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Issue Brief
Author: Anya Loukianova, Research Associate
Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program
The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
October 2007
Introduction
On September 5, 2007, Russia's first multilateral nuclear fuel cycle enterprise - the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk - was legally incorporated as a joint venture between two major nuclear fuel cycle service providers, Russia's Tekhsnabeksport and Kazakhstan's Kazatomprom. This development marked a significant milestone towards operationalizing the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC), a concept of providing non-discriminatory assured nuclear fuel supply, promoted by the Russian Federation since January 2006. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has been conducting a review of assured fuel cycle service proposals as part of its Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNA) initiative, has reportedly already thrown its support behind the IUEC.
This issue brief presents the background of Moscow's IUEC proposal and details the steps towards its implementation.[1] Initially born out of Russian efforts to diffuse the Iranian nuclear crisis, the IUEC gained steam when Moscow began presenting it as a potential MNA facility. At the same time, the Siberian home of the IUEC, the Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine (AECC), also serves as a model facility for Rosatom's growing ambitions on the international uranium enrichment market.
Dusting Off "Yesterday's Ideas"[2]
Before launching into a discussion of Moscow's proposal of a multilateral enterprise to provide nuclear fuel services, a review of prior and ongoing attempts to reexamine traditional statist frameworks of fuel cycle ownership is in order. Multiple IAEA-led efforts to reform fuel cycle ownership, from the 1970s onward, failed to gain traction until the year 2003 brought about a renewal of interest in multilateral ownership of the nuclear fuel cycle - the IAEA MNA model. The perceived growing threats posed by global warming combined with a growing need for energy to support development and concerns about proliferation risks was pushing states to consider sharing the fuel cycle to maximize the benefits from a "nuclear renaissance" While minimizing risks. This section briefly reviews past and present IAEA MNA efforts.
The idea of sharing the atom harks back to the Baruch Plan of 1946.[3] Under the direction of President Harry S. Truman, U.S. diplomat Bernard Baruch proposed creation of an International Atomic Development Authority that would have control over "all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material," including "managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy, activities potentially dangerous to world security."[4] While Baruch's proposal was perceived as too idealistic at the time, its spirit lived on in Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for Peace initiative, established the IAEA (as well as served cause for spread of nuclear technology to proliferant states like India).[5]
Container of Uranium at the Angarsk Enrichment Plant.
Source: WMDInsights.org
In a 2004 recap of initiatives on multilateral control over the nuclear fuel cycle, IAEA's Tariq Rauf and Fiona Simpson wrote that substantial discussions regarding the possibility and feasibility of such an approach started only after 1974, when the Indian government executed its "peaceful nuclear explosion" - testing a nuclear device built with plutonium diverted from its civilian program.[6] State suppliers of nuclear technology engaged in the 1975-17 Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers (RFCC) project, the 1977-80 International Nuclear Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) study, the International Plutonium Storage (IPS) expert group, the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) in 1981, and the UN Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) in 1987.[7] However, lack of state will to cooperate ultimately sealed the fate of all past IAEA-led initiatives on assured fuel supply - suppliers felt no sense of urgency and had fundamental disagreements regarding the surrendering of national control over fuel cycle facilities and the sharing of fuel cycle technology.[8]
In 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei resurrected discussions on assured fuel supply by charging an International Expert Group to look deeper into MNA realization. After two years of deliberations, in 2005, the Expert Group released its recommendations for assured supply of nuclear fuel through MNAs.[9] In brief and simple terms, an MNA could be a joint-venture between "supplier" and "recipient" states - such as the creation of international nuclear fuel cycle centers - that would conduct the front-end and/or back-end operations with as little technology transfer to the "recipient" states as possible. In turn, "recipient" states could potentially forego enrichment and reprocessing operations on their territory, constructing only the power generating reactor, while the "supplier" states (or consortia between supplier-recipient states) guaranteed "cradle-to-grave" fuel leasing services and set up fuel banks under IAEA control. To supplier states, a "fuel-lease" MNA could provide business for domestic civilian nuclear enterprises along with incentives to reduce proliferation risk. To recipients, mostly developing countries, a similar MNA would offer advantages by making it possible to tap into the nuclear energy at a much cheaper price, because it would not require construction of front-end and back-end facilities.[10]
ElBaradei maintained that MNAs would also promote the original mandate of the IAEA and strengthen the Agency's role as a mediator and a guarantor of assured supply because, as written in the statute of 1957, the IAEA was intended as "the go-between between suppliers and recipient countries."[11] The notion of the MNA was also succinctly described in INFCIRC 708, a paper on the Angarsk IUEC issued by the Russian Federation in June 2007, which stated that "the main assurance that the initiative should provide is that a country complying with its non-proliferation commitments must be sure that, whatever the turn of events, whatever changes take place in the international situation, it will receive the services guaranteed to it."[12]
Moscow Moves on the Front End
Russia's initiation of a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle enterprise that would provide assured supply is best viewed as a byproduct of arduous diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis surrounding advances in Iran's uranium enrichment program. As part of these efforts, Moscow has long sought to assuage Western concerns regarding Tehran's intentions - for instance, negotiating a fuel-lease arrangement to complement its nuclear power plant (NPP) construction project in Iran's Bushehr province. This section briefly details how Russia's assured nuclear fuel supply proposal came about.
