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Introduction


The smallest and second-least populated of the five former Soviet Central Asian states, mountainous Kyrgyzstan inherited a large uranium mining and milling complex and several military-related industrial facilities when the Soviet Union broke apart. Much of the remaining military industrial complex has either gone bankrupt, been converted to civilian use, or has reverted to Russian management. The main proliferation threat posed by Kyrgyzstan is its location near countries that possess nuclear and other WMD-related materials, namely Russia and Kazakhstan, and countries to its south that are allegedly seeking these materials. Kyrgyzstan also must deal with uranium tailings,a legacy of its once-bustling uranium industry, that are dangerously close to large population centers.
на русском (in Russian)

 
 Dec. 7, 2007
 Jul. 13, 2007
 Feb. 15, 2007
 Sep. 8, 2006

Nuclear
From the 1950s to the 1990s, the Kara-Balta Ore Mining Combine in northern Kyrgyzstan processed uranium concentrate from deposits in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan for use in the Soviet Union's military and civilian nuclear industries.  Kara-Balta stopped processing Kazakhstani uranium concentrate into U3O8 in 2005. Uranium extraction in Kyrgyzstan itself has ceased. Radioactive waste in uranium tailings ponds in Kyrgyzstan poses a significant health threat.  The European Union, Russia, and the United States have provided foreign assistance to help Kyrgyzstan come up with solutions to its uranium waste problem. Kyrgyzstan is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  The foreign ministers of the five Central Asian States--Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--signed a treaty establishing a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) on 8 September 2006. 
 
See Kyrgyzstan Nuclear Profile

Biological
Kyrgyzstan acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in October 2004. There is no evidence that it possesses or seeks biological weapons.
 
See Kyrgyzstan Biological Profile

Chemical
Kyrgyzstan signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in February and October 2003, respectively. Bishkek neither possesses nor pursues chemical weapons.
 

Missile
The Dastan facility in Bishkek, which produces Shkval torpedoes and self-guidance and control systems, is the largest missile-related production facility in Kyrgyzstan. In November 2004, the Kyrgyzstani parliament voted to sell the state share in Dastan to Russian companies, including Rosoboronexport. The facility would reportedly produce torpedoes for the export market.
 
 

Updated January 2008



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IAEA Factsheet: Kyrgyzstan
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About This Section  CNS Experts 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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