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Updated April 2009
Introduction
Taiwan currently does not possess nuclear weapons, although it has attempted to acquire them in the past. Taiwan, as the Republic of China (ROC), signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. After the seats for China in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Security Council reverted from the Taipei government to Beijing in 1971, Taiwan signed a trilateral agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States to abide by the terms of the NPT. Taiwan has since implemented the IAEA's "Program 93+2" safeguards. Despite persistent suspicions of offensive and defensive chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs, there is no conclusive evidence that Taiwan developed or deployed either. Taiwan is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The island is currently developing cruise missiles that can reach the interior of China. On February 2, 2007, the island tested the Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missile that is capable of reaching Shanghai or Hong Kong. Despite some speculation, there is no evidence that Taiwan possesses a nuclear weapon, much less one which could be deployed in a missile. Recent assessments indicate that it would take Taiwan between one and eight years to develop a complete nuclear warhead, and most likely much longer to design one light enough to be carried by any of Taiwan's current land-attack missiles; regardless, most analysts agree that under the current political situation, Taiwan is very unlikely to "go nuclear."
The island of Taiwan is claimed by both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the ROC on Taiwan, but is administered by the ROC. Taiwan is not generally recognized as a sovereign country internationally and is therefore not considered eligible for membership in nonproliferation treaties or export control regimes. The United States has taken an ambivalent official stance on Taiwan's status, recognizing neither the sovereignty of Taiwan nor the PRC's claim to sovereignty over the island. Taiwan is unlikely to gain significant recognition in the foreseeable future since China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has veto power over admittance to the UN. Beyond veto power, the PRC can also utilize its economic power worldwide to pressure key nations not to recognize Taiwan.
While the United States acknowledged in the three Joint Communiqués with China that there is only "One China," the United States has stated that the conflict over the status of Taiwan should be resolved by peaceful means, through cross-Strait dialogue, and with the support of the people of Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1979, states that the United States will, inter alia, "maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan," and "make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a self-defense capability."
China currently has clear military superiority compared to Taiwan, and without U.S. help, the island could not defend itself against an attack by Beijing. The TRA does state that any hostile acts towards Taiwan will be considered to be "a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;" however, the TRA does not commit the United States to come to Taiwan's defense if Taiwan takes unilateral measures to change the status quo. These measures would include, among others, declaring independence or restarting a nuclear weapons program. Though the U.S. Congress has consistently approved weapons sales to Taiwan since 1979, the island's legislative assembly has not always approved the budget for arms purchases from the United States. U.S. officials have expressed concern that the island is not taking adequate measures to promote stable and balanced cross-Strait relations.
Cross-Strait relations grew strained during the term of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), who actively pursued measures that would take the island closer to independence. These measures include freezing the National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines, proposing to change the official name of the ROC to the Republic of Taiwan, seeking to adopt a new constitution, and pushing to join the United Nations under the name Taiwan. In 2005, the PRC passed the Anti-Secession Law, which authorizes the use of force to take back Taiwan if all peaceful means to reunite the island with the mainland become exhausted.
Compared to their low point during the Chen presidency, current relations between Taipei and Beijing are progressing positively. In January 2008 Chen's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was defeated in legislative elections and in March 2008 the DPP lost the presidency to the Nationalist Party (KMT) with the election of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou. Ma's policies on China and cross-Strait relations are moderate and support maintaining the status quo.
In Mid December, Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou called for the establishment of "military confidence-building measures," including "prudent consideration [of] the withdrawal of missiles deployed... against Taiwan." His outreach appeared to be acknowledged by Chinese President Hu Jintao in a speech less than three weeks later, which mentioned "engage[ment] and exchange... on military issues and exploratory discussions on the issue of establishing a mechanism of mutual trust for military security."
In a demonstration of improved relations, Taiwan, for its part, has implemented cuts in its military budget, is establishing a think tank to consider troop exchanges among other broader international missions, and is planning a reduction in troop levels as well.
The prospect of a Chinese missile drawdown in response has been the subject of several media reports, most citing unnamed military sources. The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, for its part, has taken the step of commenting publicly on the possibility but remains wary of making significant concessions for easily reversible missile redeployments. While conciliatory moves have been met with a measure of suspicion on both sides, the gestures nevertheless mark a clear departure from the overt hostility of previous years.
