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China's Nuclear Weapon Development, Modernization and Testing
Beginning in 1955, China's nuclear weapon program has remained one of the nation's top priorities. Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang write in China's Security that China's nuclear weapons program is "unique among PRC modernization programs in their reliance on expertise and professional management and in their ability to recover from undue political interference. The cream of China's scientific and technical talent were involved with nuclear weapons and missiles from their inception, and top leaders assured financial and political support (and, during the Cultural Revolution, protection)." With this focus, China has been able to continuously modernize their nuclear arsenal including the recent development of miniaturized warheads for China's new road-mobile, solid-fueled missile.
Since its inception, China's nuclear weapon program has relied on a mixture of foreign assistance, indigenous know-how and espionage to steadily develop and modernize its nuclear arsenal from its first implosion device to the development of tactical nuclear weapons in the 1980s. As a result of this program, China is assessed to have at least six different types of nuclear weapons: a 15-40 Kt fission bomb; a 20 kt missile warhead; a 3 Mt thermonuclear missile warhead; a 3 Mt thermonuclear gravity bomb; a 4-5 Mt missile warhead; and a 200-300 Kt missile warhead. China may also posses some tactical nuclear weapons. The Natural Resources Defense Council estimates that China's current nuclear stockpile includes about 450 nuclear weapons.
Historical Motivations and Initial Weapons Development
China's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons came in response to nuclear threats by the United States. In July 1950, at the very beginning of the Korean War, President Truman ordered 10 nuclear configured B-29s to the Pacific, and "he warned China that the US would take 'whatever steps are necessary' to stop Chinese intervention and that the use of nuclear weapons 'had been under active consideration.'" In 1952 President-elect Eisenhower publicly hinted that he would authorize the use of nuclear weapons against China if the Korean War armistice talks continued to stagnate. In 1954, the commander of the US Strategic Air Command General Curtis LeMay stated his support for the use of nuclear weapons if China resumed fighting in Korea. LeMay stated, "There are no suitable strategic air targets in Korea. However, I would drop a few bombs in proper places like China, Manchuria and Southeastern Russia. In those 'poker games,' such as Korea and Indo-China, we. . . have never raised the ante - we have always just called the bet. We ought to try raising sometime." Finally, in January 1955, US Navy Admiral Radford also publicly advocated the use of nuclear weapons if China invaded South Korea.
These threats prompted the Chinese to begin developing nuclear weapons in the winter of 1954/55. The Ministry of Nuclear Industry was then established in 1955. With Soviet assistance, nuclear research began at the Institute of Physics and Atomic Energy in Beijing, and a gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant in Lanzhou was constructed to produce weapon-grade uranium. On 15 October 1957 the USSR agreed to provide China with a sample atomic bomb and manufacturing data. However, by 1959 the rift between the Soviet Union and China had become so great that by 1960 the Soviet Union discontinued all assistance to China. After 1960, China was forced to go it alone. China successfully tested its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964 and its first hydrogen bomb on 17 June 1967.
China's first nuclear device, codenamed 59-6 for the year and month that Nikita Krushchev refused to provide China with a prototype bomb, was an implosion device weighing 1,550 kilograms. An implosion device was chosen over a "gun assembly" design because it was more sophisticated and because it required less nuclear material. On 14 May 1965 China conducted its first test from an aircraft, revealing that it had a weaponized bomb design. On 27 October 1966 China launched a DF-2 MRBM with a 12 kt nuclear warhead from the Shuangchengzi missile test site in Gansu province which struck its target in the Lop Nur test site. This marked the only time that a country has tested a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile over populated areas.
Just 32 months after the testing of its first atomic device, China tested its first thermonuclear device on 17 June 1967. This achievement is remarkable in that the time-span between the US's first atomic test and its first hydrogen bomb test was 86 months, for the USSR it was 75 months, for the UK 66 months and for France 105 months. China's goal was to produce a thermonuclear device of at least a megaton in yield that could be dropped by an aircraft or carried by a ballistic missile. Several explosions to test thermonuclear weapon designs, characteristics and yield boosting preceded the thermonuclear test. The yield of the 1967 test was 3.3 megatons.
Nuclear Modernization Accelerates in 1980s and 1990s
During the 1970s and 1980s, China began developing lower yield nuclear weapons as well as continued testing multi-megaton warheads. The testing of lower yield nuclear weapons suggests that China began developing tactical nuclear weapons. Tests in September 1977, March 1978 and October 1980 all produced yields under 20 Kt and in 1983 the PLA published a manual explaining the different types and functions of tactical nuclear weapons. A 1984 declassified Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report estimated that "the Chinese maintain atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) in their inventory, although there is no evidence confirming their production or deployment." The DIA report noted that China probably did not possess "artillery-fired nuclear projectiles." However, the DIA report admitted that "it knew very little about the extent of tactical or theater nuclear weapons for use by the Chinese People's Liberation Army." In 1988 China conducted a test of what is believed to have been a neutron bomb. In fact, China publicly admitted in 1999 - in response to the release of the Cox Report - that in the 1970s and 1980s China had “master[ed] in succession the neutron bomb design technology...."
China's nuclear tests in the late-1980s and 1990s were geared toward further modernizing its nuclear forces. Although China officially declared in 1994 that these tests were for improving safety features on existing warheads, these tests were also likely intended for the development of new, smaller warheads for China's next-generation solid-fuel ICBMs (e.g. DF-31 and DF-41) and also possibly to develop a multiple warhead (MRV or MIRV) capability. Some speculate that China wanted to delay an international test ban until it could complete its latest round of tests and only announced a testing moratorium after all the tests necessary for the next phase of nuclear modernization were completed. China's last test was on 29 July 1996 and China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 24 September 1996.
