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Introduction


While constrained by limited resources, Syria has shown interest in and taken steps to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, especially chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. Damascus has allegedly received direct assistance from Russia (and formerly the Soviet Union), Iran, and North Korea in developing its programs. Syria's motivation to acquire WMD, and ballistic missiles in particular, appears to be a response to Israel's superior conventional military capabilities.

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 Nov. 14, 2008
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 Nov. 10, 2008

Nuclear
Syria signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1969; its 30 KW nuclear research reactor in Dayr al Jajar, provided by China, is under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Seeking to expand its nuclear capabilities, Syria has discussed reactor and technology transfer with states such as Argentina, China and Russia but there is little evidence to suggest these talks have yielded concrete results. Syria appears to lack the infrastructure and the financial resources to pursue a nuclear weapons program without significant outside help. In early 2007 Damascus announced plans to pursue nuclear energy in order to meet increased energy consumption. However, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was quick to stress that Syria is not seeking nuclear weapons, and that Damascus’ ultimate aim is a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed a building in northwestern Syria, which U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials claim was a nuclear reactor intended to produce plutonium for weapons use. The Syrian government denies these allegations, and an IAEA investigation into the matter is ongoing.

See Syria Nuclear Profile

Biological
There is very limited open-source information regarding Syria's biological warfare (BW) capability. German and Israeli sources have asserted that Syria possesses Bacillus anthracis (which causes anthrax), botulinum toxin, and ricin. Other independent assessments, however, maintain there is no evidence that the country has progressed past the research and development phase of a BW capability. Syria has a pharmaceutical infrastructure that could support a limited BW program, and it engages in extensive trade of dual-use equipment and goods with companies in Western Europe, Russia, and North Korea. Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968 and signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on April 14, 1972, but has yet to ratify it.
 
See Syria Biological Profile

Chemical
Syria is suspected of having one of the most advanced chemical warfare (CW) capabilities in the Middle East. Syria’s initial CW capability was provided by Egypt prior to the October 1973 war against Israel. Syria is believed to have an indigenous capability to produce and weaponize sarin and mustard agents and may have successfully produced and weaponized VX nerve agent. Syria allegedly maintains three facilities for producing CW agents, located near Damascus, Hama, and Safira village (in the Aleppo area). Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for some dual-use equipment and precursors critical to its CW agent production capability. In recent years Iran has been pointed to as a major supplier of Syrian requirements in this area. Syria possesses large numbers of Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles capable of being fitted with chemical warheads. In addition to this long range capability Syria is believed to possess a significant tactical CW capability using artillery shells and rockets. Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968, but has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Since 2004 Syrian officials have met with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and occasionally attended OPCW seminars and conferences. In the absence of any information on the motivations behind these actions the significance of these developments remains unclear at this time.

See Syria Chemical Weapons Profile

Missile
Syria's missile program began in the early 1970s as a means to counter Israel’s superior conventional military capabilities; since that time, the missile program has grown in tandem with the development of chemical weapons (CW). Syria now has one of the largest arsenals of ballistic missiles in the region, made up of hundreds of Scud-derived missile systems. In the 1970s and 1980s, Syria relied on Soviet technology and support for its missile program and imported the Soviet FROG-7, Scud-Bs, and the solid-fueled Scarab SS-21 missiles. In the 1990s, Syria looked to other states to supply it with missile technology and found willing partners in Iran and North Korea. Iran provided Syria with technical assistance for solid-fueled rocket motor production, while North Korea supplied it with equipment and technical assistance for liquid-fueled missile production. Syria, however, has had difficulty creating an indigenous production capability and has had to rely on continued imports from countries such as North Korea and China. Syria reportedly purchased 150 Scud-C missiles from North Korea in 1991. In September 2000, Syria tested a North Korean, 700 km-range Scud-D, revealing its commitment to expanding its missile capability. In January 2007, Syria reportedly test-fired another Scud D short-range ballistic missile. Currently, reports indicate that despite its sizable arsenal, Syria has been trying to purchase modern air-defense systems, like the S300-PMU 2 Favorit and the Pantsyr S-1 from the Russian Federation. Syria is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
 
See Syria Missile Profile

 

Updated November 2008



NTI: Syria Facilities Maps
CNS: Status of Syria’s Participation in Treaties and Organizations
CNS: WMD in the Middle East: Syria
FAS: Syria Special Weapons Guide
GlobalSecurity: World Special Weapons Guide: Syria
CSIS: Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Overview (2008)
Arms Control Today: Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime (2008)
SSI: Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (2005)
Swedish Defence Research Agency: Syria and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities (2004)
NTI: Issue Brief: WMD in the Middle East (2003)



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2008 by MIIS.

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