Sources:
- "Text of Chinese President's Speech on 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,'" Xinhua via BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,1 January 2009, in Lexis-Nexis.
- Ma Ying-Jeou, "Peace Plan; China and Taiwan" Washington Times, 12 December 2008, in Lexis-Nexis.
- "MND Considers Troop Cuts as Relations with China Improve," 20 January 2009, China Post www.chinapost.com.tw.
- "胡錦濤擬撤對台導彈內情 (Hu Jin-tao to Consider Missile Withdraw, Insider's Say)," 亞洲週刊 (Asia Press), 11 January 2009, www.yzzk.com.
- Gavin Phipps, "Taiwan Appears Skeptical about China's Missile-Reduction Offer," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 23 January 2009, www.janes.com.
- Taipower Production and Sales, "Construction Projects: Nuclear Power Project," Taipower, www.taipower.com.tw/ indexE.htm.
- Wendell Minnick, "Taiwan Produces Three LACM Prototypes," Jane's Defense Weekly, January 11, 2006.
- Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, "Hsiung Feng 1/2/3" Jane's Defence Equipment and Technology, 10 September 2008.
- Jau-shieh Joseph Wu, "Arms Sales and the Future of U.S.-Taiwan-China Relations," China Brief 22 (2008).
- Jon Grevatt, "$6.46bn Deal Ends Hiatus in US-Taiwan Arms Trade," Jane's Defense Industry, 6 October 2008.
- The Taiwan Link, "Taiwan PAC-3 Sale Delayed: Reduction of Ballistic Missile Deployment Opposite Taiwan Imminent?" 4 January 2009, thetaiwanlink.blogspot.com.
- "Taiwan Defense Minister Denies Think Tank Aimed at Contacts with China," Taiwan News, 9 March 2009.
Nuclear
Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons. Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the island built its first nuclear reactor at National Tsinghua University in 1956. After the PRC conducted its first nuclear test in October 1964, Taipei began its own covert nuclear weapons program under the direction of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) and the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology. The "Hsin Chu" program, code-named after the city where Taiwan's first nuclear reactor was located, involved procurement and operation of a heavy water reactor, a heavy water production plant, a reprocessing research laboratory, and a plutonium separation plant. The United States convinced Taiwan to give up its nuclear weapons program in 1978.
In 1987, under the leadership of Chiang's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, Taiwan started a second covert nuclear weapons program. In this case, IAEA inspectors discovered that fuel rods were missing from one of Taiwan's nuclear power facilities. In 1987, former deputy director of INER Colonel Chang Hsien-yi defected to the United States and revealed detailed information about the secret program. Taiwan shut down the second nuclear weapons program in 1988. Since 1988, the Taiwanese leadership has consistently maintained that the island will not seek nuclear weapons in the future. Taiwan's democratic government and freedoms of speech and the press would make it very difficult to keep secret any future nuclear weapons work.
Taiwan now possesses six nuclear power reactors housed in three nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 5,144 megawatts. The power plants use low grade uranium obtained from the United States and South Africa or transferred from a third country via the United States. It has no enrichment capability. Although plagued by domestic opposition and delays, a fourth nuclear power plant is currently under construction and the first unit is scheduled to come online in July 2009. Taiwan possesses much of the technological expertise necessary to develop nuclear weapons, but would face significant obstacles in doing so—namely, U.S. opposition, international pressure, and the threat of a pre-emptive strike by China.
Biological
Taiwan has been accused of making efforts to acquire a biological weapons (BW) capability, including by agencies in the U.S. government. In 2001, a report from the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service also claimed that Taiwan developed three dozen types of bacteria, apparently for weaponization purposes. The credibility of this report has been widely questioned and the claims have been vigorously denied by Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND). Taiwan signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972, but the island's role in this treaty is currently not officially recognized. Taiwan is not been permitted to join the Australia Group.
Chemical
In 1989, U.S. government officials testified before that Congress that Taiwan could have acquired an offensive chemical weapons (CW) capability. While acknowledging production of small quantities of CW agents for defense research purposes, Taiwanese authorities have consistently denied any offensive CW capabilities. Still, rumors persist that Taiwan has stockpiled sarin in two locations: Tsishan (Kaohsiung) and in Kuanhsi, Hsinchu County. Chemical defense research and development is conducted at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology. Taiwan cannot join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) or the Australia Group.