In November 2005, in a push to convince Iran to halt enrichment, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov traveled to Iran to propose joint ownership of a uranium enrichment venture, to be located in Russia.[13] Moscow apparently speedily put together an offer that would allow Tehran to use Russian facilities to convert Iranian-made uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) into uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and enrich it to LEU in order to produce nuclear fuel to power Iran's NPPs. [14] However, the draft proposal was met with dismissal, as Tehran publicly committed to restarting indigenous enrichment efforts several days prior to an official meeting with the Russian delegation on January 7, 2006. [15] Nevertheless, the failed attempt in Iran set the stage for the birth of "the IUEC concept" in Russian government circles.
Initially envisioned as a venue for bilateral cooperation (with Iran), Moscow's assured fuel supply proposal gradually expanded into a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle enterprise. During the November 2005 Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation Conference, in a response to IAEA's Tariq Rauf, then-head of Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) Aleksandr Rumyantsev reportedly "avoided comment... on his nation's stance on a proposed international system [of assured supply]... but declared Russia ready to do bilateral "business" in a similar vein."[16] However, after the appointment of Sergey Kiriyenko to head Rosatom that same month, Moscow began to understand that a multilateral enrichment venture could potentially, as one nuclear industry official put it, "reinvigorate" the Russian nuclear industry.[17] Moreover, nuclear energy fit well on the "international energy security" part of the agenda of the forthcoming G-8 summit, set to take place in St. Petersburg.
Putin first put forth the IUEC concept before states that were formerly part of the Soviet nuclear complex - Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine - during a January, 25, 2006, Council of the Eurasian Economic Union meeting. Because the press provided few details about the proposal and Russian officials maintained that creation of such centers could potentially "solve global security problems,"[18] the IUEC was initially interpreted as a recycled iteration of the Russian-Iranian enrichment joint enterprises. Kiriyenko was instantly tasked with correcting this perception, clarifying that the Russian proposal was of a wider and broader scope - potentially providing for involvement of multiple players in fuel cycle service ventures.[19]
A week later, during a January 31, 2006 press conference, Putin explained that the Russian proposal, dubbed "Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure" (GNPI), entailed "creating a network of centers that deal with that part of the nuclear fuel cycle concerning enriching uranium" set to operate under IAEA safeguards.[20] Furthermore, Putin stressed the non-discriminatory approach that Moscow wanted the IUEC project to take by saying that the center would be "equally accessible to all those who want to participate in developing atomic energy together" and noted that Iran was also welcome to take part. Lastly, he highlighted the importance of the participation of states with uranium reserves and promoted the IUEC for adoption in states with developed fuel cycle facilities.[21]
It should be noted that there was little discussion about international cooperation on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, something Russia had promoted some years before. By July 2006, Rosatom appeared to have firmly settled on moving forward with multilateral enrichment while holding off decisions on reprocessing or the widely discussed importation of US-origin spent fuel for storage. However, in October 2006, Kiriyenko stated that Russia's new multilateral model "could also be used for other applications, including spent fuel reprocessing."[22] At this point, however, proposals for expanding back-end operations appeared politically unfeasible in Russia.
Model International Uranium Enrichment Center
Rosatom has taken advantage of the momentum spurred by Putin's January 2006 announcement speedily to solidify the management and production structure of the IUEC, set to be housed at the Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine. In addition, Moscow has extended multiple invitations to potentially interested countries to join, implemented necessary changes in domestic legislation, and outlined the IAEA's role in the project. The present section briefly details organizational aspects of the IUEC.
