US-China Convergence and Friction on Arms Control/Nonproliferation Issues

US-China Convergence and Friction on Arms Control/Nonproliferation Issues

Nuclear doctrine and strategy	Nuclear non-proliferation	Missile non-proliferation	Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) non-proliferation
Conventional weapons non-proliferation	Missile Defense	Other areas	Cooperative Activities

Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy:

Areas of Convergence:

In June 1998, China and the other P-5 States issued a Joint Communiqué on India and Pakistan, condemning South Asian nuclear tests. The U.S. and China also issued a separate statement reiterating support for the P-5 Joint Communiqué
During the June 1998 Clinton - Jiang summit, the U.S. and China agreed to not target strategic nuclear weapons at each other. This Non-Targeting Agreement was a change from China's long-time insistence that the U.S. must undertake a No-First-Use pledge in exchange for a detargeting accord. (See also White House Fact Sheet on Achievements of US-China Summit )
In October 1997, during Jiang Zemin's visit to Washington, the U.S. and China signed the Agreement of Intent on Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Between the Department of Energy of the United States of America and the State Planning Commission of the People's Republic of China
In April 1995, both China and the United States, along with the other three declared nuclear weapon states, issued UN Security Council Resolution 984, providing Positive Security Assurances (PSAs) to NPT non-nuclear weapon states

Areas of Friction or Disagreement:

Despite the joint statements condemning the South Asian nuclear tests, a 2002 unclassified CIA report did not "rule out... the possibility of continued contacts between Chinese and Pakistani entities on Pakistani nuclear weapons development"
Although Beijing accepted the 1998 Non-Targeting agreement, China would still prefer an unconditional No-First-Use (NFU) pledge from the United States
Chinese opposes policies of nuclear deterrence "based on the first use of nuclear weapons". As expressed in a March 2002 statement, Chinese arm control official said that "To transcend the Cold War mindset, it is first and foremost necessary to jettison the nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons. This will go a long way to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons, and greatly contribute to nuclear nonproliferation"
China and the United States have different interpretations of the meaning of the term "deterrence"

Nuclear Nonproliferation:

Areas of Convergence:

Both China and the United States are members of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Both China and the United States are signatories of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and have instituted unilateral moratoria on their nuclear testing
China and the United States have cooperated on dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue and both agreed to support the maintenance of a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. In April of 2003 China successfully brokered a trilateral meeting with the U.S. and North Korea aimed at decreasing tensions.
In May 1996, China pledged not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any state, including Pakistan
In October 1994, China and the United States issued a joint statement declaring their support for pursuing negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
Both China and the United States are members of the Zangger Committee (ZAC)
Both China and the United States are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
China and the United States both support, and have signed the relevant protocols to, various Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs), including the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America), the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), and the Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa)
China has participated in the US Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program
Both China and the United States are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The United States and China signed the 1985 US-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) and have implemented the 1997 Agreement on the Cooperation Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology

Areas of Friction or Disagreement:

Despite agreement on maintaining a nuclear weapon free Korean peninsula, Beijing and Washington are not in complete agreement about how to best deal with North Korean nuclear intensions.
Discussions on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, as well as all other activities of the Conference on Disarmament, have been stalled for the last few year due to China and U.S. disagreement on issues regarding the weaponization of outer space
China places primary disarmament responsibility on "the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals", the U.S. and Russia, while holding that smaller nuclear powers, like China, should only be expected to disarm after the U.S. and Russia have significantly reduced their arsenals
China refuses to require full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a condition for supply of nuclear exports
The United States wants China to pledge not to use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in its civilian nuclear fuel cycle and not to export HEU-fueled research reactors
According to an unclassified report in 2002, the CIA could not "rule out ... the possibility of continued contacts between Chinese and Pakistani entities on Pakistani nuclear weapons development"

Missile Nonproliferation:

Areas of Convergence:

In August 2002, Beijing announced new missile export control regulations and an expanded control list, fulfilling its November 2000 pledge to issue export control laws covering missile technologies and reinforcing its October 1997 regulations
In October 1994, China and the United States issued a joint statement on missile proliferation, under which China agreed to the concept of "inherent capability". In October 1997 China and the United States issued a joint statement that built upon the 1994 joint statement

