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China's Missile Exports

China's transfers of missiles, missile technology and components, missile production facilities and equipment, and technical training to countries in the developing world have caused many in the West to worry that China is contributing to dangerous missile proliferation. Of particular concern are the transfers of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of functioning as delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to countries of proliferation concern, including Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. Western nonproliferation specialists are especially worried about China's perceived willingness to transfer production technology and expertise, which enables countries in the developing world to produce advanced missiles indigenously.

In its missile sales, as with its conventional arms sales in general, China has followed three arms export principles:

    (1) The weapons exported must be meant for legitimate self-defense

    (2) The weapons must contribute to regional stability

    (3) The weapons must not be intended for interference in another country's internal affairs

According to former Chinese missile engineer Hua Di, "Chinese-made [ballistic missiles] were never launched in any military conflict in the world."

In the past, China has stated that the focus of nonproliferation efforts should be on the restriction of WMD themselves, not on their delivery systems. China further argued that if one type of delivery system is to be restricted (e.g. ballistic missiles), then other delivery systems, such as combat aircraft, ought to be restricted as well. China has previously criticized the international agreement on the restriction of ballistic missile exports, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on these grounds. China has also been sharply critical of unilateral US sanctions imposed for alleged Chinese violations of MTCR guidelines, especially with regards to its application on states that are not members of the MTCR, such as China.

In response to US pressure and sanctions imposed in 1991 for alleged agreements to transfer M-11 missiles and technology to Pakistan, as well as M-9 missiles and technology to Syria, China issued a unilateral pledge to abide by MTCR guidelines. However, this pledge was called into question in 1993, when the US again imposed MTCR-related sanctions on China for M-11 technology transfers to Pakistan. The US agreed to lift these sanctions in October 1994, when China reaffirmed and clarified its commitment to MTCR guidelines in a joint statement with the US on missile proliferation. However, reports continued to circulate that China was possibly still involved in certain transfers of missile production technology to countries of proliferation concern.

On 21 November 2000, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a  policy statement on missile nonproliferation pledging that new stringent laws would be issued that would include such regulations as license application and review, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. On the same day, the State Department announced that it was waiving sanctions on Chinese entities for the past sales of missile technologies to entities in Iran and Pakistan and resuming discussions with China on extending the 1995 US-China Agreement on International Trade in Commercial Launch Services.  The MFA statement did not specifically refer to the MTCR or its control list, nor did it mention when China would issue the new export control law, leaving some experts to argue that this represented a loop-hole in the bilateral accord.

Despite the November 2000 pledge, Beijing and Washington continued to bicker about the issue. The US government claimed that a Chinese company had shipped missile technology to Pakistan in violation of the bilateral agreement. In September 2001 the US government again imposed economic sanctions on the accused Chinese company, and the Bush administration invoked a ban on new licenses for U.S. companies to put their satellites on Chinese rockets or transfer satellite technology.  The apparent gap between Beijing's words and deeds can be contributed to a number of factors. Many analysts believe that China has viewed the implementation of export control pledges as a tool in winning concessions from the US on issues such as arms transfers to Taiwan and missile defense.  Another obvious problem with all of China's export controls, not only the missile related ones, is insufficient domestic infrastructure, which can hinder effective and comprehensive implementation.

More recently, in a major policy development, China finally promulgated the long-awaited regulations on missile-related transfers.  In August 2002 China got closer to meeting US demands for stronger controls on its missile exports when it issued new regulations and a control list for the export of missile technology. This demonstrates Beijing's new official stance on the appropriateness of restricting proliferation of WMD delivery systems, and has indicated an understanding of the need to abide by the growing international norm aimed at controlling the missile trade.  The new regulations were announced at the start of a visit to Beijing of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. According to a Washington Post article:

"Beijing's decision to publish the rules appeared intended to further strengthen ties with the United States that have been improving since China backed the U.S.-led war on terrorism after the Sept. 11 attacks. U.S. officials have made it clear that weapons proliferation is a 'make-or-break issue' in relations with China..."

