Introduction

Much of South Africa's short-lived ballistic missile program remains an enigma. Although South Africa had developed short-range tactical missiles and rockets since the 1960s, evidence of its ballistic missile program only emerged in the mid- to late-1980s. A test launch of what South Africa called a "booster rocket" took place in July 1989, providing confirmation of the missile program. U.S. intelligence sources noted similarities between the South African missile and Israel's Jericho II missile, prompting speculation that Israel had supplied crucial technology to South Africa's missile effort. Some analyses went so far as to speculate that the South African program was merely a front to provide Israel with a location to test its missiles over a longer range than would be possible over the Mediterranean Sea. This contention would seem to be confirmed by the fact that South Africa never integrated its secret nuclear weapons program with its ballistic missile program.

Confirmation of the Program

Information is scarce regarding South Africa's ballistic missile program before the late 1980s. Kentron Missiles, a subsidiary of Armscor, South Africa's state-owned arms manufacturer, was formed in 1978 to undertake work in research and development of missile technology. However, it was not until almost a decade later that more information concerning the ballistic missile program emerged. In January 1989, the United States reportedly received a "very reliable" intelligence report that Israel was aiding South Africa's effort to develop an intermediate-range missile. When then-U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering raised the issue with Israeli authorities in Tel Aviv, he was rebuffed and told it was "none of Washington's business."[1]

The Washington Times reported in June 1989 that with assistance from Israel, South Africa planned to test-launch a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). In response, a spokesman for Armscor confirmed that the company had over the last six years built a missile test range at Overberg, on the southern tip of South Africa, and missiles were test-fired there to assess their performance. Around the same time, U.S. intelligence sources reported that South Africa was close to launching a modified version of the Israeli Jericho II IRBM. Reconnaissance satellite images showed that the test launch was likely to be carried out from a facility near Cape Town. The facility was reportedly almost identical to an Israeli launch site in the Negev Dessert. South African officials reported that the new missile had been under development since at least 1987 and would also be used as a booster for launching photo-reconnaissance satellites. A U.S. Central Intelligence Agency assessment reportedly suggested that a second test of the more advanced Israeli Shavit SLV, which might be converted to a 3,200km-range missile, was also being prepared at the site.[2]

On 5 July 1989, Armscor announced that it had successfully tested a booster rocket from the Overberg test range. Although South African sources described the launch as a booster rocket, outside analysts suggested that it may have been a test flight of an IRBM. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed that the missile was a "probable SRBM." U.S. intelligence sources reported that the rocket plume of the missile bore a striking resemblance to Israel's Jericho II missile. The DIA report noted that if Israel and South Africa were collaborating, a high-level if not senior-level Israeli delegation was probably present for the test. The missile flew 1,620 km southeast toward Prince Edward Island.[3]

The Israeli Connection

Israel would conduct a third test of its own improved Jericho II in September 1989. The missile traveled nearly 1,300 km, which put southern Russia and Iran within range.[4]

The next month, U.S. officials publicly accused Israel of assisting South Africa in developing a medium-range missile. Although Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir denied the involvement, the Israeli Defense Ministry issued a statement hinting that some cooperation may have occurred, but only to honor pre-existing contracts.

The U.S. State Department then confirmed that it had held discussions with Israel regarding the development of missiles and military cooperation with South Africa. Israeli sources subsequently confirmed reports of cooperation with South Africa on a variety of projects, including the joint development of a surface-to-surface missile armed with a nuclear warhead.[5]

That same month, NBC News reported that Israel had "secretly given South Africa access" to the "nuclear club." Quoting anonymous intelligence sources, the network reported that Israel was in a partnership with Pretoria to produce a missile with a nuclear warhead for South Africa, in exchange for enriched uranium and access to a long-range test site. The report identified Armscor as builder of the missile and Urdan, an Israeli firm outside of Tel Aviv, as the front company responsible for transferring missile technology. Israeli General Hagai Ravev, a former senior adviser to Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, allegedly oversaw the project from Jerusalem. In a follow-up report, NBC claimed that Israel was also sharing aviation technology with Pretoria and that at least 75 Israeli engineers had gone to South Africa to work on aviation projects. The report also alleged that South Africa was developing a site to construct a long-range missile with Israel.

Over the next year, the Bush administration became increasingly concerned about South Africa's missile program and its cooperation with Israel. During this time, South Africa also made the decision to terminate its secret nuclear weapons program and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), although this would not be revealed to the public until some time later.