In a September 2006 address to the World Nuclear Association, Kiriyenko explained that the IUEC would be governed by a management board, set to include representatives of IUEC shareholder governments, while the IAEA would carry out observer functions.[23] The center would be set up as an open joint stock company to guarantee "financial independence from the State budgets of the participatory countries."[24] Furthermore, it would be structurally divided into two entities - a production division and a division for enriched uranium product (EUP) stock management. The production division would be supplied with UF6 from the Russian domestic enrichment plant, both of which will be placed under yet-to-be negotiated IAEA safeguards. Russian laws would apply to both divisions.[25]
Tekhsnabeksport officials Ruchkin and Loginov wrote in a 2006 issue of the IAEA Bulletin that the IUEC was open for "equal and non-discriminatory membership" and targeted especially at states that met "the established non-proliferation requirements" and did not intend "development of indigenous sensitive nuclear technologies."[26] Russia also touted "transparency of IUEC... activities, cost-effectiveness, and investment attractiveness in the long-term" as well as "political, economic, scientific, and technical" advantages to IUEC participant-states. [27] However, while IUEC members would receive dividends resulting from enrichment operations and were expected to make decisions regarding enrichment technologies, the IUEC would be a "black box," as participant states would not have access to Russian enrichment technology.[28]
In September 2007, Kiriyenko announced that Russia would fund and move forward with creation of an IAEA-controlled LEU fuel bank[29] at the Angarsk site, which would provide the Agency with means to assure supply to recipient states in case of a political decision by suppliers to deny nuclear fuel.[30] Up to one-two reactor loads of LEU would be placed at the IUEC facility. [31] While Russia will preserve control over the material, Moscow is currently working on setting up the necessary legislative framework and export control procedures that would allow guaranteed shipment of material in response to requests from the IAEA. [32]
Earlier, in October 2006, Rosatom deputy head Nikolay Spasskiy had provided a timetable for implementation of the IUEC, stating that it would take four to five years to implement from the time the project had been given the go-ahead and all the necessary legislation is signed.[33] Moscow formally brought the IUEC into existence with the signing of an agreement with Almaty on May 10, 2007, which agreed to a partnership between Tekhsnabeksport and Kazatomprom. Since then, a board of directors for the joint venture has been put in place, and a director general was elected.[34]
Moscow's legislative efforts have been targeted at separation of Russia's civilian and military nuclear facilities and creation of overall transparency in operations of the nuclear sector. Putin has shepherded the law "On Special Terms of Management and Disposition of Assets and Shares of Organizations Operating in the Area of Atomic Energy Uses and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation," legislation which would, among other changes, allow entities other than state corporations to own nuclear materials and facilities.[35] In part because of the Russian efforts to put in place the necessary legislative foundation, the IAEA has indicated that it would put its support behind the IUEC as the "the most advanced" of all of the MNA proposals.[36] Moscow has paved the way for IAEA inspections at the Angarsk facility by ratifying and signing into law the IAEA Addition Protocol.[37] The IAEA delegation is set to inspect some Russian facilities in 2009, by which time Moscow also hopes to have a nuclear safety law in place.[38] Therefore, Russia has moved forward with making the facilities Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Combine, once a secretive P.O. Box 79, completely open to foreign visitors.
No Longer P.O. Box 79
Moscow plans to locate the pilot IUEC to a site at the Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine (AEKhK) - a nuclear fuel cycle facility with reportedly little connection to the Soviet military nuclear program that has provided enrichment services to foreign partners since the 1980s.[39] However, while Rosatom intends to increase the use of AEKhK's enrichment capacity, as present utilization is less than 30%, there are public concerns regarding the environmental consequences of expansion.[40] This section provides some background on AEKhK.
The Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Combine was created by Soviet Cabinet of Ministers decree No. 409-179 of March 10, 1954.[41] Construction of the facility began in 1954, with plans to create a complete nuclear fuel cycle enterprise nearby. AEKhK was intended to have gaseous diffusion enrichment and reprocessing facilities; however, it would not have a uranium conversion facility, and instead receive uranium hexafluoride (UF6) from elsewhere. Construction gained speed after the visit a Council of Ministers deputy chairman paid to the plant in early 1957, when he declared completion of the facility an issue of utmost national importance.[42]
At the launch of the first gaseous diffusion facility in 1957, 1,084 workers were already employed at AEKhK and construction was speedily moving along with installment of the most modern gaseous diffusion technology then available. While the complex was completed on February 8, 1963, gaseous diffusion technology and processes underwent continual modernization through 1985, by which time the facility had increased its production capacity twofold. In addition, 1957 saw construction of a uranium conversion plant at the Angarsk site. The latter facility went online in 1960, and by 1962 had begun to work to its full capacity. The technology used, however, quickly became obsolete and as a consequence,from 1962 to 1985, new technologies were gradually introduced and production methods pioneered. The plant also acquired the ability to manufacture calcium fluoride in the 1980s. Eventually, AEKhK would lead the world in UF6 production, increasing its original output by a factor of five. Gaseous diffusion enrichment technology was phased out throughout the 1980s, and in December 1990, the first two centrifuge assemblies went online at AEKhK. However, defense conversion caused output to shrink, at the same time forcing management to look for creative ways to make use of their technological capabilities. Forced to integrate into the international nuclear market, AEKhK began acquiring foreign customers for its fuel cycle products.[43] By 2007, AEKhK could boast its partnerships with the United States, England, France, Germany, Finland, China, Japan, and South Korea.[44]
Selection of AEKhK to house the IUEC fits well with Russia's ambitious goals for nuclear power expansion in Russia. Rosatom has made plans to double AEKhK's enrichment capacity, at present 2.6 million SWU,[45] by 2015.[46] The expansion of AEKhK is a part of the federal development program "Development of the nuclear energy-enterprise complex of Russia for 2007-2010 and perspectives for 2015," and Moscow has hinted that it is aiming for a quarter of the world's market share of nuclear fuel services.[47]
Rosatom has also announced that the Angarsk site will be home to a total of three enterprises - AEKhK, the IUEC, and a Russian-Kazakh Uranium Enrichment Center enterprise (the latter separate from the IUEC, Kazakhstan is two partake in two enrichment ventures with Russia total).[48] However, there will be no new centrifuge equipment installed to accommodate the IUEC.[49] At the same time, sources have indicated that the Russian-Kazakh Uranium Enrichment Center enterprise is expected to be capable of producing five million SWU by 2013 if construction begins in 2008, as planned, and is completed in 2011.[50] Moreover, the expanding enrichment complex in Angarsk has in place all of the essential supporting infrastructure: the Angara river provides plenty of water for technical processes at all three enterprises, while the region's electricity grid is one of the nation's largest.
AEKhK currently employs around 6,300 people.[51] According to Kiriyenko, construction of the IUEC is expected to bring economic benefits to the city of Angarsk and the Irkutsk region by creating over 2,000 new jobs and bringing in an estimated $2.5 billion dollars worth of investment opportunities.[52] However, selection of AEKhK as a site for expansion of Russia's enrichment activity has been a cause of concern for the local population due to the location's close proximity to Lake Baikal, an environmental treasure and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. While Rosatom officials have tried to reassure residents that the IUEC will not be reprocessing spent fuel,[53] announcement of the Center's creation has rallied young activists, determined to "prevent creation of the IUEC," to create an "ecological protest camp." [54] The activists-some environmentalists, others anti-nuclear, and still others people who see the IUEC as part of a covert campaign to turn Russia into a dump site for foreign nuclear waste-have caused some community tensions as their campgrounds have been attacked by skinheads. [55] At the same time, Rosatom has sought to increase public outreach in Angarsk by engaging the Russian Green Cross organization to set up an outreach office similar to outreach efforts they have conducted near chemical weapons disposal sites. Green Cross president Sergey Baranovsky, who has visited the Angarsk site, has been quoted as saying that "center will pose no threat to the ecological situation in the area."[56]
Juggling Multiple Players
On August 2, 2007, AEKhK symbolically hosted a meeting of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Union, at which Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan discussed "cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy." [57] Apart from Kazakhstan, Russia has reportedly weighed interest in IUEC partnerships with Armenia, Armenia, Mongolia, South Korea, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan[58] This section briefly lists the countries that currently play a role in the IUEC or could potentially do so in the future.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan's Kazatomprom (KAP) currently holds a 10% stake in the IUEC and is Russia's key partner in the project. From participation in the IUEC, Astana, which does not intend to forego possible pursuit of its domestic enrichment capabilities, derives both political and economic benefits. A KAP official was quoted as saying that the decision to partner in IUEC was "more political," intended to promote Russia's international fuel cycle idea on the international arena. [59] At the same time, the IUEC appears to benefit to both Kazakhstan and Russia. By participating in the IUEC, KAP has strengthened the expansion of cooperation with Russia in uranium mining, production, and enrichment, while at the same time retaining the opportunity to engage with outside partners - most recently purchasing a stake in Toshiba/Westinghouse and announcing intentions for a uranium mining joint venture with China. [60] As Nuclear Fuel's Ann McLachlan has noted, while Russia's enrichment technology will not be accessible to Kazakhstan through the agreement, Kazakh officials believe that enrichment will raise the value of KAP's exports.[61] On its end, Russia receives guaranteed access to Kazakh uranium deposits, which are the second largest in the world.