In the late 1990s attention in the US focused on the role of Chinese espionage in assisting China's nuclear weapon development. The US Congress formed a Select Committee on US National Security and Military-Commercial Concerns with China (aka the Cox Committee). According to the Cox Committee Report, suspicion of China's nuclear espionage started after the US government realized that information derived from Chinese tests in 1992-1996 were similar to US nuclear designs. This similarity combined with other information derived from classified sources led the Cox Committee to claim that China had stolen several bomb designs, including the US's most advanced W-88 design and a design for an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb). Yet, the Cox Report has been severely criticized by both experts and officials in the US as a political document that has several technical inaccuracies.
China's nuclear modernization program may be geared toward developing the capacity to move from a minimum deterrence to a limited deterrence nuclear strategy. "Limited deterrence" entails the capability to deter conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control escalation in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Under a "limited deterrence" doctrine, China would need to target nuclear forces in addition to cities, which would require expanded deployments. However, such a limited deterrence capability may still be a long way off. According to Alastair Johnston,"It is fairly safe to say that Chinese capabilities come nowhere near the level required by the concept of limited deterrence." [Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," China Quarterly, June 1996, pp. 552-558.]
[Sources: Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows and Richard W. Fieldhouse, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Boulder: Westview Press. 1994. pp. 350-352, 358; Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions From Abroad: A Quest For 'Superb and Secret Weapons', Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995. pp. 28-30; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1988. pp. 14, 18, 32; Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China's Security: The New Roles of the Military, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press. 1998. p. 239; Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy, Lexington: Lexington Books. 1988. p. 90; The Cox Report, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing. 1999,) p. 2,4; "Nuclear Weapon Systems in China," DIA Defense Estimative Brief, 4 April 1984, DEB-49-85 p. 3, declassified by the National Security Archive, Washington, DC 1999.]
The Future of Chinese Nuclear Modernization
Through these modernization efforts, China continues to develop faster, sturdier, and more accurate missiles that may carry smaller second-generation nuclear warheads, multiple reentry-vehicles (MRVs) and various penetration aids. The advancement of the DF-31, combined with the introduction of the JL-2 SLBM and Type 094 SSBN submarine significantly enhance China’s deterrence capabilities, yet they also increase the risk of unauthorized or accidental launches.
According to United States intelligence estimates, an American ballistic missile defense system may prompt China to expand its nuclear arsenal to include as many as 75-100 ICMBS and deploy up to 200 warheads by 2015. Reports suggest that China may spend $10 billion to improve its nuclear deterrence, likely focusing on stronger war-fighting capabilities and deployment of penetration aids and multiple warheads. One source asserts that China has confided to Russia its plans to deploy 500 nuclear warheads by 2015, with 300 warheads on MIRV/MRVed ICBMs and the remaining warheads on SLBMs. [Sources: Phillip Saunders and Jing-Dong Yuan, “China’s Strategic Force Modernization: Three Scenarios and Their Implications for the United States,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2003, forthcoming; National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,” December 2001; Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Missile Plan Could Reportedly Provoke China,” New York Times, August 10, 2000, p A1; Joseph Fitchett, “Chinese Nuclear Buildup Predicted,” International Herald Tribune, November 6, 1999, http://www.iht.com/IHT/DIPLO/99/jf110699.html]
Why is China strengthening
its nuclear arsenal? Three primary explanations exist.
First, China may simply wish to update their aging
weapons systems and replace them with more modern
systems. Second, China may be seeking a stronger
fighting capacity to increase the survivability of its
nuclear deterrent. As other countries (particularly the
United States) continue to increase their military
capabilities, China may feel more vulnerable. From
Desert Storm through the 2003 war in Iraq, the United
States has continuously demonstrated its ability to use
conventional forces to destroy fixed targets with
tremendous accuracy. U.S. efforts to develop a ballistic
missile defense system also threaten the deterrence
capability of China’s aging nuclear forces. China’s
leaders may fear that their older, immobile nuclear
forces are vulnerable or ineffective as a deterrent, and
should be replaced by newer, road-mobile nuclear forces
and ICBMs such as the DF-31 and DF-41 missiles. Finally,
China’s efforts to increase its nuclear capabilities may
indicate an important, yet undeclared, shift toward a
more aggressive nuclear policy. Proponents of this
explanation argue that, “More Chinese missiles might
signal a possible shift from a retaliatory countervalue
posture to an offensive counterforce posture,
particularly if accompanied by necessary improvements in
accuracy. According to (Paul) Godwin, a sufficient
number of weapons could permit China for the first time
to attempt intrawar escalation control, since Beijing
would retain enough forces to respond at a higher level
if the aggressor chooses to escalate a nuclear
exchange.” [Sources: Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, Mark
Stokes. “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition
to Credible Deterrence,” in The People’s Liberation Army
as an Organization: Reference Volume v1.0.” Ed: James C.
Mulvenon, Andrew N.D. Yang. 2001. Page 550, 553.
Available at:
http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF182/CF182.ch11.pdf;
Paul Godwin, “China’s Nuclear Forces: An Assessment,”
Current History, September 1999; Phillip Saunders and
Jing-Dong Yuan, “China’s Strategic Force Modernization:
Three Scenarios and Their Implications for the United
States,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, 2003, forthcoming.]
China's nuclear modernization programs:
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR WARHEAD MODERNIZATION]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEM MODERNIZATION]
China's nuclear testing program:
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM]
China's existing nuclear and nuclear-related capabilities:
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE AND DEPLOYMENTS]
[CHINA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE DESIGNATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS]
[CHINA'S BOMBER AND DCA DESIGNATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROGRAM]
[CHINA'S CRUISE MISSILE DESIGNATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS]
Related issues:
[CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD MISSILE DEFENSE]
Last updated: 09/26/2003
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