A September 1991 U.S. Federal Register notice announced sanctions against South Africa for importing ballistic missile technology from Israel. Under U.S. law, the president is required to prohibit U.S. exports of aerospace technology to any foreign entity exporting or importing missile technology in contravention of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). President Bush, who was unaware of the impending sanctions, received a personal call from then South African President de Klerk protesting the sanctions.

The Bush administration initially settled on a compromise that would allow U.S. sanctions to be lifted if South Africa limited its rocket activities to development of "peaceful space launch vehicles." However, some U.S. officials opposed this idea because of the technical similarities between a space launch vehicle (SLV) and a ballistic missile. A series of high-level meetings between U.S. and South African officials followed in which U.S. officials argued that South Africa's rocket program was not cost effective and would eventually harm its already shrinking economy. South African officials received a briefing on the economics of SLVs and other private economic market analyses, which was based on a RAND study. Subsequently, the South African government announced that it would stop subsidizing the project and direct those in charge of the project to determine ways to make it profitable. But after a year of unsuccessful attempts at making the program profitable, South Africa announced the abandonment of its SLV program.

The Bush administration also applied pressure on Israel to impose controls on its export of missile technology. Israel conceded in response to U.S. threats to curtail U.S. Department of Defense contracts with Israeli defense contractors. In return, the United States agreed not to impose sanctions against Israel for violating the MTCR. (President Bush was also eager to avoid a confrontation with Israel on the eve of the Middle East peace conference in Madrid.)

Termination of the Program

Facing continuing U.S. pressure, in June 1993, South Africa agreed to refrain from manufacturing long-range missiles and to dismantle its capability to produce large space rockets. Its RSA-3 and RSA-4 SLV programs were cancelled. By this time, the nuclear program had already been terminated and for the first time, South Africa revealed its existence. It is still unclear exactly what South Africa's indigenous missile production capacity was.

South African President F. W. de Klerk issued a statement announcing South Africa's termination of its SLV program, as a result of an investigation into the commercial viability of the South African commercial space industry. Foreign Minister Roelof Botha refused to divulge the total amount spent on the project and claimed that South Africa's missile test site at Hangklip could be offered to foreign weapons manufacturers. Foreign Minister Pik Botha stated that the decision had been made for commercial reasons. However, Western diplomats alleged that heavy pressure from the United States was the deciding factor. Washington did not want the technology to fall under the control of a future African National Congress government, which would likely maintain close relationships with countries such as Libya, Cuba, and various Islamic revolutionary and fundamentalist Middle East states.

Some sources assess that South Africa was only about 12 months away from perfecting a rocket capable of propelling nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads more than 1,200 miles. South Africa joined the MTCR in September 1995.

Sources:
[1] David B. Ottaway and R. Jeffrey Smith, "US Knew of Israel-S. Africa Missile Deal," Washington Post, 27 October 1989.
[2] "South Africa to Test-launch IRBM," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 July 1989, p. 1354; Martin Walker, "S Africa 'About to Test Medium-Range Missile'," Guardian (London), 21 June 1989; Bill Gertz, "S. Africa on the Brink of Ballistic Missile Test," Washington Times, 24 June 1989, pp. A1, A10.
[3] "South African Missile Test," Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 July 1989, p. 59; Michael R. Gordon, "US Sees Israeli Help in Pretoria's Missile Work," New York Times, 27 October 1989; US Defense Intelligence Agency, "Special Assessment, South Africa: Missile Activity," 5 July 1989, declassified and partially released, in South Africa and the United States: The Declassified History, ed. Kenneth Mokoena (New York: New Press, 1993), pp. 167-168; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous for Superpowers in a Fragmented World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 446-448; John Pike, "Overberg Test Range OTB Arniston South Africa," 29 May 2000, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rasa/facility/overberg.htm>.
[4] A knowledgeable source interviewed by CNS assessed that the timing of the first South African test-flight and the subsequent Israeli flight could indicate that the July Overberg test was actually one in a series of Israeli missile tests.
[5] "State Department Confirms Discussions with Israel on Pretoria Cooperation," Aerospace Daily, 27 October 1989; Michael R. Gordon, "US Sees Israeli Help in Pretoria's Missile Work," New York Times, 27 October 1989.

	Updated May 2007