Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- The United States and Russia should agree to exchange data about their respective tactical nuclear arsenals in Europe as a step toward hastening the process of removing the weapons, a new report urges (see GSN, Oct. 30).

The two former Cold War adversaries have taken unilateral action to reduce these arms stocks on the continent, amid warnings that nuclear weapons as small as torpedoes or gravity bombs are difficult to track and might pose a serious risk of terrorist theft or unauthorized use.

However, there has been no formal arrangement to control or eliminate nonstrategic nuclear weapons since the early 1990s, when Washington and Moscow loosely agreed under the so-called "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives" to take parallel actions to reduce and consolidate most of their European-based stockpiles.

A variety of political and foreign policy obstacles have blocked each side from agreeing to further reduce or end the deployments, according to the report by three analysts at the Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. However, provided with a change in dynamic, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama might have an opportunity to make significant headway, the authors argued.

"Given the longstanding deadlock, new approaches are needed to jump-start serious negotiations," states the report, "Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe."

Co-authors Miles Pomper, William Potter and Nikolai Sokov prepared the analysis for the Finnish Foreign Affairs Ministry, which has supported past efforts to codify the U.S.-Russian reductions process into a legally binding agreement.

Tactical or nonstrategic nuclear weapons typically refer to short-range arms, such as land-based missiles with ranges of less than 300 miles and air- and sea-launched weapons with ranges of less than 400 miles.

Over the years, the United States has reduced its tactical nuclear arms deployments in Europe to 200 or fewer, located at military bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, according to a recent tally by nuclear arms experts Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen. That is down from a Cold War high of more than 7,300 such weapons.

Russia is estimated to have more than 2,000 tactical armaments deployed at numerous sites within its borders, though information about the stockpile is closely held, according to Norris and Kristensen. Moscow had approximately 15,000 of the weapons deployed in Europe in the early 1990s, the analysts said.

As a first step toward eliminating the weapons deployments from Europe, the Monterey Institute report authors suggest the two sides exchange a "transparency package," including "declarations of stockpiles, as well as perhaps, locations of storage facilities."

A next step could be negotiations on bilateral reductions, and the analysts recommend a focus on pulling back the shortest-range weapons first. U.S. and Russian gravity bombs -- along with Russian missile defense warheads and short-range, sea-launched cruise missiles -- "do not have a tangible military mission," particularly now that the Cold War military standoff in Europe between the East and West is over, the report states.

Moscow wants to put limits on NATO's conventional military stance and has argued that changes to the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty must be implemented to address its security concerns. The analysts argue these Russian concerns might offer Washington leverage in demanding action on reducing or eliminating European-based tactical nuclear weapons.

That leverage might prove necessary in overcoming domestic Russian obstacles to pulling back some of the tactical weapons. The Russian naval service, in particular, is reticent to give up its nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles and other such arms "in case it needs to face [the] U.S. Navy," according to a briefing by Sokov, one of the three report authors.

Speaking alongside co-author Pomper during a presentation last Friday at the Finnish Embassy, Sokov said Russian political figures might recognize the military risks of continuing to field these weapons. However, the political perils that could be involved in taking on the Russian navy might make reductions seem unattractive.

As long as Moscow's current leadership remains in place, the prevailing Russian view is that "there is no reason for the government to engage in a politically risky and costly revision of the present stance," Sokov stated.

On the U.S. side, there is pressure to take any such reductions bilaterally, given the huge disparity of tactical nuclear forces compared to the Russians, Pomper said. And, a small number of NATO allies -- most notably Turkey -- have at times raised concerns about a U.S. pull-back.

However, there might be ways to change the current stance, the authors said.

Approaches for spurring Russian tactical nuclear weapon reductions that Washington might embrace could include, according to the report:

-- "A 'grand package' involving an exchange of concerns: action on substrategic nuclear weapons and NATO steps to modify and expedite entry into force of the Conventional Forces in Europe [or];

-- "Unilateral withdrawal of U.S. [tactical nuclear weapons] that remain in Europe. This action would remove the main justification -- whether genuine or politically motivated -- for Russia to refuse to reduce further its own [tactical nuclear weapons]. We anticipate that such a step would increase pressure on Russia to respond positively to initiatives involving both [weapon] reductions and a transparency regime."

A senior U.S. official in July told an audience in Omaha, Neb., that unilateral reductions of the European-based weapons -- done in consultation with Washington's allies -- should be considered as a means of prompting Russia to cut its own tactical arsenal (see GSN, Aug. 5).

Robert Einhorn, the State Department's special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, said officials might consider whether, "as an inducement to Russia to limit or consolidate its tactical weapons, [Washington] should be prepared to reduce or eliminate the relatively small number of U.S. nuclear weapons that remain in Europe."

He added that even though destruction of the tactical weapons might be most desirable, a more feasible objective could be to at least see them removed from forward-deployed locations and consolidated in "secure storage facilities deep within Russia."

How negotiations are carried out is less important than simply starting constructive talks, the three Monterey analysts suggested in their report.

The issue of reductions "could be tackled in a variety of ways and in a variety of fora: as a separate, stand-alone issue, in the context of future [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] negotiations, and in the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] review process," according to the authors.

Washington and Moscow are negotiating a replacement for the START agreement that would cap strategic nuclear warheads to 1,675 or fewer, and limit the delivery vehicles that carry them to between 500 and 1,100.

Meanwhile, state parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty will meet in New York next May to review progress in implementing that accord, which has been interpreted to mandate that Moscow and Washington work toward eliminating both their strategic and tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles.