room, which allows real-time electronic monitoring of cargo movement and transit vehicles entering and exiting Kazakhstan.[1,3] CCA employees will collect and process information from customs posts on cargoes and vehicles, including their license plate numbers, weights, and sizes. Customs officers will scan vehicles and transportation documents and place an electronic seal on transit vehicles. When a vehicle leaves the country's territory, customs posts will check whether the seal was tampered with. Components of this system are currently in place at the Korgas customs post on the Kazakhstani-Chinese border, and two more posts are expected to be equipped with this system in 2004—the Korday post on the Kazakhstani-Kyrgyz border and the Gani Muratbayev post on the Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani border.[2,3]

The center is also equipped with a television studio, affording it a direct link with all customs posts equipped with ground satellite stations. According to CCA head Berdibek Saparbayev, in 2003, the studio broadcast two live CCA board meetings and 10 distance-learning sessions to the customs posts to explain to regional customs officers the provisions of the new customs code.[1] Saparbayev also announced that the CCA is in the process of developing electronic customs software that will be accessed by exporters, importers, freight forwarders, brokers, and customs officers to exchange customs documentation electronically.[1,3]

Sources:
[1] "Prezident RK posetil informatsionnyy tsentr Agentstva tamozhennogo kontrolya" [President of Kazakhstan visited information center of the Customs Control Agency], Kazakhstan Today news agency, 27 December 2003, <http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=38530>.
[2] Khabar TV, 27 December 2003; in " Customs Control Agency Information Center Opens in Kazakhstan ," FBIS Document CEP20031227000061.
[3] "Prezident otkryl Informatsionnyy tsentr Agentstva tamozhennogo kontrolya" [President opened information center of the Customs Control Agency], 27 December 2003, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan Website, <http://www.government.kz>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

November 2003: Trafficker Prosecuted in Kazakhstan

In November 2003, a Kazakh national was convicted and sentenced to three years of probation in Shymkent, southern Kazakhstan in accordance with Article 247, Part 2 of the Kazakhstani Criminal Code Illicit Sale of Radioactive Materials; Their Illegal Acquisition, Storage, and Transportation with the Purpose of Sale.[1,2] The culprit was arrested on 5 August 2003, by operatives of Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security (KNB) while he was attempting to sell radioactive materials in Shymkent for $400,000, advertising it as plutonium.[1] During a search of the suspect's house, the KNB officers discovered a container with a highly radioactive substance that the unemployed resident of Shymkent had kept in his house for at least a month and a half.[1,2]

According to the analysis of the material made by experts at the Kazakhstani Institute of Nuclear Physics, the seized container included isotopes of curium-243, curium-245, and cesium-137 with a total radiation of 40,000 microroentgens per hour.[1] According to KNB officers, the container is likely a piece of equipment previously used in the mining industry or in oil and gas extraction. The suspect stole the container from a warehouse in which the retired equipment was being stored .[1,2]

Editor's Note: Based on the reported radiation emission, the container would not pose an immediate health risk. A person would have to be exposed to this radiation source for almost two months before he or she absorbed enough radiation for the onset of noticeable near term health effects, such as radiation sickness.

Sources:
[1] Nataliya Braun, "Konteynernaya operatsiya" [Container operation], Ekspress K (Kazakhstan ), 25 November 2003; in Integrum Techno, <http://www.integrum.com>.
[2] "KNB obnarodoval informatsiyu o predotvrashchennoy popytke prodat radioaktivnyy material" [KNB released information about the thwarted attempt to sell radioactive material], TV Khabar (Kazakhstan), 22 November 2003; in KNB Website, 26 November 2003, <http://www.knb.kz/index.php?parent_id=1016251312&
chapter=1069814047>.
This item originally appeared in the NIS Export Control Observer: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/index.htm>.

3 October 2003: Customs Control Agency of Kazakhstan to Reform Border Checkpoints

On 3 October 2003, the Customs Control Agency (CCA) of Kazakhstan organized a briefing for Kazakhstani journalists in Astana, Kazakhstan, entitled "On the Joint Customs Control Organization and the Joint Work of Controlling Agencies on the German-Polish Border: Results of the Official Visit of the Kazakhstani Interagency Delegation to the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland." Heads of the CCA and other Kazakhstani agencies engaged in border control, as well as heads of their local units, participated in the event.[1]

The briefin