Missile
Taiwan's short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) program is based at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, which has developed a range of missiles including the Hsiung Feng series of anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, the Tien Chien series of air-to-air missiles, and the Tien Kung series of surface-to-air missiles.
The above-mentioned systems have provided Taiwanese scientists with experience and a technological base in areas such as composite materials and guidance and fire control systems, which are essential for development of longer range surface-to-surface missiles. The liquid-fueled, single-stage Ching Feng has a range of 130 km with a 270 kg payload. Initially deployed in the early 1980s, it is unclear how many Ching Feng missiles were built and whether they are still operational. The Tien Chi, first test-fired in 1997, is a solid-fueled, two-stage missile with a 300 km range that can reach China's southeastern coast. The Tien Chi incorporates global positioning system technology and has an estimated payload of 100-500 kg. One report claims that as many as 50 Tien Chi missiles have been deployed on Tungyin Island and at an unidentified second location. Development of the Tien Ma, a ballistic missile with a range of 950 km, was reportedly discontinued in the early 1980s due to U.S. pressure. The Hsiung Feng II supersonic anti-ship missile has a range of 80km. The anti-ship missile Hsiung Feng III, tested in 2004 and 2005, has a range of 200km and travels at twice the speed of sound. The Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack cruise missile, which is beginning production with a target output of 50 missiles before 2010, currently has a range of 600km.[1] The Hsiung Feng IIE can attack multiple targets and launch warheads from the air. Research on its successor, the increased-range HF-IIER, has been the subject of conflicting reports, but is expected to have a significantly increased range of up to 1,250km. Such a range would make it capable of striking a number of high-value targets on the Chinese mainland, including the Three Gorges Dam.
With the advent of the HF-IIE missile, Taiwan may have developed a small deterrent capability. If deployed at the Matsu missile base just off the Chinese coast, its range would place Shanghai just within reach; if the system has been fitted to Kang Ding-class frigates, as some have suggested, Hong Kong would likely be within range as well. The strength of this deterrent is debatable, however, given the limited number of missiles currently available and the range constraints which force deployment to vulnerable forward island bases and ships. Should the HF-IIER enter production, on the other hand, Taiwan will have acquired the ability to strike the Three Gorges Dam. The bursting of the dam, besides being highly symbolic, would threaten three of China's fifteen largest cities—Nanjing, Wuhan, and Shanghai—with potentially devastating flooding.
Mainland China has between 1,000 and 1,400 ballistic missiles targeted at Taiwan, in addition to as many as 200 cruise missiles. The Taiwanese government has invested heavily in the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system designed specifically to intercept the short-range ballistic missiles deployed across the Taiwan Strait, but may be less able to address the cruise missile threat. Taiwan currently possesses U.S.-made anti-tactical Patriot Advanced Capability II (PAC-2) missiles and is now slowly moving forward with a purchase of as many as 330 significantly more advanced PAC-3 missiles. Previous budget disputes in the Taiwanese legislature had stalled the purchase, which is now pending the receipt of a letter of acceptance by the American Institute in Taiwan.
Sources:
—Gavin Phipps, "Taiwan appears skeptical about China's missile-reduction offer," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, January 23, 2009, jmr.janes.com
—Taipower Production and Sales, "Construction projects: Nuclear power project," Taipower, www.taipower.com.tw/ indexE.htm
—Wendell Minnick, "Taiwan produces three LACM prototypes," Jane's Defense Weekly, January 11, 2006
—Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, "Hsiung Feng 1/2/3," Jane's Defence Equipment and Technology, September 10, 2008
—Jau-shieh Joseph Wu, "Arms sales and the future of U.S.-Taiwan-China relations," China Brief 22 (2008)
—Jon Grevatt, "$6.46bn deal ends hiatus in US-Taiwan arms trade," Jane's Defense Industry, October 6, 2008.
—The Taiwan Link, "Taiwan PAC-3 sale delayed: Reduction of ballistic missile deployment opposite Taiwan imminent?" January 4, 2009, thetaiwanlink.blogspot.com/ 2009/01/ freeze-or-reduction-of-ballistic.html.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2009 by MIIS.
