New START Has Expired. Congress’s Oversight Tools Shouldn’t.

U.S. nuclear policy is approaching a critical juncture. With the New START Treaty—the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia—now expired, both countries are free to increase their deployed strategic nuclear weapons without limits. At the same time, China is expanding its nuclear arsenal and Russia continues its aggression in Europe. In this environment, U.S. lawmakers face a pressing question: What role can they play now to meet these challenges?

Congress’s oversight of U.S. nuclear policy is also at a critical juncture. When the U.S. Senate approved New START in 2010, it mandated several annual reports and certifications to ensure strong congressional oversight of Russian compliance with the treaty. These requirements expired along with the treaty, creating oversight gaps just as strategic competition heats up. Congress can address these gaps and strengthen its role in U.S. nuclear policymaking by including critical provisions in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

In its Resolution of Advice and Consent for New START, the Senate enshrined several important requirements tied to the treaty’s implementation. During the life of the treaty, the executive branch was required to:

1. notify the Senate of any indication that Russia plans to break out of the treaty’s central limits;
2. certify annually the sufficiency of U.S. national technical means (i.e. satellites) to monitor Russian compliance with the treaty;
3. brief the Senate before and after each meeting of the treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission, the treaty’s implementation body;
4. submit a detailed annual report on the treaty’s implementation; and
5. submit an annual report on Russia’s arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are unconstrained under New START and have long been a bipartisan priority for arms control with Russia.

For 15 years, these reports and briefings were essential tools for keeping the Senate engaged in the operation of New START and U.S. nuclear policy more broadly. They ensure the executive branch is effectively addressing any treaty compliance concerns, devoting sufficient resources to monitor Russia compliance with New START, and advancing U.S. arms control objectives. As a forcing mechanism for congressional-executive engagement, these requirements also gave Congress the opportunity to actively influence U.S. strategic policy towards Russia. Congress used these reports to stress test administration thinking in private briefings but also as fodder to influence public opinion.

Beyond their New START-specific benefits, the reports served as routine information exchanges on the composition of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the U.S. intelligence community’s efforts to monitor Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. When these reports expired in early February, Congress lost access to information on key nuclear issues and oversight tools to influence U.S. nuclear policy.

The end of these reports also deprives civil society of a window into U.S.-Russia strategic dynamics. The U.S. Department of State published the unclassified versions of these reports on its website every year. This practice served as a useful signaling tool to Russia and other countries on U.S. arms control priorities and treaty compliance concerns. But importantly, it also gave the U.S. public a unique look into issues as important as U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control dynamics and Russian nuclear force trends.

Fortunately, Congress can act to fill this looming gap.

Through this year’s NDAA or appropriations process, Congress could require various reports and certifications tied to any decision to increase U.S. nuclear force levels above New START limits – a decision that could have major implications for U.S. nuclear force posture and strategic relations with Russia and China. These could include:

1. assessments of likely Russian and Chinese responses to U.S. force structure changes, including potential changes to their respective nuclear force structures and postures;
2. assessments of the costs and impacts of those changes on U.S. nuclear modernization efforts;
3.  Assessment of U.S. allies’ perspectives and likely reactions to U.S. increases; and
4. a description of U.S. arms control strategy to constrain Russian and Chinese nuclear forces.

When the Senate was deliberating over New START in the spring of 2010, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—then the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—stated that “the Senate’s decision on [New] START will reverberate throughout our strategic relationships worldwide.” As the United States enters a new era of nuclear competition, Congress’s actions can still reverberate positively and help keep U.S. nuclear policy on a stable path.