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China and Nuclear Disarmament/Arms Control

Since 1963, China has consistently called for the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction" of nuclear weapons and is officially opposed to the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the implicit or explicit threat to use nuclear weapons first, and to the deployment of nuclear weapons outside of national territories. China has repeatedly called for an international convention to ban nuclear weapons, similar to the chemical and biological weapons conventions.

China has also insisted that the two major nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, have a special obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament. In the past, China conditioned its willingness to participate in certain arms control/nonproliferation agreements, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), on progress by the superpowers toward overall nuclear disarmament. Eventually China signed on to both the NPT and CTBT, but issued statements indicating that China considers these agreements as preliminary steps toward the overall goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

A recent statement of China's general position on arms control and disarmament is as as follows:

China has called on other states (particularly nuclear weapon states) to promote nuclear disarmament and arms control by following the six areas outlined below:

(1) Nuclear weapon states should abandon their policies of nuclear deterrence;

(2) States with the largest nuclear arsenals should further reduce nuclear stockpiles drastically, and should destroy those removed nuclear warheads rather than simply transferring them from deployment to storage;

(3) All nuclear-weapon states should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances [no-first-use], commit themselves unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones [negative security assurances], and conclude, at an early date, international legal instruments to such effect;

(4) States with nuclear weapons deployed outside their borders should withdraw all these weapons home;

(5) All nuclear-weapon states should pledge their support to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect their status and undertake corresponding obligations;

(6) No country should develop and deploy space weapons systems or missile defense systems which undermine strategic security and stability. ["Statement by H.E. Mr. Sha Zukang, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs and Head of Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 8 April 1997.]

China has signed onto a number of nuclear non-armament agreements, including the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and the relevant protocols of a number of regional nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) agreements.

Chinese Participation in Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament:

Although China generally praised the START 1 and 2 agreements, it has not agreed to participate in multilateral nuclear arms reduction talks with the other nuclear powers. In 1982, China presented its "three halts and one reduction" proposal (halt testing, improvement, and manufacture; 50 percent reduction), which called for the Soviet Union and United States to:

However, by 1988 China had changed its position, stating that the United States and Soviet Union would have to achieve "drastic" or "substantial" reductions in their nuclear arsenals (not "reduce by 50 per cent")  before China would be willing to enter multilateral arms reduction negotiations. Some observers suggest that China never had any intention of participating in such discussions, and abandoned the 50 percent condition once it seemed like cuts that large might actually occur. China's official explanation was that the revision was justified, given the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program and its possible effect on the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Once certain conditions are met, China states that it would support the convening of an international conference of all nuclear-weapon states to discuss nuclear arms reduction and the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. [For example, see: Alastair Iain Johnston, "Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s," China Journal, January 1996, pp. 27-61.]

According to Chinese arms control researcher Liu Huaqiu, China's current policy toward its participation in multilateral nuclear disarmament is that China will be willing to participate in such a process once three conditions are met:

(1) All nuclear countries must reach an agreement not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear free zones (no-first-use and negative security assurances);

(2) The United States and Russia must reduce their nuclear weapon stockpiles far beyond START-2 levels (i.e. 3,000-3,500 strategic warheads), to a level comparable to that of medium-size nuclear countries;

(3) There must be a halt to the development of ballistic missiles defense (BMD) systems, including the current theater missile defense (TMD) system, because the latter has potential anti-strategic missile capabilities. [Liu Huaqiu, Xiandai Junshi (Conmilit), 11 November 1995, pp. 15-18, in "Analysis Of Nuclear Arms Control Policy," FBIS-CHI-95-246, 11 November 1995.]

Possible additional prerequisites may include:

(1) Nuclear weapons reductions to the point which would not allow a first-strike by any nuclear-weapon state;
(2) Deployment of nuclear weapons only in the national territories of the nuclear weapon states;
(3) No alert status of nuclear weapons in peacetime;
(4) Elimination of tactical weapons and no development of neutron bombs and other low-threshold nuclear weapons. [Zhou Peizhen and Lu Min, Beijing Institute of System Engineering, "Preconditions for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament," presented at ISODARCO Arms Control Seminar, Chengdu, China, November 1996, pp. 1-3.]

The extent to which China might actually be willing to participate in multilateral nuclear arms reduction talks is unclear. J. Mohan Malik states that China's objectives regarding nuclear arms control consist of the following four points:

(1) Maintain and enhance the credibility and potency of China's nuclear deterrent capability vis-à-vis its rivals;
(2) Keep China's nuclear forces out of bilateral and/or multilateral nuclear arms reduction talks;
(3) Influence the outcome of superpower arms control talks in a way beneficial to its own security interests and have its views given due consideration in superpower arms control negotiations;
(4) Project China's image as a peace-loving and responsible nuclear power. [J. Mohan Malik, "China's Policy Towards Nuclear Arms Control In The Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary Security Policy, August 1995, pp. 8-9.]

 Key statements/documents related to China and nuclear disarmament/arms control:

For more on China's position on nuclear disarmament issues, and nuclear doctrine generally, see:

[CHRONOLOGY OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR DETERRENCE]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR DECLARATORY POLICY] (See especially [CHINA AND NO-FIRST-USE] and [CHINA AND SECURITY ASSURANCES])

For China's position on various international arms control and disarmament regimes, see:

[CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL REGIMES]
(See especially: [CHINA AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY], [CHINA AND THE SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY], [CHINA AND THE OUTER SPACE TREATY (OST)], [CHINA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES (NWFZ)], [CHINA AND START 1 AND 2], [CHINA AND THE INF TREATY], [CHINA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)], and [CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)])

Other related issues:

[CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD MISSILE DEFENSE]

[AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IN NORTHEAST ASIA, 1990-PRESENT]

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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