The 2002 regulations and control list are relatively comprehensive and in some fields are stricter than MTCR guidelines.  The regulations also follow the MTCR's "presumption of denial" approach, requiring specific approval and an export license for exports to authorized end-users.  In a press briefing on the new regulations, Liu Jieyi, Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament at the Ministry of Foreign Affair stated:

"The Regulations reflect the 'catch-all' principle in export control where there is a risk of proliferation.  ... The Regulations specially stipulate that if an exporter knows or should know that the missile-related items or technologies to be exported will be used by the receiving party directly in its program for developing missiles that can be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction, the exporter is still required to apply for export license even if the items and technologies do not figure in the Control List. Furthermore, the competent departments may decide, on an Ad Hoc basis, to exercise export control on specific items and technologies not contained in the Control List."

However, when Liu was asked about whether China would continue exporting relevant technologies to Pakistan and Iran he stated:

"I am not sure about the factual basis of what you were suggesting in your question. China has been implementing a very strict policy on the non-proliferation of missiles and missile-related items and technologies. ... The Regulations and Control List will be strictly enforced. Since we are talking about Regulations promulgated by China, I don't think it's fair and polite to bring other countries into discussion."

Initial reaction from Washington after China's announcement was low-key.  Reports indicated that the US leadership recognized the new regulations as a step forward, but would hold off with their judgment until China proved its commitment to enforce its new rules.  State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated that: "It is an important part to have the regulations in place, it is an equally important part to see that they are enforced."  However, CIA Director, George Tenet, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee on February, 11, 2003 that Chinese firms were not complying with export controls.  In his testimony, he remarked that:

"China vowed in November 2000 to refrain from assisting countries seeking to develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and last August Beijing promulgated new missile-related export controls.  Despite such steps, ...Chinese firms remain key suppliers of ballistic and cruise missile-related technologies to Pakistan, Iran, and several other countries--and Chinese firms may be backing away from Beijing's 1997 bilateral commitment to forego any new nuclear cooperation with Iran.  We are monitoring this closely."

  

[Sources: Bates Gill, "Report On The Mission To The People's Republic Of China," March 1995, Research Project: Nuclear Proliferation and World Order, p. 9; Viktor Stefashin, Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow), 11 July 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-133, 11 July 1995; Liu Huaqiu, Xiandai Junshi (Conmilit) (Beijing), 11 November 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-246, 11 November 1995; Hua Di, "China's Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation," in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p. 163; State Department Statement on Chinese Missile Sanctions, November 2000; Philip P. Pan, "China Issues Rules On Missile Exports," Washington Post, 26 August 2002, p. 11; Phillip Saunders, Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Missile Technology Export Control List, 6 September 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/pubs/prc_msl.pdf; Jing-Dong Yuan, "Missile Export Controls Significant Step for Beijing," South China Morning Post (Op-Ed), 29 August 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/beijing.htm; "China tightens missile export rules," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/2216361.stm; George Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World," DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing for Testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, 11 February 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/ latest&f=03021101.plt&t=/ products/washfile/newsitem.shtml]

RECENT STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS:

Briefing by Mr. Liu Jieyi Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament Dept. MFA on the Promulgation of Regulations on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies and the Control List, 27 August 2002

Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies , 25 August 2002

The Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List, 25 August 2002

 

OTHER RELATED LINKS:

[CHINA AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)]

[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT (ICOC)]

For information on China's missile trade and cooperation with specific regions, see:

[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST]

(Note especially: [CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO IRAN] and [CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA])

[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH ASIA]

(Note especially: [CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN])

[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO EAST ASIA]

[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH AMERICA]

[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO EUROPE (I.E. ALBANIA)]

See also:

[CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROLS]

[CHINA AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION]

Updated 03/26/2003


CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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