Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)

State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND)

国家国防科技工业局

Previously, Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) 国防科技工业委员会

DIRECTOR: Chen Qiufa

DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Yu Liegui

Chen Qiufa also serves as Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and Director of China Atomic Energy Agency.

ADDRESS: 2A Guang'anmen, Xuanwu District, Beijing 100053 CHINA; Tel: 86-10-6603-4714, Fax: 86-10-6357-1398.

History: From COSTIND to SASTIND

COSTIND, SASTIND's predecessor, was established in 1982 by a merger of the Defense Science and Technology Commission (DSTC), the National Defense Industry Office (NDIO), and the Science, Technology, and Equipment Commission (STEC) of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

COSTIND's responsibilities were wide ranging in until the mid-1990s. Those responsibilities were curtailed by the late 1990s and today's SASTIND has a more restricted role than its predecessor. Beginning on 1 July 1986, COSTIND was given authority over the military products trade of China's entire defense industry. Also in 1986, the State Council and COSTIND took control over four ministries producing military goods (nuclear, aviation, ordnance, and space) in order to expedite the defense conversion process which had begun in the early 1980s. As a result of this change, these industries no longer reported to both COSTIND and the CMC. Thus, COSTIND was given responsibility for the research, development, and production of certain high technology weapons and for providing policy guidance related to military production. COSTIND also had extensive responsibility over all of China's testing and evaluation bases such as the Lop Nur nuclear testing site.

In March 1998 COSTIND underwent a substantial transformation and its responsibilities changed significantly. It became a ministry level agency under the control of the State Council. At the Ninth National People's Congress (NPC), COSTIND was civilianized and all of its strictly military responsibilities were taken away and given to a new PLA department under the CMC called the General Armaments Department (GAD). For example, after 1998 COSTIND no longer controlled any of the testing and evaluation bases in China such as the Xichang satellite launch center. The twin goals of this organizational change were to reform the management and operation of China's defense industries to improve efficiency and competition and, secondly, to create a more rational and formal military procurement system.

In 2007, the State Council approved the policy document "Some Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Investment System of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense," which proposed a new investment system featuring effective government regulation and control, participation of social capital, standardized intermediary services, vigorous supervision and management, and positive military-civilian interaction.

The plan for restructuring passed at the First Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress in 2008 established State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).

Organizational Structure:

The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), one of the five "super ministries" approved by the National People's Congress (NPC), the Chinese parliament, in March 2008 was launched in June 2008. The MIIT is comprised of a total of 24 departments, SASTIND being one of them. The new ministry, transformed from the Ministry of Information Industry, integrated the National Development and Reform Commission's (NDRC) functions on industry and trade management, most of the functions of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) (except that on nuclear power management), the functions of the Ministry of Information Industry and the State Council Informatization Office. Nuclear power management functions were transferred to NRDC's National Energy Commission.

Since COSTIND was a "ministry-level" organization—reporting directly to the State Council, the 2008 reorganization that created SASTIND was a significant reduction in status for the body. The new SASTIND does however continue to maintain control of the research and development within the industrial enterprises that are contracted with the PLA General Armaments Department (GAD), such as the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC).

Key Functions:

The SASTIND inherited its key functions from COSTIND. In this regards, its responsibilities are a combination of the national defense administrative functions of the former COSTIND, the functions of the national defense department of the former State Planning Commission, and the governmental/administrative duties of China's ten military industrial corporations (jungong qiye). SASTIND coordinates with the GAD to supply military equipment to the PLA. As such, SASTIND is mainly responsible for military R&D and military production and has broad authority over China's ten military industrial corporations. Previously, it was unclear which organization—COSTIND or GAD— made the decision about which military systems the PLA required, but it is clear since the reorganization that SASTIND decides which military enterprises produced the required military goods.

As with COSTIND, SASTIND performs five major duties:

Researches and drafts guidelines, policies, laws and regulations related to science, technology and industry for national defense and the development of military-civilian production conversion; formulates guidelines for the management of science, technology and industry for national defense.
Organizes the research and implementation of structural reform in national defense science, technology and industry.
Researches and formulates plans for the development of science, technology and industry for national defense.
Organizes and manages quality, safety, measurement, standards, statistics, and records in the area of national defense science, technology and industry, as well as related major research and development efforts and the promotion of those efforts.
Undertakes the organization and management of all international cooperation and exchanges, introduction of foreign technologies, and foreign trade that involves national defense science, technology and industry; oversees matters relating to bilateral and multilateral international cooperation, such as with the International Aerospace Organization and the International Atomic Energy Association.

Role in Export Control Administration and Nonproliferation

SASTIND has an important role in regulating China's exports (and possibly imports) of sensitive military items. As with COSTIND, SASTIND has responsibility for vetting all of China's conventional military exports, including missile-related exports (this role that was formerly carried out by the State Committee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT) before it was disbanded in March 1998.) SASTIND also has influence over the vetting of nuclear exports. The China Atomic Energy Agency was bureaucratically under the COSTIND, and is responsible for vetting applications to export nuclear materials and equipment. It appears to continue in this role under the new SASTIND. Previously the China Atomic Energy Agency was part of CNNC and was responsible for all nuclear regulatory activities, including monitoring nuclear exports. (Nuclear related dual-use items are vetted by Ministry of Commerce in consultation with SASTIND and CAEA.)

Prior to its first reorganization in 1998, COSTIND had an arms control and disarmament division (within its Foreign Affairs Office) which conducted policy research and coordinated the flow of technical information on arms control to various parts of the PLA. After 1998 responsibilities related to China's arms control and nonproliferation policies were removed from COSTIND. Another research organization called the China Defense, Science, Technology, Information Center (CDSTIC) also used to be part of COSTIND. Following the March 1998 reforms, CDSTIC and COSTIND's arms control division moved over to the GAD.

Sources:
Interviews with Chinese military officials, Beijing, September 1998; "Speech of Liu Jibin at COSTIND Working Meeting," Zhongguo Hangkong Bao [China Aviation News], 30 April 1999. Tseng Hai-tao, "Jiang Zemin Pushes Forward Restructuring of Military Industry — Developments of State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National defense and Five Major Ordnance Corporations," Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle], 16 July 1998, pp. 18-20 as translated in FBIS-CHI-98-209, 28 July 1998; Liu Xiaohua, "Zhu Rongji Discusses Matters of Vital Importance With Military—Inside Story of Reorganization of China's Five Major Military Industry Departments," Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle], 6 February 1998 as translated in FBIS-CHI-98-065, 6 March 1998. Liu Jibin, "Implement the Guideline of Military-Civilian Integration, Rejuvenate the National Defense Science and Technology Industry," Renmin Ribao, 2 February 1999, pp. 12 as translated in FBIS, 2 February 1999; "China's National Defense in 2008," Xinhua General News Service, 19 January 2009, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com; "Ministry of Industry and Information Technology inaugurated," General News Service, 29 June 2008, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com; "Highlights: China launches sweeping institutional restructuring of government," Xinhua General News Service, 11 March 2008, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com; Biography of Chen Qiufa, www.chinavitae.com/biography/Chen_Qiufa; "MII Reorganization Plan Drafted: Report," China Telecommunications Newswire, 3 March 2008, in LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

For historical work on COSTIND see John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, "Current and Future Challenges Facing Chinese Defense Industries," The China Quarterly, June 1996; Shirley A. Kan, "China: Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)," CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 7 November 1996; John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving The Arms-Export Enigma," International Security, Spring 1991, p. 89; John W. Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40; Yan Kong, "China's Arms Trade Bureaucracy," Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 80.]

Updated December 2009

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.