Syria has recently witnessed widespread unrest and demonstrations directed against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. It is unclear whether or how the ongoing political turmoil in Syria will affect that country's nonproliferation policies. However, concerns have been voiced in the international community regarding what would happen to Syria's arsenal of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons if the current regime collapsed. [2]

Nuclear

Syria signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1969. Seeking to expand its nuclear capabilities, Syria has vigorously pursued external assistance since the 1980s, including reactor and technology transfers from states such as Argentina, China, and Russia.[3] These efforts, however, produced few tangible results. It was not until 1991 that the Chinese began to construct Syria's first research reactor at Dayr Al Hajar (or Der Al-Hadjar). The SRR-1 30KW miniature neutron source reactor went critical in 1996, and although it is not large enough to be of proliferation concern, IAEA inspectors discovered the presence of undeclared anthropogenic uranium particles in 2008 and 2009.[4] In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed a building in northwestern Syria that U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials claim was a plutonium production reactor. The Syrian government has denied these allegations. However, in May 2011 following a more than three-year long investigation, during which Syria did not sufficiently cooperate with the IAEA, the Agency concluded "that it is very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency." [5] On 9 June 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution that found Syria in noncompliance with its obligations under the NPT and referred the case to the UN Security Council. [6]

Biological

There is very limited open-source information regarding Syria's biological warfare (BW) capability. German and Israeli sources have asserted that Syria possesses Bacillus anthracis (which causes anthrax), botulinum toxin, and ricin. American sources have characterized Syria's anthrax and botulism production capability as "probable." [7] However, a Swedish Defense Agency report found no evidence of an offensive, or even defensive, biological weapons program. [8] Ultimately, there is no reliable evidence to the effect that Syria has the capability to weaponize biological agents. Syria has a pharmaceutical infrastructure that could support a limited BW program, and it engages in trade of dual-use equipment and goods with companies in Western Europe, Russia, and North Korea that could support such a program. Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968 and signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on 14 April 1972, but has not yet ratified it.

Chemical

Syria is suspected of having one of the most advanced chemical warfare (CW) capabilities in the Middle East. Syria's initial CW capability was provided by Egypt prior to the October 1973 war against Israel. Since then, Syria appears to have acquired an indigenous capability to develop and produce chemical weapons agents including mustard gas and sarin, and possibly also VX nerve agent. [9] Chemical weapons agents have been produced since the 1980s at facilities located near the Hama, Homs, and Al-Safira villages in the Aleppo region. However, Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for some dual-use equipment and for the precursor chemicals critical to CW agent production. In recent years, Iran has been identified as a major supplier of Syrian requirements for CW-related supplies. Syria signed an agreement with Iran in 2005 that specifies, among other things, the provision of training and technical assistance to Syrian scientists and technicians and the construction of five chemical pilot plant facilities for developing and producing precursor chemicals. Syria possesses large numbers of Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles capable of being fitted with chemical warheads. However, the Syrian military supposedly discontinued its efforts to arm short-range missiles with chemical warheads following a mishap in mid-2007. In addition to its chemically-armed Scud missiles, Syria is believed to possess a significant tactical CW capability in terms of artillery shells and rockets filled with chemicals.

Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968, but is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However, Syrian officials have shown interest in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) since 2004, having met its Director-General on several occasions and attended OPCW seminars and conferences. In the absence of information on the motivations behind these actions the significance of these developments remains unclear. However, they may be the first signs of an impending change in Syrian policy on chemical weapons, or more likely, an attempt to relieve international pressure on Syria by suggesting that a change is being considered.

Missile

Syria's missile program began in the early 1970s and has grown in tandem with Syrian chemical weapons (CW) development. Damascus possesses one of the largest arsenals of ballistic missiles in the region, composed of hundreds of Scud-derived missile systems. [10] Syria relied on Soviet technology transfer to build its program, and imported FROG-7, Scud-B, and solid-fueled Scarab SS-21 missiles from the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s. [11] In the 1990s, Iran provided Syria with technical assistance for solid-fueled rocket motor production, while North Korea supplied it with equipment and technical assistance for liquid-fueled missile production. Syria reportedly purchased 150 Scud-C missiles from North Korea in 1991. [12] Demonstrating its continued commitment to expanding its missile capabilities, Syria tested a North Korean 700 km-range Scud-D in September 2000, reportedly testing another Scud-D in January 2007. [13] However, Syrian efforts to establish an indigenous production capability have so far failed, forcing Damascus to rely on continued imports from countries such as North Korea and China to sustain its program. Syria expressed interest in purchasing the Russian Iskander missile as early as 2004, but has so far been unable to acquire this surface-to-surface missile. Reports also indicate that Syria has been trying to purchase modern air-defense systems, such as the S300-PMU 2 Favorit and the Pantsyr S-1, from Russia. [14] Damascus is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Sources:
[1] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Overview," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 June 2008, www.csis.org; Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C: 2004), pp. 83-110.
[2] Leonard Spector, "Assad's Chemical Romance," Foreign Policy, 23 August 2011, www.foreignpolicy.com, accessed 25 August 2011.
[3] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[4] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, (GOV/2010/47), 6 September 2010; "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, (GOV/2010/29), 31 May 2010.
[5] International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 24 May 2011, www.isis-online.org; Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Israeli Nuclear Reactor Strike and Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Background Analysis," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 24 October 2007, www.csis.org.
[6] "Syrian Nuclear Dispute Sent to United States," Global Security Newswire, 9 June 2011.
[7] Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström,and Louise Waldenström, "Syria and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI - Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2004) p. 32.
[8] Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström,and Louise Waldenström, "Syria and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI - Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2004) p. 41.
[9] Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström,and Louise Waldenström, "Syria and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI - Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2004) p. 35.
[10] Deputy Director for National Intelligence Analysis, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 31 December 2006, p. 6, www.fas.org; Claremont Institute, "The Threat from Syria," www.missilethreat.com.
[11] Global Security, "Missile Programs: Syria," www.globalsecurity.org.
[12] Arms Control Association, "Fact Sheet: Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories," May 2002, www.armscontrol.org; Deputy Director for National Intelligence Analysis, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 31 December 2006, p. 6. www.fas.org.
[13] Global Security, "Missile Programs: Syria," www.globalsecurity.org.
[14] Anthony Cordesman, "If It's Syria: Syrian Military Forces and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003, pp. 5-9, www.csis.org.