Jump to search Jump to main navigation Jump to main content Jump to footer navigation

Jordan flagJordan

Overview Last updated: August, 2012

Jordan is not known to possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs, or ballistic or cruise missile systems. [1] The country is a member in good standing of all relevant nonproliferation treaties and organizations, in addition to participating in ad hoc efforts such as the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative. Jordan is a strong supporter of establishing a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East. [2]

Nuclear

Jordan is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and is not believed to harbor nuclear weapons ambitions. As an NPT member in good standing, the country is seeking international assistance to develop a peaceful nuclear program. Jordan does not possess any significant nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. The country concluded an agreement with South Korea in 2009 for the construction of a 5MW research reactor fueled by 19% low enriched uranium, which is slated for completion by 2015. [3]

In January 2007, King Abdullah II announced Jordan's intention to develop a civilian nuclear power program, which would contribute to a number of national strategic goals. [4] In order to achieve greater energy security, Jordan is looking to diversify its energy portfolio. While the country hopes to obtain 30% of its electricity from nuclear power by 2030, there are significant obstacles to achieving this ambition. The country is earthquake prone and water poor, which poses major environmental challenges to the development of a nuclear energy program. Since nuclear power is highly capital intensive, requiring enormous up-front investment, Jordan may also find acquiring a nuclear power plant financially prohibitive. [5] Jordan possesses few trained personnel and a limited nuclear research and education infrastructure, though the country is working to address this challenge. In 2007, the Jordan University of Science and Technology started a nuclear engineering degree program in support of the budding nuclear program. [6] Additionally, the country recently established a regulatory authority, but it is still in its infancy and therefore insufficiently robust to provide oversight for a major civil nuclear program. [7]
 
As a country new to nuclear power, Jordan will rely on foreign suppliers for assistance constructing and operating its first nuclear power plants. The country is in the process of negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, and has concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with Argentina, Canada, China, France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Russia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. [8] Officials at Jordan's Atomic Energy Commission have expressed a preference for Generation III and Generation III+ reactor designs. [9] Based on currently deployed Generation II designs, these reactors are generally distinguished from their older counterparts by evolutionary improvements in areas such as passive safety. In January 2011, Jordan issued a tender for the construction of its first nuclear power plant— the country is currently negotiating in parallel with both an AREVA-Mitsubishi joint venture and Russia's Atomstroyexport, and the government had hoped to conclude an agreement with one of the two vendors by the end of 2013. [10] However, progress on Jordan's first nuclear power plant is likely to be delayed by the 30 May 2012 parliamentary vote to suspend the country's nuclear power program in response to financial and environmental concerns. [11]

It is unclear whether Jordan will successfully conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, but given its agreements with other countries this is unlikely to be a limiting factor for the development of its nuclear power sector. Bilateral talks stalled in 2011 due to "political turmoil" in the Middle East, but resumed in February 2012. [12] The Obama Administration has sent mixed signals as to whether it will pressure Jordan to agree to the "gold standard" precedent set with the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement, under which the UAE agreed not to pursue indigenous uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. [13] While it is uncertain whether Jordan could ever build economically justifiable enrichment capabilities, the country possesses significant undeveloped uranium reserves, and has expressed a preference to keep its enrichment and reprocessing options open. The country is believed to have approximately 79,000 tonnes of uranium-ore reserves, which is roughly 2% of the world's total. [14] The Jordan Atomic Energy Commission signed an exploration agreement with the French company, AREVA, in 2008 in order to study the possibility of uranium mining in central Jordan. [15] Like many non-nuclear weapon states, the Jordanian government also believes that the NPT affords it the right to all capabilities associated with the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle, and is therefore on principle disinclined to sign an agreement holding it to a different standard than most other treaty members.

Biological

Jordan does not possess biological weapons and is not known to have ever had a biological weapons program. [16] The country became a state party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1975, and has submitted an Article B BTWC Confidence Building Measure. [17]

Since 2004, Jordan has launched several initiatives to develop its biotechnology sector, including establishing a National Center for Biotechnology to serve as a central coordinating institution for both domestic and international biotechnology activities. [18] However, the robustness of these initiatives remains hampered by human capital and investment constraints. [19] The Jordanian pharmaceutical industry has shown strong growth since the early 2000s, and exports products throughout the Middle East and North Africa. [20] In 2004, Jordan prepared a National Biosafety Framework to better manage the risks associated with these activities. [21] Jordan also hosted the Biosafety and Biosecurity International Conference in Amman in 2011 to promote "healthier and more secure communities in the Middle East and North Africa." [22]

Chemical

Jordan acceded to the Geneva Protocol in January 1977 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in October 1997. [23] Amman has consistently been found in compliance with its CWC commitments, and is not believed to have pursued a chemical warfare capability. [24] However, Jordan shares borders with several states suspected of chemical weapons activities, and as such requires robust border security and export controls to prevent its territory from being used as an illicit transshipment route. [25] Jordan has invested heavily in counter-terrorism efforts and has received training and other assistance from the United States to secure its borders against illicit trafficking. [26]

