Global Security Newswire

Officials in Washington have grown increasingly optimistic that Russia and the United States will agree on a deal to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty before the 1991 pact expires next month, the Washington Post reported yesterday (see GSN, Nov. 6).

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama agreed in July to cut their nations' respective deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to between 1,500 and 1,675 warheads under a START successor, down from the 2,200-warhead limit the states are required to meet by 2012 under another treaty.

The sides could be close to overcoming a division over how many strategic delivery vehicles each nation should be allowed to maintain under the new agreement, the Post reported. Moscow wanted a limit of around 500 delivery systems for each country while Washington pushed for a number closer to 1,100.

Late last month, U.S. national security adviser Gen. James Jones put forward what one U.S. official called a "judicious compromise" to the dispute, proposing a limit that outside analysts placed around 700 (see GSN, Nov. 5).

In a possible concession to Russia, the Obama administration might also allow strategic delivery systems armed with non-nuclear warheads to count toward that limit.

Moscow could give its formal response to the proposals at negotiations expected to resume today in Geneva, Switzerland.

Russia has called for an end to U.S. scrutiny of its ICBM manufacturing sites, arguing that the United States no longer operates equivalent facilities.

Even if the two states reach an agreement in coming weeks, it would take months for the U.S. Senate to ratify the deal. U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has offered legislation that would maintain the START verification regime for six months. The United States is also seeking a "bridge mechanism" to temporarily extend inspections, data sharing and other verification measures established under the treaty, according to high-level U.S. officials (see GSN, Oct. 20).

"There are issues that we have to work through, but there is also a path forward," said Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher (Sheridan/Pincus, Washington Post, Nov. 8).

"We have every chance to agree on a new treaty, determine new (weapons) levels and control measures and sign a legally binding document in the end of the year," Medvedev told Der Spiegel in comments published Saturday.

Worldwide nuclear disarmament, though, is unlikely to be achieved in the near future, he said.

"A nuclear-free world is our shared ideal for which we must aspire, but a road to that is difficult. It takes not just the United States and Russia renouncing nuclear weapons, but other countries as well," the Associated Press quoted him as saying (Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press/Google News, Nov. 7).

Still, Medvedev argued that disarmament is an important goal to pursue, according to Interfax.

"Who will do this if we don't? If we do not care about this, there will be no disarmament. We have gained some momentum of late indeed. I must admit that the new (U.S.) administration treats this issue as its priority. The previous one did not," he said.

"The nuclear threshold countries display even less understanding, not to mention those who are trying to acquire nuclear technology illegally. And besides that, while there are countries that do not admit possession of nuclear weapons, they do not deny this, either. We need to think how we can convince everybody to abandon nuclear weapons," he added (Interfax I, Nov. 7).

Verification mechanisms in the new treaty do not need to be as stringent as those in the 1991 pact, which was negotiated amid Cold War-era tensions, said former Russian nuclear missile chief Viktor Yesin.

"The START I treaty was being forged in an era of tight confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The level of trust was low between the two countries. Hence excessive control rooted in mutual suspicion. The current relationship between Russia and the United States is radically different. At least, Moscow and Washington no longer see each other as adversaries prepared for a surprise nuclear attack. Given this, the system of control over strategic arms should be adapted to the new environment," Yesin told Interfax.

"A new Russian-American strategic arms reduction treaty must spell out a transparent verification system. But it is also clear, that this system must be simpler and, for that matter, less costly than that envisioned in the START I treaty," he said.

The number of verification audits allowed under the 1991 agreement might no longer be necessary, Yesin contended.

"The treaty says that the sides, alongside conducting comprehensive information and notification exchanges, which state exactly how many strategic missiles or heavy bombers of each type are located exactly where, must carry out 13 types of inspections," he said.

"Moreover, the U.S. exercises regular control over the Votkinsk plant manufacturing ballistic missiles. By contrast, Russia curtailed similar inspections of the plant in Magna, Utah, in 2001," Yesin noted (Interfax II, Nov. 6).