Armenia
Yerevan is currently exploring participation in the IUEC. In January 2007, Putin and Armenia's President Robert Kocharian agreed to set up a bilateral commission to examine possible joint exploration of,[62] which paved the way for the signing of an intergovernmental nuclear cooperation agreement in April 2007. During a recent visit to Armenia, Kiriyenko also promised that Armenia's IUEC membership could potentially be coupled with construction of a new Armenian nuclear power plant (NPP).[63] Apparently, this tactic worked because on September 25, 2007, Armenian Prime Minister Serge Sarkisyan during his visit to Moscow announced that Armenia was seeking Russian construction of a new NPP.[64] In addition, Rosatom has argued that IUEC membership would also potentially enable Armenia to engage in uranium exports, as uranium deposits in Sunik (southern Armenia), initially expected to contain around 30,000 tons of uranium, are reportedly twice as large as was originally believed.[65]
Uzbekistan
Russia formally extended an invitation to Uzbek officials during First Vice-Premier Sergey Ivanov's state visit to Tashkent on July 4, 2007. Ivanov promoted the IUEC during his visit, communicating to his hosts Rosatom's firm belief that "Uzbekistan's commercial benefit will be higher than selling raw material, because enriched uranium has high added value." [66] On July 9, 2007, Tass quoted Ivanov as saying that the Uzbek side had promised to consider the offer, and that "Cooperation in the field of uranium production and enrichment at the International Center in Angarsk ... [was] possible."[67] Kiriyenko, however, later explained to the press that Russia has not discussed NPP construction in Uzbekistan[68] [which currently operates its single research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics, for which Russia is to supply LEU fuel assemblies under the aegis of the RERTR program.[69],[70]]. This may potentially have been a bargaining chip for Tashkent, because on October 8, 2007, Uzbek officials notified their Russian counterparts that they would for now abstain from participation, though they might reconsider the matter later. Interfax quoted a government source as saying that "Uzbekistan has its own vision of the matter and it does not coincide (with Russia's) on many issues."[71]
Ukraine
Although Kyiv has not committed to participate in the IUEC, Ukrainian nuclear officials recently inked a memorandum of understanding with their Russian counterparts. While a Ukrainian delegation visited the AECC in June 2007 to continue negotiations on the benefits of participation,[72] Ukraine, reliant on Russia for fuel for its reactors, has been interested in diversifying its supply of enriched uranium, and has looked to the West and has publicly expressed its interest in creating a closed nuclear cycle. [73] Kyiv may consider buy-in with the IUEC, however, because its expanding nuclear needs will not be met by indigenous supply at least until after completion of an enrichment facility in 2014. [74]
Mongolia
Rosatom officials have stated that Ulaanbaatar has expressed interest in joining the IUEC.[75] Mongolia, which shares a lengthy border with the Russian Federation, also has a long history of uranium-prospecting and mining cooperation with its neighbor to the north. Soviet prospectors from the Ministry of Geology have explored Mongolia's uranium deposits since 1945, while Mongolia's Dornod mines were developed by the Soviet Union and once operated as part of MinAtom's Priargunsky Mining and Chemical Enterprise.[76] Today, Russian entities retain shares in two uranium-mining joint-ventures in Mongolia's Dornod and Haarat deposits - Gurvan-Saihan Joint Venture and Central Asian Uranium Co. Ltd.[77] On April 13, 2007, a delegation of business and atomic industry officials, headed by Kiryienko, visited Ulaanbaatar. The delegation met with Mongolia's president Nambaryn Ankhbayar, and Kiryienko inked a protocol of cooperation on prospecting, production, and processing of uranium ores on territories of both Russian Federation and Mongolia.[78] The status of negotiations with Mongolia regarding participation in the IUEC is at this time unclear.
South Korea
Rosatom has reportedly discussed IUEC membership with Seoul, and has received a positive response. South Korea has no known uranium resources or domestic uranium production capability, however its nuclear energy capacity provides for almost 40% of its electricity demands, while construction of additional NPPs is ongoing.[79] Russian-Korean nuclear cooperation to date has centered on delivery of fuel for the Korean civilian nuclear program - today Russia reportedly fulfills 37% of Korea's enriched uranium needs. [80] Korea Russian-Korean nuclear cooperation began in the 1980s, and was strengthened through strengthened with an Inter-Governmental Agreement of 28, 1999 in accordance to which the Russian side would provide the Korean energy sector with LEU fuel and enrichment services and the two countries would cooperate in designing reactors for floating nuclear power plants, etc. [81] Initially, Tekhsnabeksport worked on the Korean market through an intermediary - an American company Palmco; however, after disagreements with Palmco, in 2003 Tekhsnabeksport created the Korean subsidiary Tenex-Korea and opened an affiliate office in Seoul to deal with the Korean buyers directly.[82] While the status of negotiations with South Korea on IUEC participation have not been made public, Seoul's commitment would pave the way for Western participation in Russia's pilot multilateral enrichment facility at Angarsk.
