China's Export Controls

China's Export Controls

This section provides an overview of China's system of export controls related to nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use technology, conventional arms (including missiles), and CBW, China's export control-related administrative bodies, and the key export control decrees and regulations.

In the summer and fall of 2002 a comprehensive set of regulations and control lists were released that went far in strengthening China's export controls. In total, the new regulations and control lists closely adhere to the MTCR and Australia Group.

On August 25, 2002, Beijing issued Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, and Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List,, fulfilling its November 2000 pledge to issue export control laws covering missile technologies. The new regulations included both the MTCR's "presumption of denial" approach, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. In addition to the new missile regulations, China also issued a revision to Regulations on Control of Military Products Export in October 2002.

On October 14, 2002, China released its Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies and Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List. The regulations, which will go into effect on December 1, 2002, contain measures to strengthen export controls to prevent diversion of dual-use biological agents, related equipment, and technologies toward production of biological weapons. Domestic measures include an export licensing system, application process, and criminal prosecution for violations. The regulations also cover the receiving party and require guarantees that biological materials will not be diverted toward weapon production and unapproved third parties. The export control list provides an extensive and well-defined list of pathogens and toxins covered by the new set of export control regulations.

On October 19, 2002, China released its Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies and Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies Export Control List, with the stated intention of further strengthening control over the export of dual-use chemicals and their related equipment and technologies. Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) spokeswoman Gao Yan stated:

"As an important component of China's export control legal system, the measures are significant to implementing the country's nonproliferation policy, to fulfilling its international obligations, to safeguarding its national security as well as social and public interests, to standardizing its export control of sensitive items, and to maintaining the normal order of foreign trade." ["PRC FM Spokeswoman on Measures on Export Controls of Chemicals," Beijing Xinhua in English, 19 October, 2002, CPP20021019000058.]

Initial reaction to these new regulations from Washington was low-key. Reports indicated that the US leadership recognized the new regulations as a step forward, but would hold off with their judgment until China proved its commitment to enforce its new rules. With regards to the missile regulations, for instance, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated that: "It is an important part to have the regulations in place, it is an equally important part to see that they are enforced."

In September 2003, China sent a letter announcing its interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). China has since begun negotiations for its application to join the MTCR, with the first round of consultations occurring in February 2004. In addition, on January 26, 2004, China announced its intention to apply for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). China faced little opposition to its application to join the NSG and was admitted during the May 2004 NSG meeting in Sweden. However, China's application to enter the MTCR has raised concerns from MTCR supporters that the membership and inclusion of states that do not fully support the nonproliferation objectives of the regimes would damage the regime and weaken its effectiveness. Despite these concerns, China's admission to the NSG and its application to the MTCR represent a significant departure from past policy, when China regarded both regimes as inherently discriminatory. However, despite these positive developments, U.S. government officials continued to express concerns about China's export controls, noting that the implementation and enforcement phases that are most critical to determining China's nonproliferation objectives. ["Kyodo: China to Join Missile Technology Control Initiative," Kyodo World Service, 12 February 2004 in FBIS JPP200401212000139; "China poised to join nuclear supplier group," Financial Times, 12 April 2004, at http://www.ft.com; "PRC FM Spokesman: China Firmly Opposes WMD Proliferation," Xinhua, 12 February 2004 in FBIS CPP20040212000171; Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," Report for Congress, Congressional Research Services, updated February 26, 2003, p.23.]

Assessments of China's Export Controls Prior to 2002

On November 21, 2000, the Acting Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher welcomed the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s 2000 Statement as reflecting:

"China’s clear policy commitment not to assist, in any way, other countries to develop ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons and to further improve and reinforce its export control system, including by publishing at an early date a comprehensive export control list of missile-related items, including dual use items."

This development led to a decision to waive economic sanctions required by U.S. law for past assistance by Chinese entities to missile programs in Pakistan and Iran; resume processing of licenses necessary for commercial space cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese companies, such as launching U.S. satellites in China; and resume discussions as soon as possible on extending the 1995 U.S.-China Agreement Regarding International Trade in Commercial Launch Services. [Statement by the Acting Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, 21 November 2000]

In its 1997 annual report, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

"Problems have arisen primarily in the area of nonproliferation export controls, where China has failed to adopt an effective national system and has proven reluctant to embrace completely the norms established by the multilateral regimes, i.e. the Australia Group (CBW exports), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms exports and related dual-use items)." [ACDA, 1996 Annual Report, "Regional Arms Control: China."]

In April 1997 testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn stated:

"China still does not have an effective national system to control exports of sensitive goods and technologies. Even when Beijing is willing to exercise restraint, its ability to do so in a substantial number of cases may be inadequate."

"China's current ability to control exports appears to vary with the type of commodity exported. Exports of specialized nuclear equipment and technology, conventional weapons systems and technology, and missile systems and specialized missile components and technology all seem to be subject to centralized governmental approval procedures. However, dual-use items in the nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile areas -- items that have both legitimate, civil applications as well as more sensitive applications -- are not necessarily controlled by centralized or senior-level review and approval mechanisms. Indeed, we have considerable evidence that decisions to export potentially sensitive dual use nuclear, chemical, and missile items are often taken by Chinese manufacturing or exporting entities -- even government-owned or government-operated entities -- without referral to central or high-level authorities. This problem of inadequate control is compounded by the rapid growth and decentralization of certain Chinese industries (especially the chemical industry) and their incentives to make a profit." ["Engaging China on Nonproliferation," testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 10 April 1997.]

For more information on China's export controls, see:

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORT CONTROLS]

[CHINA'S CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE EXPORT CONTROLS]

[CHINA'S CHEMICAL EXPORT CONTROLS]

[CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROL-RELATED BODIES]

[CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROL DECREES AND REGULATIONS]

[CHINA AND MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES]

Key statements/documents related to China and export controls:

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.