Areas of Friction or Disagreement:

The United States continues to suspect that China is failing to abide by MTCR guidelines by exporting missiles and missile technologies to countries of concern. In the past sales have included M-11 missile sales to Pakistan
Although Beijing's newest regulations coincide closely with the MTCR, China continues to insist that the MTCR is discriminatory and has yet to officially join the regime
China did not sign the U.S. backed International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)

Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation:

Areas of Convergence:

Both China and the United States are members of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Both China and the United States adhere to the Geneva Protocol
With the issuance October 2002 Regulations on Dual-Use Biological Agents, Dual-Use Biological Agents Control List, Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals, and Chemicals Control List, China has made major strides in strengthening its export control mechanism for dual-use biological and chemical weapons, including covering all items on the Australia Group control list

Areas of Friction or Disagreement:

Despite the comprehensiveness of China's regulations issued in 2002, Beijing continues to refuse to join the Australia Group (AG)
The U.S. government has sanctioned Chinese entities for allegedly selling chemical weapons-related technology to countries in the Middle East, particularly Iran. China has countered that these sanctions are not justified and that the trade between China and Iran are allowed under the CWC

Conventional Weapons Nonproliferation:

Areas of Convergence:

In October 2002, China issued an expanded and revised version of its 1997 Regulations on Export Control of Military Items, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening its system of export controls and its relations with the US
China and the United States both participated in the now-suspended arms control in the Middle East (ACME/P-5) talks
China and the U.S. both helped bloc a binding multilateral agreement to restrict the proliferation of small arms and light weapons
China and the United States both declined to join the total ban on anti-personnel landmines (APLs)

Areas of Friction or Disagreement:

China has been highly critical of US arms sales to Taiwan, which Beijing alleges violate the 1982 US-China joint communiqué
In 1997 China stopped its participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) due to the United States listing its arms exports to Taiwan
China and the United States differ on the proposed ban on anti-personnel landmines (APLs)
China is not a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement
The United States is critical of Chinese sales of certain conventional arms to Iran (e.g. anti-ship cruise missiles) and other countries
U.S. pressure led to the cancellation of Israeli arms sales to China

Missile Defense:

Areas of Convergence

China is not opposed to the development and deployment of lower-tier Theater Missile Defense systems

Areas of Friction or Disagreement

China is opposed to the development and deployment of National Missile Defense (NMD) Systems
China is opposed to the possible deployment of missile defense that would include Taiwan, and has expressed serious reservation about Japanese participation
China is opposed to the development and deployment of upper-tier TMD
China opposed the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002.
China has expressed a view that development of missile defense will result in increased WMD proliferation

Other Areas:

Areas of Friction or Disagreement:

China has been increasingly critical of U.S. and allied actions in Iraq. See:

National People's Congress Foreign Affairs Committee Issues Statement on the Military Actions Against Iraq by the United States and Other Countries, 21 March 2003 and

Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress Foreign Affairs Committee Statement on Military Action in Iraq, 21 March 2003
China objects to the use of national technical means (NTM) of verification as part of multilateral treaty verification regimes
China objects to the use by the United States and others of unilateral sanctions as a nonproliferation measure
The work of the Conference on Disarmament has been stagnant for the last few years primarily due to U.S. -China disagreement on the weaponization of outer space. China wants an Ad Hoc Committee to formally discuss the formulation of a treaty on the Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which the U.S. does not support

Cooperative Activities

In August and October 2000, China made strong efforts toward strengthening its commitment to the nonproliferation regime in the area of export controls on missile technology as well as on biological and chemical precursors, equipment and technology. In October of 2000, China also issued an expanded and revised version of its 1997 Regulations on Export Control of Military Items. These policy shifts can be attributed to China's increased recognition of the dangers that proliferation poses to its own security and opens up new avenues of cooperation and improved relations with the United States
While bringing destruction and mass casualties, the events of September 11, 2001 provided a broad-based incentive for improving Sino-US relations and cooperation. Transparency and information sharing regarding terrorism may also have a beneficial impact on cooperative efforts in the realm of nonproliferation

Updated 04/29/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.