Missile

Jordan is not believed to possess Missile Technology Control Regime Category I or II ballistic or cruise missile delivery systems. [27] Amman is a state party to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. [28]

Sources:
[1] "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," National Air and Space Intelligence Center: Wright Patterson Air Force Base, April 2009, MASIC-1031-0985-09.
[2] "Mideast WMD-Free Zone Should be Pursued Incrementally, Experts Say," Global Security Newswire, 2 December 2011, www.nti.org/gsn.
[3] "Work on Jordan's First Nuclear Reactor Begins," Xinhua, 27 July 2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn.
[4] Charles Ebinger et al, "Models for Aspirant Civil Nuclear Energy Nations in the Middle East," Policy Brief 11-0, The Brookings Institute, September 2011, pp. 15-16, www.brookings.edu; "Jordan: non-proliferation credentials," Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 82.
[5] "Chapter Four: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq," in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-96.
[6] "Faculty of Engineering: Nuclear Engineering," Jordan University of Science and Technology, 2012, www.just.edu.jo.
[7] "Jordan: Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries," World Nuclear Association, February 2012, www.world-nuclear.org.
[8] "Jordan: Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries," World Nuclear Association, February 2012, www.world-nuclear.org.
[9] "White Paper on Nuclear Energy in Jordan: Final Report," Worley Parsons Resources and Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, September 2011, p. 53, www.jaec.gov.jo; Kamal J. Araj, "The Role of Nuclear Power in Jordan," Presentation at the Jordan Energy Investment Summit, 11 October 2011.
[10] Dan Yurman, "Update on Jordan's Nuclear Program," The Energy Collective, 7 June 2012, www.theenergycollective.com.
[11] "Jordanian Parliament Votes to Suspend Nuclear Power Program." Haaretz, 30 May 2012, www.haaretz.com; Raed Omari, "Deputies Vote to Suspend Nuclear Project," The Jordan Times, 30 May 2012, www.jordantimes.com.
[12] Yanmei Xie, "Negotiations for Nuclear Trade Suspended with Jordan: State Department," Platts, 10 March 2011, www.platts.com.
[13] Elaine Grossman, "U.S. Nuclear Trade Policy Concerns Mounting on Capitol Hill," Global Security Newswire, 17 February 2012, www.nti.org/gsn.
[14] "Chapter Four: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq," in Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-96.
[15] "Worldwide Presence: Jordan," AREVA, www.areva.com; Associated Free Press, "Areva finds 20,000 tonnes of uranium in Jordan," France 24, 12 June 2012.
[16] Raymond Zilinskas, Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Lynne Reiner Publishers Incorporated, 2000), p. 45.
[17] "Status of the Convention," The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, June 2005, www.opbw.org; "Jordan: Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes," Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), 18 November 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[18] Hannah Highfill, Assessment Report on Biotechnology Capabilities and Opportunities in Jordan, BearingPoint, Inc, September 2007.
[19] Hannah Highfill, Assessment Report on Biotechnology Capabilities and Opportunities in Jordan in Jordan, BearingPoint, Inc, September 2007; Moh'd M. Ajlouni and H. Malkawi, "Jordan: Status and Future Prospects of Biotechnology," in G.J. Persley and M.M. Lantin, eds., Agricultural Biotechnology and the Poor (Washington, DC: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, The World Bank, 2000).
[20] Jordan National Competitiveness Observator, "Pharmaceuticals," Jordan's Competitiveness Report of 2007 (Amman: JNCO, 2007).
[21] The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Ministry of Environment, National Biosafety Framework of Jordan (Amman: Ministry of the Environment, August 2004).
[22] "Conference Statement: Biosafety and Biosecurity International Conference 2011," International Council for the Life Sciences and El Hassan Science Society, 15 September 2011, www.bbic-2011.org.
[23] U.S. Department of State, "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol), www.state.gov, 14 March 2012; Office of the Legal Adviser, "Note by the Technical Secretariat: Status of Participation in the CWC as at 21 May 2009," Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 27 May 2009; Tom Collina, "Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and State Parties," Arms Control Association, 2011, www.armscontrol.org;
[24] See, for example: U.S. Department of State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," July 2010; and Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2009," 2009; E.J. Hogendoorn, "A chemical weapons atlas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 5, September/October 1997, pp. 35-39; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1993).
[25] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 330.
[26] Jeremy M. Sharp, "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 3 May 2012, www.fas.org.
[27] "Missile Technology Control Regime- Handbook 2010," Missile Technology Control Regime, 2010, www.mtcr.info/english; "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," National Air and Space Intelligence Center Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, April 2009.
[28] "Jordan: Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes," Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), 18 November 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.

CNS logo

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2011 by MIIS.

Get the Facts on Jordan

  • Joined the IAEA Additional Protocol
  • Negotiating a 123 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the United States
  • Hopes to obtain 30% of its electricity from nuclear power by 2030