Global Security Newswire

Iran has transferred pyroprocessing equipment that could help isolate weapon-usable plutonium out of a facility in Tehran, International Atomic Energy Agency chief Yukiya Amano said in a report circulated yesterday to members of his organization's 35-nation governing board (see GSN, May 28).

The agency was informed in January that Iran was carrying out pyroprocessing work at its Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory; inspectors found during an April inspection that equipment for the experiments was no longer at the site.

The situation would add to questions regarding Iran's atomic activities, which to date has focused on uranium enrichment, a process that could also be used to produce nuclear-weapon material, the Los Angeles Times reported.

Pyroprocessing, which Tehran now denies conducting, would "bring Iran close to being able to separate plutonium and thus have a second path to a nuclear weapon," former U.S. State Department nonproliferation official Mark Fitzpatrick said. "Given the evidence of military connections to Iran's nuclear program, it is worth asking the purpose for which Iran is studying the production of uranium metal" (Daragahi/Damianova, Los Angeles Times, May 31).

Iran has continued to stonewall inquiries by the U.N. nuclear watchdog regarding nuclear-weapon design activities allegedly carried out by the nation, says the report.

"Since August 2008 ... Iran has declined to discuss outstanding issues with the agency or to provide any further information or access to locations and people necessary to address the agency’s concerns, asserting that the allegations relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear program are baseless and that the information to which the agency is referring is based on forged documents," the report states. Iran has long insisted its atomic ambitions are strictly peaceful.

"Based on an overall analysis undertaken by the agency of all the information available to it, the agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities, involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. There are indications that certain of these activities may have continued beyond 2004," Amano said in the report (see GSN, Feb. 18).

"With the passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of information, it is

important that Iran engage with the agency on these issues, and that the agency be permitted to visit

all relevant sites, have access to all relevant equipment and documentation, and be allowed to

interview all relevant persons, without further delay" the document adds.

At its Natanz facility, Iran estimated it had produced 619 kilograms of low-enriched uranium in its operational centrifuges between Nov. 23, 2009, and May 1 of this year. If correct, the estimate would indicate Iran had amassed a stockpile of 2,427 kilograms of low-enriched uranium as of early May (Diane Barnes, Global Security Newswire, June 1). The facility has produced an average of 120 kilograms of low-enriched uranium each month, up from 117 kilograms in the previous reporting period, the Institute for Science and International Security said in an analysis (Institute for Science and International Security release, May 31).

Iran's existing uranium stockpile could fuel two nuclear weapons if sufficiently enriched, the New York Times reported (Sanger/Broad, New York Times, May 31).

"If they wanted to make highly enriched uranium, they could do it," ISIS head David Albright told the Philadelphia Inquirer, suggesting the development would take roughly 18 more months (Faye Flam, Philadelphia Inquirer, June 1).

"Iran continues to resist IAEA efforts to provide design information on the [Qum] facility; IAEA monthly inspections confirm that construction on the facility continues," the ISIS analysis adds in reference to the unfinished uranium enrichment site that Tehran disclosed to the agency last fall. "In two February letters to the IAEA responding to the agency’s requests for design information, Iran 'referred to its earlier answers on this subject and indicated that ‘the agency is not mandated to raise any question beyond the safeguards agreement,'" the analysis states (Institute for Science and International Security release).

The report confirms that Iran has installed a second "cascade" of 164 uranium enrichment centrifuges to further refine low-enriched uranium from its stockpile, Reuters reported (see GSN, May 14). Iran has said it would refine uranium to the 20 percent level required to fuel a medical research reactor in Tehran, but the assertion has been received with skepticism by the United States and other powers concerned that the process could help the Middle Eastern state generate nuclear-weapon material, which has an enrichment level around 90 percent.

Tehran also permitted the agency to implement updates to its surveillance of the higher-level enrichment area (see GSN, April 23). New monitoring measures that were being put in place on May 15 included monthly inventory and design audits, two monthly surprise audits, destructive nuclear material sampling, updated surveillance camera positions, and sealing of all piping between experimental and production areas of the facility as well as "all possible" exits for uranium hexafluoride, an intermediate product in the uranium enrichment process (Barnes, Global Security Newswire).

"This is good enough for when the cascades are eventually interconnected," one high-level official with knowledge of the probe told Reuters. "In this case the (inspections) regime is very tough."

Another expert expressed less optimism about Tehran's concessions to the agency.

"The fact that Iran allowed the IAEA to upgrade its safeguards approach for the 20 percent enrichment work is small comfort, given that Tehran continues to reject so many other IAEA requests necessary for proper application of safeguards," said Fitzpatrick, now an expert with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

"This latest report says Iran still refuses to answer questions about the [Qum] plant, to provide access to heavy water-related facilities, to answer questions about the possible military dimensions and to provide advance design information," Fitzpatrick said (Sylvia Westall, Reuters, May 31).

"If Iran were really interested in cooperation with the agency, it would have allowed the IAEA to undertake additional surveillance measures before it started enriching up to 20 percent" a Western diplomatic official told the Los Angeles Times (Daragahi/Damianova, Los Angeles Times).

In the report, Amano repeated his agency's call for Iran to implement the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement, which would allow for more intrusive inspections of Iranian nuclear sites, and to provide various documents that could shed light on suspicions that the nation has carried out nuclear-weapon activities in the past.

The nuclear standoff with Iran is set to be on the agenda for the next Board of Governors meeting, which begins next month (Barnes, Global Security Newswire).

Speaking for the White House, U.S. National Security Council spokesman Mike Hammer said the "latest IAEA report clearly shows Iran's continued failure to comply with its international obligations and its sustained lack of cooperation with the IAEA."

Tehran's ambassador to the U.N. nuclear watchdog, though, said the report "shows Iran has carried out its commitments regarding the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty and all of Iran's activities, including enrichment, are under the complete supervision of the agency" (see related GSN story, today; Westall, Reuters).

China today urged Iran "further step up cooperation with the IAEA and resolve the pending issues at an early date," Agence France-Presse reported (Agence France-Presse/Google News, June 1).

Meanwhile, Israel intends to dispatch to the Persian Gulf three submarines equipped with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the London Times reported.

“The 1,500-kilometer range of the submarines' cruise missiles can reach any target in Iran,” one navy officer said.

The submarines are expected to serve deter aggression, collect sensitive information and possibly aid in dispatching Israeli intelligence operatives, a flotilla officer said (Uzi Mahnaimi, London Times, May 30).