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Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)

国防科技工业委员会


MINISTER:
Zhang Yunchuan

VICE MINISTERS (all appointed in April 1998): Zhang Junjiu (former President of COSTIND); Zhang Huazhu (former Vice President of CNNC) ; Xu Penghang (former President of CSSC); Zhang Hongbiao (former Vice President of AvIC); Luan Enjie (former Vice President of CASC; current head of CNSA); Yu Zonglin (former Director of that National Defense Department of the State Planning Commission.)

Luan Enjie also serves as the Director of the new COSTIND's State Aerospace Industry Bureau. Zhang Huazhu also serves as the Chair of the new COSTIND's China Atomic Energy Agency.

OTHER NAMES: National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission .

ADDRESS:  2A Guang'anmen, Xuanwu District, Beijing 100053 CHINA; Tel:  86-10-6603-4714, Fax:  86-10-6357-1398.


Organizational Structure:

COSTIND was established in 1982 by a merger of the Defense Science and Technology Commission (DSTC), the National Defense Industry Office (NDIO), and the Science, Technology, and Equipment Commission (STEC) of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

In the past, COSTIND's responsibilities were more comprehensive than they are today. Beginning on 1 July 1986, COSTIND was given authority over the military products trade of China's entire defense industry. Also in 1986, the State Council and COSTIND took control over four ministries producing military goods (nuclear, aviation, ordnance, and space) in order to expedite the defense conversion process which had begun in the early 1980s. As a result of this change, these industries no longer reported to both COSTIND and the CMC. Thus, COSTIND was given responsibility for the research, development, and production of certain high technology weapons and for providing policy guidance related to military production. COSTIND also had extensive responsibility over all of China's testing and evaluation bases such as the Lop Nur nuclear testing site.

In March 1998 COSTIND underwent a substantial transformation and its responsibilities changed significantly. It is currently a ministry level agency under the control of the State Council; it no longer reports to both the State Council and the CMC. At the 9th  National People's Congress (NPC), COSTIND was civilianized and all of its strictly military responsibilities were taken away and given to a new PLA department under the CMC called the General Armaments Department (GAD). For example, the new COSTIND no longer controls any of the former COSTIND's testing and evaluation bases in China such as the Xichang satellite launch center. The twin goals of this organizational change were to reform the management and operation of China's defense industries to improve efficiency and competition and, secondly, to create a more rational and formal military procurement system.

COSTIND is currently organized into several different departments. These include:

  1. General Office,
  2. Policies and Regulations Department,
  3. Structural Reform Department,
  4. Comprehensive Planning Department,
  5. Finance Department, Science,
  6. Technology and Quality Department,
  7. Systems Engineering Department,
  8. Civilian Products Development Department,
  9. International Cooperation Department, and
  10. Personnel and Education Department.

COSTIND also now has two new subsidiary bureaus under its control. They are the State Aerospace Bureau and the State Atomic Energy Agency. These two organizations existed before the recent reforms but were part of the CASC and the CNNC, respectively. They recently moved over to the new COSTIND and are expected to function as the administrative and regulatory arms for the aerospace and the nuclear industries which are now under the control of COSTIND.

Key Functions:

The new COSTIND's responsibilities are a combination of the national defense administrative functions of the former COSTIND, the functions of the national defense department of the former State Planning Commission, and the governmental/administrative duties of China's ten newly-formed military industrial corporations (jungong qiye). The new COSTIND is expected to coordinate with the newly-formed GAD to supply military equipment to the PLA. As such, COSTIND is mainly responsible for military R&D and military production and has broad authority over China's ten military industrial corporations.  Its is still unclear which organization, the new COSTIND or the GAD, will decide which military systems the PLA requires, but it is clear that COSTIND will decide which military enterprises produce the required military goods.

COSTIND performs five major duties:

Role in Export Control Administration and Nonproliferation

In addition, COSTIND has an important role in regulating China's exports (and possibly imports) of sensitive military items. COSTIND has responsibility for vetting all of China's conventional military exports, including missile-related exports (this role that was formerly carried out by the State Committee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT) before it was disbanded in March 1998.) COSTIND also has influence over the vetting of nuclear exports. The China Atomic Energy Agency is bureaucratically under the COSTIND, and is responsible for vetting applications to export nuclear materials and equipment. Previously the China Atomic Energy Agency was part of CNNC and was responsible for all nuclear regulatory activities, including monitoring nuclear exports.  (Nuclear related dual-use items are vetted by Ministry of Commerce in consultation with COSTIND and CAEA.)

COSTIND no longer has responsibilities related to China's arms control and nonproliferation policies. Prior to the 1998 reorganization, COSTIND had an arms control and disarmament division (within its Foreign Affairs Office) which conducted policy research and coordinated the flow of technical information on arms control to various parts of the PLA. Another research organization called the China Defense, Science, Technology, Information Center (CDSTIC) also used to be part of COSTIND.  Following the March 1998 reforms, CDSTIC and COSTIND's arms control division moved over to the GAD.

Sources: Official COSTIND webpage; Interviews with Chinese military officials, Beijing, September 1998; for a recent discussion of COSTIND’s role and its relationship to the defense enterprises see: “Speech of Liu Jibin at COSTIND Working Meeting,” Zhongguo Hangkong Bao [China Aviation News], 30 April 1999.  Also see Tseng  Hai-tao, “Jiang Zemin Pushes Forward Restructuring of Military Industry – Developments of State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National defense and Five Major Ordnance Corporations,” Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle], 16 July 1998, pp. 18-20 as translated in FBIS-CHI-98-209, 28 July 1998; Liu Xiaohua, “Zhu Rongji Discusses Matters of Vital Importance With Military—Inside Story of Reorganization of China’s Five Major Military Industry Departments,” Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle], 6 February 1998 as translated in FBIS-CHI-98-065, 6 March 1998. For COSTIND’s continued role in defense conversion see Liu Jibin, “Implement the Guideline of Military-Civilian Integration, Rejuvenate the National Defense Science and Technology Industry,” Renmin Ribao, 2 February 1999, pp. 12 as translated in FBIS, 2 February 1999.

For historical work on COSTIND see John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, "Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defense Industries," The China Quarterly, June 1996;  Shirley A. Kan, "China: Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)," CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 7 November 1996; John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving The Arms-Export Enigma," International Security, Spring 1991, p. 89; John W. Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40; Yan Kong, "China's Arms Trade Bureaucracy," Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 80.]

Updated: 11/07/2003


CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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