Conclusion: The Wider Ripples of Angarsk
On September 18, 2007, Rosatom deputy head Nikolay Spasskiy expressed Moscow's hope to the IAEA that the Angarsk IUEC would serve as a model for similar international enrichment centers in Africa and Latin America.[83] As of October 2007, Russia had yet to find willing buyers for IUEC stock, apart from Kazakhstan, and faced multiple hurdles in operationalizing its multilateral enrichment center proposal. However, Moscow has already made the first step in potentially making the IAEA's Multilateral Nuclear Approaches concepts a reality. No matter the outcome, the lessons of the IUEC will be shared by all.
Sources:
[1] This issue brief builds on
research conducted by CNS Researchers Cristina Hansell Chuen and Elena Sokova
for "Nuclear Power Broker," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, September/October 2007.
[2] Title inspired by Laura
Holgate's comment that assured fuel supply proposals are actually
"yesterday's ideas," made during the panel discussion
"Realizing Fuel Assurances: Third Time's The Charm?" at the
2007 Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation Conference, June 26, 2007;
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=1028&&prog=zgp&proj=znpp>
[3] Tariq Rauf and Fiona Simpson,
"The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Is It Time for a Multilateral Approach?"
Arms Control Today, December 2004;
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Rauf.asp#sidebar
[4] The Baruch Plan, presented to
the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946;
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml
[5] For more information, see
Randy Rydell, "Looking Back: Going for Baruch: The Nuclear Plan That
Refused to Go Away," Arms Control Today, June 2006;
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/LookingbackBaruch.asp
[6]
Rauf and Simpson, op.cit.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Ibid.
[9] Expert Group report
recommendations were outlined in Bruno Pellaud, "Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Which
way forward for Multilateral Nuclear Approaches?" IAEA Bulletin
46/2, 2005;
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull462/nuclear_fcycle.html
[10] Rauf and
Simpson, op.cit.
[11] Paul Kerr
and Miles Pomper, "Tackling the Nuclear Dilemma: An interview with IAEA
Director-General Mohamed El-Baradei," Arms Control Today, March
2005;
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/ElBaradei.asp
[12]
United Nations Information Circular (INFCIRC) 708, "Communication received
from the Resident Representative of the Russian Federation to the IAEA on the
Establishment, Structure and Operation of the International Uranium Enrichment
Centre," June 8, 2007;
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc708.pdf
[13]
Cristina Hansell Chuen, NISNP Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
interview with former Rosatom official, Moscow,
2006
[14] Paul Kerr, "IAEA
Unlikely to Refer Iran to Security Council," Arms Control Today,
November 2005;
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-Iran.asp
[15]
Nikolai Sokov, "The Prospects of Russian Mediation of the Iranian Nuclear
Crisis," CNS Research Story, February 17, 2006;
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060217.htm
[16]
Joe Fiorill, "Russian Nuclear Agency Chief Backs Bilateral Fuel Assurances
for Nonproliferation," Global Security Newswire, November 9, 2005;
<http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/>
[17]
Alexei Breus, "Putin says Russia is ready to create international fuel
cycle center," Platts Nuclear Fuel, January 30, 2006; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[18]
"Russia's nuclear centre proposal solves global security
problems," Itar Tass, January 25, 2006;
<http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/>
[19]
Breus, "Putin says Russia is ready to create international fuel
cycle center," op.
cit.
[20] S.V. Ruchkin and
Vladimir Loginov, "Securing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: What Next?"
IAEA Bulletin, Volume 48, Number 1, 2006;
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull481/htmls/nuclear_fuel_cycle.html
[21] "Answers of Russian
President Vladimir Putin to questions during a news conference with Russian and
foreign journalists (excerpts)," Official Website of the G8 Presidency of
the Russian Federation of the G8 in 2006, January 30, 2006;
<http://en.g8russia.ru/news/20060131/1142081.html>
[22] Daniel Horner, Ann
MacLachlan "Russia could take foreign spent fuel under international
scheme," Platts Nuclear Fuel, November 6, 2006; in Lexis-Nexis
Academic Universe,
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[23]
Sergey Kiriyenko's presentation at the Annual WNA Symposium, London,
September 7, 2006;
http://www.world-nuclear.org/sym/2006/pdf/kirienkoppt.pdf
[24]
INFCIRC 708, op.cit.
[25] Sergey
Kiriyenko's presentation at the Annual WNA Symposium,
op.cit.
[26] Ruchkin and
Loginov, op.cit.
[27] INFCIRC 708,
op.cit.
[28]
Ibid.
[29] For fuel bank offer
made by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, see "Nuclear Threat Initiative
Commits $50 Million to Create IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank," NTI press release,
September 19, 2006,
http://www.nti.org/c_press/release_IAEA_fuelbank_091906.pdf
[30]
"Sergey Kirienko: Rossiya za svoi schet sozdast garantiinyi zapas
yadernogo topliva pri MTSOU," (Sergey Kiriyenko: Russia will pay for own
creation of a guaranteed stockpile of nuclear fuel at IUEC), Interfax, September
19, 2007;
<http://www.interfax.com/>
[31]
INFCIRC 708, op.cit
[32]
Ibid.
[33] "Sozdaniye
mezdunarodnogo yadernogo tsentra v Angarske oboidetsya v neskol'ko
milliardov dollarov," (Creation of international nuclear center in Angarks
will cost several billion dollars) IA Regnum, October 2, 2006.
[34] "Russia says Siberian
uranium enrichment center open to all," RIA Novosti, October 25, 2007;
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071025/85429927.html
[35]
For more information, see Nikolai Sokov, "Russia Enacts Reform of Nuclear
Industry," WMD Insights, March 2007;
http://www.wmdinsights.com/I13/I13_R3_RussiaEnacts.htm
[36]
Statements of IAEA officials, for example, Tariq Rauf's comment during a
panel discussion "Realizing Fuel Assurances: Third Time's The
Charm?" at the 2007 Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation Conference, June
26, 2007, op.cit.
[37]
"Putin signs law on ratification of additional protocol with IAEA,"
RIA Novosti, October 3, 2007;
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071003/82180284-print.html
[38]
"Russia hopes to adopt nuclear safety law," RIA Novosti, September
17, 2007;
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070917/79078903.html
[39]
For example, see profile of Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine, Nuclear
Threat Initiative website,
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fissmat/enrichme/angarsk.htm
[40]
Sergey Baranovsky comment at Rosatom Press Center website, January 2007;
http://www.rosatom.ru/en/comments/3365_10.01.2007
[41]
Viktor Novokshenov, "Poctovyi yaschik nomer 79," (P.O. Box 79)
Oblastnaya Gazeta, September 28, 2007,
<http://og-irk.ru/vp233/pochtoviy_yaschik_%E2%84%96_79/view_4128.html>
[42]
All information is from V.P.Shopen and A.T. Shuleshko, "Stanovleniye i
razvitiye Angarskogo Khimicheskogo Kombinata," in Yadernaya Industriya
Rossii (Moscow: Energoatomizdat, 2000), pp. 576-583
[43]
Ibid.
[44] According AECC
Website;
http://www.aecc.ru/
[45]
Ann MacLachlan, "Kazatomrom sets goals higher for U production, pursues
nuclear cycle," Platts Nuclear Fuel, September 10, 2007; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[46]
"Vizit rukovoditelya Rosatoma Sergeya Kiriyenko na AEKKh," (Visit of
Rosatom head Sergey Kirienko to AECC), AECC Website, June 22, 2007;
<http://www.aecc.ru/newsdetal.php?par=189>
[47]"Russia
aims for 25% of global nuclear fuel services market," RIA Novosti.
April 19, 2006. http://en.rian.ru/world/20060419/46602834.html
[48] "Vizit rukovoditelya
Rosatoma Sergeya Kiriyenko na AEKKh,"
op.cit.
[49] "Russia vows
comprehensive support to nuke innovative technologies," Itar Tass,
September 18, 2007.
[50] MacLachlan, "Kazatomrom sets goals higher for U production, pursues
nuclear cycle,"
op.cit.
[51] According AECC
Website;
<http://www.aecc.ru/>
[52]
"Vizit rukovoditelya Rosatoma Sergeya Kiriyenko na AEKKh,"
op.cit.
[53] "Kirienko:
Otrabotannoye yadernoye toplivo v Angarsk postavlyat' ne budut,"
(Kiriyenko: spent fuel will not be delivered to Angarsk), IA Regnum, September
29, 2006.
[54]
"Ekologicheskii Lager' Protesta v Angarske," (Ecological
protest camp in Angarsk) Indymedia Sibir, July 11, 2007;
<http://imc-siberia.org/node/19>
[55]
"Natsi skinhedy napali na ekolager v Angarske, est zhertvy," (Nazi
skinheads have attacked the ecological camp in Angarsk, there are victims),
website of Kollektivnoye Deistviye movement, Undated;
<http://www.ikd.ru/node/3362>
[56]
Sergey Baranovsky comment at Rosatom Press Center website, January 2007;
<http://www.rosatom.ru/en/comments/3365_10.01.2007>
[57]
"Na baze FGUP AEKhK sostoyalos' pervoye zasedanie Soveta
EvrAzES," (First summit of EurAsEC Council conducted at AECC) RosAtom
press service, August 2, 2007; <http://www.rosatom.ru>
[58] MacLachlan,
"Russia's Angarsk international enrichment center open for
business," op.cit.
[59] MacLachlan, "Kazatomrom sets goals higher for U production, pursues
nuclear cycle,"
op.cit.
[60] "Kazatomprom
to form jv with Chinese companies for uranium mining," Interfax, October
12.
[61] MacLachlan,
"Kazatomrom sets goals higher for U production, pursues nuclear
cycle," op.cit.
[62] Alexei
Breus, "Rosatom seeks access to Armeniam U deposits," Platts
Nuclear Fuel, February 26, 2007; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[63]
"Rosatom and Ecology Ministry of Armenia signed a protocol on joint
uranium prospecting and extraction," Rosatom Press Center, April 23, 2007;
http://www.rosatom.com/en/news/4444_23.04.2007
[64]
"Armenia predlojila Rossii proekty po razrabotke v respublike uranovykh
rud i stroitel'stvu novogo bloka Armyanskoi AES," (Armenia offered
Russia projects on development of uranium ores in the republic and construction
of a unit of new Armenian NPP), Itar Tass, September 25, 2007.
[65] Breus,
"Rosatom seeks access to Armeniam U deposits,"
op.cit.
[66] "Russia
invites Uzbekistan to join Angarsk Uranium Center," Itar-Tass, July 9,
2007; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[67]
"Russia invites Uzbekistan to join Angarsk Uranium Center," op.cit.
[68] "No Talks on Building
Nuclear Plant in Uzbekistan So Far - Russian official," Itar Tass, July 4,
2007, BBC Monitoring International Reports; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[69]
Russia to supply uranium fuel for Uzbek research reactor, RIA Novosti, June 22,
2007, BBC Monitoring International Reports; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[70]
Uzbekistan Nuclear Facilities Profile, Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2007,
http://nti.org/e_research/profiles/Uzbekistan/Nuclear/5451_5467.html
[71]
"Uzbekistan rejects Russian proposal to join intl uranium enrichment
center in Angarsk," Central Asia General Newswire, October 5, 2007; in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[72]
"Ukraina zainteresovana v prisoyedinenii k mejdunarodnomu tsentru po
obogascheniiu urana," (Ukraine is interested in joining the IUEC) Rosatom
press center, June 19, 2007.
<http://www.rosatom.ru/>
[73]
Alexei Breus, "Ukraine takes steps to establish national fuel cycle, with
enrichment," Platts Nuclear Fuel, January 29, 2007; in Lexis-Nexis
Academic Universe,
<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
[74]
Ibid.
[75]
MacLachlan, "Russia's Angarsk international enrichment center
open for business,"
op.cit.
[76] Wallace Mays,
"The Dornod Uranium Project in Mongolia," paper presented at the
Uranium Institute 23rd International Symposium, 1998;
http://www.world-nuclear.org/sym/1998/mays.htm
[77]
Information is from World Information Service on Energy Uranium Project, October
16, 2007;
http://www.wise-uranium.org/uoasi.html#MN
[78]"Vizit
Sergeya Kirienko v Mongoliiy nachalsya podpisaniyem protocola o
sotrudnichestve," (Sergey Kiriyenko's visit to Mongolia begun with
signing of a cooperation memorandum) Rosatom press center, April 13, 2007;
<http://www.rosatom.ru/>
[79]
"Uranium 2005: Resources, Production, and Demand," IAEA/OECD, 2006;
<http://www.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/get-it.asp?REF=6606031E.PDF&TYPE=browse>
[80]
Website of the Russian Embassy in Seoul;
http://www.russian-embassy.org/english/political.html
[81]
Ibid.
[82] "Tenex JSC
confirms its wiliness to provide uninterrupted supply of nuclear materials for
consumers in the Republic of Korea," Tenex website, March 23, 2006;
http://www.tenex.ru/digest/palmco_en.html
[83]
MacLachlan, "Russia's Angarsk international enrichment center
open for business," op.cit.
Relevant Resources
 |
Revisiting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, IAEA News Centre. |
|
|
NTI Commits $50 Million to Create IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank, Nuclear Threat Initiative. |
|
|
Angarsk Project, Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center). |
|
|
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Russian Nuclear Industry Reforms: Consolidation and Expansion, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Research Story. |
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not
necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been
independently verified by NTI or its directors,
officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.
